From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
KASAN's quarantine might save its metadata inside freed objects. As
this happens after the memory is zeroed by the slab allocator when
init_on_free is enabled, the memory coming out of quarantine is not
properly zeroed.
This causes lib/test_meminit.c tests to fail with Generic KASAN.
Zero the metadata when the object is removed from quarantine.
Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
---
mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
index 587da8995f2d..2e50869fd8e2 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
@@ -132,11 +132,22 @@ static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
{
void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
+ struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
unsigned long flags;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
local_irq_save(flags);
+ /*
+ * If init_on_free is enabled and KASAN's free metadata is stored in
+ * the object, zero the metadata. Otherwise, the object's memory will
+ * not be properly zeroed, as KASAN saves the metadata after the slab
+ * allocator zeroes the object.
+ */
+ if (slab_want_init_on_free(cache) &&
+ cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == 0)
+ memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta));
+
/*
* As the object now gets freed from the quarantine, assume that its
* free track is no longer valid.
--
2.25.1
On Mon, 20 Dec 2021 at 17:37, <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
>
> KASAN's quarantine might save its metadata inside freed objects. As
> this happens after the memory is zeroed by the slab allocator when
> init_on_free is enabled, the memory coming out of quarantine is not
> properly zeroed.
>
> This causes lib/test_meminit.c tests to fail with Generic KASAN.
>
> Zero the metadata when the object is removed from quarantine.
>
> Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
> ---
> mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> index 587da8995f2d..2e50869fd8e2 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> @@ -132,11 +132,22 @@ static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> {
> void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
> + struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
> unsigned long flags;
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
> local_irq_save(flags);
>
> + /*
> + * If init_on_free is enabled and KASAN's free metadata is stored in
> + * the object, zero the metadata. Otherwise, the object's memory will
> + * not be properly zeroed, as KASAN saves the metadata after the slab
> + * allocator zeroes the object.
> + */
> + if (slab_want_init_on_free(cache) &&
> + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == 0)
> + memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta));
memzero_explicit()
although in this case it probably doesn't matter much, because AFAIK
memzero_explicit() only exists to prevent the compiler from eliding
the zeroing. Up to you.
> +
> /*
> * As the object now gets freed from the quarantine, assume that its
> * free track is no longer valid.
> --
> 2.25.1
>
On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 6:07 PM Marco Elver <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 20 Dec 2021 at 17:37, <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
> >
> > KASAN's quarantine might save its metadata inside freed objects. As
> > this happens after the memory is zeroed by the slab allocator when
> > init_on_free is enabled, the memory coming out of quarantine is not
> > properly zeroed.
> >
> > This causes lib/test_meminit.c tests to fail with Generic KASAN.
> >
> > Zero the metadata when the object is removed from quarantine.
> >
> > Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
> > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> > index 587da8995f2d..2e50869fd8e2 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> > @@ -132,11 +132,22 @@ static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> > static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> > {
> > void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
> > + struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
> > unsigned long flags;
> >
> > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
> > local_irq_save(flags);
> >
> > + /*
> > + * If init_on_free is enabled and KASAN's free metadata is stored in
> > + * the object, zero the metadata. Otherwise, the object's memory will
> > + * not be properly zeroed, as KASAN saves the metadata after the slab
> > + * allocator zeroes the object.
> > + */
> > + if (slab_want_init_on_free(cache) &&
> > + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == 0)
> > + memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta));
>
> memzero_explicit()
>
> although in this case it probably doesn't matter much, because AFAIK
> memzero_explicit() only exists to prevent the compiler from eliding
> the zeroing. Up to you.
I've thought about using memzero_explicit(), but the rest of
init_on_alloc/free code uses memset(0) so I decided to use it as well.
If we decide to switch to memzero_explicit(), it makes sense to do it
everywhere.
Thanks!
On Mon, 20 Dec 2021 at 18:16, Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 6:07 PM Marco Elver <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 20 Dec 2021 at 17:37, <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > KASAN's quarantine might save its metadata inside freed objects. As
> > > this happens after the memory is zeroed by the slab allocator when
> > > init_on_free is enabled, the memory coming out of quarantine is not
> > > properly zeroed.
> > >
> > > This causes lib/test_meminit.c tests to fail with Generic KASAN.
> > >
> > > Zero the metadata when the object is removed from quarantine.
> > >
> > > Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
> > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > > mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> > > index 587da8995f2d..2e50869fd8e2 100644
> > > --- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> > > @@ -132,11 +132,22 @@ static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> > > static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> > > {
> > > void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
> > > + struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
> > > unsigned long flags;
> > >
> > > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
> > > local_irq_save(flags);
> > >
> > > + /*
> > > + * If init_on_free is enabled and KASAN's free metadata is stored in
> > > + * the object, zero the metadata. Otherwise, the object's memory will
> > > + * not be properly zeroed, as KASAN saves the metadata after the slab
> > > + * allocator zeroes the object.
> > > + */
> > > + if (slab_want_init_on_free(cache) &&
> > > + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == 0)
> > > + memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta));
> >
> > memzero_explicit()
> >
> > although in this case it probably doesn't matter much, because AFAIK
> > memzero_explicit() only exists to prevent the compiler from eliding
> > the zeroing. Up to you.
>
> I've thought about using memzero_explicit(), but the rest of
> init_on_alloc/free code uses memset(0) so I decided to use it as well.
> If we decide to switch to memzero_explicit(), it makes sense to do it
> everywhere.
memzero_explicit() is newer than those existing memset(0) -- new code
should probably start using it.
So I'd opt for just using it here. Who knows what other optimizations
future compilers may come up with.