During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.
Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.
Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
having MMIO access.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 3 +++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index b3b13ec04bac..139960deb736 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
/* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */
mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
+ /* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+ CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
/* Check EFLAGS.CF from the VMX_RUN_VMRESUME bit test above. */
jnc .Lvmlaunch
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index bdcf2c041e0c..0190e7584ffd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -387,7 +387,16 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
- vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+ /*
+ * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the
+ * CPU isn't affected by MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled
+ * the mitigation. Disabling the clearing behavior provides a
+ * performance boost for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing
+ * CPU buffers is unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry
+ * and VM-Exit.
+ */
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) &&
+ (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
@@ -7226,11 +7235,14 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
guest_state_enter_irqoff();
- /* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
+ /*
+ * L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS, but VERW
+ * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still
+ * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW
+ * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush.
+ */
if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
- else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
- mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
--
2.34.1
On Tue, Jan 23, 2024, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
> access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
> CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.
>
> Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
> callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
> by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.
>
> Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
> the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
> that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
> MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
> having MMIO access.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
> ---
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 01:31:54PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 23, 2024, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
> > access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
> > CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.
> >
> > Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
> > callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
> > by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.
> >
> > Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
> > the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
> > that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
> > MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
> > having MMIO access.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
> > ---
>
> Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Thanks.