From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
memfd_create.
The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
being created.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec119da1d89b..fd40840927c8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, memfd_create, char *name, unsigned int flags)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 4ec80b96c22e..5a18a6552278 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -543,6 +543,10 @@
* simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
* should never be used by the security module.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @memfd_create:
+ * @name is the name of memfd file.
+ * @flags is the flags used in memfd_create.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @mmap_addr :
* Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
* @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca1b7109c0db..5b87a780822a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags);
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags);
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
@@ -963,6 +964,11 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 92f0a5765f7c..f04ed5f0474f 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
goto err_name;
}
+ /* security hook for memfd_create */
+ error = security_memfd_create(name, flags);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
if (flags & MFD_HUGETLB) {
file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE,
HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 79d82cb6e469..57788cf94075 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
+int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(memfd_create, 0, name, flags);
+}
+
int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
{
return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
--
2.39.0.rc1.256.g54fd8350bd-goog
On 12/9/2022 8:04 AM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
>
> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> memfd_create.
>
> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> being created.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> security/security.c | 5 +++++
> 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index ec119da1d89b..fd40840927c8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> unsigned long arg)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, memfd_create, char *name, unsigned int flags)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 4ec80b96c22e..5a18a6552278 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -543,6 +543,10 @@
> * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
> * should never be used by the security module.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @memfd_create:
> + * @name is the name of memfd file.
> + * @flags is the flags used in memfd_create.
> + * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> * @mmap_addr :
> * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
> * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ca1b7109c0db..5b87a780822a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
> int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
> void security_file_free(struct file *file);
> int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
> +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags);
> int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
> unsigned long flags);
> int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
> @@ -963,6 +964,11 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
Add a proper kernel doc comment for this function.
> static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
> index 92f0a5765f7c..f04ed5f0474f 100644
> --- a/mm/memfd.c
> +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> @@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
> goto err_name;
> }
>
> + /* security hook for memfd_create */
> + error = security_memfd_create(name, flags);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
> if (flags & MFD_HUGETLB) {
> file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE,
> HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 79d82cb6e469..57788cf94075 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
>
> +int security_memfd_create(char *name, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(memfd_create, 0, name, flags);
> +}
> +
> int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
> {
> return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
>
> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> memfd_create.
>
> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> being created.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> security/security.c | 5 +++++
> 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
accompany a new LSM hook. Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
well as future LSM implementations. Also, while the BPF LSM is
definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
perspective.
--
paul-moore.com
On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> >
> > The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> > memfd_create.
> >
> > The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> > to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> > being created.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> > mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> > security/security.c | 5 +++++
> > 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
> accompany a new LSM hook. Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
> has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
> well as future LSM implementations. Also, while the BPF LSM is
> definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
> implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
> Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
> perspective.
>
Thanks for the comments.
Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel to block executable
memfd creation ?
Alternatively, it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
landlock, it will be a larger change.
Thanks
Jeff
> --
> paul-moore.com
On 12/13/2022 7:00 AM, Jeff Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
>>>
>>> The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
>>> memfd_create.
>>>
>>> The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
>>> to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
>>> being created.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
>>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
>>> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
>>> mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
>>> security/security.c | 5 +++++
>>> 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>> We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
>> accompany a new LSM hook. Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
>> has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
>> well as future LSM implementations. Also, while the BPF LSM is
>> definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
>> implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
>> Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
>> perspective.
>>
> Thanks for the comments.
> Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel to block executable
> memfd creation ?
> Alternatively, it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
> landlock, it will be a larger change.
I expect you'll get other opinions, but I'd be happy with a small LSM
that does sophisticated memory fd controls. I also expect that the
SELinux crew would like to see a hook included there.
>
> Thanks
>
> Jeff
>
>
>> --
>> paul-moore.com
On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 10:00 AM Jeff Xu <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> > > memfd_create.
> > >
> > > The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> > > to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> > > being created.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> > > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> > > mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> > > security/security.c | 5 +++++
> > > 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> >
> > We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
> > accompany a new LSM hook. Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
> > has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
> > well as future LSM implementations. Also, while the BPF LSM is
> > definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
> > implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
> > Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
> > perspective.
>
> Thanks for the comments.
> Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel to block executable
> memfd creation ?
If you would be proposing the LSM only to meet the requirement of
providing an in-tree LSM example, no that would definitely *not* be
okay.
Proposing a new LSM involves documenting a meaningful security model,
implementing it, developing tests, going through a (likely multi-step)
review process, and finally accepting the long term maintenance
responsibilities of this new LSM. If you are proposing a new LSM
because you feel the current LSMs do not provide a security model
which meets your needs, then yes, proposing a new LSM might be a good
idea. However, if you are proposing a new LSM because you don't want
to learn how to add a new hook to an existing LSM, then I suspect you
are misguided/misinformed with the amount of work involved in
submitting a new LSM.
> Alternatively, it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
> landlock, it will be a larger change.
It will be a much smaller change than submitting a new LSM, and it
would have infinitely more value to the community than a throw-away
LSM where the only use-case is getting your code merged upstream.
--
paul-moore.com
On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 11:22 AM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 10:00 AM Jeff Xu <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 10:29 AM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 11:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> > > >
> > > > The new security_memfd_create allows lsm to check flags of
> > > > memfd_create.
> > > >
> > > > The security by default system (such as chromeos) can use this
> > > > to implement system wide lsm to allow only non-executable memfd
> > > > being created.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
> > > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> > > > ---
> > > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
> > > > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> > > > mm/memfd.c | 5 +++++
> > > > security/security.c | 5 +++++
> > > > 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > We typically require at least one in-tree LSM implementation to
> > > accompany a new LSM hook. Beyond simply providing proof that the hook
> > > has value, it helps provide a functional example both for reviewers as
> > > well as future LSM implementations. Also, while the BPF LSM is
> > > definitely "in-tree", its nature is such that the actual
> > > implementation lives out-of-tree; something like SELinux, AppArmor,
> > > Smack, etc. are much more desirable from an in-tree example
> > > perspective.
> >
> > Thanks for the comments.
> > Would that be OK if I add a new LSM in the kernel to block executable
> > memfd creation ?
>
> If you would be proposing the LSM only to meet the requirement of
> providing an in-tree LSM example, no that would definitely *not* be
> okay.
>
> Proposing a new LSM involves documenting a meaningful security model,
> implementing it, developing tests, going through a (likely multi-step)
> review process, and finally accepting the long term maintenance
> responsibilities of this new LSM. If you are proposing a new LSM
> because you feel the current LSMs do not provide a security model
> which meets your needs, then yes, proposing a new LSM might be a good
> idea. However, if you are proposing a new LSM because you don't want
> to learn how to add a new hook to an existing LSM, then I suspect you
> are misguided/misinformed with the amount of work involved in
> submitting a new LSM.
>
> > Alternatively, it might be possible to add this into SELinux or
> > landlock, it will be a larger change.
>
> It will be a much smaller change than submitting a new LSM, and it
> would have infinitely more value to the community than a throw-away
> LSM where the only use-case is getting your code merged upstream.
>
Thanks, my original thought is this LSM will be used by ChromeOS,
since all of its memfd shall be non-executable. That said, I see the community
will benefit more with this in SELinux.
I will work to add this in SELinux, appreciate help while I'm learning
to add this.
Jeff
> --
> paul-moore.com