2020-09-16 07:36:54

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Hi,

This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
without CMA.

v5 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc5
* drop boot time memory reservation patch

v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to
memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)

v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the
command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable
it only on x86.

v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.
CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems
from one side and still make it available unconditionally on
architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP.

The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.

Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users,
such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is
trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants
mappings.

Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest
memory in a virtual machine host.

For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
[1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to
redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret
keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is
expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the
use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with
secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give
them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the
toolkits without any need for user application modification.

I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to
add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've
started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely
independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.

Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of
the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as
well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.

The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to
implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm
ABIs in the future.

As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised
during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size
pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the
secret memory areas.

v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/


Mike Rapoport (5):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

arch/Kconfig | 7 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
fs/dax.c | 11 +-
include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +-
include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 +
kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 +
mm/Kconfig | 4 +
mm/Makefile | 1 +
mm/internal.h | 3 +
mm/mmap.c | 5 +-
mm/secretmem.c | 333 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
20 files changed, 383 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h
create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c

--
2.28.0


2020-09-16 07:37:14

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5 1/5] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the
second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other
cases as well.

Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of
second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use
PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
---
fs/dax.c | 11 ++++-------
include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/dax.c b/fs/dax.c
index 994ab66a9907..c0b9aa4bda9e 100644
--- a/fs/dax.c
+++ b/fs/dax.c
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)
#define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)
#define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)

-/* The order of a PMD entry */
-#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
-
static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES];

static int __init init_dax_wait_table(void)
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)
static unsigned int dax_entry_order(void *entry)
{
if (xa_to_value(entry) & DAX_PMD)
- return PMD_ORDER;
+ return PMD_PAGE_ORDER;
return 0;
}

@@ -1455,7 +1452,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
- XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_ORDER);
+ XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address & PMD_MASK;
bool write = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
bool sync;
@@ -1514,7 +1511,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,
* entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return
* VM_FAULT_FALLBACK.
*/
- entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_ORDER);
+ entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
if (xa_is_internal(entry)) {
result = xa_to_internal(entry);
goto fallback;
@@ -1680,7 +1677,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)
if (order == 0)
ret = vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD
- else if (order == PMD_ORDER)
+ else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER)
ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
#endif
else
diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
index e8cbc2e795d5..b0389078df39 100644
--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
#define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL
#endif

+/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */
+#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+
/*
* A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD]
*
--
2.28.0

2020-09-16 07:38:24

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5 5/5] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is
allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of
the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages
as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.

Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with
PMD-size pages.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
---
mm/secretmem.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 88 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 3293f761076e..333eb18fb483 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/genalloc.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -40,24 +41,66 @@
#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK

struct secretmem_ctx {
+ struct gen_pool *pool;
unsigned int mode;
};

-static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp)
+static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
{
- /*
- * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map
- * fragmentation
- */
- return alloc_page(gfp);
+ unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
+ struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ struct page *page;
+ int err;
+
+ page = alloc_pages(gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+ split_page(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
+
+ err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+ if (err) {
+ __free_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ __kernel_map_pages(page, nr_pages, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ struct page *page;
+ int err;
+
+ if (gen_pool_avail(pool) < PAGE_SIZE) {
+ err = secretmem_pool_increase(ctx, gfp);
+ if (err)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ addr = gen_pool_alloc(pool, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!addr)
+ return NULL;
+
+ page = virt_to_page(addr);
+ get_page(page);
+
+ return page;
}

static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
+ struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
- unsigned long addr;
struct page *page;
int ret = 0;

@@ -66,7 +109,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)

page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset);
if (!page) {
- page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
+ page = secretmem_alloc_page(ctx, vmf->gfp_mask);
if (!page)
return vmf_error(-ENOMEM);

@@ -74,14 +117,8 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
if (unlikely(ret))
goto err_put_page;

- ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
- if (ret)
- goto err_del_page_cache;
-
- addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
- flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
-
__SetPageUptodate(page);
+ set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ctx);

ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
}
@@ -89,8 +126,6 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
vmf->page = page;
return ret;

-err_del_page_cache:
- delete_from_page_cache(page);
err_put_page:
put_page(page);
return vmf_error(ret);
@@ -138,7 +173,11 @@ static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping,

static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page)
{
- set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+ struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = (struct secretmem_ctx *)page_private(page);
+ struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
+
+ gen_pool_free(pool, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
}

static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = {
@@ -163,13 +202,18 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
if (!ctx)
goto err_free_inode;

+ ctx->pool = gen_pool_create(PAGE_SHIFT, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+ if (!ctx->pool)
+ goto err_free_ctx;
+
file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
if (IS_ERR(file))
- goto err_free_ctx;
+ goto err_free_pool;

mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);

+ inode->i_private = ctx;
inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx;
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;

@@ -183,6 +227,8 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)

return file;

+err_free_pool:
+ gen_pool_destroy(ctx->pool);
err_free_ctx:
kfree(ctx);
err_free_inode:
@@ -221,11 +267,34 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)
return err;
}

+static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,
+ struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr;
+ unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr;
+ unsigned long nr_pages, addr;
+
+ nr_pages = (end - start + 1) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ __kernel_map_pages(virt_to_page(start), nr_pages, 1);
+
+ for (addr = start; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE)
+ put_page(virt_to_page(addr));
+}
+
+static void secretmem_cleanup_pool(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
+
+ gen_pool_for_each_chunk(pool, secretmem_cleanup_chunk, ctx);
+ gen_pool_destroy(pool);
+}
+
static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private;

truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
+ secretmem_cleanup_pool(ctx);
clear_inode(inode);
kfree(ctx);
}
--
2.28.0

2020-09-16 07:39:20

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 ++++++-
8 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
index 3b859596840d..b3b2019f8d16 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)

-#define __NR_compat_syscalls 440
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls 441
#endif

#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
index 734860ac7cf9..ce0838fc7a5c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
@@ -887,6 +887,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2)
__SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)
#define __NR_faccessat2 439
__SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2)
+#define __NR_memfd_secret 440
+__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret)

/*
* Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
index f83a70e07df8..ce2ee8f1e361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@
#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT
#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS
#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3
+#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET

#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h
index 977ee6181dab..6c316093a1e5 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
*/

#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
+#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET

#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 9d1102873666..e7a58a360732 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -444,3 +444,4 @@
437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2
438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd
439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2
+440 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index f30d6ae9a688..635d7aa2bb9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@
437 common openat2 sys_openat2
438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd
439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2
+440 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret

#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 75ac7f8ae93c..78afb99c6892 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,
siginfo_t __user *info,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned long flags);

/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 995b36c2ea7d..d063e37dbb4a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -860,8 +860,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)
#define __NR_faccessat2 439
__SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2)

+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
+#define __NR_memfd_secret 440
+__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret)
+#endif
+
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 440
+#define __NR_syscalls 441

/*
* 32 bit systems traditionally used different
--
2.28.0

2020-09-16 07:39:28

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/5] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
---
mm/internal.h | 3 +++
mm/mmap.c | 5 ++---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h
index 10c677655912..40544fbf49c9 100644
--- a/mm/internal.h
+++ b/mm/internal.h
@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page);
extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page);

+extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long len);
+
/*
* Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where
* we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 40248d84ad5f..190761920142 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1310,9 +1310,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
return hint;
}

-static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
- unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long len)
+int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;

--
2.28.0

2020-09-16 07:39:37

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v5 3/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.

The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call
where flags supplied as a parameter to this system call will define the
desired protection mode for the memory associated with that file
descriptor.

Currently there are two protection modes:

* exclusive - the memory area is unmapped from the kernel direct map and it
is present only in the page tables of the owning mm.
* uncached - the memory area is present only in the page tables of the
owning mm and it is mapped there as uncached.

The "exclusive" mode is enabled implicitly and it is the default mode for
memfd_secret().

The "uncached" mode requires architecture support and an architecture
should opt-in for this mode using HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED configuration
option.

For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error
handling is omitted):

fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED);
ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
---
arch/Kconfig | 7 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 +
kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 +
mm/Kconfig | 4 +
mm/Makefile | 1 +
mm/secretmem.c | 264 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 288 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h
create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index af14a567b493..8d161bd4142d 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -975,6 +975,13 @@ config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
config ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA
bool

+config HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED
+ bool
+ help
+ An architecture can select this if its semantics of non-cached
+ mappings can be used to prevent speculative loads and it is
+ useful for secret protection.
+
source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"

source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7101ac64bb20..38ead8bd9909 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
+ select HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED
select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@
#define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d /* "DMEM" */
#define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33
#define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590
+#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d /* "SECM" */

#endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h b/include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2b9675f5dea9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H
+
+/* secretmem operation modes */
+#define SECRETMEM_UNCACHED 0x1
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H */
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 4d59775ea79c..8ae8d0c2d381 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);
COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc);
COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);

+/* memfd_secret */
+COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret);

/*
* Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 6c974888f86f..70cfc20d7caa 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -868,4 +868,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD
config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS
bool

+config SECRETMEM
+ def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED
+ select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
+
endmenu
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index d5649f1c12c0..cae063dc8298 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3293f761076e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2020
+ *
+ * Author: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/memfd.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/secretmem.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
+
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt
+
+/*
+ * Secret memory areas are always exclusive to owning mm and they are
+ * removed from the direct map.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED
+#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (SECRETMEM_UNCACHED)
+#else
+#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0)
+#endif
+
+#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK
+
+struct secretmem_ctx {
+ unsigned int mode;
+};
+
+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ /*
+ * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map
+ * fragmentation
+ */
+ return alloc_page(gfp);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
+ pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ struct page *page;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
+ return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
+
+ page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset);
+ if (!page) {
+ page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
+ if (!page)
+ return vmf_error(-ENOMEM);
+
+ ret = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ goto err_put_page;
+
+ ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_del_page_cache;
+
+ addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+ flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ __SetPageUptodate(page);
+
+ ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+ }
+
+ vmf->page = page;
+ return ret;
+
+err_del_page_cache:
+ delete_from_page_cache(page);
+err_put_page:
+ put_page(page);
+ return vmf_error(ret);
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
+ .fault = secretmem_fault,
+};
+
+static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
+ unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ if (ctx->mode & SECRETMEM_UNCACHED)
+ vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
+
+ vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops;
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
+ .mmap = secretmem_mmap,
+};
+
+static bool secretmem_isolate_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping,
+ struct page *newpage, struct page *page,
+ enum migrate_mode mode)
+{
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page)
+{
+ set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+}
+
+static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = {
+ .freepage = secretmem_freepage,
+ .migratepage = secretmem_migratepage,
+ .isolate_page = secretmem_isolate_page,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt;
+
+static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ struct secretmem_ctx *ctx;
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
+ if (IS_ERR(inode))
+ return ERR_CAST(inode);
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto err_free_inode;
+
+ file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
+ O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ goto err_free_ctx;
+
+ mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
+
+ inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx;
+ inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
+
+ /* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */
+ inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
+ inode->i_size = 0;
+
+ file->private_data = ctx;
+
+ ctx->mode = flags & SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK;
+
+ return file;
+
+err_free_ctx:
+ kfree(ctx);
+err_free_inode:
+ iput(inode);
+ return file;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ int fd, err;
+
+ /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
+
+ if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ file = secretmem_file_create(flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto err_put_fd;
+ }
+
+ file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
+
+ fd_install(fd, file);
+ return fd;
+
+err_put_fd:
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private;
+
+ truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
+ clear_inode(inode);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = {
+ .evict_inode = secretmem_evict_inode,
+};
+
+static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC);
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
+ .name = "secretmem",
+ .init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context,
+ .kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+static int secretmem_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
+ if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt))
+ ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+fs_initcall(secretmem_init);
--
2.28.0

2020-09-16 21:11:20

by Randy Dunlap

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

Hi Mike,


On 9/16/20 12:35 AM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/Kconfig | 7 +
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 +
> kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 +
> mm/Kconfig | 4 +
> mm/Makefile | 1 +
> mm/secretmem.c | 264 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 288 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h
> create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index af14a567b493..8d161bd4142d 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -975,6 +975,13 @@ config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
> config ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA
> bool
>
> +config HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED
> + bool
> + help
> + An architecture can select this if its semantics of non-cached
> + mappings can be used to prevent speculative loads and it is
> + useful for secret protection.

Please use tabs instead of spaces for indentation.

> +
> source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
>
> source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"

> diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
> index 6c974888f86f..70cfc20d7caa 100644
> --- a/mm/Kconfig
> +++ b/mm/Kconfig
> @@ -868,4 +868,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD
> config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS
> bool
>
> +config SECRETMEM
> + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED

Use tab above for indentation.

> + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
> +
> endmenu


thanks.
--
~Randy

2020-09-16 23:21:55

by Andrew Morton

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

On Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:35:34 +0300 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:

> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> without CMA.

It seems early days for this, especially as regards reviewer buyin.
But I'll toss it in there to get it some additional testing.

A test suite in tools/testging/selftests/ would be helpful, especially
for arch maintainers.

I assume that user-facing manpage alterations are planned?

Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

On Thu, 17 Sep 2020 at 01:20, Andrew Morton <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:35:34 +0300 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> > I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> > required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> > without CMA.
>
> It seems early days for this, especially as regards reviewer buyin.
> But I'll toss it in there to get it some additional testing.
>
> A test suite in tools/testging/selftests/ would be helpful, especially
> for arch maintainers.
>
> I assume that user-facing manpage alterations are planned?

I was just about to write a mail into this thread when I saw this :-).

So far, I don't think I saw a manual page patch. Mike, how about it?

Thanks,

Michael

--
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

2020-09-17 06:12:06

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 07:46:12AM +0200, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> On Thu, 17 Sep 2020 at 01:20, Andrew Morton <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:35:34 +0300 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> > > I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> > > required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> > > without CMA.
> >
> > It seems early days for this, especially as regards reviewer buyin.
> > But I'll toss it in there to get it some additional testing.
> >
> > A test suite in tools/testging/selftests/ would be helpful, especially
> > for arch maintainers.
> >
> > I assume that user-facing manpage alterations are planned?

> I was just about to write a mail into this thread when I saw this :-).
>
> So far, I don't think I saw a manual page patch. Mike, how about it?

It is planned :)

I have a draft, but I'm waiting for consensus about the uncached
mappings before sending it out.

--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

2020-09-17 06:13:43

by Mike Rapoport

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 04:20:20PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:35:34 +0300 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> > I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> > required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> > without CMA.
>
> It seems early days for this, especially as regards reviewer buyin.
> But I'll toss it in there to get it some additional testing.

Thanks!

> A test suite in tools/testging/selftests/ would be helpful, especially
> for arch maintainers.

I'll look into it.

> I assume that user-facing manpage alterations are planned?

Of course.

--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

2020-09-17 13:34:16

by Qian Cai

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

On Wed, 2020-09-16 at 10:35 +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
>
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> without CMA.

On powerpc: https://gitlab.com/cailca/linux-mm/-/blob/master/powerpc.config

There is a compiling warning from the today's linux-next:

<stdin>:1532:2: warning: #warning syscall memfd_secret not implemented [-Wcpp]

2020-09-18 18:28:33

by Qian Cai

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

On Thu, 2020-09-17 at 09:27 -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
> On Wed, 2020-09-16 at 10:35 +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> > I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> > required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> > without CMA.
>
> On powerpc: https://gitlab.com/cailca/linux-mm/-/blob/master/powerpc.config
>
> There is a compiling warning from the today's linux-next:
>
> <stdin>:1532:2: warning: #warning syscall memfd_secret not implemented [-Wcpp]

This should silence the warning:

diff --git a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755
--- a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
+++ b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF
#define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */
#endif

+#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
+#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret
+#endif
+
/* Missing flags argument */
#define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */

2020-09-21 08:10:38

by Stephen Rothwell

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

Hi all,

On Fri, 18 Sep 2020 14:25:15 -0400 Qian Cai <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2020-09-17 at 09:27 -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
> > On Wed, 2020-09-16 at 10:35 +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> > > I've dropped the boot time reservation patch for now as it is not strictly
> > > required for the basic usage and can be easily added later either with or
> > > without CMA.
> >
> > On powerpc: https://gitlab.com/cailca/linux-mm/-/blob/master/powerpc.config
> >
> > There is a compiling warning from the today's linux-next:
> >
> > <stdin>:1532:2: warning: #warning syscall memfd_secret not implemented [-Wcpp]
>
> This should silence the warning:
>
> diff --git a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
> index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755
> --- a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
> +++ b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
> @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF
> #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
> +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret
> +#endif
> +
> /* Missing flags argument */
> #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */
>

Added to linux-next today.

--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell


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