2023-05-24 06:31:40

by Chao Gao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps

to avoid computing the supported value at runtime every time.

Toggle the ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH bit when l1tf_vmx_mitigation
is modified to achieve the same result as runtime computing.

Opportunistically, add a comment to document the problem of allowing
changing the supported value of ARCH_CAPABILITIES and the reason why
we don't fix it.

No functional change intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZGZhW%[email protected]/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 44fb619803b8..8274ef5e89e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -309,10 +309,31 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)

l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;

- if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+ /*
+ * Update static keys and supported arch capabilities according to
+ * the new mitigation state.
+ *
+ * ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH is toggled because if we do cache
+ * flushes for L1 guests on (nested) vmlaunch/vmresume to L2, L1
+ * guests can skip the flush and if we don't, then L1 guests need
+ * to do a flush.
+ *
+ * Toggling ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH may present inconsistent
+ * model to the guest, e.g., if userspace isn't careful, a VM can
+ * have vCPUs with different values for ARCH_CAPABILITIES. But
+ * there is almost no chance to fix the issue. Because, to present
+ * a consistent model, KVM essentially needs to disallow changing
+ * the module param after VMs/vCPUs have been created, but that
+ * would prevent userspace from toggling the param while VMs are
+ * running, e.g., in response to a new vulnerability.
+ */
+ if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER) {
static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
- else
+ kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
+ } else {
static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+ kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap &= ~ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
+ }

if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c0778ca39650..2408b5f554b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
{
switch (msr->index) {
case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
- msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
+ msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
break;
case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
@@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
return;
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
- if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+ if (!(kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
return;
break;
default:
@@ -9532,6 +9532,7 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
}
kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
+ kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
kvm_init_msr_lists();
return 0;

@@ -11895,7 +11896,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (r)
goto free_guest_fpu;

- vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
+ vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index c544602d07a3..d3e524bcc169 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct kvm_caps {
u64 supported_xcr0;
u64 supported_xss;
u64 supported_perf_cap;
+ u64 supported_arch_cap;
};

void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
--
2.40.0



2023-05-24 08:29:20

by Xiaoyao Li

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps

On 5/24/2023 2:16 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> to avoid computing the supported value at runtime every time.
>
> Toggle the ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH bit when l1tf_vmx_mitigation
> is modified to achieve the same result as runtime computing.

It's not the same result.

In kvm_get_arch_capabilities(), host's value is honored. I.e., when host
supports ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH, l1tf_vmx_mitigation doesn't
make any difference to the result.

> Opportunistically, add a comment to document the problem of allowing
> changing the supported value of ARCH_CAPABILITIES and the reason why
> we don't fix it.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZGZhW%[email protected]/
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 44fb619803b8..8274ef5e89e5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -309,10 +309,31 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
>
> l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
>
> - if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
> + /*
> + * Update static keys and supported arch capabilities according to
> + * the new mitigation state.
> + *
> + * ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH is toggled because if we do cache
> + * flushes for L1 guests on (nested) vmlaunch/vmresume to L2, L1
> + * guests can skip the flush and if we don't, then L1 guests need
> + * to do a flush.
> + *
> + * Toggling ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH may present inconsistent
> + * model to the guest, e.g., if userspace isn't careful, a VM can
> + * have vCPUs with different values for ARCH_CAPABILITIES. But
> + * there is almost no chance to fix the issue. Because, to present
> + * a consistent model, KVM essentially needs to disallow changing
> + * the module param after VMs/vCPUs have been created, but that
> + * would prevent userspace from toggling the param while VMs are
> + * running, e.g., in response to a new vulnerability.
> + */
> + if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER) {
> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
> - else
> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
> + } else {
> static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap &= ~ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
> + }
>
> if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index c0778ca39650..2408b5f554b7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
> {
> switch (msr->index) {
> case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
> - msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
> + msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
> break;
> case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
> msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
> @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
> return;
> break;
> case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
> - if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
> + if (!(kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
> return;
> break;
> default:
> @@ -9532,6 +9532,7 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
> kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
> }
> kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
> kvm_init_msr_lists();
> return 0;
>
> @@ -11895,7 +11896,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (r)
> goto free_guest_fpu;
>
> - vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
> + vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
> vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
> kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
> kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index c544602d07a3..d3e524bcc169 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct kvm_caps {
> u64 supported_xcr0;
> u64 supported_xss;
> u64 supported_perf_cap;
> + u64 supported_arch_cap;
> };
>
> void kvm_spurious_fault(void);


2023-05-24 08:52:57

by Chao Gao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps

On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 04:14:10PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>On 5/24/2023 2:16 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>> to avoid computing the supported value at runtime every time.
>>
>> Toggle the ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH bit when l1tf_vmx_mitigation
>> is modified to achieve the same result as runtime computing.
>
>It's not the same result.

it is because ...

>
>In kvm_get_arch_capabilities(), host's value is honored. I.e., when host
>supports ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH, l1tf_vmx_mitigation doesn't make any
>difference to the result.

... l1tf_vmx_mitigation should be VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED in this
case. l1tf_vmx_mitigation cannot be VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER.

>
>> Opportunistically, add a comment to document the problem of allowing
>> changing the supported value of ARCH_CAPABILITIES and the reason why
>> we don't fix it.
>>
>> No functional change intended.
>>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZGZhW%[email protected]/
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
>> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++---
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index 44fb619803b8..8274ef5e89e5 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -309,10 +309,31 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
>> l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
>> - if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
>> + /*
>> + * Update static keys and supported arch capabilities according to
>> + * the new mitigation state.
>> + *
>> + * ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH is toggled because if we do cache
>> + * flushes for L1 guests on (nested) vmlaunch/vmresume to L2, L1
>> + * guests can skip the flush and if we don't, then L1 guests need
>> + * to do a flush.
>> + *
>> + * Toggling ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH may present inconsistent
>> + * model to the guest, e.g., if userspace isn't careful, a VM can
>> + * have vCPUs with different values for ARCH_CAPABILITIES. But
>> + * there is almost no chance to fix the issue. Because, to present
>> + * a consistent model, KVM essentially needs to disallow changing
>> + * the module param after VMs/vCPUs have been created, but that
>> + * would prevent userspace from toggling the param while VMs are
>> + * running, e.g., in response to a new vulnerability.
>> + */
>> + if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER) {
>> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
>> - else
>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
>> + } else {
>> static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap &= ~ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
>> + }
>> if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
>> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> index c0778ca39650..2408b5f554b7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
>> {
>> switch (msr->index) {
>> case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
>> - msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>> + msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
>> msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
>> @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
>> return;
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
>> - if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
>> + if (!(kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
>> return;
>> break;
>> default:
>> @@ -9532,6 +9532,7 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
>> kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
>> }
>> kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>> kvm_init_msr_lists();
>> return 0;
>> @@ -11895,7 +11896,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> if (r)
>> goto free_guest_fpu;
>> - vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>> + vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
>> vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
>> kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
>> kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> index c544602d07a3..d3e524bcc169 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct kvm_caps {
>> u64 supported_xcr0;
>> u64 supported_xss;
>> u64 supported_perf_cap;
>> + u64 supported_arch_cap;
>> };
>> void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
>

2023-05-25 02:51:23

by Xiaoyao Li

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps

On 5/24/2023 4:32 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 04:14:10PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> On 5/24/2023 2:16 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>>> to avoid computing the supported value at runtime every time.
>>>
>>> Toggle the ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH bit when l1tf_vmx_mitigation
>>> is modified to achieve the same result as runtime computing.
>>
>> It's not the same result.
>
> it is because ...
>
>>
>> In kvm_get_arch_capabilities(), host's value is honored. I.e., when host
>> supports ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH, l1tf_vmx_mitigation doesn't make any
>> difference to the result.
>
> ... l1tf_vmx_mitigation should be VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED in this
> case. l1tf_vmx_mitigation cannot be VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER.

yes. you are right. Maybe we can clarify it in the changelog

anyway,

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>

>>
>>> Opportunistically, add a comment to document the problem of allowing
>>> changing the supported value of ARCH_CAPABILITIES and the reason why
>>> we don't fix it.
>>>
>>> No functional change intended.
>>>
>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZGZhW%[email protected]/
>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
>>> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++---
>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
>>> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> index 44fb619803b8..8274ef5e89e5 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> @@ -309,10 +309,31 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
>>> l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
>>> - if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
>>> + /*
>>> + * Update static keys and supported arch capabilities according to
>>> + * the new mitigation state.
>>> + *
>>> + * ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH is toggled because if we do cache
>>> + * flushes for L1 guests on (nested) vmlaunch/vmresume to L2, L1
>>> + * guests can skip the flush and if we don't, then L1 guests need
>>> + * to do a flush.
>>> + *
>>> + * Toggling ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH may present inconsistent
>>> + * model to the guest, e.g., if userspace isn't careful, a VM can
>>> + * have vCPUs with different values for ARCH_CAPABILITIES. But
>>> + * there is almost no chance to fix the issue. Because, to present
>>> + * a consistent model, KVM essentially needs to disallow changing
>>> + * the module param after VMs/vCPUs have been created, but that
>>> + * would prevent userspace from toggling the param while VMs are
>>> + * running, e.g., in response to a new vulnerability.
>>> + */
>>> + if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER) {
>>> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
>>> - else
>>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
>>> + } else {
>>> static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
>>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap &= ~ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
>>> + }
>>> if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
>>> static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> index c0778ca39650..2408b5f554b7 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> @@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
>>> {
>>> switch (msr->index) {
>>> case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
>>> - msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>>> + msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
>>> break;
>>> case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
>>> msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
>>> @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
>>> return;
>>> break;
>>> case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
>>> - if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
>>> + if (!(kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
>>> return;
>>> break;
>>> default:
>>> @@ -9532,6 +9532,7 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
>>> kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
>>> }
>>> kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
>>> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>>> kvm_init_msr_lists();
>>> return 0;
>>> @@ -11895,7 +11896,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> if (r)
>>> goto free_guest_fpu;
>>> - vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
>>> + vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
>>> vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
>>> kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
>>> kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>>> index c544602d07a3..d3e524bcc169 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct kvm_caps {
>>> u64 supported_xcr0;
>>> u64 supported_xss;
>>> u64 supported_perf_cap;
>>> + u64 supported_arch_cap;
>>> };
>>> void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
>>


2023-06-06 16:51:22

by Sean Christopherson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Track supported ARCH_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps

On Wed, May 24, 2023, Chao Gao wrote:
> @@ -9532,6 +9532,7 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
> kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
> }
> kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
> + kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
> kvm_init_msr_lists();
> return 0;
>
> @@ -11895,7 +11896,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (r)
> goto free_guest_fpu;
>
> - vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
> + vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_arch_cap;
> vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
> kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
> kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index c544602d07a3..d3e524bcc169 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct kvm_caps {
> u64 supported_xcr0;
> u64 supported_xss;
> u64 supported_perf_cap;
> + u64 supported_arch_cap;

Hrm, I take back my earlier vote about using a dynamic snapshot.

"supported" isn't quite right. KVM always "supports" advertising SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH
to the guest. And KVM really does treat the MSR like a CPUID leaf, in that KVM
doesn't sanity check the value coming in from userspace. Whether or not that's
a good idea is debatable, but it is was it is. The value is more like KVM's current
default.

Looking at all the uses of both the default/supported value, and the host MSR,
I think it makes more sense to snapshot the host value than it does to snapshot
and update the default/supported value. The default value is used only when a
vCPU is created and when userspace does a system-scoped KVM_GET_MSRS, i.e. avoiding
the RDMSR is nice, but making the read super fast isn't necessary, e.g. the overhead
of the boot_cpu_has() and boot_cpu_has_bug() checks is negligible.

And if KVM snapshots the MSR, the other usage of the host value can be cleaned up
too.

I'm leaning towards doing this instead of patches [1/3] and [3/3]:

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 09:20:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: x86: Snapshot host's MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 22 ++++++----------------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 +++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 2d9d155691a7..42d1148f933c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -255,14 +255,9 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
return 0;
}

- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
- u64 msr;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
- if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+ l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+ return 0;
}

/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
@@ -373,15 +368,10 @@ static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)

static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
{
- u64 msr;
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
+ if ((host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
- !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
- if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL)
- vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
- }
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
}

static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 7c7be4815eaa..7c2e796fa460 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_apicv);
u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xss);

+u64 __read_mostly host_arch_capabilities;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_arch_capabilities);
+
const struct _kvm_stats_desc kvm_vm_stats_desc[] = {
KVM_GENERIC_VM_STATS(),
STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_shadow_zapped),
@@ -1612,12 +1615,7 @@ static bool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)

static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
{
- u64 data = 0;
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, data);
- data &= KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP;
- }
+ u64 data = host_arch_capabilities & KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP;

/*
* If nx_huge_pages is enabled, KVM's shadow paging will ensure that
@@ -9492,6 +9490,9 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)

kvm_init_pmu_capability(ops->pmu_ops);

+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, host_arch_capabilities);
+
r = ops->hardware_setup();
if (r != 0)
goto out_mmu_exit;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 82e3dafc5453..1e7be1f6ab29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

extern u64 host_xcr0;
extern u64 host_xss;
+extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;

extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;


base-commit: 02f1b0b736606f9870595b3089d9c124f9da8be9
--
2.41.0.rc2.161.g9c6817b8e7-goog

From bd4b41fea5d5fa0347c5ef1ffb73dbdf783b23d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 09:25:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: VMX: Drop unnecessary vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available
"cache"

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 +++--------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 42d1148f933c..17003660138a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -237,9 +237,6 @@ static const struct {
#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;

-/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */
-static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
-
static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -366,14 +363,6 @@ static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
}

-static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
-{
- if ((host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
- !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
- !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
- vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
-}
-
static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u64 msr;
@@ -399,7 +388,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)

static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
- vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);

/*
* If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
@@ -8580,8 +8571,6 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
if (r)
goto err_l1d_flush;

- vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();
-
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));

--