2001-04-13 09:48:12

by Dawson Engler

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [CHECKER] security rules?


We're looking at making a set of security checkers. Does anyone have
suggestions for good things to go after in addition to the usual
copy_*_user and buffer overrun bugs? For example, are there any
documents that describe the rules for when/how 'capable' is supposed to
be used?

Thanks for any help,
Dawson


2001-04-13 12:08:02

by Chris Evans

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [CHECKER] security rules?


Hi Dawson,

Excellent project.

Can I suggest that you check for signedness issues? A typical signature of
a signedness problem is:

int i = get_from_userspace_somehow();
/* Sanity check i */
if (i > MAX_LEN_FOR_I)
goto bad_bad_out;
/* Bug here!! i can be negative! */


I suspect you find a lot of these sort of errors. I've already nailed a
few.

Cheers
Chris

On Fri, 13 Apr 2001, Dawson Engler wrote:

>
> We're looking at making a set of security checkers. Does anyone have
> suggestions for good things to go after in addition to the usual
> copy_*_user and buffer overrun bugs? For example, are there any
> documents that describe the rules for when/how 'capable' is supposed to
> be used?
>
> Thanks for any help,
> Dawson
> -
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>

2001-04-26 21:51:52

by William Ie

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [CHECKER] security rules?

Hi, my name is William Ie and I am currently working with the mc group. We
are currently looking into how capability checks are used in the 2.4.3
kernel. Along the way, we found a few potential bugs that we are not too
sure about. Please bear in mind our checker right now is still very very
crude.
1.
linux/2.4.3/drivers/block/cciss.c:381:cciss_ioctl:
put_user(hba[ctlr]->hd[MINOR(inode->i_rdev)].start_sect,
&geo->start);
return 0;
case BLKGETSIZE:
if (!arg) return -EINVAL;
put_user(hba[ctlr]->hd[MINOR(inode->i_rdev)].nr_sects,
(long*)arg);
return 0;
case BLKRRPART:
return revalidate_logvol(inode->i_rdev, 1);
Error --->
case BLKFLSBUF:
our analysis indicates that servicing of the BLKRRPART requires the
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability check, which is not being done here. Is this a
bug?
2.
linux/2.4.3/drivers/block/cpqarray.c:1182:ida_ioctl:

case IDAGETDRVINFO:
return
copy_to_user(&io->c.drv,&hba[ctlr]->drv[dsk],sizeof(drv_info_t));
case BLKGETSIZE:
if (!arg) return -EINVAL;

put_user(ida[(ctlr<<CTLR_SHIFT)+MINOR(inode->i_rdev)].nr_sects,
(long*)arg);
return 0;
case BLKRRPART:
return revalidate_logvol(inode->i_rdev, 1);
Error --->
case IDAPASSTHRU:
if (!suser()) return -EPERM;
error = copy_from_user(&my_io, io, sizeof(my_io));
if (error) return error;
error = ida_ctlr_ioctl(ctlr, dsk, &my_io);

Same as above.
3.
linux/2.4.3/net/rose/af_rose.c:1290:rose_ioctl:
case SIOCRSSCAUSE: {
struct rose_cause_struct rose_cause;
if (copy_from_user(&rose_cause, (void *)arg,
sizeof(struct rose_cause_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
sk->protinfo.rose->cause = rose_cause.cause;
sk->protinfo.rose->diagnostic =
rose_cause.diagnostic;
return 0;
}
The code appears to us to be configuring the device without CAP_NET_ADMIN
capability although we are not too sure that this is actually ok.
4.linux/2.4.3/drivers/net/ppp_async.c:345:ppp_async_ioctl
case PPPIOCGFLAGS:
val = ap->flags | ap->rbits;
if (put_user(val, (int *) arg))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCSFLAGS:
if (get_user(val, (int *) arg))
break;
ap->flags = val & ~SC_RCV_BITS;
spin_lock_bh(&ap->recv_lock);
ap->rbits = val & SC_RCV_BITS;
spin_unlock_bh(&ap->recv_lock);
err = 0;
break;
seems to be getting and setting some flags without CAP_NET_ADMIN like in
ppp_synctty.c
5.
linux/2.4.3/drivers/isdn/isdn_ppp.c:478:isdn_ppp_ioctl
case PPPIOCGFLAGS: /* get configuration flags */
if ((r = set_arg((void *) arg,
&is->pppcfg,sizeof(is->pppcfg) )))
return r;
break;
Error --->
case PPPIOCSFLAGS: /* set configuration flags */
if ((r = get_arg((void *) arg, &val,
sizeof(val) ))) {
return r;
}
if (val & SC_ENABLE_IP && !(is->pppcfg &
SC_ENABLE_IP) && (is->state & IPPP_CONNECT)) {
Same as above.
6.linux/2.4.3/drivers/net/ppp_generic.c:550:ppp_ioctl


case PPPIOCGFLAGS:
val = ppp->flags | ppp->xstate | ppp->rstate;
if (put_user(val, (int *) arg))
break;
err = 0;
break;

Error --->
Same as above.



2001-04-27 04:19:57

by Paul Mackerras

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [CHECKER] security rules?

William Ie writes:

> 4.linux/2.4.3/drivers/net/ppp_async.c:345:ppp_async_ioctl
> case PPPIOCGFLAGS:
> val = ap->flags | ap->rbits;
> if (put_user(val, (int *) arg))
> break;
> err = 0;
> break;
> case PPPIOCSFLAGS:
> if (get_user(val, (int *) arg))
> break;
> ap->flags = val & ~SC_RCV_BITS;
> spin_lock_bh(&ap->recv_lock);
> ap->rbits = val & SC_RCV_BITS;
> spin_unlock_bh(&ap->recv_lock);
> err = 0;
> break;
> seems to be getting and setting some flags without CAP_NET_ADMIN like in
> ppp_synctty.c

It is OK because this is a channel ioctl routine called from
ppp_generic.c as a result of an ioctl call on /dev/ppp, and it is not
possible to open /dev/ppp unless you have CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Paul.