From: Dmitry Popov <[email protected]>
tcp_parse_md5sig_option doesn't check md5sig option (TCPOPT_MD5SIG)
length, but tcp_v[46]_inbound_md5_hash assume that it's at least 16
bytes long.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 3c426cb..e663b78 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -3930,7 +3930,7 @@ u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(struct tcphdr *th)
if (opsize < 2 || opsize > length)
return NULL;
if (opcode == TCPOPT_MD5SIG)
- return ptr;
+ return opsize == TCPOLEN_MD5SIG ? ptr : NULL;
}
ptr += opsize - 2;
length -= opsize;
From: Dmitry Popov <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 2010 23:17:52 +0400
> From: Dmitry Popov <[email protected]>
>
> tcp_parse_md5sig_option doesn't check md5sig option (TCPOPT_MD5SIG)
> length, but tcp_v[46]_inbound_md5_hash assume that it's at least 16
> bytes long.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov <[email protected]>
I'll apply this, but the memcmp() we do against this pointer is always
safe because there's at least skb_shared_info()'s worth of valid
memory past skb->data guarenteed at all times which is much larger
than 16 bytes.
So at worst we'd access garbage, but never past a valid piece of
allocated memory.
Thanks.