This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.10.28 release.
There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat Jan 25 18:38:43 UTC 2014.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.10.28-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 3.10.28-rc1
Taras Kondratiuk <[email protected]>
ARM: 7938/1: OMAP4/highbank: Flush L2 cache before disabling
Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
drm/i915: Don't grab crtc mutexes in intel_modeset_gem_init()
Jon Medhurst <[email protected]>
serial: amba-pl011: use port lock to guard control register access
Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
mm: Make {,set}page_address() static inline if WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
md/raid5: Fix possible confusion when multiple write errors occur.
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
md/raid10: fix two bugs in handling of known-bad-blocks.
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
md/raid10: fix bug when raid10 recovery fails to recover a block.
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
md: fix problem when adding device to read-only array with bitmap.
Paulo Zanoni <[email protected]>
drm/i915: fix DDI PLLs HW state readout code
Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
nilfs2: fix segctor bug that causes file system corruption
Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
thp: fix copy_page_rep GPF by testing is_huge_zero_pmd once only
Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
ftrace/x86: Load ftrace_ops in parameter not the variable holding it
Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
writeback: Fix data corruption on NFS
Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
hwmon: (coretemp) Fix truncated name of alarm attributes
Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
vfs: In d_path don't call d_dname on a mount point
H Hartley Sweeten <[email protected]>
staging: comedi: adl_pci9111: fix incorrect irq passed to request_irq()
H Hartley Sweeten <[email protected]>
staging: comedi: addi_apci_1032: fix subdevice type/flags bug
Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
mm/memory-failure.c: recheck PageHuge() after hugetlb page migrate successfully
Bob Peterson <[email protected]>
GFS2: Increase i_writecount during gfs2_setattr_chown
Robert Richter <[email protected]>
perf/x86/amd/ibs: Fix waking up from S3 for AMD family 10h
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf scripting perl: Fix build error on Fedora 12
Vijaya Kumar K <[email protected]>
ARM: 7815/1: kexec: offline non panic CPUs on Kdump panic
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-highbank/highbank.c | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap4-common.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_amd_ibs.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ddi.c | 8 +++-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c | 4 +-
drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c | 2 +-
drivers/md/md.c | 18 ++++++--
drivers/md/md.h | 3 ++
drivers/md/raid10.c | 12 ++---
drivers/md/raid5.c | 4 +-
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/addi_apci_1032.c | 4 +-
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/adl_pci9111.c | 2 +-
drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 6 +++
fs/dcache.c | 7 ++-
fs/fs-writeback.c | 15 +++---
fs/gfs2/inode.c | 16 ++++++-
fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 10 ++--
include/linux/mm.h | 13 ++++--
mm/huge_memory.c | 6 +--
mm/memory-failure.c | 14 ++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +-
.../perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-perl.c | 2 +-
27 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
commit a49ecbcd7b0d5a1cda7d60e03df402dd0ef76ac8 upstream.
After a successful hugetlb page migration by soft offline, the source
page will either be freed into hugepage_freelists or buddy(over-commit
page). If page is in buddy, page_hstate(page) will be NULL. It will
hit a NULL pointer dereference in dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page().
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
IP: [<ffffffff81163761>] dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1d0
PGD c23762067 PUD c24be2067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
So check PageHuge(page) after call migrate_pages() successfully.
[wujg: backport to 3.10:
- adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1499,10 +1499,16 @@ static int soft_offline_huge_page(struct
pr_info("soft offline: %#lx: migration failed %d, type %lx\n",
pfn, ret, page->flags);
} else {
- set_page_hwpoison_huge_page(hpage);
- dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page(hpage);
- atomic_long_add(1 << compound_trans_order(hpage),
- &num_poisoned_pages);
+ /* overcommit hugetlb page will be freed to buddy */
+ if (PageHuge(page)) {
+ set_page_hwpoison_huge_page(hpage);
+ dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page(hpage);
+ atomic_long_add(1 << compound_order(hpage),
+ &num_poisoned_pages);
+ } else {
+ SetPageHWPoison(page);
+ atomic_long_inc(&num_poisoned_pages);
+ }
}
/* keep elevated page count for bad page */
return ret;
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
commit 1739f09e33d8f66bf48ddbc3eca615574da6c4f6 upstream.
Function tracing callbacks expect to have the ftrace_ops that registered it
passed to them, not the address of the variable that holds the ftrace_ops
that registered it.
Use a mov instead of a lea to store the ftrace_ops into the parameter
of the function tracing callback.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ ENTRY(ftrace_caller)
pushl $0 /* Pass NULL as regs pointer */
movl 4*4(%esp), %eax
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx
- leal function_trace_op, %ecx
+ movl function_trace_op, %ecx
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
.globl ftrace_call
@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ ENTRY(ftrace_regs_caller)
movl 12*4(%esp), %eax /* Load ip (1st parameter) */
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax /* Adjust ip */
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx /* Load parent ip (2nd parameter) */
- leal function_trace_op, %ecx /* Save ftrace_pos in 3rd parameter */
+ movl function_trace_op, %ecx /* Save ftrace_pos in 3rd parameter */
pushl %esp /* Save pt_regs as 4th parameter */
GLOBAL(ftrace_regs_call)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ END(function_hook)
MCOUNT_SAVE_FRAME \skip
/* Load the ftrace_ops into the 3rd parameter */
- leaq function_trace_op, %rdx
+ movq function_trace_op(%rip), %rdx
/* Load ip into the first parameter */
movq RIP(%rsp), %rdi
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: H Hartley Sweeten <[email protected]>
commit 48108fe3daa0d142f9b97178fdb23704ea3a407b upstream.
The dev->irq passed to request_irq() will always be 0 when the auto_attach
function is called. The pcidev->irq should be used instead to get the correct
irq number.
Signed-off-by: H Hartley Sweeten <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/adl_pci9111.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/adl_pci9111.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/adl_pci9111.c
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ static int pci9111_auto_attach(struct co
pci9111_reset(dev);
if (pcidev->irq > 0) {
- ret = request_irq(dev->irq, pci9111_interrupt,
+ ret = request_irq(pcidev->irq, pci9111_interrupt,
IRQF_SHARED, dev->board_name, dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Taras Kondratiuk <[email protected]>
commit b25f3e1c358434bf850220e04f28eebfc45eb634 upstream.
Kexec disables outer cache before jumping to reboot code, but it doesn't
flush it explicitly. Flush is done implicitly inside of l2x0_disable().
But some SoC's override default .disable handler and don't flush cache.
This may lead to a corrupted memory during Kexec reboot on these
platforms.
This patch adds cache flush inside of OMAP4 and Highbank outer_cache.disable()
handlers to make it consistent with default l2x0_disable().
Acked-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Taras Kondratiuk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/mach-highbank/highbank.c | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap4-common.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm/mach-highbank/highbank.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-highbank/highbank.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ void highbank_set_cpu_jump(int cpu, void
#ifdef CONFIG_CACHE_L2X0
static void highbank_l2x0_disable(void)
{
+ outer_flush_all();
/* Disable PL310 L2 Cache controller */
highbank_smc1(0x102, 0x0);
}
--- a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap4-common.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap4-common.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ void __iomem *omap4_get_l2cache_base(voi
static void omap4_l2x0_disable(void)
{
+ outer_flush_all();
/* Disable PL310 L2 Cache controller */
omap_smc1(0x102, 0x0);
}
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jon Medhurst <[email protected]>
commit fe43390702a1b5741fdf217063b05c7612b38303 upstream.
When the pl011 is being used for a console, pl011_console_write forces
the control register (CR) to enable the UART for transmission and then
restores this to the original value afterwards. It does this while
holding the port lock.
Unfortunately, when the uart is started or shutdown - say in response to
userland using the serial device for a terminal - then this updates the
control register without any locking.
This means we can have
pl011_console_write Save CR
pl011_startup Initialise CR, e.g. enable receive
pl011_console_write Restore old CR with receive not enabled
this result is a serial port which doesn't respond to any input.
A similar race in reverse could happen when the device is shutdown.
We can fix these problems by taking the port lock when updating CR.
Signed-off-by: Jon Medhurst <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c
@@ -1543,6 +1543,8 @@ static int pl011_startup(struct uart_por
/*
* Provoke TX FIFO interrupt into asserting.
*/
+ spin_lock_irq(&uap->port.lock);
+
cr = UART01x_CR_UARTEN | UART011_CR_TXE | UART011_CR_LBE;
writew(cr, uap->port.membase + UART011_CR);
writew(0, uap->port.membase + UART011_FBRD);
@@ -1567,6 +1569,8 @@ static int pl011_startup(struct uart_por
cr |= UART01x_CR_UARTEN | UART011_CR_RXE | UART011_CR_TXE;
writew(cr, uap->port.membase + UART011_CR);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&uap->port.lock);
+
/*
* initialise the old status of the modem signals
*/
@@ -1636,11 +1640,13 @@ static void pl011_shutdown(struct uart_p
* it during startup().
*/
uap->autorts = false;
+ spin_lock_irq(&uap->port.lock);
cr = readw(uap->port.membase + UART011_CR);
uap->old_cr = cr;
cr &= UART011_CR_RTS | UART011_CR_DTR;
cr |= UART01x_CR_UARTEN | UART011_CR_TXE;
writew(cr, uap->port.membase + UART011_CR);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&uap->port.lock);
/*
* disable break condition and fifos
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
commit f92f455f67fef27929e6043499414605b0c94872 upstream.
{,set}page_address() are macros if WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL. If
!WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL, they're plain C functions.
If someone calls them with a void *, this pointer is auto-converted to
struct page * if !WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL, but causes a build failure on
architectures using WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL (arc, m68k and sparc64):
drivers/md/bcache/bset.c: In function `__btree_sort':
drivers/md/bcache/bset.c:1190: warning: dereferencing `void *' pointer
drivers/md/bcache/bset.c:1190: error: request for member `virtual' in something not a structure or union
Convert them to static inline functions to fix this. There are already
plenty of users of struct page members inside <linux/mm.h>, so there's
no reason to keep them as macros.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Tested-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/mm.h | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -766,11 +766,14 @@ static __always_inline void *lowmem_page
#endif
#if defined(WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL)
-#define page_address(page) ((page)->virtual)
-#define set_page_address(page, address) \
- do { \
- (page)->virtual = (address); \
- } while(0)
+static inline void *page_address(const struct page *page)
+{
+ return page->virtual;
+}
+static inline void set_page_address(struct page *page, void *address)
+{
+ page->virtual = address;
+}
#define page_address_init() do { } while(0)
#endif
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit 1cc03eb93245e63b0b7a7832165efdc52e25b4e6 upstream.
commit 5d8c71f9e5fbdd95650be00294d238e27a363b5c
md: raid5 crash during degradation
Fixed a crash in an overly simplistic way which could leave
R5_WriteError or R5_MadeGood set in the stripe cache for devices
for which it is no longer relevant.
When those devices are removed and spares added the flags are still
set and can cause incorrect behaviour.
commit 14a75d3e07c784c004b4b44b34af996b8e4ac453
md/raid5: preferentially read from replacement device if possible.
Fixed the same bug if a more effective way, so we can now revert
the original commit.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Lyakas <[email protected]>
Fixes: 5d8c71f9e5fbdd95650be00294d238e27a363b5c
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/raid5.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
@@ -3391,7 +3391,7 @@ static void analyse_stripe(struct stripe
*/
set_bit(R5_Insync, &dev->flags);
- if (rdev && test_bit(R5_WriteError, &dev->flags)) {
+ if (test_bit(R5_WriteError, &dev->flags)) {
/* This flag does not apply to '.replacement'
* only to .rdev, so make sure to check that*/
struct md_rdev *rdev2 = rcu_dereference(
@@ -3404,7 +3404,7 @@ static void analyse_stripe(struct stripe
} else
clear_bit(R5_WriteError, &dev->flags);
}
- if (rdev && test_bit(R5_MadeGood, &dev->flags)) {
+ if (test_bit(R5_MadeGood, &dev->flags)) {
/* This flag does not apply to '.replacement'
* only to .rdev, so make sure to check that*/
struct md_rdev *rdev2 = rcu_dereference(
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Robert Richter <[email protected]>
commit bee09ed91cacdbffdbcd3b05de8409c77ec9fcd6 upstream.
On AMD family 10h we see following error messages while waking up from
S3 for all non-boot CPUs leading to a failed IBS initialization:
Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x1
[Firmware Bug]: cpu 1, try to use APIC500 (LVT offset 0) for vector 0x400, but the register is already in use for vector 0xf9 on another cpu
perf: IBS APIC setup failed on cpu #1
process: Switch to broadcast mode on CPU1
CPU1 is up
...
ACPI: Waking up from system sleep state S3
Reason for this is that during suspend the LVT offset for the IBS
vector gets lost and needs to be reinialized while resuming.
The offset is read from the IBSCTL msr. On family 10h the offset needs
to be 1 as offset 0 is used for the MCE threshold interrupt, but
firmware assings it for IBS to 0 too. The kernel needs to reprogram
the vector. The msr is a readonly node msr, but a new value can be
written via pci config space access. The reinitialization is
implemented for family 10h in setup_ibs_ctl() which is forced during
IBS setup.
This patch fixes IBS setup after waking up from S3 by adding
resume/supend hooks for the boot cpu which does the offset
reinitialization.
Marking it as stable to let distros pick up this fix.
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_amd_ibs.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_amd_ibs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_amd_ibs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -816,6 +817,18 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+static void ibs_eilvt_setup(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Force LVT offset assignment for family 10h: The offsets are
+ * not assigned by the BIOS for this family, so the OS is
+ * responsible for doing it. If the OS assignment fails, fall
+ * back to BIOS settings and try to setup this.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10)
+ force_ibs_eilvt_setup();
+}
+
static inline int get_ibs_lvt_offset(void)
{
u64 val;
@@ -851,6 +864,36 @@ static void clear_APIC_ibs(void *dummy)
setup_APIC_eilvt(offset, 0, APIC_EILVT_MSG_FIX, 1);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM
+
+static int perf_ibs_suspend(void)
+{
+ clear_APIC_ibs(NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void perf_ibs_resume(void)
+{
+ ibs_eilvt_setup();
+ setup_APIC_ibs(NULL);
+}
+
+static struct syscore_ops perf_ibs_syscore_ops = {
+ .resume = perf_ibs_resume,
+ .suspend = perf_ibs_suspend,
+};
+
+static void perf_ibs_pm_init(void)
+{
+ register_syscore_ops(&perf_ibs_syscore_ops);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline void perf_ibs_pm_init(void) { }
+
+#endif
+
static int __cpuinit
perf_ibs_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
@@ -877,18 +920,12 @@ static __init int amd_ibs_init(void)
if (!caps)
return -ENODEV; /* ibs not supported by the cpu */
- /*
- * Force LVT offset assignment for family 10h: The offsets are
- * not assigned by the BIOS for this family, so the OS is
- * responsible for doing it. If the OS assignment fails, fall
- * back to BIOS settings and try to setup this.
- */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10)
- force_ibs_eilvt_setup();
+ ibs_eilvt_setup();
if (!ibs_eilvt_valid())
goto out;
+ perf_ibs_pm_init();
get_online_cpus();
ibs_caps = caps;
/* make ibs_caps visible to other cpus: */
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit b50c259e25d9260b9108dc0c2964c26e5ecbe1c1 upstream.
If we discover a bad block when reading we split the request and
potentially read some of it from a different device.
The code path of this has two bugs in RAID10.
1/ we get a spin_lock with _irq, but unlock without _irq!!
2/ The calculation of 'sectors_handled' is wrong, as can be clearly
seen by comparison with raid1.c
This leads to at least 2 warnings and a probable crash is a RAID10
ever had known bad blocks.
Fixes: 856e08e23762dfb92ffc68fd0a8d228f9e152160
Reported-by: Damian Nowak <[email protected]>
URL: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68181
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/raid10.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/raid10.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ read_again:
/* Could not read all from this device, so we will
* need another r10_bio.
*/
- sectors_handled = (r10_bio->sectors + max_sectors
+ sectors_handled = (r10_bio->sector + max_sectors
- bio->bi_sector);
r10_bio->sectors = max_sectors;
spin_lock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ read_again:
bio->bi_phys_segments = 2;
else
bio->bi_phys_segments++;
- spin_unlock(&conf->device_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
/* Cannot call generic_make_request directly
* as that will be queued in __generic_make_request
* and subsequent mempool_alloc might block
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit e8b849158508565e0cd6bc80061124afc5879160 upstream.
commit e875ecea266a543e643b19e44cf472f1412708f9
md/raid10 record bad blocks as needed during recovery.
added code to the "cannot recover this block" path to record a bad
block rather than fail the whole recovery.
Unfortunately this new case was placed *after* r10bio was freed rather
than *before*, yet it still uses r10bio.
This is will crash with a null dereference.
So move the freeing of r10bio down where it is safe.
Fixes: e875ecea266a543e643b19e44cf472f1412708f9
Reported-by: Damian Nowak <[email protected]>
URL: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68181
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/raid10.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/raid10.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c
@@ -3198,10 +3198,6 @@ static sector_t sync_request(struct mdde
if (j == conf->copies) {
/* Cannot recover, so abort the recovery or
* record a bad block */
- put_buf(r10_bio);
- if (rb2)
- atomic_dec(&rb2->remaining);
- r10_bio = rb2;
if (any_working) {
/* problem is that there are bad blocks
* on other device(s)
@@ -3233,6 +3229,10 @@ static sector_t sync_request(struct mdde
mirror->recovery_disabled
= mddev->recovery_disabled;
}
+ put_buf(r10_bio);
+ if (rb2)
+ atomic_dec(&rb2->remaining);
+ r10_bio = rb2;
break;
}
}
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit 8313b8e57f55b15e5b7f7fc5d1630bbf686a9a97 upstream.
If an array is started degraded, and then the missing device
is found it can be re-added and a minimal bitmap-based recovery
will bring it fully up-to-date.
If the array is read-only a recovery would not be allowed.
But also if the array is read-only and the missing device was
present very recently, then there could be no need for any
recovery at all, so we simply include the device in the read-only
array without any recovery.
However... if the missing device was removed a little longer ago
it could be missing some updates, but if a bitmap is present it will
be conditionally accepted pending a bitmap-based update. We don't
currently detect this case properly and will include that old
device into the read-only array with no recovery even though it really
needs a recovery.
This patch keeps track of whether a bitmap-based-recovery is really
needed or not in the new Bitmap_sync rdev flag. If that is set,
then the device will not be added to a read-only array.
Cc: Andrei Warkentin <[email protected]>
Fixes: d70ed2e4fafdbef0800e73942482bb075c21578b
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/md.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
drivers/md/md.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/md.c
+++ b/drivers/md/md.c
@@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ static int super_90_validate(struct mdde
rdev->raid_disk = -1;
clear_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
+ clear_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(WriteMostly, &rdev->flags);
if (mddev->raid_disks == 0) {
@@ -1196,6 +1197,8 @@ static int super_90_validate(struct mdde
*/
if (ev1 < mddev->bitmap->events_cleared)
return 0;
+ if (ev1 < mddev->events)
+ set_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
} else {
if (ev1 < mddev->events)
/* just a hot-add of a new device, leave raid_disk at -1 */
@@ -1604,6 +1607,7 @@ static int super_1_validate(struct mddev
rdev->raid_disk = -1;
clear_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
+ clear_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(WriteMostly, &rdev->flags);
if (mddev->raid_disks == 0) {
@@ -1686,6 +1690,8 @@ static int super_1_validate(struct mddev
*/
if (ev1 < mddev->bitmap->events_cleared)
return 0;
+ if (ev1 < mddev->events)
+ set_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
} else {
if (ev1 < mddev->events)
/* just a hot-add of a new device, leave raid_disk at -1 */
@@ -2829,6 +2835,7 @@ slot_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const c
else
rdev->saved_raid_disk = -1;
clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
+ clear_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
err = rdev->mddev->pers->
hot_add_disk(rdev->mddev, rdev);
if (err) {
@@ -5761,6 +5768,7 @@ static int add_new_disk(struct mddev * m
info->raid_disk < mddev->raid_disks) {
rdev->raid_disk = info->raid_disk;
set_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
+ clear_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
} else
rdev->raid_disk = -1;
} else
@@ -7694,7 +7702,8 @@ static int remove_and_add_spares(struct
if (test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags))
continue;
if (mddev->ro &&
- rdev->saved_raid_disk < 0)
+ ! (rdev->saved_raid_disk >= 0 &&
+ !test_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags)))
continue;
rdev->recovery_offset = 0;
@@ -7775,9 +7784,12 @@ void md_check_recovery(struct mddev *mdd
* As we only add devices that are already in-sync,
* we can activate the spares immediately.
*/
- clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
remove_and_add_spares(mddev, NULL);
- mddev->pers->spare_active(mddev);
+ /* There is no thread, but we need to call
+ * ->spare_active and clear saved_raid_disk
+ */
+ md_reap_sync_thread(mddev);
+ clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
goto unlock;
}
--- a/drivers/md/md.h
+++ b/drivers/md/md.h
@@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ struct md_rdev {
enum flag_bits {
Faulty, /* device is known to have a fault */
In_sync, /* device is in_sync with rest of array */
+ Bitmap_sync, /* ..actually, not quite In_sync. Need a
+ * bitmap-based recovery to get fully in sync
+ */
Unmerged, /* device is being added to array and should
* be considerred for bvec_merge_fn but not
* yet for actual IO
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bob Peterson <[email protected]>
commit 62e96cf81988101fe9e086b2877307b6adda5197 upstream.
This patch calls get_write_access in function gfs2_setattr_chown,
which merely increases inode->i_writecount for the duration of the
function. That will ensure that any file closes won't delete the
inode's multi-block reservation while the function is running.
It also ensures that a multi-block reservation exists when needed
for quota change operations during the chown.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/gfs2/inode.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/gfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/inode.c
@@ -1536,10 +1536,22 @@ static int setattr_chown(struct inode *i
if (!(attr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID) || gid_eq(ogid, ngid))
ogid = ngid = NO_GID_QUOTA_CHANGE;
- error = gfs2_quota_lock(ip, nuid, ngid);
+ error = get_write_access(inode);
if (error)
return error;
+ error = gfs2_rs_alloc(ip);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
+ error = gfs2_rindex_update(sdp);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
+ error = gfs2_quota_lock(ip, nuid, ngid);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
if (!uid_eq(ouid, NO_UID_QUOTA_CHANGE) ||
!gid_eq(ogid, NO_GID_QUOTA_CHANGE)) {
error = gfs2_quota_check(ip, nuid, ngid);
@@ -1566,6 +1578,8 @@ out_end_trans:
gfs2_trans_end(sdp);
out_gunlock_q:
gfs2_quota_unlock(ip);
+out:
+ put_write_access(inode);
return error;
}
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paulo Zanoni <[email protected]>
commit 0882dae983707455e97479e5e904e37673517ebc upstream.
Properly zero the refcounts and crtc->ddi_pll_set so the previous HW
state doesn't affect the result of reading the current HW state.
This fixes WARNs about WRPLL refcount if we have an HDMI monitor on
HSW and then suspend/resume.
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64379
Tested-by: Qingshuai Tian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Zanoni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ddi.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ddi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ddi.c
@@ -1193,12 +1193,18 @@ void intel_ddi_setup_hw_pll_state(struct
enum pipe pipe;
struct intel_crtc *intel_crtc;
+ dev_priv->ddi_plls.spll_refcount = 0;
+ dev_priv->ddi_plls.wrpll1_refcount = 0;
+ dev_priv->ddi_plls.wrpll2_refcount = 0;
+
for_each_pipe(pipe) {
intel_crtc =
to_intel_crtc(dev_priv->pipe_to_crtc_mapping[pipe]);
- if (!intel_crtc->active)
+ if (!intel_crtc->active) {
+ intel_crtc->ddi_pll_sel = PORT_CLK_SEL_NONE;
continue;
+ }
intel_crtc->ddi_pll_sel = intel_ddi_get_crtc_pll(dev_priv,
pipe);
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
commit 70f2fe3a26248724d8a5019681a869abdaf3e89a upstream.
There is a bug in the function nilfs_segctor_collect, which results in
active data being written to a segment, that is marked as clean. It is
possible, that this segment is selected for a later segment
construction, whereby the old data is overwritten.
The problem shows itself with the following kernel log message:
nilfs_sufile_do_cancel_free: segment 6533 must be clean
Usually a few hours later the file system gets corrupted:
NILFS: bad btree node (blocknr=8748107): level = 0, flags = 0x0, nchildren = 0
NILFS error (device sdc1): nilfs_bmap_last_key: broken bmap (inode number=114660)
The issue can be reproduced with a file system that is nearly full and
with the cleaner running, while some IO intensive task is running.
Although it is quite hard to reproduce.
This is what happens:
1. The cleaner starts the segment construction
2. nilfs_segctor_collect is called
3. sc_stage is on NILFS_ST_SUFILE and segments are freed
4. sc_stage is on NILFS_ST_DAT current segment is full
5. nilfs_segctor_extend_segments is called, which
allocates a new segment
6. The new segment is one of the segments freed in step 3
7. nilfs_sufile_cancel_freev is called and produces an error message
8. Loop around and the collection starts again
9. sc_stage is on NILFS_ST_SUFILE and segments are freed
including the newly allocated segment, which will contain active
data and can be allocated at a later time
10. A few hours later another segment construction allocates the
segment and causes file system corruption
This can be prevented by simply reordering the statements. If
nilfs_sufile_cancel_freev is called before nilfs_segctor_extend_segments
the freed segments are marked as dirty and cannot be allocated any more.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
@@ -1440,17 +1440,19 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_collect(struct
nilfs_clear_logs(&sci->sc_segbufs);
- err = nilfs_segctor_extend_segments(sci, nilfs, nadd);
- if (unlikely(err))
- return err;
-
if (sci->sc_stage.flags & NILFS_CF_SUFREED) {
err = nilfs_sufile_cancel_freev(nilfs->ns_sufile,
sci->sc_freesegs,
sci->sc_nfreesegs,
NULL);
WARN_ON(err); /* do not happen */
+ sci->sc_stage.flags &= ~NILFS_CF_SUFREED;
}
+
+ err = nilfs_segctor_extend_segments(sci, nilfs, nadd);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
+
nadd = min_t(int, nadd << 1, SC_MAX_SEGDELTA);
sci->sc_stage = prev_stage;
}
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
commit eecc1e426d681351a6026a7d3e7d225f38955b6c upstream.
We see General Protection Fault on RSI in copy_page_rep: that RSI is
what you get from a NULL struct page pointer.
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81154955>] [<ffffffff81154955>] copy_page_rep+0x5/0x10
RSP: 0000:ffff880136e15c00 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff880000000000 RBX: ffff880136e14000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: 6db6db6db6db6db7 RSI: db73880000000000 RDI: ffff880dd0c00000
RBP: ffff880136e15c18 R08: 0000000000000200 R09: 000000000005987c
R10: 000000000005987c R11: 0000000000000200 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffea00305aa000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f195752f700(0000) GS:ffff880c7fc20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000093010000 CR3: 00000001458e1000 CR4: 00000000000027e0
Call Trace:
copy_user_huge_page+0x93/0xab
do_huge_pmd_wp_page+0x710/0x815
handle_mm_fault+0x15d8/0x1d70
__do_page_fault+0x14d/0x840
do_page_fault+0x2f/0x90
page_fault+0x22/0x30
do_huge_pmd_wp_page() tests is_huge_zero_pmd(orig_pmd) four times: but
since shrink_huge_zero_page() can free the huge_zero_page, and we have
no hold of our own on it here (except where the fourth test holds
page_table_lock and has checked pmd_same), it's possible for it to
answer yes the first time, but no to the second or third test. Change
all those last three to tests for NULL page.
(Note: this is not the same issue as trinity's DEBUG_PAGEALLOC BUG
in copy_page_rep with RSI: ffff88009c422000, reported by Sasha Levin
in https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/29/103. I believe that one is due
to the source page being split, and a tail page freed, while copy
is in progress; and not a problem without DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, since
the pmd_same check will prevent a miscopy from being made visible.)
Fixes: 97ae17497e99 ("thp: implement refcounting for huge zero page")
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/huge_memory.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ alloc:
if (unlikely(!new_page)) {
count_vm_event(THP_FAULT_FALLBACK);
- if (is_huge_zero_pmd(orig_pmd)) {
+ if (!page) {
ret = do_huge_pmd_wp_zero_page_fallback(mm, vma,
address, pmd, orig_pmd, haddr);
} else {
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ alloc:
goto out;
}
- if (is_huge_zero_pmd(orig_pmd))
+ if (!page)
clear_huge_page(new_page, haddr, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
else
copy_user_huge_page(new_page, page, haddr, vma, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ alloc:
page_add_new_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, haddr);
set_pmd_at(mm, haddr, pmd, entry);
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, address, pmd);
- if (is_huge_zero_pmd(orig_pmd)) {
+ if (!page) {
add_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
put_huge_zero_page();
} else {
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
commit 3f9aec7610b39521c7c69d754de7265f6994c194 upstream.
When the core number exceeds 9, the size of the buffer storing the
alarm attribute name is insufficient and the attribute name is
truncated. This causes libsensors to skip these attributes as the
truncated name is not recognized.
Reported-by: Andreas Hollmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(tjmax, "TjMax value in
#define BASE_SYSFS_ATTR_NO 2 /* Sysfs Base attr no for coretemp */
#define NUM_REAL_CORES 32 /* Number of Real cores per cpu */
-#define CORETEMP_NAME_LENGTH 17 /* String Length of attrs */
+#define CORETEMP_NAME_LENGTH 19 /* String Length of attrs */
#define MAX_CORE_ATTRS 4 /* Maximum no of basic attrs */
#define TOTAL_ATTRS (MAX_CORE_ATTRS + 1)
#define MAX_CORE_DATA (NUM_REAL_CORES + BASE_SYSFS_ATTR_NO)
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: H Hartley Sweeten <[email protected]>
commit 90daf69a7a3f1d1a41018c799968a0bb896d65e0 upstream.
The SDF_CMD_READ should be one of the s->subdev_flags not part of
the s->type.
Signed-off-by: H Hartley Sweeten <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/addi_apci_1032.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/addi_apci_1032.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/addi_apci_1032.c
@@ -332,8 +332,8 @@ static int apci1032_auto_attach(struct c
s = &dev->subdevices[1];
if (dev->irq) {
dev->read_subdev = s;
- s->type = COMEDI_SUBD_DI | SDF_CMD_READ;
- s->subdev_flags = SDF_READABLE;
+ s->type = COMEDI_SUBD_DI;
+ s->subdev_flags = SDF_READABLE | SDF_CMD_READ;
s->n_chan = 1;
s->maxdata = 1;
s->range_table = &range_digital;
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
commit f48cfddc6729ef133933062320039808bafa6f45 upstream.
Aditya Kali ([email protected]) wrote:
> Commit bf056bfa80596a5d14b26b17276a56a0dcb080e5:
> "proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks." converted
> the namespace files into symlinks. The same commit changed
> the way namespace bind mounts appear in /proc/mounts:
> $ mount --bind /proc/self/ns/ipc /mnt/ipc
> Originally:
> $ cat /proc/mounts | grep ipc
> proc /mnt/ipc proc rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec 0 0
>
> After commit bf056bfa80596a5d14b26b17276a56a0dcb080e5:
> $ cat /proc/mounts | grep ipc
> proc ipc:[4026531839] proc rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec 0 0
>
> This breaks userspace which expects the 2nd field in
> /proc/mounts to be a valid path.
The symlink /proc/<pid>/ns/{ipc,mnt,net,pid,user,uts} point to
dentries allocated with d_alloc_pseudo that we can mount, and
that have interesting names printed out with d_dname.
When these files are bind mounted /proc/mounts is not currently
displaying the mount point correctly because d_dname is called instead
of just displaying the path where the file is mounted.
Solve this by adding an explicit check to distinguish mounted pseudo
inodes and unmounted pseudo inodes. Unmounted pseudo inodes always
use mount of their filesstem as the mnt_root in their path making
these two cases easy to distinguish.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Aditya Kali <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/dcache.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -2686,8 +2686,13 @@ char *d_path(const struct path *path, ch
* thus don't need to be hashed. They also don't need a name until a
* user wants to identify the object in /proc/pid/fd/. The little hack
* below allows us to generate a name for these objects on demand:
+ *
+ * Some pseudo inodes are mountable. When they are mounted
+ * path->dentry == path->mnt->mnt_root. In that case don't call d_dname
+ * and instead have d_path return the mounted path.
*/
- if (path->dentry->d_op && path->dentry->d_op->d_dname)
+ if (path->dentry->d_op && path->dentry->d_op->d_dname &&
+ (!IS_ROOT(path->dentry) || path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root))
return path->dentry->d_op->d_dname(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vijaya Kumar K <[email protected]>
commit 4f9b4fb7a2091eec339413a460b1665758401828 upstream.
In case of normal kexec kernel load, all cpu's are offlined
before calling machine_kexec().But in case crash panic cpus
are relaxed in machine_crash_nonpanic_core() SMP function
but not offlined.
When crash kernel is loaded with kexec and on panic trigger
machine_kexec() checks for number of cpus online.
If more than one cpu is online machine_kexec() fails to load
with below error
kexec: error: multiple CPUs still online
In machine_crash_nonpanic_core() SMP function, offline CPU
before cpu_relax
Signed-off-by: Vijaya Kumar K <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Warren <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: l00221744 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void machine_crash_nonpanic_core(void *u
crash_save_cpu(®s, smp_processor_id());
flush_cache_all();
+ set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
while (1)
cpu_relax();
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream.
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Call Trace:
security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
__inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
inode_permission+0x18/0x50
link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
CR2: 0000000000000020
Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.
in selinux_inode_permission():
isec = inode->i_security;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not
sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.
What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().
The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).
Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct i
return 0;
}
+static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
+ kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+}
+
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -229,8 +237,16 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct i
list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
- inode->i_security = NULL;
- kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+ /*
+ * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+ * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
+ * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+ * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+ * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+ * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+ * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+ */
+ call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
}
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ struct task_security_struct {
struct inode_security_struct {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
- struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
+ union {
+ struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
+ struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
+ };
u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit f9b0e058cbd04ada76b13afffa7e1df830543c24 upstream.
Commit 4f8ad655dbc8 "writeback: Refactor writeback_single_inode()" added
a condition to skip clean inode. However this is wrong in WB_SYNC_ALL
mode because there we also want to wait for outstanding writeback on
possibly clean inode. This was causing occasional data corruption issues
on NFS because it uses sync_inode() to make sure all outstanding writes
are flushed to the server before truncating the inode and with
sync_inode() returning prematurely file was sometimes extended back
by an outstanding write after it was truncated.
So modify the test to also check for pages under writeback in
WB_SYNC_ALL mode.
Fixes: 4f8ad655dbc82cf05d2edc11e66b78a42d38bf93
Reported-and-tested-by: Dan Duval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/fs-writeback.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fs-writeback.c
+++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c
@@ -505,13 +505,16 @@ writeback_single_inode(struct inode *ino
}
WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_SYNC);
/*
- * Skip inode if it is clean. We don't want to mess with writeback
- * lists in this function since flusher thread may be doing for example
- * sync in parallel and if we move the inode, it could get skipped. So
- * here we make sure inode is on some writeback list and leave it there
- * unless we have completely cleaned the inode.
+ * Skip inode if it is clean and we have no outstanding writeback in
+ * WB_SYNC_ALL mode. We don't want to mess with writeback lists in this
+ * function since flusher thread may be doing for example sync in
+ * parallel and if we move the inode, it could get skipped. So here we
+ * make sure inode is on some writeback list and leave it there unless
+ * we have completely cleaned the inode.
*/
- if (!(inode->i_state & I_DIRTY))
+ if (!(inode->i_state & I_DIRTY) &&
+ (wbc->sync_mode != WB_SYNC_ALL ||
+ !mapping_tagged(inode->i_mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_WRITEBACK)))
goto out;
inode->i_state |= I_SYNC;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 10:39:33AM -0800, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.10.28 release.
> There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 25 18:38:43 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results are as expected:
total: 126 pass: 121 skipped: 4 fail: 1
The failing build is avr32:atngw100mkii_evklcd101_defconfig.
qemu tests were all successful.
Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.
Thanks,
Guenter
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 03:35:45PM -0800, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 10:39:33AM -0800, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.10.28 release.
> > There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sat Jan 25 18:38:43 UTC 2014.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> Build results are as expected:
> total: 126 pass: 121 skipped: 4 fail: 1
>
> The failing build is avr32:atngw100mkii_evklcd101_defconfig.
That means we fixed the previous build errors, which is good to know. I
guess no one cares about avr32 for this kernel release, which is fine.
thanks,
greg k-h
On 01/23/2014 11:39 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.10.28 release.
> There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 25 18:38:43 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.10.28-rc1.gz
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Patch testing - passed
Compile testing - passed
Boot testing - passed
dmesg regression testing - passed - no regressions in emerg, crit,
alert, err are clean. No regressions in warn.
-- Shuah
--
Shuah Khan
Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
[email protected] | (970) 672-0658
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 08:18:41AM -0700, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On 01/23/2014 11:39 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.10.28 release.
> >There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> >to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> >let me know.
> >
> >Responses should be made by Sat Jan 25 18:38:43 UTC 2014.
> >Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> >The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.10.28-rc1.gz
> >and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> >thanks,
> >
> >greg k-h
> >
>
> Patch testing - passed
> Compile testing - passed
> Boot testing - passed
> dmesg regression testing - passed - no regressions in emerg, crit, alert,
> err are clean. No regressions in warn.
Thanks for testing both of these and letting me know.
greg k-h
At Thu, 23 Jan 2014 10:39:33 -0800,
Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.10.28 release.
> There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 25 18:38:43 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
I reviewed the following patches and they look good to me.
> Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
> mm: Make {,set}page_address() static inline if WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL
...
> Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
> vfs: In d_path don't call d_dname on a mount point
> Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
> mm/memory-failure.c: recheck PageHuge() after hugetlb page migrate successfully
This kernel also passed my test.
- Test Cases:
- Build this kernel.
- Boot this kernel.
- Build the latest mainline kernel with this kernel.
- Test Tool:
https://github.com/satoru-takeuchi/test-linux-stable
- Test Result (kernel .config, ktest config and test log):
http://satoru-takeuchi.org/test-linux-stable/results/<version>-<test datetime>.xz
- Build Environment:
- OS: Debian Jessy x86_64
- CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz x 4
- memory: 8GB
- Test Target Environment:
- Debian Jessy x86_64 (KVM guest on the Build Environment)
- # of vCPU: 2
- memory: 2GB
Thanks,
Satoru