This patch adds a new prctl called PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE which allows
processes to hide their own /proc/*/exe file. When this prctl is
used, every access to /proc/*/exe for the calling process will
fail with ENOENT.
This is useful for preventing issues like CVE-2019-5736, where an
attacker can gain host root access by overwriting the binary
in OCI runtimes through file-descriptor mishandling in containers.
The current fix for CVE-2019-5736 is to create a read-only copy or
a bind-mount of the current executable, and then re-exec the current
process. With the new prctl, the read-only copy or bind-mount copy is
not needed anymore.
While map_files/ also might contain symlinks to files in host,
proc_map_files_get_link() permissions checks are already sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]>
---
fs/exec.c | 1 +
fs/proc/base.c | 8 +++++---
include/linux/sched.h | 5 +++++
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
kernel/sys.c | 9 +++++++++
tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
v1: https://lkml.org/lkml/2023/1/4/334
Differences from v1:
- amended more information in the commit message wrt map_files not
requiring the same protection.
- changed the test to verify PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE cannot be unset after
a fork.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index ab913243a367..5a5dd964c3a3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1855,6 +1855,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
+ task_clear_hide_self_exe(current);
rseq_execve(current);
acct_update_integrals(current);
task_numa_free(current, false);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 9e479d7d202b..959968e2da0d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1723,19 +1723,21 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct file *exe_file;
+ long hide_self_exe;
task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task);
+ hide_self_exe = task_hide_self_exe(task);
put_task_struct(task);
- if (exe_file) {
+ if (exe_file && !hide_self_exe) {
*exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
fput(exe_file);
return 0;
- } else
- return -ENOENT;
+ }
+ return -ENOENT;
}
static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 853d08f7562b..8db32d5fc285 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1790,6 +1790,7 @@ static __always_inline bool is_percpu_thread(void)
#define PFA_SPEC_IB_DISABLE 5 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted */
#define PFA_SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE 6 /* Indirect branch speculation permanently restricted */
#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_NOEXEC 7 /* Speculative Store Bypass clear on execve() */
+#define PFA_HIDE_SELF_EXE 8 /* Hide /proc/self/exe for the process */
#define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \
static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p) \
@@ -1832,6 +1833,10 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_TEST(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
+TASK_PFA_SET(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
+
static inline void
current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags)
{
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a5e06dcbba13..f12f3df12468 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -284,4 +284,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
#define PR_SET_VMA 0x53564d41
# define PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME 0
+#define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
+#define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 5fd54bf0e886..e992f1b72973 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2626,6 +2626,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case PR_SET_VMA:
error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
break;
+ case PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE:
+ if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ task_set_hide_self_exe(current);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE:
+ if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return task_hide_self_exe(current) ? 1 : 0;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a5e06dcbba13..f12f3df12468 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -284,4 +284,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
#define PR_SET_VMA 0x53564d41
# define PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME 0
+#define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
+#define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
--
2.38.1
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]>
---
tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
index c7923b205222..024e107b26ec 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/)
ifeq ($(ARCH),x86)
TEST_PROGS := disable-tsc-ctxt-sw-stress-test disable-tsc-on-off-stress-test \
- disable-tsc-test
+ disable-tsc-test hide-self-exe
all: $(TEST_PROGS)
include ../lib.mk
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f86cef8e061c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Tests for prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, ...) / prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, ...)
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE
+# define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
+# define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int status;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ perror("open /proc/self/exe");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ close(ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /* check it doesn't fail a second time. */
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
+ if (ret >= 0 || errno != ENOENT) {
+ perror("open /proc/self/exe succeeded");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0) {
+ perror("fork");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ /* Verify that it is still unreachable after fork(). */
+ ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
+ if (ret >= 0 || errno != ENOENT)
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ close(ret);
+
+ /* And that it cannot be unset. */
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /* HIDE_SELF_EXE is cleared after execve. */
+ ret = system("cat /proc/self/exe > /dev/null");
+ exit(ret == 0 ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
+ perror("waitpid");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (status != 0) {
+ perror("child failed");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
--
2.38.1
On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 06:07:17PM +0100, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
> This patch adds a new prctl called PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE which allows
> processes to hide their own /proc/*/exe file. When this prctl is
> used, every access to /proc/*/exe for the calling process will
> fail with ENOENT.
>
> This is useful for preventing issues like CVE-2019-5736, where an
> attacker can gain host root access by overwriting the binary
> in OCI runtimes through file-descriptor mishandling in containers.
>
> The current fix for CVE-2019-5736 is to create a read-only copy or
> a bind-mount of the current executable, and then re-exec the current
> process. With the new prctl, the read-only copy or bind-mount copy is
> not needed anymore.
>
> While map_files/ also might contain symlinks to files in host,
> proc_map_files_get_link() permissions checks are already sufficient.
>
> Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/exec.c | 1 +
> fs/proc/base.c | 8 +++++---
> include/linux/sched.h | 5 +++++
> include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
> kernel/sys.c | 9 +++++++++
> tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
> 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> v1: https://lkml.org/lkml/2023/1/4/334
>
> Differences from v1:
>
> - amended more information in the commit message wrt map_files not
> requiring the same protection.
> - changed the test to verify PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE cannot be unset after
> a fork.
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index ab913243a367..5a5dd964c3a3 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1855,6 +1855,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
> /* execve succeeded */
> current->fs->in_exec = 0;
> current->in_execve = 0;
> + task_clear_hide_self_exe(current);
[snip]
> rseq_execve(current);
> acct_update_integrals(current);
> task_numa_free(current, false);
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 9e479d7d202b..959968e2da0d 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -1723,19 +1723,21 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path)
> {
> struct task_struct *task;
> struct file *exe_file;
> + long hide_self_exe;
>
> task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
> if (!task)
> return -ENOENT;
> exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task);
> + hide_self_exe = task_hide_self_exe(task);
Perhaps I am missing something, but where is task_clear_hide_self_exe()
and task_hide_self_exe() defined?
Brian
On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 06:07:18PM +0100, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile | 2 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
> index c7923b205222..024e107b26ec 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
> @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/)
>
> ifeq ($(ARCH),x86)
> TEST_PROGS := disable-tsc-ctxt-sw-stress-test disable-tsc-on-off-stress-test \
> - disable-tsc-test
> + disable-tsc-test hide-self-exe
> all: $(TEST_PROGS)
>
> include ../lib.mk
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f86cef8e061c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Tests for prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, ...) / prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, ...)
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +#include <inttypes.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <sys/wait.h>
> +
> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
> +#include <linux/prctl.h>
> +
> +#ifndef PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE
> +# define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
> +# define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
> +#endif
> +
> +int main(void)
> +{
> + int status;
> + pid_t pid;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + perror("open /proc/self/exe");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> + close(ret);
> +
> + ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
> + if (ret != 0) {
> + perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> +
> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 1, 0, 0, 0);
> + if (ret != 0) {
> + perror("prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> +
> + /* check it doesn't fail a second time. */
> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 1, 0, 0, 0);
> + if (ret != 0) {
> + perror("prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> +
> + ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
> + if (ret != 1) {
> + perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> +
> + ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
> + if (ret >= 0 || errno != ENOENT) {
> + perror("open /proc/self/exe succeeded");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + if (pid < 0) {
> + perror("fork");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + /* Verify that it is still unreachable after fork(). */
> + ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
> + if (ret >= 0 || errno != ENOENT)
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + close(ret);
> +
> + /* And that it cannot be unset. */
> + ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
Should this be PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE?
Brian
Brian Masney <[email protected]> writes:
> On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 06:07:17PM +0100, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
>> This patch adds a new prctl called PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE which allows
>> processes to hide their own /proc/*/exe file. When this prctl is
>> used, every access to /proc/*/exe for the calling process will
>> fail with ENOENT.
>>
>> This is useful for preventing issues like CVE-2019-5736, where an
>> attacker can gain host root access by overwriting the binary
>> in OCI runtimes through file-descriptor mishandling in containers.
>>
>> The current fix for CVE-2019-5736 is to create a read-only copy or
>> a bind-mount of the current executable, and then re-exec the current
>> process. With the new prctl, the read-only copy or bind-mount copy is
>> not needed anymore.
>>
>> While map_files/ also might contain symlinks to files in host,
>> proc_map_files_get_link() permissions checks are already sufficient.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> fs/exec.c | 1 +
>> fs/proc/base.c | 8 +++++---
>> include/linux/sched.h | 5 +++++
>> include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
>> kernel/sys.c | 9 +++++++++
>> tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +++
>> 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> v1: https://lkml.org/lkml/2023/1/4/334
>>
>> Differences from v1:
>>
>> - amended more information in the commit message wrt map_files not
>> requiring the same protection.
>> - changed the test to verify PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE cannot be unset after
>> a fork.
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>> index ab913243a367..5a5dd964c3a3 100644
>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>> @@ -1855,6 +1855,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>> /* execve succeeded */
>> current->fs->in_exec = 0;
>> current->in_execve = 0;
>> + task_clear_hide_self_exe(current);
>
> [snip]
>
>> rseq_execve(current);
>> acct_update_integrals(current);
>> task_numa_free(current, false);
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index 9e479d7d202b..959968e2da0d 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -1723,19 +1723,21 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path)
>> {
>> struct task_struct *task;
>> struct file *exe_file;
>> + long hide_self_exe;
>>
>> task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
>> if (!task)
>> return -ENOENT;
>> exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task);
>> + hide_self_exe = task_hide_self_exe(task);
>
> Perhaps I am missing something, but where is task_clear_hide_self_exe()
> and task_hide_self_exe() defined?
they are defined with:
TASK_PFA_TEST(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
TASK_PFA_SET(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
TASK_PFA_CLEAR(HIDE_SELF_EXE, hide_self_exe)
Regards,
Giuseppe
Brian Masney <[email protected]> writes:
> On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 06:07:18PM +0100, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
>> Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile | 2 +-
>> tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
>> index c7923b205222..024e107b26ec 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/Makefile
>> @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/)
>>
>> ifeq ($(ARCH),x86)
>> TEST_PROGS := disable-tsc-ctxt-sw-stress-test disable-tsc-on-off-stress-test \
>> - disable-tsc-test
>> + disable-tsc-test hide-self-exe
>> all: $(TEST_PROGS)
>>
>> include ../lib.mk
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..f86cef8e061c
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/hide-self-exe.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * Tests for prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, ...) / prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, ...)
>> + *
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <stdio.h>
>> +#include <stdlib.h>
>> +#include <unistd.h>
>> +#include <signal.h>
>> +#include <inttypes.h>
>> +#include <errno.h>
>> +#include <fcntl.h>
>> +#include <sys/wait.h>
>> +
>> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
>> +#include <linux/prctl.h>
>> +
>> +#ifndef PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE
>> +# define PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 65
>> +# define PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE 66
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +int main(void)
>> +{
>> + int status;
>> + pid_t pid;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
>> + if (ret < 0) {
>> + perror("open /proc/self/exe");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> + close(ret);
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
>> + if (ret != 0) {
>> + perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>> + if (ret != 0) {
>> + perror("prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* check it doesn't fail a second time. */
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>> + if (ret != 0) {
>> + perror("prctl(PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
>> + if (ret != 1) {
>> + perror("prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> +
>> + ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
>> + if (ret >= 0 || errno != ENOENT) {
>> + perror("open /proc/self/exe succeeded");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> +
>> + pid = fork();
>> + if (pid < 0) {
>> + perror("fork");
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + }
>> + if (pid == 0) {
>> + /* Verify that it is still unreachable after fork(). */
>> + ret = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
>> + if (ret >= 0 || errno != ENOENT)
>> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + close(ret);
>> +
>> + /* And that it cannot be unset. */
>> + ret = prctl(PR_GET_HIDE_SELF_EXE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
>
> Should this be PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE?
you are right, thanks for spotting it! I should test
PR_SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE not the getter.