We report the crash: WARNING in ip_recv_error
(I resend the email since I mistakenly missed the subject in my previous
email. I'm sorry.)
This crash has been found in v4.17-rc1 using RaceFuzzer (a modified
version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this
report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two
syscalls concurrently, setsockopt$inet6_IPV6_ADDRFORM and recvmsg.
Diagnosis:
We think the concurrent execution of do_ipv6_setsockopt() with optname
IPV6_ADDRFORM and inet_recvmsg() causes the crash. do_ipv6_setsockopt()
can update sk->prot to &udp_prot and sk->sk_family to PF_INET. But
inet_recvmsg() can execute sk->sk_prot->recvmsg() right after that
sk->prot is updated and sk->sk_family is not updated by
do_ipv6_setsockopt(). This will lead WARN_ON in ip_recv_error().
Thread interleaving:
CPU0 (do_ipv6_setsockopt) CPU1 (inet_recvmsg)
===== =====
struct proto *prot = &udp_prot;
...
sk->sk_prot = prot;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
err = sk->sk_prot->recvmsg(sk, msg, size, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, &addr_len);
(in udp_recvmsg)
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
(in ip_recv_error)
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
Call Sequence:
CPU0
=====
udpv6_setsockopt
ipv6_setsockopt
do_ipv6_setsockopt
CPU1
=====
sock_recvmsg
sock_recvmsg_nosec
inet_recvmsg
udp_recvmsg
==================================================================
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 32600 at /home/daeryong/workspace/new-race-fuzzer/kernels_repo/kernel_v4.17-rc1/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:508 ip_recv_error+0x6f2/0x720 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:508
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 32600 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x166/0x21c lib/dump_stack.c:113
panic+0x1a0/0x3a7 kernel/panic.c:184
__warn+0x191/0x1a0 kernel/panic.c:536
report_bug+0x132/0x1b0 lib/bug.c:186
fixup_bug.part.11+0x28/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x28b/0x2d0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315
invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:992
RIP: 0010:ip_recv_error+0x6f2/0x720 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:508
RSP: 0018:ffff8801dadff630 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: 0000000000002002 RCX: ffffffff8327de12
RDX: 000000000000008a RSI: ffffc90001a0c000 RDI: ffff8801be615010
RBP: ffff8801dadff720 R08: 0000000000002002 R09: ffff8801dadff918
R10: ffff8801dadff738 R11: ffff8801dadffaff R12: ffff8801be615000
R13: ffff8801dadffd50 R14: 1ffff1003b5bfece R15: ffff8801dadffb90
udp_recvmsg+0x834/0xa10 net/ipv4/udp.c:1571
inet_recvmsg+0x121/0x420 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:830
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:802 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x7f/0xa0 net/socket.c:809
___sys_recvmsg+0x1f0/0x430 net/socket.c:2279
__sys_recvmsg+0xfc/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2328
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x48/0x50 net/socket.c:2335
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x4a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4563f9
RSP: 002b:00007f24f6927b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000072bfa0 RCX: 00000000004563f9
RDX: 0000000000002002 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000016
RBP: 00000000000004e4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24f69286d4
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 00000000006fc600 R15: 0000000000000000
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
==================================================================
= About RaceFuzzer
RaceFuzzer is a customized version of Syzkaller, specifically tailored
to find race condition bugs in the Linux kernel. While we leverage
many different technique, the notable feature of RaceFuzzer is in
leveraging a custom hypervisor (QEMU/KVM) to interleave the
scheduling. In particular, we modified the hypervisor to intentionally
stall a per-core execution, which is similar to supporting per-core
breakpoint functionality. This allows RaceFuzzer to force the kernel
to deterministically trigger racy condition (which may rarely happen
in practice due to randomness in scheduling).
RaceFuzzer's C repro always pinpoints two racy syscalls. Since C
repro's scheduling synchronization should be performed at the user
space, its reproducibility is limited (reproduction may take from 1
second to 10 minutes (or even more), depending on a bug). This is
because, while RaceFuzzer precisely interleaves the scheduling at the
kernel's instruction level when finding this bug, C repro cannot fully
utilize such a feature. Please disregard all code related to
"should_hypercall" in the C repro, as this is only for our debugging
purposes using our own hypervisor.
On 05/18/2018 05:08 AM, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
> We report the crash: WARNING in ip_recv_error
> (I resend the email since I mistakenly missed the subject in my previous
> email. I'm sorry.)
>
>
> This crash has been found in v4.17-rc1 using RaceFuzzer (a modified
> version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this
> report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two
> syscalls concurrently, setsockopt$inet6_IPV6_ADDRFORM and recvmsg.
>
>
> Diagnosis:
> We think the concurrent execution of do_ipv6_setsockopt() with optname
> IPV6_ADDRFORM and inet_recvmsg() causes the crash. do_ipv6_setsockopt()
> can update sk->prot to &udp_prot and sk->sk_family to PF_INET. But
> inet_recvmsg() can execute sk->sk_prot->recvmsg() right after that
> sk->prot is updated and sk->sk_family is not updated by
> do_ipv6_setsockopt(). This will lead WARN_ON in ip_recv_error().
>
>
> Thread interleaving:
> CPU0 (do_ipv6_setsockopt) CPU1 (inet_recvmsg)
> ===== =====
> struct proto *prot = &udp_prot;
> ...
> sk->sk_prot = prot;
> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
> err = sk->sk_prot->recvmsg(sk, msg, size, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
> flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, &addr_len);
>
> (in udp_recvmsg)
> if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
> return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
>
> (in ip_recv_error)
> WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>
>
> Call Sequence:
> CPU0
> =====
> udpv6_setsockopt
> ipv6_setsockopt
> do_ipv6_setsockopt
>
> CPU1
> =====
> sock_recvmsg
> sock_recvmsg_nosec
> inet_recvmsg
> udp_recvmsg
>
>
> ==================================================================
> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 32600 at /home/daeryong/workspace/new-race-fuzzer/kernels_repo/kernel_v4.17-rc1/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:508 ip_recv_error+0x6f2/0x720 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:508
> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
>
> CPU: 1 PID: 32600 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1 #1
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x166/0x21c lib/dump_stack.c:113
> panic+0x1a0/0x3a7 kernel/panic.c:184
> __warn+0x191/0x1a0 kernel/panic.c:536
> report_bug+0x132/0x1b0 lib/bug.c:186
> fixup_bug.part.11+0x28/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178
> fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline]
> do_error_trap+0x28b/0x2d0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
> do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315
> invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:992
> RIP: 0010:ip_recv_error+0x6f2/0x720 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:508
> RSP: 0018:ffff8801dadff630 EFLAGS: 00010212
> RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: 0000000000002002 RCX: ffffffff8327de12
> RDX: 000000000000008a RSI: ffffc90001a0c000 RDI: ffff8801be615010
> RBP: ffff8801dadff720 R08: 0000000000002002 R09: ffff8801dadff918
> R10: ffff8801dadff738 R11: ffff8801dadffaff R12: ffff8801be615000
> R13: ffff8801dadffd50 R14: 1ffff1003b5bfece R15: ffff8801dadffb90
> udp_recvmsg+0x834/0xa10 net/ipv4/udp.c:1571
> inet_recvmsg+0x121/0x420 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:830
> sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:802 [inline]
> sock_recvmsg+0x7f/0xa0 net/socket.c:809
> ___sys_recvmsg+0x1f0/0x430 net/socket.c:2279
> __sys_recvmsg+0xfc/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2328
> __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
> __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
> __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x48/0x50 net/socket.c:2335
> do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x4a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x4563f9
> RSP: 002b:00007f24f6927b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000072bfa0 RCX: 00000000004563f9
> RDX: 0000000000002002 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000016
> RBP: 00000000000004e4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24f69286d4
> R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 00000000006fc600 R15: 0000000000000000
> Dumping ftrace buffer:
> (ftrace buffer empty)
> Kernel Offset: disabled
> Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
> ==================================================================
>
>
> = About RaceFuzzer
>
> RaceFuzzer is a customized version of Syzkaller, specifically tailored
> to find race condition bugs in the Linux kernel. While we leverage
> many different technique, the notable feature of RaceFuzzer is in
> leveraging a custom hypervisor (QEMU/KVM) to interleave the
> scheduling. In particular, we modified the hypervisor to intentionally
> stall a per-core execution, which is similar to supporting per-core
> breakpoint functionality. This allows RaceFuzzer to force the kernel
> to deterministically trigger racy condition (which may rarely happen
> in practice due to randomness in scheduling).
>
> RaceFuzzer's C repro always pinpoints two racy syscalls. Since C
> repro's scheduling synchronization should be performed at the user
> space, its reproducibility is limited (reproduction may take from 1
> second to 10 minutes (or even more), depending on a bug). This is
> because, while RaceFuzzer precisely interleaves the scheduling at the
> kernel's instruction level when finding this bug, C repro cannot fully
> utilize such a feature. Please disregard all code related to
> "should_hypercall" in the C repro, as this is only for our debugging
> purposes using our own hypervisor.
>
We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>
>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>
> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
< HERE >
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
of the above two operations.
All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
either.
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
>> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
>> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>>
>>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>>
>> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
>
> I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
> atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
> ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
>
> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
> < HERE >
> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>
> Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
>
> Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
> ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
>
> Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
> of the above two operations.
>
> All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
> I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
> either.
Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
but see caveat on reconnect below.
The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
IPV6_ADDRFORM.
I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
msg_name.
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Willem de Bruijn
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
>>> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>>>
>>>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>>>
>>> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
>>
>> I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
>> atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
>> ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
>>
>> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
>> < HERE >
>> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>>
>> Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
>>
>> Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
>> ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
>>
>> Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
>> of the above two operations.
>>
>> All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
>> I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
>> either.
>
> Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
> socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
>
> It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
> but see caveat on reconnect below.
>
> The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
> ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
> whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
> or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
>
> There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
> sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
> IPV6_ADDRFORM.
>
> I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
> real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
> ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
> on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
> msg_name.
In do_ipv6_setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM we can test that the
error queue is empty, and then take its lock for the duration of the
operation.
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:46 PM, Willem de Bruijn
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
>>>> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>>>>
>>>>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>>>>
>>>> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
>>>
>>> I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
>>> atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
>>> ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
>>>
>>> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
>>> < HERE >
>>> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>>>
>>> Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
>>>
>>> Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
>>> ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
>>>
>>> Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
>>> of the above two operations.
>>>
>>> All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
>>> I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
>>> either.
>>
>> Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
>> socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
>>
>> It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
>> but see caveat on reconnect below.
>>
>> The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
>> ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
>> whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
>> or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
>>
>> There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
>> sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
>> IPV6_ADDRFORM.
>>
>> I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
>> real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
>> ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
>> on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
>> msg_name.
>
> In do_ipv6_setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM we can test that the
> error queue is empty, and then take its lock for the duration of the
> operation.
Actually, no reason to hold the lock. This setsockopt holds the socket
lock, which connect would need, too. So testing that the queue
is empty after testing that it is connected to a v4 address is
sufficient to ensure that no ipv6 packets are queued for reception.
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index 4d780c7f0130..a975d6311341 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
int level, int optname,
if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
+ if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) {
+ retv = -EBUSY;
+ break;
+ }
+
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
__ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
After this it should be safe to remove the warning in ip_recv_error.
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Willem de Bruijn
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:46 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
>>>>> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>>>>>
>>>>>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>>>>>
>>>>> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
>>>>
>>>> I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
>>>> atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
>>>> ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
>>>>
>>>> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
>>>> < HERE >
>>>> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>>>>
>>>> Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
>>>>
>>>> Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
>>>> ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
>>>>
>>>> Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
>>>> of the above two operations.
>>>>
>>>> All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
>>>> I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
>>>> either.
>>>
>>> Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
>>> socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
>>>
>>> It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
>>> but see caveat on reconnect below.
>>>
>>> The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
>>> ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
>>> whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
>>> or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
>>>
>>> There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
>>> sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
>>> IPV6_ADDRFORM.
>>>
>>> I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
>>> real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
>>> ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
>>> on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
>>> msg_name.
>>
>> In do_ipv6_setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM we can test that the
>> error queue is empty, and then take its lock for the duration of the
>> operation.
>
> Actually, no reason to hold the lock. This setsockopt holds the socket
> lock, which connect would need, too. So testing that the queue
> is empty after testing that it is connected to a v4 address is
> sufficient to ensure that no ipv6 packets are queued for reception.
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> index 4d780c7f0130..a975d6311341 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> @@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
> int level, int optname,
>
> if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
> !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
> retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
> break;
> }
>
> + if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) {
> + retv = -EBUSY;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> fl6_free_socklist(sk);
> __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
>
> After this it should be safe to remove the warning in ip_recv_error.
Hmm.. nope.
This ensures that the socket cannot produce any new true v6 packets.
But it does not guarantee that they are not already in the system, e.g.
queued in tc, and will find their way to the error queue later.
We'll have to just be able to handle ipv6 packets in ip_recv_error.
Since IPV6_ADDRFORM is used to pass to legacy v4-only
processes and those likely are only confused by SOL_IPV6
error messages, it is probably best to just drop them and perhaps
WARN_ONCE.
On Sun, May 20, 2018 at 7:13 PM, Willem de Bruijn
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:46 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
>>>>>> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
>>>>>
>>>>> I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
>>>>> atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
>>>>> ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
>>>>>
>>>>> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
>>>>> < HERE >
>>>>> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>>>>>
>>>>> Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
>>>>>
>>>>> Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
>>>>> ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
>>>>>
>>>>> Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
>>>>> of the above two operations.
>>>>>
>>>>> All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
>>>>> I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
>>>>> either.
>>>>
>>>> Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
>>>> socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
>>>>
>>>> It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
>>>> but see caveat on reconnect below.
>>>>
>>>> The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
>>>> ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
>>>> whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
>>>> or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
>>>>
>>>> There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
>>>> sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
>>>> IPV6_ADDRFORM.
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
>>>> real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
>>>> ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
>>>> on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
>>>> msg_name.
>>>
>>> In do_ipv6_setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM we can test that the
>>> error queue is empty, and then take its lock for the duration of the
>>> operation.
>>
>> Actually, no reason to hold the lock. This setsockopt holds the socket
>> lock, which connect would need, too. So testing that the queue
>> is empty after testing that it is connected to a v4 address is
>> sufficient to ensure that no ipv6 packets are queued for reception.
>>
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
>> index 4d780c7f0130..a975d6311341 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
>> @@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
>> int level, int optname,
>>
>> if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
>> !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
>> retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> + if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) {
>> + retv = -EBUSY;
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> fl6_free_socklist(sk);
>> __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
>>
>> After this it should be safe to remove the warning in ip_recv_error.
>
> Hmm.. nope.
>
> This ensures that the socket cannot produce any new true v6 packets.
> But it does not guarantee that they are not already in the system, e.g.
> queued in tc, and will find their way to the error queue later.
>
> We'll have to just be able to handle ipv6 packets in ip_recv_error.
> Since IPV6_ADDRFORM is used to pass to legacy v4-only
> processes and those likely are only confused by SOL_IPV6
> error messages, it is probably best to just drop them and perhaps
> WARN_ONCE.
Even more fun, this is not limited to the error queue.
I can queue a v6 packet for reception on a socket, connect to a v4
address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then a regular recvfrom will
return a partial v6 address as AF_INET.
We definitely do not want to have to add a check
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto try_again;
}
to the normal recvmsg path.
An alternative may be to tighten the check on when to allow
IPV6_ADDRFORM. Not only return EBUSY if a packet is pending,
but also if any sk_{rmem, omem, wmem}_alloc is non-zero. Only,
these tightened constraints could break a legacy application.
Either way, this race is somewhat tangential to the one that
RaceFuzzer found. The sk changes that IPV6_ADDRFORM makes
to sk_prot, sk_socket->ops and sk_family are not atomic and will
not be. They need not be, because no other code assumes this
consistency.
So I'll start by removing the warning as Eric suggested.
On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 11:40 AM, Willem de Bruijn
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sun, May 20, 2018 at 7:13 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:46 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>>>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>> From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
>>>>>>> Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
>>>>>> atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
>>>>>> ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
>>>>>> < HERE >
>>>>>> sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
>>>>>> ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
>>>>>> of the above two operations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
>>>>>> I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
>>>>>> either.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
>>>>> socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
>>>>> but see caveat on reconnect below.
>>>>>
>>>>> The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
>>>>> ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
>>>>> whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
>>>>> or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
>>>>>
>>>>> There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
>>>>> sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
>>>>> IPV6_ADDRFORM.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
>>>>> real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
>>>>> ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
>>>>> on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
>>>>> msg_name.
>>>>
>>>> In do_ipv6_setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM we can test that the
>>>> error queue is empty, and then take its lock for the duration of the
>>>> operation.
>>>
>>> Actually, no reason to hold the lock. This setsockopt holds the socket
>>> lock, which connect would need, too. So testing that the queue
>>> is empty after testing that it is connected to a v4 address is
>>> sufficient to ensure that no ipv6 packets are queued for reception.
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
>>> index 4d780c7f0130..a975d6311341 100644
>>> --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
>>> +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
>>> @@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
>>> int level, int optname,
>>>
>>> if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
>>> !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
>>> retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
>>> break;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) {
>>> + retv = -EBUSY;
>>> + break;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> fl6_free_socklist(sk);
>>> __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
>>>
>>> After this it should be safe to remove the warning in ip_recv_error.
>>
>> Hmm.. nope.
>>
>> This ensures that the socket cannot produce any new true v6 packets.
>> But it does not guarantee that they are not already in the system, e.g.
>> queued in tc, and will find their way to the error queue later.
>>
>> We'll have to just be able to handle ipv6 packets in ip_recv_error.
>> Since IPV6_ADDRFORM is used to pass to legacy v4-only
>> processes and those likely are only confused by SOL_IPV6
>> error messages, it is probably best to just drop them and perhaps
>> WARN_ONCE.
>
> Even more fun, this is not limited to the error queue.
>
> I can queue a v6 packet for reception on a socket, connect to a v4
> address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then a regular recvfrom will
> return a partial v6 address as AF_INET.
>
> We definitely do not want to have to add a check
>
> if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
> kfree_skb(skb);
> goto try_again;
> }
>
> to the normal recvmsg path.
>
> An alternative may be to tighten the check on when to allow
> IPV6_ADDRFORM. Not only return EBUSY if a packet is pending,
> but also if any sk_{rmem, omem, wmem}_alloc is non-zero. Only,
> these tightened constraints could break a legacy application.
>
> Either way, this race is somewhat tangential to the one that
> RaceFuzzer found. The sk changes that IPV6_ADDRFORM makes
> to sk_prot, sk_socket->ops and sk_family are not atomic and will
> not be. They need not be, because no other code assumes this
> consistency.
>
> So I'll start by removing the warning as Eric suggested.
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/919270/
On Wed, 2018-05-23 at 11:40 -0400, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> On Sun, May 20, 2018 at 7:13 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:46 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> > > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> > > > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 1:09 PM, Willem de Bruijn
> > > > > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > > > On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 11:44 AM, David Miller <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > > > > From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
> > > > > > > Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 08:30:43 -0700
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > We probably need to revert Willem patch (7ce875e5ecb8562fd44040f69bda96c999e38bbc)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Is it really valid to reach ip_recv_err with an ipv6 socket?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I guess the issue is that setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM is not an
> > > > > > atomic operation, so that the socket is neither fully ipv4 nor fully
> > > > > > ipv6 by the time it reaches ip_recv_error.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
> > > > > > < HERE >
> > > > > > sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Even calling inet_recv_error to demux would not necessarily help.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Safest would be to look up by skb->protocol, similar to what
> > > > > > ipv6_recv_error does to handle v4-mapped-v6.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Or to make that function safe with PF_INET and swap the order
> > > > > > of the above two operations.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > All sound needlessly complicated for this rare socket option, but
> > > > > > I don't have a better idea yet. Dropping on the floor is not nice,
> > > > > > either.
> > > > >
> > > > > Ensuring that ip_recv_error correctly handles packets from either
> > > > > socket and removing the warning should indeed be good.
> > > > >
> > > > > It is robust against v4-mapped packets from an AF_INET6 socket,
> > > > > but see caveat on reconnect below.
> > > > >
> > > > > The code between ipv6_recv_error for v4-mapped addresses and
> > > > > ip_recv_error is essentially the same, the main difference being
> > > > > whether to return network headers as sockaddr_in with SOL_IP
> > > > > or sockaddr_in6 with SOL_IPV6.
> > > > >
> > > > > There are very few other locations in the stack that explicitly test
> > > > > sk_family in this way and thus would be vulnerable to races with
> > > > > IPV6_ADDRFORM.
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm not sure whether it is possible for a udpv6 socket to queue a
> > > > > real ipv6 packet on the error queue, disconnect, connect to an
> > > > > ipv4 address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then call ip_recv_error
> > > > > on a true ipv6 packet. That would return buggy data, e.g., in
> > > > > msg_name.
> > > >
> > > > In do_ipv6_setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM we can test that the
> > > > error queue is empty, and then take its lock for the duration of the
> > > > operation.
> > >
> > > Actually, no reason to hold the lock. This setsockopt holds the socket
> > > lock, which connect would need, too. So testing that the queue
> > > is empty after testing that it is connected to a v4 address is
> > > sufficient to ensure that no ipv6 packets are queued for reception.
> > >
> > > diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> > > index 4d780c7f0130..a975d6311341 100644
> > > --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> > > +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> > > @@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
> > > int level, int optname,
> > >
> > > if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
> > > !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
> > > retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
> > > break;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) {
> > > + retv = -EBUSY;
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > fl6_free_socklist(sk);
> > > __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
> > >
> > > After this it should be safe to remove the warning in ip_recv_error.
> >
> > Hmm.. nope.
> >
> > This ensures that the socket cannot produce any new true v6 packets.
> > But it does not guarantee that they are not already in the system, e.g.
> > queued in tc, and will find their way to the error queue later.
> >
> > We'll have to just be able to handle ipv6 packets in ip_recv_error.
> > Since IPV6_ADDRFORM is used to pass to legacy v4-only
> > processes and those likely are only confused by SOL_IPV6
> > error messages, it is probably best to just drop them and perhaps
> > WARN_ONCE.
>
> Even more fun, this is not limited to the error queue.
>
> I can queue a v6 packet for reception on a socket, connect to a v4
> address, call IPV6_ADDRFORM and then a regular recvfrom will
> return a partial v6 address as AF_INET.
>
> We definitely do not want to have to add a check
>
> if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
> kfree_skb(skb);
> goto try_again;
> }
>
> to the normal recvmsg path.
>
> An alternative may be to tighten the check on when to allow
> IPV6_ADDRFORM. Not only return EBUSY if a packet is pending,
> but also if any sk_{rmem, omem, wmem}_alloc is non-zero. Only,
> these tightened constraints could break a legacy application.
I fear that condition will be very restrictive: for UDP sockets sk_rmem
can be zero only occasionally, after the first packet has been
received, due to the peculiar memory accounting - commit 6b229cf77d68
("This computer thing still completely fool me").
Cheers,
Paolo