Hello,
The following program triggers GPF in sock_sndtimeo:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/dvyukov/c19cadd309791cf5cb9b2bf936d3f48d/raw/1743ba0211079a5465d039512b427bc6b59b1a76/gistfile1.txt
On commit 16ae16c6e5616c084168740990fc508bda6655d4 (Nov 24).
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 19950 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #54
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88002a0d0840 task.stack: ffff880036920000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo
include/net/sock.h:2075
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [<ffffffff86cb35e1>]
netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
RSP: 0018:ffff880036926f68 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000068 RBX: ffff880036927000 RCX: ffffc900021d0000
RDX: 0000000000000d63 RSI: 00000000024000c0 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffff880036927028 R08: ffffed0006ea7aab R09: ffffed0006ea7aab
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0006ea7aaa R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880035de3400 R15: ffff880035de3400
FS: 00007f90a2fc7700(0000) GS:ffff88003ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006de0c0 CR3: 0000000035de6000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff880035de3400 ffffffff819f02a1 1ffff10006d24df4 0000000000000004
00004db400000014 ffff880036926fd8 ffffffff00000000 0000000041b58ab3
ffffffff89653c11 ffffffff86cb3500 ffffffff819f0345 ffff880035de3400
Call Trace:
[< inline >] audit_replace kernel/audit.c:817
[<ffffffff816c34b9>] audit_receive_msg+0x22c9/0x2ce0 kernel/audit.c:894
[< inline >] audit_receive_skb kernel/audit.c:1120
[<ffffffff816c40ac>] audit_receive+0x1dc/0x360 kernel/audit.c:1133
[< inline >] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1214
[<ffffffff86cb3a14>] netlink_unicast+0x514/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1240
[<ffffffff86cb46d4>] netlink_sendmsg+0xaa4/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1786
[< inline >] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621
[<ffffffff86a6d54f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 net/socket.c:631
[<ffffffff86a6d8bb>] sock_write_iter+0x32b/0x620 net/socket.c:829
[< inline >] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
[<ffffffff81a6f24e>] __vfs_write+0x4fe/0x830 fs/read_write.c:512
[<ffffffff81a70cf5>] vfs_write+0x175/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
[<ffffffff81a75180>] SyS_write+0x100/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
[<ffffffff81009a24>] do_syscall_64+0x2f4/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:280
[<ffffffff88149e8d>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: fe 4c 89 f7 e8 31 16 ff ff 8b 8d 70 ff ff ff 49 89 c7 31 c0 85
c9 75 25 e8 7d 4a a3 fa 49 8d bd 40 03 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42>
80 3c 20 00 0f 85 3a 06 00 00 49 8b 85 40 03 00 00 4c 8d 73
RIP [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo include/net/sock.h:2075
RIP [<ffffffff86cb35e1>] netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730
net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
RSP <ffff880036926f68>
---[ end trace 8383a15fba6fdc59 ]---
CC Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 7:44 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> The following program triggers GPF in sock_sndtimeo:
> https://gist.githubusercontent.com/dvyukov/c19cadd309791cf5cb9b2bf936d3f48d/raw/1743ba0211079a5465d039512b427bc6b59b1a76/gistfile1.txt
>
> On commit 16ae16c6e5616c084168740990fc508bda6655d4 (Nov 24).
>
> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
> Dumping ftrace buffer:
> (ftrace buffer empty)
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 19950 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #54
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> task: ffff88002a0d0840 task.stack: ffff880036920000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo
> include/net/sock.h:2075
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [<ffffffff86cb35e1>]
> netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
> RSP: 0018:ffff880036926f68 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: 0000000000000068 RBX: ffff880036927000 RCX: ffffc900021d0000
> RDX: 0000000000000d63 RSI: 00000000024000c0 RDI: 0000000000000340
> RBP: ffff880036927028 R08: ffffed0006ea7aab R09: ffffed0006ea7aab
> R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0006ea7aaa R12: dffffc0000000000
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880035de3400 R15: ffff880035de3400
> FS: 00007f90a2fc7700(0000) GS:ffff88003ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00000000006de0c0 CR3: 0000000035de6000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff880035de3400 ffffffff819f02a1 1ffff10006d24df4 0000000000000004
> 00004db400000014 ffff880036926fd8 ffffffff00000000 0000000041b58ab3
> ffffffff89653c11 ffffffff86cb3500 ffffffff819f0345 ffff880035de3400
> Call Trace:
> [< inline >] audit_replace kernel/audit.c:817
> [<ffffffff816c34b9>] audit_receive_msg+0x22c9/0x2ce0 kernel/audit.c:894
> [< inline >] audit_receive_skb kernel/audit.c:1120
> [<ffffffff816c40ac>] audit_receive+0x1dc/0x360 kernel/audit.c:1133
> [< inline >] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1214
> [<ffffffff86cb3a14>] netlink_unicast+0x514/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1240
> [<ffffffff86cb46d4>] netlink_sendmsg+0xaa4/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1786
> [< inline >] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621
> [<ffffffff86a6d54f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 net/socket.c:631
> [<ffffffff86a6d8bb>] sock_write_iter+0x32b/0x620 net/socket.c:829
> [< inline >] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
> [<ffffffff81a6f24e>] __vfs_write+0x4fe/0x830 fs/read_write.c:512
> [<ffffffff81a70cf5>] vfs_write+0x175/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560
> [< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
> [<ffffffff81a75180>] SyS_write+0x100/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
> [<ffffffff81009a24>] do_syscall_64+0x2f4/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:280
> [<ffffffff88149e8d>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: fe 4c 89 f7 e8 31 16 ff ff 8b 8d 70 ff ff ff 49 89 c7 31 c0 85
> c9 75 25 e8 7d 4a a3 fa 49 8d bd 40 03 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42>
> 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 3a 06 00 00 49 8b 85 40 03 00 00 4c 8d 73
> RIP [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo include/net/sock.h:2075
> RIP [<ffffffff86cb35e1>] netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730
> net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
> RSP <ffff880036926f68>
> ---[ end trace 8383a15fba6fdc59 ]---
Looks a bug added in commit 32a1dbaece7e37cea415e03cd426172249aa859e
("audit: try harder to send to auditd upon netlink failure")
or 133e1e5acd4a63c4a0dcc413e90d5decdbce9c4a ("audit: stop an old
auditd being starved out by a new auditd")
Richard, can you take a look ?
Thanks !
On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 7:44 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> The following program triggers GPF in sock_sndtimeo:
> https://gist.githubusercontent.com/dvyukov/c19cadd309791cf5cb9b2bf936d3f48d/raw/1743ba0211079a5465d039512b427bc6b59b1a76/gistfile1.txt
>
> On commit 16ae16c6e5616c084168740990fc508bda6655d4 (Nov 24).
>
> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
> Dumping ftrace buffer:
> (ftrace buffer empty)
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 19950 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #54
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> task: ffff88002a0d0840 task.stack: ffff880036920000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo
> include/net/sock.h:2075
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [<ffffffff86cb35e1>]
> netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
> RSP: 0018:ffff880036926f68 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: 0000000000000068 RBX: ffff880036927000 RCX: ffffc900021d0000
> RDX: 0000000000000d63 RSI: 00000000024000c0 RDI: 0000000000000340
> RBP: ffff880036927028 R08: ffffed0006ea7aab R09: ffffed0006ea7aab
> R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0006ea7aaa R12: dffffc0000000000
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880035de3400 R15: ffff880035de3400
> FS: 00007f90a2fc7700(0000) GS:ffff88003ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00000000006de0c0 CR3: 0000000035de6000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff880035de3400 ffffffff819f02a1 1ffff10006d24df4 0000000000000004
> 00004db400000014 ffff880036926fd8 ffffffff00000000 0000000041b58ab3
> ffffffff89653c11 ffffffff86cb3500 ffffffff819f0345 ffff880035de3400
> Call Trace:
> [< inline >] audit_replace kernel/audit.c:817
> [<ffffffff816c34b9>] audit_receive_msg+0x22c9/0x2ce0 kernel/audit.c:894
> [< inline >] audit_receive_skb kernel/audit.c:1120
> [<ffffffff816c40ac>] audit_receive+0x1dc/0x360 kernel/audit.c:1133
> [< inline >] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1214
> [<ffffffff86cb3a14>] netlink_unicast+0x514/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1240
> [<ffffffff86cb46d4>] netlink_sendmsg+0xaa4/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1786
> [< inline >] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621
> [<ffffffff86a6d54f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 net/socket.c:631
> [<ffffffff86a6d8bb>] sock_write_iter+0x32b/0x620 net/socket.c:829
> [< inline >] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
> [<ffffffff81a6f24e>] __vfs_write+0x4fe/0x830 fs/read_write.c:512
> [<ffffffff81a70cf5>] vfs_write+0x175/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560
> [< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
> [<ffffffff81a75180>] SyS_write+0x100/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
> [<ffffffff81009a24>] do_syscall_64+0x2f4/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:280
> [<ffffffff88149e8d>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: fe 4c 89 f7 e8 31 16 ff ff 8b 8d 70 ff ff ff 49 89 c7 31 c0 85
> c9 75 25 e8 7d 4a a3 fa 49 8d bd 40 03 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42>
> 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 3a 06 00 00 49 8b 85 40 03 00 00 4c 8d 73
> RIP [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo include/net/sock.h:2075
> RIP [<ffffffff86cb35e1>] netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730
> net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
> RSP <ffff880036926f68>
> ---[ end trace 8383a15fba6fdc59 ]---
It is racy on audit_sock, especially on the netns exit path.
Could the following patch help a little bit? Also, I don't see how the
synchronize_net() here could sync with netlink rcv path, since unlike
packets from wire, netlink messages are not handled in BH context
nor I see any RCU taken on rcv path.
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f1ca116..20bc79e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1167,10 +1167,13 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
+
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
if (sock == audit_sock) {
audit_pid = 0;
audit_sock = NULL;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
synchronize_net();
On 2016-11-26 17:11, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 7:44 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Hello,
Eric, thanks for the heads up on this. (more below...)
> > The following program triggers GPF in sock_sndtimeo:
> > https://gist.githubusercontent.com/dvyukov/c19cadd309791cf5cb9b2bf936d3f48d/raw/1743ba0211079a5465d039512b427bc6b59b1a76/gistfile1.txt
> >
> > On commit 16ae16c6e5616c084168740990fc508bda6655d4 (Nov 24).
> >
> > general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
> > Dumping ftrace buffer:
> > (ftrace buffer empty)
> > Modules linked in:
> > CPU: 1 PID: 19950 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #54
> > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> > task: ffff88002a0d0840 task.stack: ffff880036920000
> > RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo
> > include/net/sock.h:2075
> > RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff86cb35e1>] [<ffffffff86cb35e1>]
> > netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
> > RSP: 0018:ffff880036926f68 EFLAGS: 00010202
> > RAX: 0000000000000068 RBX: ffff880036927000 RCX: ffffc900021d0000
> > RDX: 0000000000000d63 RSI: 00000000024000c0 RDI: 0000000000000340
> > RBP: ffff880036927028 R08: ffffed0006ea7aab R09: ffffed0006ea7aab
> > R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0006ea7aaa R12: dffffc0000000000
> > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880035de3400 R15: ffff880035de3400
> > FS: 00007f90a2fc7700(0000) GS:ffff88003ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: 00000000006de0c0 CR3: 0000000035de6000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> > Stack:
> > ffff880035de3400 ffffffff819f02a1 1ffff10006d24df4 0000000000000004
> > 00004db400000014 ffff880036926fd8 ffffffff00000000 0000000041b58ab3
> > ffffffff89653c11 ffffffff86cb3500 ffffffff819f0345 ffff880035de3400
> > Call Trace:
> > [< inline >] audit_replace kernel/audit.c:817
> > [<ffffffff816c34b9>] audit_receive_msg+0x22c9/0x2ce0 kernel/audit.c:894
> > [< inline >] audit_receive_skb kernel/audit.c:1120
> > [<ffffffff816c40ac>] audit_receive+0x1dc/0x360 kernel/audit.c:1133
> > [< inline >] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1214
> > [<ffffffff86cb3a14>] netlink_unicast+0x514/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1240
> > [<ffffffff86cb46d4>] netlink_sendmsg+0xaa4/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1786
> > [< inline >] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621
> > [<ffffffff86a6d54f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 net/socket.c:631
> > [<ffffffff86a6d8bb>] sock_write_iter+0x32b/0x620 net/socket.c:829
> > [< inline >] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
> > [<ffffffff81a6f24e>] __vfs_write+0x4fe/0x830 fs/read_write.c:512
> > [<ffffffff81a70cf5>] vfs_write+0x175/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560
> > [< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
> > [<ffffffff81a75180>] SyS_write+0x100/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
> > [<ffffffff81009a24>] do_syscall_64+0x2f4/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:280
> > [<ffffffff88149e8d>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> > Code: fe 4c 89 f7 e8 31 16 ff ff 8b 8d 70 ff ff ff 49 89 c7 31 c0 85
> > c9 75 25 e8 7d 4a a3 fa 49 8d bd 40 03 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42>
> > 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 3a 06 00 00 49 8b 85 40 03 00 00 4c 8d 73
> > RIP [< inline >] sock_sndtimeo include/net/sock.h:2075
> > RIP [<ffffffff86cb35e1>] netlink_unicast+0xe1/0x730
> > net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232
> > RSP <ffff880036926f68>
> > ---[ end trace 8383a15fba6fdc59 ]---
>
> It is racy on audit_sock, especially on the netns exit path.
I think that is the only place it is racy. The other places audit_sock
is set is when the socket failure has just triggered a reset.
Is there a notifier callback for failed or reaped sockets?
> Could the following patch help a little bit? Also, I don't see how the
> synchronize_net() here could sync with netlink rcv path, since unlike
> packets from wire, netlink messages are not handled in BH context
> nor I see any RCU taken on rcv path.
Thanks Cong, this looks like it could help. I'll have a closer look.
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f1ca116..20bc79e 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1167,10 +1167,13 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> if (sock == audit_sock) {
> audit_pid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
> }
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>
> RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
> synchronize_net();
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2016-11-26 17:11, Cong Wang wrote:
>> It is racy on audit_sock, especially on the netns exit path.
>
> I think that is the only place it is racy. The other places audit_sock
> is set is when the socket failure has just triggered a reset.
>
> Is there a notifier callback for failed or reaped sockets?
Is NETLINK_URELEASE event what you are looking for?
On 2016-11-29 15:13, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2016-11-26 17:11, Cong Wang wrote:
> >> It is racy on audit_sock, especially on the netns exit path.
> >
> > I think that is the only place it is racy. The other places audit_sock
> > is set is when the socket failure has just triggered a reset.
> >
> > Is there a notifier callback for failed or reaped sockets?
>
> Is NETLINK_URELEASE event what you are looking for?
Possibly, yes. Thanks, I'll have a look.
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-11-29 23:52, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2016-11-29 15:13, Cong Wang wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 2016-11-26 17:11, Cong Wang wrote:
> > >> It is racy on audit_sock, especially on the netns exit path.
> > >
> > > I think that is the only place it is racy. The other places audit_sock
> > > is set is when the socket failure has just triggered a reset.
> > >
> > > Is there a notifier callback for failed or reaped sockets?
> >
> > Is NETLINK_URELEASE event what you are looking for?
>
> Possibly, yes. Thanks, I'll have a look.
I tried a quick compile attempt on the test case (I assume it is a
socket fuzzer) and get the following compile error:
cc -g -O0 -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE -o socket_fuzz socket_fuzz.c
socket_fuzz.c:16:1: warning: "_GNU_SOURCE" redefined
<command-line>: warning: this is the location of the previous definition
socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘segv_handler’:
socket_fuzz.c:89: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_load_n’
socket_fuzz.c:89: error: ‘__ATOMIC_RELAXED’ undeclared (first use in this function)
socket_fuzz.c:89: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
socket_fuzz.c:89: error: for each function it appears in.)
socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘loop’:
socket_fuzz.c:280: warning: unused variable ‘errno0’
socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘test’:
socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_add’
socket_fuzz.c:303: error: ‘__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST’ undeclared (first use in this function)
socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_sub’
I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
get the test case to compile.
This is being tracked as https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/30
Subject: [PATCH] audit: proactively reset audit_sock on matching NETLINK_URELEASE
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f1ca116..91d222d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "audit_pid=%d reset", audit_pid);
audit_log_lost(s);
audit_pid = 0;
+ audit_nlk_portid = 0;
audit_sock = NULL;
} else {
pr_warn("re-scheduling(#%d) write to audit_pid=%d\n",
@@ -1143,6 +1144,28 @@ static int audit_bind(struct net *net, int group)
return 0;
}
+static int audit_sock_netlink_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long event,
+ void *_notify)
+{
+ struct netlink_notify *notify = _notify;
+ struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(notify->net, audit_net_id);
+
+ if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && notify->protocol == NETLINK_AUDIT) {
+ if (audit_nlk_portid == notify->portid &&
+ audit_sock == aunet->nlsk) {
+ audit_pid = 0;
+ audit_nlk_portid = 0;
+ audit_sock = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block audit_netlink_notifier = {
+ .notifier_call = audit_sock_netlink_notify,
+};
+
static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
@@ -1167,10 +1190,14 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
+
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
if (sock == audit_sock) {
audit_pid = 0;
+ audit_nlk_portid = 0;
audit_sock = NULL;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
synchronize_net();
@@ -1202,6 +1229,7 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_enabled = audit_default;
audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
+ netlink_register_notifier(&audit_netlink_notifier);
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++)
--
1.7.1
> - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
> NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
> stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
> Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
>
> Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
> get the test case to compile.
It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
NETLINK_URELEASE.
> @@ -1167,10 +1190,14 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> if (sock == audit_sock) {
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
> }
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>
If you decide to use NETLINK_URELEASE notifier, the above piece is no
longer needed, the net_exit path simply releases a refcnt.
On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 7:02 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2016-11-29 23:52, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> On 2016-11-29 15:13, Cong Wang wrote:
>> > On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > > On 2016-11-26 17:11, Cong Wang wrote:
>> > >> It is racy on audit_sock, especially on the netns exit path.
>> > >
>> > > I think that is the only place it is racy. The other places audit_sock
>> > > is set is when the socket failure has just triggered a reset.
>> > >
>> > > Is there a notifier callback for failed or reaped sockets?
>> >
>> > Is NETLINK_URELEASE event what you are looking for?
>>
>> Possibly, yes. Thanks, I'll have a look.
>
> I tried a quick compile attempt on the test case (I assume it is a
> socket fuzzer) and get the following compile error:
> cc -g -O0 -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE -o socket_fuzz socket_fuzz.c
> socket_fuzz.c:16:1: warning: "_GNU_SOURCE" redefined
> <command-line>: warning: this is the location of the previous definition
> socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘segv_handler’:
> socket_fuzz.c:89: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_load_n’
> socket_fuzz.c:89: error: ‘__ATOMIC_RELAXED’ undeclared (first use in this function)
> socket_fuzz.c:89: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
> socket_fuzz.c:89: error: for each function it appears in.)
> socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘loop’:
> socket_fuzz.c:280: warning: unused variable ‘errno0’
> socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘test’:
> socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_add’
> socket_fuzz.c:303: error: ‘__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST’ undeclared (first use in this function)
> socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_sub’
-std=gnu99 should help
ignore warnings
> I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
> NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
> stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
> Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
>
> Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
> get the test case to compile.
>
> This is being tracked as https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/30
>
> Subject: [PATCH] audit: proactively reset audit_sock on matching NETLINK_URELEASE
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f1ca116..91d222d 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "audit_pid=%d reset", audit_pid);
> audit_log_lost(s);
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
> } else {
> pr_warn("re-scheduling(#%d) write to audit_pid=%d\n",
> @@ -1143,6 +1144,28 @@ static int audit_bind(struct net *net, int group)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int audit_sock_netlink_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
> + unsigned long event,
> + void *_notify)
> +{
> + struct netlink_notify *notify = _notify;
> + struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(notify->net, audit_net_id);
> +
> + if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && notify->protocol == NETLINK_AUDIT) {
> + if (audit_nlk_portid == notify->portid &&
> + audit_sock == aunet->nlsk) {
> + audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> + audit_sock = NULL;
> + }
> + }
> + return NOTIFY_DONE;
> +}
> +
> +static struct notifier_block audit_netlink_notifier = {
> + .notifier_call = audit_sock_netlink_notify,
> +};
> +
> static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)
> {
> struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
> @@ -1167,10 +1190,14 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> if (sock == audit_sock) {
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
> }
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>
> RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
> synchronize_net();
> @@ -1202,6 +1229,7 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
> audit_enabled = audit_default;
> audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
>
> + netlink_register_notifier(&audit_netlink_notifier);
> audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
>
> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++)
> --
> 1.7.1
>
>
>> - RGB
>
> - RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
> Remote, Ottawa, Canada
> Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
> >
> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
> > get the test case to compile.
>
> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
> NETLINK_URELEASE.
This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
removing the mutex.
Another approach might be to look at consolidating the three into one
identifier or derive the other two from one, or serialize their access.
> > @@ -1167,10 +1190,14 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> > {
> > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > if (sock == audit_sock) {
> > audit_pid = 0;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> > audit_sock = NULL;
> > }
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>
> If you decide to use NETLINK_URELEASE notifier, the above piece is no
> longer needed, the net_exit path simply releases a refcnt.
Good point. It would have already killed it off. So this piece is
arguably too late anyways.
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-09 11:49, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 7:02 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2016-11-29 23:52, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > I tried a quick compile attempt on the test case (I assume it is a
> > socket fuzzer) and get the following compile error:
> > cc -g -O0 -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE -o socket_fuzz socket_fuzz.c
> > socket_fuzz.c:16:1: warning: "_GNU_SOURCE" redefined
> > <command-line>: warning: this is the location of the previous definition
> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘segv_handler’:
> > socket_fuzz.c:89: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_load_n’
> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: ‘__ATOMIC_RELAXED’ undeclared (first use in this function)
> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: for each function it appears in.)
> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘loop’:
> > socket_fuzz.c:280: warning: unused variable ‘errno0’
> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘test’:
> > socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_add’
> > socket_fuzz.c:303: error: ‘__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST’ undeclared (first use in this function)
> > socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_sub’
>
> -std=gnu99 should help
> ignore warnings
I got a little further, left with "__ATOMIC_RELAXED undeclared", "__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST
undeclared" under gcc 4.4.7-16.
gcc 4.8.2-15 leaves me with "undefined reference to `clock_gettime'"
What compiler version do you recommend?
> >> - RGB
> >
> > - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2016-12-09 11:49, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 7:02 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > On 2016-11-29 23:52, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> > I tried a quick compile attempt on the test case (I assume it is a
>> > socket fuzzer) and get the following compile error:
>> > cc -g -O0 -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE -o socket_fuzz socket_fuzz.c
>> > socket_fuzz.c:16:1: warning: "_GNU_SOURCE" redefined
>> > <command-line>: warning: this is the location of the previous definition
>> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘segv_handler’:
>> > socket_fuzz.c:89: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_load_n’
>> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: ‘__ATOMIC_RELAXED’ undeclared (first use in this function)
>> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
>> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: for each function it appears in.)
>> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘loop’:
>> > socket_fuzz.c:280: warning: unused variable ‘errno0’
>> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘test’:
>> > socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_add’
>> > socket_fuzz.c:303: error: ‘__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST’ undeclared (first use in this function)
>> > socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_sub’
>>
>> -std=gnu99 should help
>> ignore warnings
>
> I got a little further, left with "__ATOMIC_RELAXED undeclared", "__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST
> undeclared" under gcc 4.4.7-16.
>
> gcc 4.8.2-15 leaves me with "undefined reference to `clock_gettime'"
add -lrt
> What compiler version do you recommend?
6.x sounds reasonable
4.4 branch is 7.5 years old, surprised that it does not disintegrate
into dust yet :)
>> >> - RGB
>> >
>> > - RGB
>
> - RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
> Remote, Ottawa, Canada
> Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-09 12:53, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2016-12-09 11:49, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> >> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 7:02 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> > On 2016-11-29 23:52, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >> > I tried a quick compile attempt on the test case (I assume it is a
> >> > socket fuzzer) and get the following compile error:
> >> > cc -g -O0 -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE -o socket_fuzz socket_fuzz.c
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:16:1: warning: "_GNU_SOURCE" redefined
> >> > <command-line>: warning: this is the location of the previous definition
> >> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘segv_handler’:
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:89: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_load_n’
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: ‘__ATOMIC_RELAXED’ undeclared (first use in this function)
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:89: error: for each function it appears in.)
> >> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘loop’:
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:280: warning: unused variable ‘errno0’
> >> > socket_fuzz.c: In function ‘test’:
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_add’
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:303: error: ‘__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST’ undeclared (first use in this function)
> >> > socket_fuzz.c:303: warning: implicit declaration of function ‘__atomic_fetch_sub’
> >>
> >> -std=gnu99 should help
> >> ignore warnings
> >
> > I got a little further, left with "__ATOMIC_RELAXED undeclared", "__ATOMIC_SEQ_CST
> > undeclared" under gcc 4.4.7-16.
> >
> > gcc 4.8.2-15 leaves me with "undefined reference to `clock_gettime'"
>
> add -lrt
Ok, that helped. Thanks!
> > What compiler version do you recommend?
>
> 6.x sounds reasonable
> 4.4 branch is 7.5 years old, surprised that it does not disintegrate
> into dust yet :)
These are under RHEL6... so there are updates to them, but yeah, they are old.
> >> >> - RGB
> >> >
> >> > - RGB
> >
> > - RGB
> >
> > --
> > Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
> > Remote, Ottawa, Canada
> > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 3:01 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
>> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
>> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
>> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
>> >
>> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
>> > get the test case to compile.
>>
>> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
>> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
>> NETLINK_URELEASE.
>
> This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
> callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
> process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
> solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
> removing the mutex.
Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
a patch.
But I seriously doubt you really need NETLINK_URELEASE here,
it adds nothing but overhead, b/c the netlink notifier is called on
every netlink socket in the system, but for net exit path, that is
relatively a slow path.
Also, kauditd_send_skb() needs audit_cmd_mutex too.
I will send a formal patch.
Thanks.
On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 8:13 PM, Cong Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 3:01 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
>>> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
>>> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
>>> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
>>> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
>>> >
>>> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
>>> > get the test case to compile.
>>>
>>> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
>>> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
>>> NETLINK_URELEASE.
>>
>> This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
>> callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
>> process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
>> solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
>> removing the mutex.
>
> Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
> a patch.
>
> But I seriously doubt you really need NETLINK_URELEASE here,
> it adds nothing but overhead, b/c the netlink notifier is called on
> every netlink socket in the system, but for net exit path, that is
> relatively a slow path.
>
> Also, kauditd_send_skb() needs audit_cmd_mutex too.
Please let me know what you think about the attached patch?
Thanks!
On 2016-12-09 20:13, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 3:01 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
> >> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
> >> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
> >> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
> >> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
> >> >
> >> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
> >> > get the test case to compile.
> >>
> >> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
> >> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
> >> NETLINK_URELEASE.
> >
> > This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
> > callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
> > process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
> > solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
> > removing the mutex.
>
> Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
> a patch.
I had a quick look at how that might happen. The netlink notifier chain
is atomic. Would the registered callback funciton need to spawn a
one-time thread to avoid blocking?
> But I seriously doubt you really need NETLINK_URELEASE here,
> it adds nothing but overhead, b/c the netlink notifier is called on
> every netlink socket in the system, but for net exit path, that is
> relatively a slow path.
I was a bit concerned about its overhead, but was hoping to update
audit_sock more quickly in the case of a sock shutting down for any
reason.
> Also, kauditd_send_skb() needs audit_cmd_mutex too.
Agreed.
> I will send a formal patch.
I had a look at your patch. It looks attractively simple. The audit
next tree has patches queued that add an audit_reset function that will
require more work. I still see some potential gaps.
- If the process messes up (or the sock lookup messes up) it is reset
in the kauditd thread under the audit_cmd_mutex.
- If the process exits normally or is replaced due to an audit_replace
error, it is reset from audit_receive_skb under the audit_cmd_mutex.
- If the process dies before the kauditd thread notices, either reap it
via notifier callback or it needs a check on net exit to reset. This
last one appears necessary to decrement the sock refcount so the sock
can be released in netlink_kernel_release().
If we want to be proactive and use the netlink notifier, we assume the
overhead of adding to the netlink notifier chain and eliminate all the
other reset calls under the kauditd thread. If we are ok being
reactionary, then we'll at least need the net exit check on audit_sock.
Have I understood this correctly?
I'll follow with a patch based on audit#next
There will be an upstream merge conflict between audit#next and net#next
due to the removal of:
RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
synchronize_net();
from the end of audit_net_exit(). This patch should probably go through
the audit maintainer due to the other anticipated merge conflicts.
> Thanks.
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
the source sock.
Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
<[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
---
kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* break the connection */
+ sock_put(audit_sock);
audit_pid = 0;
+ audit_nlk_portid = 0;
audit_sock = NULL;
/* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
@@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (rc >= 0) {
consume_skb(skb);
rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ }
}
return rc;
@@ -579,7 +587,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
auditd = 0;
if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
reschedule = 0;
}
} else
@@ -594,7 +604,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
auditd = 0;
if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
kauditd_hold_skb(skb);
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
reschedule = 0;
} else
/* temporary problem (we hope), queue
@@ -623,7 +635,9 @@ quick_loop:
if (rc) {
auditd = 0;
if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
reschedule = 0;
}
@@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
return -EACCES;
}
if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
- audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
+ (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 0);
return -EEXIST;
}
if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
- audit_pid = new_pid;
- audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
- audit_sock = skb->sk;
- if (!new_pid)
+ if (new_pid) {
+ if (audit_sock)
+ sock_put(audit_sock);
+ audit_pid = new_pid;
+ audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
+ sock_hold(skb->sk);
+ audit_sock = skb->sk;
+ } else {
auditd_reset();
+ }
wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
}
if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
@@ -1283,8 +1302,11 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
- if (sock == audit_sock)
+ if (sock == audit_sock) {
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ }
RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
synchronize_net();
--
1.7.1
On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 8:40 AM, Cong Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
>>>> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
>>>> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
>>>> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
>>>> >
>>>> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
>>>> > get the test case to compile.
>>>>
>>>> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
>>>> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
>>>> NETLINK_URELEASE.
>>>
>>> This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
>>> callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
>>> process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
>>> solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
>>> removing the mutex.
>>
>> Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
>> a patch.
>>
>> But I seriously doubt you really need NETLINK_URELEASE here,
>> it adds nothing but overhead, b/c the netlink notifier is called on
>> every netlink socket in the system, but for net exit path, that is
>> relatively a slow path.
>>
>> Also, kauditd_send_skb() needs audit_cmd_mutex too.
>
> Please let me know what you think about the attached patch?
Applied the patch locally and have not seen the bug since then (~24
hours of testing).
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 5:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
>
> audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> the source sock.
>
> Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
>
> See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
>
> Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
This is coming in pretty late for the v4.10 merge window, much later
than I would usually take things, but this is arguably important, and
(at first glance) relatively low risk - what testing have you done on
this?
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> struct sk_buff *skb;
>
> /* break the connection */
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
>
> /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (rc >= 0) {
> consume_skb(skb);
> rc = 0;
> + } else {
> + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + }
> }
>
> return rc;
> @@ -579,7 +587,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
>
> auditd = 0;
> if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> reschedule = 0;
> }
> } else
> @@ -594,7 +604,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
> auditd = 0;
> if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> kauditd_hold_skb(skb);
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> reschedule = 0;
> } else
> /* temporary problem (we hope), queue
> @@ -623,7 +635,9 @@ quick_loop:
> if (rc) {
> auditd = 0;
> if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> reschedule = 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> return -EACCES;
> }
> if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
> audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 0);
> return -EEXIST;
> }
> if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
> audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
> - audit_pid = new_pid;
> - audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> - audit_sock = skb->sk;
> - if (!new_pid)
> + if (new_pid) {
> + if (audit_sock)
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
> + audit_pid = new_pid;
> + audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> + sock_hold(skb->sk);
> + audit_sock = skb->sk;
> + } else {
> auditd_reset();
> + }
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> }
> if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
> @@ -1283,8 +1302,11 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> - if (sock == audit_sock)
> + if (sock == audit_sock) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + }
>
> RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
> synchronize_net();
> --
> 1.7.1
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 5:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
>
> audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> the source sock.
>
> Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
>
> See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
>
> Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
My previous question about testing still stands, but I took a closer
look and have some additional comments, see below ...
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> struct sk_buff *skb;
>
> /* break the connection */
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
>
> /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (rc >= 0) {
> consume_skb(skb);
> rc = 0;
> + } else {
> + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
I dislike the way you wrote this because instead of simply looking at
this to see if it correct I need to sort out all the bits and find out
if there are other error codes that could run afoul of this check ...
make it simple, e.g. (rc == -ENOMEM || rc == -EPERM || ...).
Actually, since EPERM is 1, -EPERM (-1 in two's compliment is
0xffffffff) is going to cause this to be true for pretty much any
value of rc, yes?
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + }
The code in audit#next handles netlink_unicast() errors in
kauditd_thread() and you are adding error handling code here in
kauditd_send_unicast_skb() ... that's messy. I don't care too much
where the auditd_reset() call is made, but let's only do it in one
function; FWIW, I originally put the error handling code in
kauditd_thread() because there was other error handling code that
needed to done in that scope so it resulted in cleaner code.
Related, I see you are now considering ENOMEM to be a fatal condition,
that differs from the AUDITD_BAD macro in kauditd_thread(); this
difference needs to be reconciled.
Finally, you should update the comment header block for auditd_reset()
that it needs to be called with the audit_cmd_mutex held.
> @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> return -EACCES;
> }
> if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
Do we simply want to treat any error here as fatal, and not just
ECONN/EPERM/ENOMEM? If not, let's come up with a single macro to
handle the fatal netlink_unicast() return codes so we have some chance
to keep things consistent in the future.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 2:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
>
> audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> the source sock.
>
> Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
>
> See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
>
> Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> struct sk_buff *skb;
>
> /* break the connection */
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
Why audit_sock can't be NULL here?
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> audit_sock = NULL;
>
> /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (rc >= 0) {
> consume_skb(skb);
> rc = 0;
> + } else {
> + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
Are these errno's bits??
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + }
> }
>
> return rc;
> @@ -579,7 +587,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
>
> auditd = 0;
> if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> reschedule = 0;
> }
> } else
> @@ -594,7 +604,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
> auditd = 0;
> if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> kauditd_hold_skb(skb);
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> reschedule = 0;
> } else
> /* temporary problem (we hope), queue
> @@ -623,7 +635,9 @@ quick_loop:
> if (rc) {
> auditd = 0;
> if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> reschedule = 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> return -EACCES;
> }
> if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
> audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 0);
> return -EEXIST;
> }
> if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
> audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
> - audit_pid = new_pid;
> - audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> - audit_sock = skb->sk;
> - if (!new_pid)
> + if (new_pid) {
> + if (audit_sock)
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
> + audit_pid = new_pid;
> + audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> + sock_hold(skb->sk);
Why refcnt is still needed here? I need it because I removed the code
in net exit code path.
> + audit_sock = skb->sk;
> + } else {
> auditd_reset();
> + }
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> }
> if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
> @@ -1283,8 +1302,11 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> - if (sock == audit_sock)
> + if (sock == audit_sock) {
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
You need to put the if check inside the mutex too. Again, this could be
removed if you use refcnt.
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> + }
>
> RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
> synchronize_net();
> --
> 1.7.1
>
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2016-12-09 20:13, Cong Wang wrote:
>> Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
>> a patch.
>
> I had a quick look at how that might happen. The netlink notifier chain
> is atomic. Would the registered callback funciton need to spawn a
> one-time thread to avoid blocking?
It is already non-atomic now:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=efa172f42836477bf1ac3c9a3053140df764699c
> I had a look at your patch. It looks attractively simple. The audit
> next tree has patches queued that add an audit_reset function that will
> require more work. I still see some potential gaps.
>
> - If the process messes up (or the sock lookup messes up) it is reset
> in the kauditd thread under the audit_cmd_mutex.
>
> - If the process exits normally or is replaced due to an audit_replace
> error, it is reset from audit_receive_skb under the audit_cmd_mutex.
>
> - If the process dies before the kauditd thread notices, either reap it
> via notifier callback or it needs a check on net exit to reset. This
> last one appears necessary to decrement the sock refcount so the sock
> can be released in netlink_kernel_release().
>
> If we want to be proactive and use the netlink notifier, we assume the
> overhead of adding to the netlink notifier chain and eliminate all the
> other reset calls under the kauditd thread. If we are ok being
> reactionary, then we'll at least need the net exit check on audit_sock.
>
I don't see why we need to check it in net exit if we use refcnt,
because we have two different users of audit_sock: kauditd and
netns, if both take care of refcnt properly, we don't need to worry
about who is the last, no matter what failures occur in what order.
On 2016-12-12 12:10, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 5:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
> >
> > audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> > the source sock.
> >
> > Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> > audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> > modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
> >
> > See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
> >
> > Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> > <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> > upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> > source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> > 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> This is coming in pretty late for the v4.10 merge window, much later
> than I would usually take things, but this is arguably important, and
> (at first glance) relatively low risk - what testing have you done on
> this?
At this point, compile and boot, and I'm able to compile and run the
supplied test code without any issues.
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> > struct sk_buff *skb;
> >
> > /* break the connection */
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > audit_pid = 0;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> > audit_sock = NULL;
> >
> > /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> > @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > if (rc >= 0) {
> > consume_skb(skb);
> > rc = 0;
> > + } else {
> > + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > return rc;
> > @@ -579,7 +587,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
> >
> > auditd = 0;
> > if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > reschedule = 0;
> > }
> > } else
> > @@ -594,7 +604,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
> > auditd = 0;
> > if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> > kauditd_hold_skb(skb);
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > reschedule = 0;
> > } else
> > /* temporary problem (we hope), queue
> > @@ -623,7 +635,9 @@ quick_loop:
> > if (rc) {
> > auditd = 0;
> > if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > reschedule = 0;
> > }
> >
> > @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> > return -EACCES;
> > }
> > if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> > - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> > + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
> > audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 0);
> > return -EEXIST;
> > }
> > if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
> > audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
> > - audit_pid = new_pid;
> > - audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> > - audit_sock = skb->sk;
> > - if (!new_pid)
> > + if (new_pid) {
> > + if (audit_sock)
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > + audit_pid = new_pid;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> > + sock_hold(skb->sk);
> > + audit_sock = skb->sk;
> > + } else {
> > auditd_reset();
> > + }
> > wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> > }
> > if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
> > @@ -1283,8 +1302,11 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> > {
> > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> > - if (sock == audit_sock)
> > + if (sock == audit_sock) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + }
> >
> > RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
> > synchronize_net();
> > --
> > 1.7.1
> >
> > --
> > Linux-audit mailing list
> > [email protected]
> > https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
>
>
>
> --
> paul moore
> http://www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-12 15:18, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 5:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
> >
> > audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> > the source sock.
> >
> > Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> > audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> > modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
> >
> > See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
> >
> > Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> > <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> > upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> > source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> > 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> > struct sk_buff *skb;
> >
> > /* break the connection */
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > audit_pid = 0;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> > audit_sock = NULL;
> >
> > /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> > @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > if (rc >= 0) {
> > consume_skb(skb);
> > rc = 0;
> > + } else {
> > + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
>
> I dislike the way you wrote this because instead of simply looking at
> this to see if it correct I need to sort out all the bits and find out
> if there are other error codes that could run afoul of this check ...
> make it simple, e.g. (rc == -ENOMEM || rc == -EPERM || ...).
> Actually, since EPERM is 1, -EPERM (-1 in two's compliment is
> 0xffffffff) is going to cause this to be true for pretty much any
> value of rc, yes?
Yes, you are correct. We need there a logical or on the results of each
comparison to the return code rather than bit-wise or-ing the result
codes together first to save a step.
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + }
>
> The code in audit#next handles netlink_unicast() errors in
> kauditd_thread() and you are adding error handling code here in
> kauditd_send_unicast_skb() ... that's messy. I don't care too much
> where the auditd_reset() call is made, but let's only do it in one
> function; FWIW, I originally put the error handling code in
> kauditd_thread() because there was other error handling code that
> needed to done in that scope so it resulted in cleaner code.
Hmmm, I seem to remember it not returning the return code and I thought
I had changed it to do so, but I see now that it was already there.
Agreed, I needlessly duplicated that error handling.
> Related, I see you are now considering ENOMEM to be a fatal condition,
> that differs from the AUDITD_BAD macro in kauditd_thread(); this
> difference needs to be reconciled.
Also correct about -EPERM now that I check back to the intent of commit
32a1dbaece7e ("audit: try harder to send to auditd upon netlink
failure")
> Finally, you should update the comment header block for auditd_reset()
> that it needs to be called with the audit_cmd_mutex held.
Yup.
> > @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> > return -EACCES;
> > }
> > if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> > - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> > + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
>
> Do we simply want to treat any error here as fatal, and not just
> ECONN/EPERM/ENOMEM? If not, let's come up with a single macro to
> handle the fatal netlink_unicast() return codes so we have some chance
> to keep things consistent in the future.
I'll work through this before I post another patch...
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-09 23:40, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 8:13 PM, Cong Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 3:01 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
> >>> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
> >>> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
> >>> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
> >>> >
> >>> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
> >>> > get the test case to compile.
> >>>
> >>> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
> >>> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
> >>> NETLINK_URELEASE.
> >>
> >> This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
> >> callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
> >> process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
> >> solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
> >> removing the mutex.
> >
> > Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
> > a patch.
> >
> > But I seriously doubt you really need NETLINK_URELEASE here,
> > it adds nothing but overhead, b/c the netlink notifier is called on
> > every netlink socket in the system, but for net exit path, that is
> > relatively a slow path.
> >
> > Also, kauditd_send_skb() needs audit_cmd_mutex too.
>
> Please let me know what you think about the attached patch?
>
> Thanks!
> commit a12b43ee814625933ff155c20dc863c59cfcf240
> Author: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
> Date: Fri Dec 9 17:56:42 2016 -0800
>
> audit: close a race condition on audit_sock
>
> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f1ca116..ab947d8 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -423,6 +423,8 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "audit_pid=%d reset", audit_pid);
> audit_log_lost(s);
> audit_pid = 0;
> + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
> audit_sock = NULL;
> } else {
> pr_warn("re-scheduling(#%d) write to audit_pid=%d\n",
> @@ -899,6 +901,9 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
> audit_pid = new_pid;
> audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> + sock_hold(skb->sk);
> + if (audit_sock)
> + sock_put(audit_sock);
> audit_sock = skb->sk;
> }
> if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
> @@ -1167,10 +1172,6 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> - if (sock == audit_sock) {
> - audit_pid = 0;
> - audit_sock = NULL;
> - }
So how does this not leak memory leaving the sock refcount incremented
by the registered audit daemon when that daemon shuts down normally?
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-13 02:51, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2016-12-09 23:40, Cong Wang wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 8:13 PM, Cong Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 3:01 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >> On 2016-12-08 22:57, Cong Wang wrote:
> > >>> On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >>> > I also tried to extend Cong Wang's idea to attempt to proactively respond to a
> > >>> > NETLINK_URELEASE on the audit_sock and reset it, but ran into a locking error
> > >>> > stack dump using mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex) in the notifier callback.
> > >>> > Eliminating the lock since the sock is dead anways eliminates the error.
> > >>> >
> > >>> > Is it safe? I'll resubmit if this looks remotely sane. Meanwhile I'll try to
> > >>> > get the test case to compile.
> > >>>
> > >>> It doesn't look safe, because 'audit_sock', 'audit_nlk_portid' and 'audit_pid'
> > >>> are updated as a whole and race between audit_receive_msg() and
> > >>> NETLINK_URELEASE.
> > >>
> > >> This is what I expected and why I originally added the mutex lock in the
> > >> callback... The dumps I got were bare with no wrapper identifying the
> > >> process context or specific error, so I'm at a bit of a loss how to
> > >> solve this (without thinking more about it) other than instinctively
> > >> removing the mutex.
> > >
> > > Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
> > > a patch.
> > >
> > > But I seriously doubt you really need NETLINK_URELEASE here,
> > > it adds nothing but overhead, b/c the netlink notifier is called on
> > > every netlink socket in the system, but for net exit path, that is
> > > relatively a slow path.
> > >
> > > Also, kauditd_send_skb() needs audit_cmd_mutex too.
> >
> > Please let me know what you think about the attached patch?
> >
> > Thanks!
>
> > commit a12b43ee814625933ff155c20dc863c59cfcf240
> > Author: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
> > Date: Fri Dec 9 17:56:42 2016 -0800
> >
> > audit: close a race condition on audit_sock
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index f1ca116..ab947d8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -423,6 +423,8 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "audit_pid=%d reset", audit_pid);
> > audit_log_lost(s);
> > audit_pid = 0;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > audit_sock = NULL;
> > } else {
> > pr_warn("re-scheduling(#%d) write to audit_pid=%d\n",
> > @@ -899,6 +901,9 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> > audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
> > audit_pid = new_pid;
> > audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> > + sock_hold(skb->sk);
> > + if (audit_sock)
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > audit_sock = skb->sk;
> > }
> > if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
> > @@ -1167,10 +1172,6 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> > {
> > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> > - if (sock == audit_sock) {
> > - audit_pid = 0;
> > - audit_sock = NULL;
> > - }
>
> So how does this not leak memory leaving the sock refcount incremented
> by the registered audit daemon when that daemon shuts down normally?
Sorry, that should have been: How does it not leak if auditd exits
abnormally without sending a shutdown message, but no message is sent on
the queue to trigger an error before the net namespace exits?
> - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-12 16:10, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 2016-12-09 20:13, Cong Wang wrote:
> >> Netlink notifier can safely be converted to blocking one, I will send
> >> a patch.
> >
> > I had a quick look at how that might happen. The netlink notifier chain
> > is atomic. Would the registered callback funciton need to spawn a
> > one-time thread to avoid blocking?
>
> It is already non-atomic now:
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=efa172f42836477bf1ac3c9a3053140df764699c
Ok, that is recent... It is still less attractive as you point out due
to the overhead, but still worth considering if we can't find another
way.
> > I had a look at your patch. It looks attractively simple. The audit
> > next tree has patches queued that add an audit_reset function that will
> > require more work. I still see some potential gaps.
> >
> > - If the process messes up (or the sock lookup messes up) it is reset
> > in the kauditd thread under the audit_cmd_mutex.
> >
> > - If the process exits normally or is replaced due to an audit_replace
> > error, it is reset from audit_receive_skb under the audit_cmd_mutex.
> >
> > - If the process dies before the kauditd thread notices, either reap it
> > via notifier callback or it needs a check on net exit to reset. This
> > last one appears necessary to decrement the sock refcount so the sock
> > can be released in netlink_kernel_release().
> >
> > If we want to be proactive and use the netlink notifier, we assume the
> > overhead of adding to the netlink notifier chain and eliminate all the
> > other reset calls under the kauditd thread. If we are ok being
> > reactionary, then we'll at least need the net exit check on audit_sock.
>
> I don't see why we need to check it in net exit if we use refcnt,
> because we have two different users of audit_sock: kauditd and
> netns, if both take care of refcnt properly, we don't need to worry
> about who is the last, no matter what failures occur in what order.
It is actually the audit_pid and audit_nlk_portid that I care about
more. The audit daemon could vanish or close the socket while the
kernel sock to which it was attached is still quite valid. Accessing
the set of three atomically is the urge. I wonder if it makes more
sense to test for the presence of auditd using audit_sock rather than
audit_pid, but still keep audit_pid for our reporting and replacement
strategy. Another idea would be to put the three in one struct.
Can someone explain how they think the original test was able to trigger
this GPF? Network namespace shutdown while something pretended to set
up a new auditd? That's impressive for a fuzzer if that's the case...
Is there an strace? I guess it is all in test().
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-12 15:58, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 2:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
> >
> > audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> > the source sock.
> >
> > Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> > audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> > modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
> >
> > See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
> >
> > Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> > <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> > upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> > source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> > 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> > struct sk_buff *skb;
> >
> > /* break the connection */
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
>
> Why audit_sock can't be NULL here?
Fixed.
> > audit_pid = 0;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> > audit_sock = NULL;
> >
> > /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> > @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > if (rc >= 0) {
> > consume_skb(skb);
> > rc = 0;
> > + } else {
> > + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
>
> Are these errno's bits??
No, I've fixed this silly error.
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > return rc;
> > @@ -579,7 +587,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
> >
> > auditd = 0;
> > if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > reschedule = 0;
> > }
> > } else
> > @@ -594,7 +604,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
> > auditd = 0;
> > if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> > kauditd_hold_skb(skb);
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > reschedule = 0;
> > } else
> > /* temporary problem (we hope), queue
> > @@ -623,7 +635,9 @@ quick_loop:
> > if (rc) {
> > auditd = 0;
> > if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > reschedule = 0;
> > }
> >
> > @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> > return -EACCES;
> > }
> > if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> > - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> > + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
> > audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 0);
> > return -EEXIST;
> > }
> > if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
> > audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
> > - audit_pid = new_pid;
> > - audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> > - audit_sock = skb->sk;
> > - if (!new_pid)
> > + if (new_pid) {
> > + if (audit_sock)
> > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > + audit_pid = new_pid;
> > + audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
> > + sock_hold(skb->sk);
>
> Why refcnt is still needed here? I need it because I removed the code
> in net exit code path.
Because there is a chance that auditd exits abnormally and no message is
send from the kauditd thread to discover it has gone.
> > + audit_sock = skb->sk;
> > + } else {
> > auditd_reset();
> > + }
> > wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> > }
> > if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
> > @@ -1283,8 +1302,11 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> > {
> > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> > - if (sock == audit_sock)
> > + if (sock == audit_sock) {
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>
> You need to put the if check inside the mutex too. Again, this could be
> removed if you use refcnt.
Ok, right, fixed.
That last patch was a bit of a mess! Thanks for your patience in
checking it...
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > + }
> >
> > RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
> > synchronize_net();
> > --
> > 1.7.1
> >
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-13 00:10, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2016-12-12 15:18, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 5:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
> > >
> > > audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> > > the source sock.
> > >
> > > Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> > > audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> > > modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
> > >
> > > See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
> > >
> > > Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> > > <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > > There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> > > upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> > > source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> > > ---
> > > kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> > > 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > > index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void)
> > > struct sk_buff *skb;
> > >
> > > /* break the connection */
> > > + sock_put(audit_sock);
> > > audit_pid = 0;
> > > + audit_nlk_portid = 0;
> > > audit_sock = NULL;
> > >
> > > /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
> > > @@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > > if (rc >= 0) {
> > > consume_skb(skb);
> > > rc = 0;
> > > + } else {
> > > + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {
> >
> > I dislike the way you wrote this because instead of simply looking at
> > this to see if it correct I need to sort out all the bits and find out
> > if there are other error codes that could run afoul of this check ...
> > make it simple, e.g. (rc == -ENOMEM || rc == -EPERM || ...).
> > Actually, since EPERM is 1, -EPERM (-1 in two's compliment is
> > 0xffffffff) is going to cause this to be true for pretty much any
> > value of rc, yes?
>
> Yes, you are correct. We need there a logical or on the results of each
> comparison to the return code rather than bit-wise or-ing the result
> codes together first to save a step.
>
> > > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > > + auditd_reset();
> > > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > > + }
> >
> > The code in audit#next handles netlink_unicast() errors in
> > kauditd_thread() and you are adding error handling code here in
> > kauditd_send_unicast_skb() ... that's messy. I don't care too much
> > where the auditd_reset() call is made, but let's only do it in one
> > function; FWIW, I originally put the error handling code in
> > kauditd_thread() because there was other error handling code that
> > needed to done in that scope so it resulted in cleaner code.
>
> Hmmm, I seem to remember it not returning the return code and I thought
> I had changed it to do so, but I see now that it was already there.
> Agreed, I needlessly duplicated that error handling.
>
> > Related, I see you are now considering ENOMEM to be a fatal condition,
> > that differs from the AUDITD_BAD macro in kauditd_thread(); this
> > difference needs to be reconciled.
>
> Also correct about -EPERM now that I check back to the intent of commit
> 32a1dbaece7e ("audit: try harder to send to auditd upon netlink
> failure")
>
> > Finally, you should update the comment header block for auditd_reset()
> > that it needs to be called with the audit_cmd_mutex held.
>
> Yup.
>
> > > @@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> > > return -EACCES;
> > > }
> > > if (audit_pid && new_pid &&
> > > - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) {
> > > + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) {
> >
> > Do we simply want to treat any error here as fatal, and not just
> > ECONN/EPERM/ENOMEM? If not, let's come up with a single macro to
> > handle the fatal netlink_unicast() return codes so we have some chance
> > to keep things consistent in the future.
>
> I'll work through this before I post another patch...
Ok, I've gone back to look at the reasoning in commit 133e1e5acd4a
("audit: stop an old auditd being starved out by a new auditd") which
suggests only ECONNREFUSED can cause an audit_pid replace, so I've
returned it to its original state.
I'll post another tested patch, but I'm still not that happy that it
does not proactively reset audit_pid, audit_nlk_portid and audit_sock
when auditd's socket has a problem. I'll leave the test run overnight.
> > paul moore
>
> - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
the source sock.
Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
<[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
---
kernel/audit.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f20eee0..3bb4126 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -446,14 +446,19 @@ static void kauditd_retry_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
* Description:
* Break the auditd/kauditd connection and move all the records in the retry
* queue into the hold queue in case auditd reconnects.
+ * The audit_cmd_mutex must be held when calling this function.
*/
static void auditd_reset(void)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* break the connection */
+ if (audit_sock) {
+ sock_put(audit_sock);
+ audit_sock = NULL;
+ }
audit_pid = 0;
- audit_sock = NULL;
+ audit_nlk_portid = 0;
/* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_retry_queue)))
@@ -579,7 +584,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
auditd = 0;
if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
reschedule = 0;
}
} else
@@ -594,7 +601,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
auditd = 0;
if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
kauditd_hold_skb(skb);
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
reschedule = 0;
} else
/* temporary problem (we hope), queue
@@ -623,7 +632,9 @@ quick_loop:
if (rc) {
auditd = 0;
if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) {
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
reschedule = 0;
}
@@ -1010,11 +1021,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
- audit_pid = new_pid;
- audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
- audit_sock = skb->sk;
- if (!new_pid)
+ if (new_pid) {
+ if (audit_sock)
+ sock_put(audit_sock);
+ audit_pid = new_pid;
+ audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
+ sock_hold(skb->sk);
+ audit_sock = skb->sk;
+ } else {
auditd_reset();
+ }
wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
}
if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
@@ -1283,8 +1299,10 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
if (sock == audit_sock)
auditd_reset();
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
synchronize_net();
--
1.7.1
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 10:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy.
>
> audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on
> the source sock.
>
> Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in
> audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock
> modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex.
>
> See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232
>
> Thanks to Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> and Cong Wang
> <[email protected]> on ideas how to fix it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go
> upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the
> source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
This looks more reasonable. I still wonder about synchronization
between threads changing the audit_* connection variables and the
kauditd_thread, but I guess we can treat that as another issue; this
patch fixes a bug and is worth merging now.
I'm building a test kernel right now, assuming nothing blows up I'll
push this patch with the rest of the audit patches tomorrow; if
something bad happens, this is going to miss the first audit pull
request.
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f20eee0..3bb4126 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -446,14 +446,19 @@ static void kauditd_retry_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> * Description:
> * Break the auditd/kauditd connection and move all the records in the retry
> * queue into the hold queue in case auditd reconnects.
> + * The audit_cmd_mutex must be held when calling this function.
> */
Don't resend, but in the future please start comments like this on the
previous line.
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 7:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> @@ -1283,8 +1299,10 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> {
> struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> if (sock == audit_sock)
> auditd_reset();
> + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
This still doesn't look correct to me, b/c here we release the audit_sock
refcnt twice:
1) inside audit_reset()
2) netlink_kernel_release()
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 2:52 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> It is actually the audit_pid and audit_nlk_portid that I care about
> more. The audit daemon could vanish or close the socket while the
> kernel sock to which it was attached is still quite valid. Accessing
> the set of three atomically is the urge. I wonder if it makes more
> sense to test for the presence of auditd using audit_sock rather than
> audit_pid, but still keep audit_pid for our reporting and replacement
> strategy. Another idea would be to put the three in one struct.
Note, the process has audit_pid should hold a refcnt to the netns too,
so the netns can't be gone until that process is gone.
>
> Can someone explain how they think the original test was able to trigger
> this GPF? Network namespace shutdown while something pretended to set
> up a new auditd? That's impressive for a fuzzer if that's the case...
> Is there an strace? I guess it is all in test().
>
I am surprised you still don't get the race condition even when you
are now working on v2...
The race happens in this scenarios :
1) Create a new netns
2) In the new netns, communicate with kauditd to set audit_sock
3) Generate some audit messages, so kauditd will keep sending them
via audit_sock
4) exit the netns
5) the previous audit_sock is now going away, but kaudit_sock could still
access it in this small window.
On 2016-12-13 16:19, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 7:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > @@ -1283,8 +1299,10 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
> > {
> > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
> > if (sock == audit_sock)
> > auditd_reset();
> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>
> This still doesn't look correct to me, b/c here we release the audit_sock
> refcnt twice:
>
> 1) inside audit_reset()
The audit_reset() refcount decrement corresponds to a setting of
audit_sock only if audit_sock is still non-NULL.
> 2) netlink_kernel_release()
This refcount decrement corresponds to netlink_kernel_create().
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2016-12-13 16:17, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 2:52 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > It is actually the audit_pid and audit_nlk_portid that I care about
> > more. The audit daemon could vanish or close the socket while the
> > kernel sock to which it was attached is still quite valid. Accessing
> > the set of three atomically is the urge. I wonder if it makes more
> > sense to test for the presence of auditd using audit_sock rather than
> > audit_pid, but still keep audit_pid for our reporting and replacement
> > strategy. Another idea would be to put the three in one struct.
>
> Note, the process has audit_pid should hold a refcnt to the netns too,
> so the netns can't be gone until that process is gone.
I noted that. I did wonder if there might be a problem if all the
processes were moved to another netns with the struct sock stuck in the
now process-void netns.
This is alluded-to in 6f285b19d09f ("audit: Send replies in the proper
network namespace.").
> > Can someone explain how they think the original test was able to trigger
> > this GPF? Network namespace shutdown while something pretended to set
> > up a new auditd? That's impressive for a fuzzer if that's the case...
> > Is there an strace? I guess it is all in test().
>
> I am surprised you still don't get the race condition even when you
> are now working on v2...
>
> The race happens in this scenarios :
>
> 1) Create a new netns
>
> 2) In the new netns, communicate with kauditd to set audit_sock
>
> 3) Generate some audit messages, so kauditd will keep sending them
> via audit_sock
>
> 4) exit the netns
>
> 5) the previous audit_sock is now going away, but kaudit_sock could still
> access it in this small window.
Ah ok that fits...
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 8:00 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2016-12-13 16:19, Cong Wang wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 7:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > @@ -1283,8 +1299,10 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net)
>> > {
>> > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
>> > struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk;
>> > + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>> > if (sock == audit_sock)
>> > auditd_reset();
>> > + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
>>
>> This still doesn't look correct to me, b/c here we release the audit_sock
>> refcnt twice:
>>
>> 1) inside audit_reset()
>
> The audit_reset() refcount decrement corresponds to a setting of
> audit_sock only if audit_sock is still non-NULL.
>
Hmm, thinking about it again, looks like the sock == audit_sock
and audit_sock != NULL checks can guarantee we are safe. So,
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>