> From: Roberto Sassu
> Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2021 10:49 AM
> When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the
> inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have
> LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains
> without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it, or
> because the filesystem does not support them.
>
> Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new files,
> as evm_protect_xattr() will return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error if protected
> xattrs exist without security.evm, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected
> xattrs exist or INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN if xattrs are not supported. This would
> limit the usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands
> such as cp or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work.
>
> This patch introduces the evm_hmac_disabled() function to determine whether
> or not it is safe to ignore verification errors, based on the ability of
> EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key is not loaded, and it cannot be
> loaded in the future due to the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag,
> allowing an operation despite the attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not
> make them valid.
>
> Since the post hooks can be executed even when the HMAC key is not loaded,
> this patch also ensures that the EVM_INIT_HMAC initialization flag is set
> before the post hooks call evm_update_evmxattr().
Resending, to ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN when a filesystem does not
support xattrs.
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 782915117175..4206c7e492ae 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -90,6 +90,24 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
> return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification
> + * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key
> + * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the
> + * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite
> the
> + * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid.
> + */
> +static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void)
> +{
> + if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
> + return false;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> @@ -338,6 +356,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *xattr_name,
> if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
>
> + /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
> + if (evm_hmac_disabled())
> + return 0;
> +
> iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
> if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
> return 0;
> @@ -354,6 +376,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *xattr_name,
> -EPERM, 0);
> }
> out:
> + /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
> + if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
> + evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
> + return 0;
> if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
> integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> d_backing_inode(dentry),
> dentry->d_name.name,
> "appraise_metadata",
> @@ -474,6 +500,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *xattr_name,
> if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
> return;
>
> + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
> + return;
> +
> evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
> xattr_value_len);
> }
>
> @@ -497,6 +526,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry
> *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
> return;
>
> + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
> + return;
> +
> evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
> }
>
> @@ -522,7 +554,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct
> iattr *attr)
> return 0;
> evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
> if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
> - (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
> + (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
> + evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)))
> return 0;
> integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> d_backing_inode(dentry),
> dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
> @@ -548,6 +582,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> int ia_valid)
>
> evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
>
> + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
> + return;
> +
> if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
> evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
> }
> --
> 2.25.1