This allows to hide all files and directories in the procfs that are not
related to tasks.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <[email protected]>
---
fs/proc/generic.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
fs/proc/inode.c | 7 +++++++
fs/proc/root.c | 12 ++++++++++--
include/linux/proc_fs.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c
index 2078e70..af1295c 100644
--- a/fs/proc/generic.c
+++ b/fs/proc/generic.c
@@ -266,6 +266,11 @@ struct dentry *proc_lookup_de(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct dentry *proc_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(dir->i_sb);
+
+ if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+
return proc_lookup_de(dir, dentry, PDE(dir));
}
@@ -322,10 +327,24 @@ int proc_readdir_de(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
int proc_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(inode->i_sb);
+
+ if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info))
+ return 1;
return proc_readdir_de(file, ctx, PDE(inode));
}
+static int proc_dir_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(inode->i_sb);
+
+ if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* These are the generic /proc directory operations. They
* use the in-memory "struct proc_dir_entry" tree to parse
@@ -335,6 +354,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_dir_operations = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.read = generic_read_dir,
.iterate_shared = proc_readdir,
+ .open = proc_dir_open,
};
/*
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index 5e62598..9b7d9cb 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
if (limit_pids > PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF)
seq_printf(seq, ",limit_pids=%u", limit_pids);
+ if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info))
+ seq_printf(seq, ",pidonly");
+
return 0;
}
@@ -338,12 +341,16 @@ proc_reg_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long orig_addr,
static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(inode->i_sb);
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode);
int rv = 0;
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *);
int (*release)(struct inode *, struct file *);
struct pde_opener *pdeo;
+ if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
/*
* Ensure that
* 1) PDE's ->release hook will be called no matter what
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index c72d22c..daa318e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -28,17 +28,18 @@
#include "internal.h"
enum {
- Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_limit_pids, Opt_err,
+ Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_limit_pids, Opt_pidonly, Opt_err,
};
static const match_table_t tokens = {
{Opt_hidepid, "hidepid=%u"},
{Opt_gid, "gid=%u"},
{Opt_limit_pids, "limit_pids=%u"},
+ {Opt_pidonly, "pidonly"},
{Opt_err, NULL},
};
-/* We only parse 'limit_pids' option here */
+/* We only parse 'limit_pids' and 'pidonly' option here */
int proc_parse_early_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info)
{
char *p, *opts, *orig;
@@ -74,6 +75,11 @@ int proc_parse_early_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info)
proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, true);
pr_info("proc: mounting a new procfs instance ");
break;
+ case Opt_pidonly:
+ proc_fs_set_pidonly(fs_info, PROC_PIDONLY_ON);
+ proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, true);
+ pr_info("proc: mounting a new procfs instance ");
+ break;
case Opt_gid:
case Opt_hidepid:
break;
@@ -126,6 +132,7 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info)
}
proc_fs_set_hide_pid(fs_info, option);
break;
+ case Opt_pidonly:
case Opt_limit_pids:
break;
default:
@@ -198,6 +205,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
/* Set it as early as possible */
proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, false);
proc_fs_set_limit_pids(fs_info, PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF);
+ proc_fs_set_pidonly(fs_info, PROC_PIDONLY_OFF);
if (flags & SB_KERNMOUNT) {
ns = data;
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
index 70e8b10..77137c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ enum { /* definitions for proc mount option limit_pids */
PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_PTRACE = 1, /* Limit pids to only ptracable pids */
};
+enum {
+ PROC_PIDONLY_OFF = 0,
+ PROC_PIDONLY_ON = 1,
+};
+
struct proc_fs_info {
struct super_block *sb;
struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
@@ -26,6 +31,7 @@ struct proc_fs_info {
struct dentry *proc_thread_self; /* For /proc/thread-self/ */
bool newinstance; /* Private flag for new separated instances */
int limit_pids:1;
+ int pidonly:1;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
@@ -60,6 +66,16 @@ static inline int proc_fs_set_limit_pids(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, int value
return 0;
}
+static inline int proc_fs_set_pidonly(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, int value)
+{
+ if (value != PROC_PIDONLY_ON && value != PROC_PIDONLY_OFF)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fs_info->pidonly = value;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int proc_fs_hide_pid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info)
{
return fs_info->pid_ns->hide_pid;
@@ -80,6 +96,11 @@ static inline int proc_fs_limit_pids(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info)
return fs_info->limit_pids;
}
+static inline int proc_fs_pidonly(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info)
+{
+ return fs_info->pidonly;
+}
+
extern void proc_root_init(void);
extern void proc_flush_task(struct task_struct *);
--
2.10.5
On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Alexey Gladkov
<[email protected]> wrote:
> This allows to hide all files and directories in the procfs that are not
> related to tasks.
/proc/$pid/net and /proc/$pid/task/$tid/net aren't in scope for this
protection, even though they contain information about the whole
network namespace of the task, right?
On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 03:58:39PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Alexey Gladkov
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> > This allows to hide all files and directories in the procfs that are not
> > related to tasks.
>
> /proc/$pid/net and /proc/$pid/task/$tid/net aren't in scope for this
> protection, even though they contain information about the whole
> network namespace of the task, right?
Yes. The pidonly makes visible only pids subset. You can still access the
process namespaces via /proc/$pid/ns.
We can think of additional constraints since the parameters are not
stored in the pid namespace anymore.
--
Rgrds, legion
Alexey Gladkov <[email protected]> writes:
> On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 03:58:39PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
>> On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Alexey Gladkov
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > This allows to hide all files and directories in the procfs that are not
>> > related to tasks.
>>
>> /proc/$pid/net and /proc/$pid/task/$tid/net aren't in scope for this
>> protection, even though they contain information about the whole
>> network namespace of the task, right?
>
> Yes. The pidonly makes visible only pids subset. You can still access the
> process namespaces via /proc/$pid/ns.
>
> We can think of additional constraints since the parameters are not
> stored in the pid namespace anymore.
pidonly is fine.
You have to be very careful with this. The existing hidepid option
needs to live in the pid namespace. The issue is if someone is allowed
to mount proc and play with these options as in remount you this may
cause issues.
Eric