Syzkaller reported the following issue:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2807 at mm/vmalloc.c:3247 __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2807 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #12
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
unwind_backtrace from show_stack (arch/arm/kernel/traps.c:258)
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))
dump_stack_lvl from __warn (kernel/panic.c:633 kernel/panic.c:680)
__warn from warn_slowpath_fmt (./include/linux/context_tracking.h:153 kernel/panic.c:700)
warn_slowpath_fmt from __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361 (discriminator 3))
__vmalloc_node_range from vmalloc_user (mm/vmalloc.c:3478)
vmalloc_user from xskq_create (net/xdp/xsk_queue.c:40)
xskq_create from xsk_setsockopt (net/xdp/xsk.c:953 net/xdp/xsk.c:1286)
xsk_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2308)
__sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall (arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S:68)
xskq_get_ring_size() uses struct_size() macro to safely calculate the
size of struct xsk_queue and q->nentries of desc members. But the
syzkaller repro was able to set q->nentries with the value initially
taken from copy_from_sockptr() high enough to return SIZE_MAX by
struct_size(). The next PAGE_ALIGN(size) is such case will overflow
the size_t value and set it to 0. This will trigger WARN_ON_ONCE in
vmalloc_user() -> __vmalloc_node_range().
The issue is reproducible on 32-bit arm kernel.
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fae676d3cf469331fc89
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
Fixes: 9f78bf330a66 ("xsk: support use vaddr as ring")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Kanner <[email protected]>
---
Notes (akanner):
v4:
- add explanation about SIZE_MAX, suggested by Martin KaFai Lau
<[email protected]>
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
- free kzalloc-ed memory before return, the leak was noticed by
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/raw
- use unlikely() optimization for the case with SIZE_MAX return from
struct_size(), suggested by Alexander Lobakin
<[email protected]>
- cc-ed 4 more maintainers, mentioned by cc_maintainers patchwork
test
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
- RFC notes:
It was found that net/xdp/xsk.c:xsk_setsockopt() uses
copy_from_sockptr() to get the number of entries (int) for cases
with XDP_RX_RING / XDP_TX_RING and XDP_UMEM_FILL_RING /
XDP_UMEM_COMPLETION_RING.
Next in xsk_init_queue() there're 2 sanity checks (entries == 0)
and (!is_power_of_2(entries)) for which -EINVAL will be returned.
After that net/xdp/xsk_queue.c:xskq_create() will calculate the
size multipling the number of entries (int) with the size of u64,
at least.
I wonder if there should be the upper bound (e.g. the 3rd sanity
check inside xsk_init_queue()). It seems that without the upper
limit it's quiet easy to overflow the allocated size (SIZE_MAX),
especially for 32-bit architectures, for example arm nodes which
were used by the syzkaller.
In this patch I added a naive check for SIZE_MAX which helped to
skip zero-size allocation after overflow, but maybe it's not quite
right. Please, suggest if you have any thoughts about the
appropriate limit for the size of these xdp rings.
PS: the initial number of entries is 0x20000000 in syzkaller
repro: syscall(__NR_setsockopt, (intptr_t)r[0], 0x11b, 3,
0x20000040, 0x20);
Link:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=10910f18280000
net/xdp/xsk_queue.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c b/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c
index f8905400ee07..d2c264030017 100644
--- a/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c
+++ b/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c
@@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ struct xsk_queue *xskq_create(u32 nentries, bool umem_queue)
q->ring_mask = nentries - 1;
size = xskq_get_ring_size(q, umem_queue);
+
+ /* size which is overflowing or close to SIZE_MAX will become 0 in
+ * PAGE_ALIGN(), checking SIZE_MAX is enough due to the previous
+ * is_power_of_2(), the rest will be handled by vmalloc_user()
+ */
+ if (unlikely(size == SIZE_MAX)) {
+ kfree(q);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
q->ring = vmalloc_user(size);
--
2.39.3
On Sat, 7 Oct 2023 at 09:52, Andrew Kanner <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Syzkaller reported the following issue:
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2807 at mm/vmalloc.c:3247 __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361)
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 PID: 2807 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #12
> Hardware name: Generic DT based system
> unwind_backtrace from show_stack (arch/arm/kernel/traps.c:258)
> show_stack from dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))
> dump_stack_lvl from __warn (kernel/panic.c:633 kernel/panic.c:680)
> __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt (./include/linux/context_tracking.h:153 kernel/panic.c:700)
> warn_slowpath_fmt from __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361 (discriminator 3))
> __vmalloc_node_range from vmalloc_user (mm/vmalloc.c:3478)
> vmalloc_user from xskq_create (net/xdp/xsk_queue.c:40)
> xskq_create from xsk_setsockopt (net/xdp/xsk.c:953 net/xdp/xsk.c:1286)
> xsk_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2308)
> __sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall (arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S:68)
>
> xskq_get_ring_size() uses struct_size() macro to safely calculate the
> size of struct xsk_queue and q->nentries of desc members. But the
> syzkaller repro was able to set q->nentries with the value initially
> taken from copy_from_sockptr() high enough to return SIZE_MAX by
> struct_size(). The next PAGE_ALIGN(size) is such case will overflow
> the size_t value and set it to 0. This will trigger WARN_ON_ONCE in
> vmalloc_user() -> __vmalloc_node_range().
>
> The issue is reproducible on 32-bit arm kernel.
>
> Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
> Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fae676d3cf469331fc89
> Reported-by: [email protected]
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
> Fixes: 9f78bf330a66 ("xsk: support use vaddr as ring")
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Kanner <[email protected]>
Thanks Andrew for fixing this.
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
> ---
>
> Notes (akanner):
> v4:
> - add explanation about SIZE_MAX, suggested by Martin KaFai Lau
> <[email protected]>
> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
> - free kzalloc-ed memory before return, the leak was noticed by
> Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/raw
> - use unlikely() optimization for the case with SIZE_MAX return from
> struct_size(), suggested by Alexander Lobakin
> <[email protected]>
> - cc-ed 4 more maintainers, mentioned by cc_maintainers patchwork
> test
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
> - RFC notes:
> It was found that net/xdp/xsk.c:xsk_setsockopt() uses
> copy_from_sockptr() to get the number of entries (int) for cases
> with XDP_RX_RING / XDP_TX_RING and XDP_UMEM_FILL_RING /
> XDP_UMEM_COMPLETION_RING.
>
> Next in xsk_init_queue() there're 2 sanity checks (entries == 0)
> and (!is_power_of_2(entries)) for which -EINVAL will be returned.
>
> After that net/xdp/xsk_queue.c:xskq_create() will calculate the
> size multipling the number of entries (int) with the size of u64,
> at least.
>
> I wonder if there should be the upper bound (e.g. the 3rd sanity
> check inside xsk_init_queue()). It seems that without the upper
> limit it's quiet easy to overflow the allocated size (SIZE_MAX),
> especially for 32-bit architectures, for example arm nodes which
> were used by the syzkaller.
>
> In this patch I added a naive check for SIZE_MAX which helped to
> skip zero-size allocation after overflow, but maybe it's not quite
> right. Please, suggest if you have any thoughts about the
> appropriate limit for the size of these xdp rings.
>
> PS: the initial number of entries is 0x20000000 in syzkaller
> repro: syscall(__NR_setsockopt, (intptr_t)r[0], 0x11b, 3,
> 0x20000040, 0x20);
>
> Link:
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=10910f18280000
>
> net/xdp/xsk_queue.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c b/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c
> index f8905400ee07..d2c264030017 100644
> --- a/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c
> +++ b/net/xdp/xsk_queue.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ struct xsk_queue *xskq_create(u32 nentries, bool umem_queue)
> q->ring_mask = nentries - 1;
>
> size = xskq_get_ring_size(q, umem_queue);
> +
> + /* size which is overflowing or close to SIZE_MAX will become 0 in
> + * PAGE_ALIGN(), checking SIZE_MAX is enough due to the previous
> + * is_power_of_2(), the rest will be handled by vmalloc_user()
> + */
> + if (unlikely(size == SIZE_MAX)) {
> + kfree(q);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
>
> q->ring = vmalloc_user(size);
> --
> 2.39.3
>
>
Hello:
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master)
by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:
On Sat, 7 Oct 2023 10:51:49 +0300 you wrote:
> Syzkaller reported the following issue:
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2807 at mm/vmalloc.c:3247 __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361)
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 PID: 2807 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #12
> Hardware name: Generic DT based system
> unwind_backtrace from show_stack (arch/arm/kernel/traps.c:258)
> show_stack from dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))
> dump_stack_lvl from __warn (kernel/panic.c:633 kernel/panic.c:680)
> __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt (./include/linux/context_tracking.h:153 kernel/panic.c:700)
> warn_slowpath_fmt from __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361 (discriminator 3))
> __vmalloc_node_range from vmalloc_user (mm/vmalloc.c:3478)
> vmalloc_user from xskq_create (net/xdp/xsk_queue.c:40)
> xskq_create from xsk_setsockopt (net/xdp/xsk.c:953 net/xdp/xsk.c:1286)
> xsk_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2308)
> __sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall (arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S:68)
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf,v4] net/xdp: fix zero-size allocation warning in xskq_create()
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/a12bbb3cccf0
You are awesome, thank you!
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