Subject: [PATCH 00/23] LSM: Full security module stacking
Here it is, the whole nine yards, broken into mostly
review friendly pieces. I believe that it would make
a good deal of sense to take this in two bites, with
the infrastructure managed blobs going first and the
secid conversion coming later. I hope there will be some
debate around that.
The blob management part is pretty clean by now. I
welcome serious review on that. The secid part is more
wobbly, but I am convinced that it's the right direction
if not perhaps always the best possible implementation.
AppArmor in in the process of a major overhaul, and that
slowed me down a bit as I had to do new work to convert
it to use the new mechanisms.
I had experimented with secid "tokens" in the hope of
minimizing API changes. That doesn't work. Changing
the APIs to use a struct secids pointer in place of a
u32 is brutal to the diffstat, but reduces the amount
of active code that has to change, and really makes
data management easier.
If there are two possible ways to do a thing you will
find them both in the networking code. AF_UNIX, netfilter,
SO_PEERSEC and netlabel each has its own clever ways
to manipulate security information. I think I nailed
them all, but I'm not betting more than a beer on it.
There could be issues in the audit code, although nothing
jumped out immediately. The same goes for the integrity
subsystem. I haven't tried Infiniband or very many
filesystem types that don't com standard with Fedora or
Ubuntu.
I have fixed everything I've found. If you find something
(please look!) let me know.
Tested primarily on virtual machines.
Fedora 25-27 - SELinux, Smack and the two together
Ubuntu 17.04 - AppArmor and AppArmor + Smack
The SELinux test suite completes successfully unless
you add in Smack, in which case it fails where you would
expect it to due to the different use models for netlabel.
Smack tests work as well. AppArmor was tested by booting
Ubuntu, but not beyond.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 23 +-
fs/btrfs/super.c | 10 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 63 +-
fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 85 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 211 +++++--
include/net/flow.h | 5 +-
include/net/netlabel.h | 16 +-
include/net/scm.h | 4 +-
include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 4 +
kernel/audit.c | 25 +-
kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 44 +-
kernel/cred.c | 19 +-
kernel/fork.c | 3 +
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 19 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 22 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 14 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 44 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 52 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 19 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 5 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +-
security/Kconfig | 80 +++
security/Makefile | 1 +
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 24 +-
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 9 +-
security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 4 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 10 +-
security/apparmor/include/task.h | 22 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 131 ++--
security/apparmor/task.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 11 +-
security/security.c | 973 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 658 ++++++++------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 87 ++-
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 9 +-
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 33 +-
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 5 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 13 +-
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 29 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 90 ++-
security/smack/smack_access.c | 6 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 673 ++++++++++-----------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 19 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 32 +-
security/tomoyo/common.h | 31 +-
security/tomoyo/domain.c | 4 +-
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c | 15 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 57 +-
64 files changed, 2581 insertions(+), 1256 deletions(-)
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 13:47:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 03/23] SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++++
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 4 +--
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4cafe6a19167..81b1715a1998 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = cred->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
return tsec->sid;
}
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
const struct cred *cred)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
const struct cred *cred)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
@@ -1938,7 +1938,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir,
&dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2467,8 +2467,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->called_set_creds)
return 0;
- old_tsec = current_security();
- new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
isec = inode_security(inode);
/* Default to the current task SID. */
@@ -2632,7 +2632,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
int rc, i;
- new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
return;
@@ -2675,7 +2675,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct itimerval itimer;
u32 osid, sid;
int rc, i;
@@ -2978,7 +2978,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
u32 newsid;
int rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
@@ -2998,14 +2998,14 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
int rc;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = new->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
tsec->create_sid = newsid;
return 0;
}
@@ -3015,7 +3015,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 newsid, clen;
int rc;
@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
dir, qstr,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
@@ -3486,7 +3486,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- tsec = new_creds->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
tsec->create_sid = sid;
@@ -3906,7 +3906,7 @@ static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
*/
static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
/*
* cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
@@ -3926,7 +3926,7 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- old_tsec = old->security;
+ old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
if (!tsec)
@@ -3941,8 +3941,8 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
@@ -3958,7 +3958,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*/
static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
@@ -3983,7 +3983,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
@@ -4518,7 +4518,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
u32 newsid;
u16 secclass;
int rc;
@@ -4538,7 +4538,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
@@ -5398,7 +5398,7 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 tsid;
- __tsec = current_security();
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
tsid = __tsec->sid;
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -6335,7 +6335,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
unsigned len;
rcu_read_lock();
- __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
if (current != p) {
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -6456,7 +6456,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
- tsec = new->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
@@ -6585,7 +6585,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
if (!ksec)
return -ENOMEM;
- tsec = cred->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
else
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index cc5e26b0161b..734b6833bdff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -158,4 +158,9 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
};
+static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 91dc3783ed94..8ffe7e1053c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 str_len;
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
if (!ctx)
return 0;
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 13:26:52 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 01/23] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs
Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious
mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module.
The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate
the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar
interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did
likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the
security "context" of the process, but it will be different
depending on the security module you're using.
This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for
Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in
this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting
SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the
old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case
may be) as before.
The original implementation is by Kees Cook.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 13 +++++--
fs/proc/base.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/proc/internal.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 15 +++++---
security/security.c | 24 ++++++++++---
5 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
index c980dfe9abf1..9842e21afd4a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
@@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
in the core functionality of Linux itself.
-Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the
-Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities
-system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
+The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. This may be
+followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one "major" module.
For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux
man-pages project.
@@ -30,6 +29,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always
be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then
the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured.
+Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should
+be accessed and maintained using the special files in ``/proc/.../attr``.
+A security module may maintain a module specific subdirectory there,
+named after the module. ``/proc/.../attr/smack`` is provided by the Smack
+security module and contains all its special files. The files directly
+in ``/proc/.../attr`` remain as legacy interfaces for modules that provide
+subdirectories.
+
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 1b2ede6abcdf..fa1681a0b75e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -140,9 +140,13 @@ struct pid_entry {
#define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \
NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {})
#define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \
- NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = show } )
+#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE) \
+ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \
+ NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \
+ { .lsm = LSM })
/*
* Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
@@ -2536,7 +2540,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
- length = security_getprocattr(task,
+ length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
(char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
&p);
put_task_struct(task);
@@ -2582,7 +2586,8 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
if (length < 0)
goto out_free;
- length = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
+ length = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
+ file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
page, count);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
@@ -2599,13 +2604,53 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
+#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \
+static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \
+ struct dir_context *ctx) \
+{ \
+ return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \
+ LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
+ ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
+} \
+\
+static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \
+ .read = generic_read_dir, \
+ .iterate = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \
+ .llseek = default_llseek, \
+}; \
+\
+static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \
+{ \
+ return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \
+ LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
+ ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
+} \
+\
+static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \
+ .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \
+ .getattr = pid_getattr, \
+ .setattr = proc_setattr, \
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
+ ATTR("smack", "current", 0666),
+};
+LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
+#endif
+
static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
- REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
- REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
+ ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444),
+ ATTR(NULL, "exec", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+ DIR("smack", 0555,
+ proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
+#endif
};
static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 0f1692e63cb6..e3a655a788a7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ union proc_op {
int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m,
struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid,
struct task_struct *task);
+ const char *lsm;
};
struct proc_inode {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ecb06e1357dd..9afe7a509030 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -368,8 +368,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd);
int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter);
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value);
+int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -1113,15 +1115,18 @@ static inline int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode)
{ }
-static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
+ char *name, char **value)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7bc2fde023a7..3d3c746fd517 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1267,14 +1267,30 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value)
{
- return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
- return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 13:44:35 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 02/23] Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob
Don't use the cred->security poiter directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 14 ++++++++---
security/smack/smack_access.c | 4 +--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
security/smack/smackfs.c | 18 +++++++-------
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index f7db791fb566..0b55d6a55b26 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
#define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
+static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
@@ -382,13 +387,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
return tsp->smk_task;
}
-static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(
+ const struct task_struct *t)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
+ const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
- skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security);
+ cred = __task_cred(t);
rcu_read_unlock();
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
return skp;
}
@@ -405,7 +413,7 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
*/
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
{
- return smk_of_task(current_security());
+ return smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 9a4c0ad46518..489d49a20b47 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_known, mode, a);
}
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
*/
bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task;
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0b414836bebd..d9307a172ab7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
if (rc <= 0)
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
int mode, int rc)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
}
rcu_read_lock();
- tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
+ tsp = smack_cred(__task_cred(tracer));
tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
int rc;
struct smack_known *skp;
- skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
return rc;
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
- struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
int rc;
@@ -1743,7 +1743,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
return -EACCES;
mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
- tsp = current_security();
+ tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
skp = smk_of_current();
rc = 0;
@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
struct file *file;
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- tsp = current_security();
+ tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
* passed socket or if the passed socket can't
@@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
*/
static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_rule *rp;
struct list_head *l;
struct list_head *n;
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
struct task_smack *new_tsp;
int rc;
@@ -2037,15 +2037,14 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
- struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
-
/* cbs copy rule list */
}
@@ -2056,12 +2055,12 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
rcu_read_lock();
- skp = smk_of_task(c->security);
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
*secid = skp->smk_secid;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -2075,7 +2074,7 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*/
static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
@@ -2093,7 +2092,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
@@ -2277,7 +2276,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
@@ -3582,7 +3581,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
*/
static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct cred *new;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
@@ -3623,7 +3622,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- tsp = new->security;
+ tsp = smack_cred(new);
tsp->smk_task = skp;
/*
* process can change its label only once
@@ -4259,7 +4258,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
key->security = skp;
return 0;
@@ -4290,7 +4289,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
{
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
int request = 0;
int rc;
@@ -4561,7 +4560,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- tsp = new_creds->security;
+ tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
/*
* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
@@ -4589,8 +4588,8 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct cred *old,
struct cred *new)
{
- struct task_smack *otsp = old->security;
- struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security;
+ struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
+ struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
struct inode_smack *isp;
int may;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f6482e53d55a..9d2dde608298 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2208,14 +2208,14 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}
static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}
@@ -2262,7 +2262,7 @@ static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
&tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
@@ -2414,14 +2414,14 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_load2_ops = {
static void *load_self2_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}
static void *load_self2_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
}
@@ -2467,7 +2467,7 @@ static int smk_open_load_self2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load_self2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
&tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_LONG_FMT);
@@ -2681,14 +2681,14 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {
static void *relabel_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
}
static void *relabel_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
}
@@ -2736,7 +2736,7 @@ static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
char *data;
int rc;
LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:04:35 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 06/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security
blob
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 ++++++++--------
security/security.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 ++-------------------
security/smack/smack.h | 5 +++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 26 ++++++++--------------
6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index ee22b2b9b458..2268e43709d4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2016,6 +2016,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
*/
struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
+ int lbs_file;
};
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index a35ef9473b71..e986a0eed01e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -429,21 +429,21 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- int error = 0;
-
- /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
+ struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!file_ctx(file))
- error = -ENOMEM;
- end_current_label_crit_section(label);
- return error;
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return 0;
}
static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
- aa_free_file_ctx(file_ctx(file));
+ struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
+
+ if (ctx)
+ aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
}
static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
*/
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 16e8fb077412..ee77af08086b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+
char *lsm_names;
static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
@@ -89,6 +91,13 @@ int __init security_init(void)
*/
do_security_initcalls();
+ /*
+ * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
+ */
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
+ lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/*
* The second call to a module specific init function
* adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
@@ -98,6 +107,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
#endif
return 0;
@@ -272,6 +282,28 @@ static void __init lsm_set_size(int *need, int *lbs)
void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
{
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
+ * @file: the file that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!lsm_file_cache) {
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (file->f_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -957,12 +989,28 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
{
- return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+ int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_file_free(file);
+ return rc;
}
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{
+ void *blob;
+
+ if (!lsm_file_cache)
+ return;
+
call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
+
+ blob = file->f_security;
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
}
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -1080,7 +1128,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
security_cred_free(cred);
return rc;
}
@@ -1101,7 +1149,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
security_cred_free(new);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0a4a9fa08b..334f47305551 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -149,7 +149,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
-static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
/**
* selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
@@ -382,27 +381,15 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
u32 sid = current_sid();
- fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!fsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
fsec->sid = sid;
fsec->fown_sid = sid;
- file->f_security = fsec;
return 0;
}
-static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
- file->f_security = NULL;
- kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
-}
-
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -3546,11 +3533,6 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
return file_alloc_security(file);
}
-static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- file_free_security(file);
-}
-
/*
* Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
* operation to an inode.
@@ -6811,6 +6793,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
};
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6881,7 +6864,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
@@ -7082,9 +7064,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
- sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();
avtab_cache_init();
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 0c6dce446825..043525a52e94 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -362,6 +362,11 @@ static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
return cred->security;
}
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ return file->f_security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index bcba72d760f4..da22e31312b9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1570,24 +1570,12 @@ static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
- file->f_security = skp;
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
- * @file: the object
- *
- * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
- * label list, so no memory is freed.
- */
-static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- file->f_security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
* @file: the object
@@ -1812,7 +1800,9 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
*/
static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
+
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
}
/**
@@ -1829,6 +1819,7 @@ static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
struct file *file;
@@ -1841,7 +1832,8 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
- skp = file->f_security;
+ blob = smack_file(file);
+ skp = *blob;
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
@@ -4596,6 +4588,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4633,7 +4626,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:23:27 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 10/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
blob
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 ++
security/security.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 32 +--------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 70 +++++---------------------------
5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3ba96e406827..a935ab92906d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2017,6 +2017,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
+ int lbs_inode;
int lbs_task;
};
@@ -2080,10 +2081,12 @@ static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
#endif
extern int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
+extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
+void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode);
#endif
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b414186ad45f..02df9b608b7e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
@@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ int __init security_init(void)
lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
+ lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/*
* The second call to a module specific init function
* adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
@@ -108,8 +113,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
return 0;
}
@@ -285,6 +291,13 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ /*
+ * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
+ * what the modules might need.
+ */
+ if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
+ blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
}
/**
@@ -348,6 +361,46 @@ void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_inode - during initialization allocate a composite inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (inode == NULL)
+ panic("%s: NULL inode.\n", __func__);
+ if (inode->i_security != NULL)
+ return;
+ rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early inode alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -594,14 +647,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = NULL;
- return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+ int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_inode_free(inode);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ /*
+ * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
+ */
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
}
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
integrity_inode_free(inode);
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
+ /*
+ * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+ * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
+ * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+ * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+ * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+ * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+ * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_security)
+ call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
+ inode_free_by_rcu);
}
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index baefd36b44df..493328a1c789 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -148,8 +148,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
-static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
-
/**
* selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
*
@@ -245,13 +243,9 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!isec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
isec->inode = inode;
@@ -259,7 +253,6 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
isec->task_sid = sid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
- inode->i_security = isec;
return 0;
}
@@ -338,14 +331,6 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
return selinux_inode(inode);
}
-static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-
- isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
- kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
-}
-
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
@@ -366,17 +351,6 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
}
-
- /*
- * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
- * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
- * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
- * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
- * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
- * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
- * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
- */
- call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
}
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -6794,6 +6768,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
};
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -7061,9 +7036,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
- sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
- sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();
avtab_cache_init();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 168a96104fa0..60d109caaeef 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -59,10 +59,7 @@ enum label_initialized {
struct inode_security_struct {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
- union {
- struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
- struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
- };
+ struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b9db97470e06..cfabb9f5cc9b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -287,24 +287,18 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
}
/**
- * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
+ * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
+ * @isp: the blob to initialize
* @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
*
- * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
-static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
+static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp;
-
- isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (isp == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
isp->smk_inode = skp;
isp->smk_flags = 0;
mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
-
- return isp;
}
/**
@@ -823,17 +817,13 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
- isp = smack_inode(inode);
- if (isp == NULL) {
- isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
- if (isp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
- inode->i_security = isp;
- } else
- isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+ lsm_early_inode(inode);
+ init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
- if (transmute)
+ if (transmute) {
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -962,48 +952,10 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
- if (inode->i_security == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache
- * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer
- *
- * Call back function called from call_rcu() to free
- * the i_security blob pointer in inode
- */
-static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct inode_smack *issp;
-
- issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu);
- kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp);
-}
-
-/**
- * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu()
- * @inode: the inode with a blob
- *
- * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU
- */
-static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
-
- /*
- * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
- * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made
- * after smack_inode_free_security() is called.
- * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU
- * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
- * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
- */
- call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu);
-}
-
/**
* smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
* @inode: the newly created inode
@@ -4589,6 +4541,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4607,7 +4560,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 13:53:07 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 04/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the cred security
blob
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.
Some SELinux memory management debug code has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 14 +++++
kernel/cred.c | 13 -----
security/Kconfig | 11 ++++
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 16 +++++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 28 ++++++++--
security/apparmor/task.c | 6 +--
security/security.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 63 ++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 ++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 1 +
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 85 +++++++++++-------------------
security/tomoyo/common.h | 21 +++++++-
security/tomoyo/domain.c | 4 +-
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c | 15 ++++--
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++----
18 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 9d0b286f3dba..ee22b2b9b458 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2011,6 +2011,13 @@ struct security_hook_list {
char *lsm;
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Security blob size or offset data.
+ */
+struct lsm_blob_sizes {
+ int lbs_cred;
+};
+
/*
* Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes
* up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes
@@ -2023,6 +2030,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
+extern void security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed);
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
char *lsm);
@@ -2069,4 +2077,10 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
#endif
+extern int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ecf03657e71c..fa2061ee4955 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -704,19 +704,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
return true;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
- /*
- * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
- * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
- */
- if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
- if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
- return true;
- if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
- (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
- return true;
- }
-#endif
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index c4302067a3ad..116dba966553 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -36,6 +36,17 @@ config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
bool
default n
+config SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
+ bool "Enable debugging of the LSM infrastructure"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ help
+ This allows you to choose debug messages related to
+ security modules configured into your kernel. These
+ messages may be helpful in determining how a security
+ module is using security blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITYFS
bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
help
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 590b7e8cd21c..1fe17fba2a95 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
/* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
- cred_label(bprm->cred) = new;
+ set_cred_label(bprm->cred, new);
done:
aa_put_label(label);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
index e287b7d0d4be..a90eae76d7c1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -23,8 +23,22 @@
#include "policy_ns.h"
#include "task.h"
-#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
+static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+
+ AA_BUG(!blob);
+ return *blob;
+}
+static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct aa_label *label)
+{
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+
+ AA_BUG(!blob);
+ *blob = label;
+}
/**
* aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ce2b89e9ad94..a35ef9473b71 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
- cred_label(cred) = NULL;
+ set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
*/
static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- cred_label(cred) = NULL;
+ set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
return 0;
}
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
return 0;
}
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
}
static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -1117,6 +1117,13 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
}
+/*
+ * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx.
+ */
+struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1437,7 +1444,8 @@ static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
task_ctx(current) = ctx;
return 0;
@@ -1522,8 +1530,18 @@ static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
+ static int finish;
int error;
+ if (!finish) {
+ if (apparmor_enabled && security_module_enable("apparmor"))
+ security_add_blobs(&apparmor_blob_sizes);
+ else
+ apparmor_enabled = false;
+ finish = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
apparmor_enabled = false;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index c6b78a14da91..4551110f0496 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
*/
aa_get_label(label);
aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
- cred_label(new) = label;
+ set_cred_label(new, label);
commit_creds(new);
return 0;
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
return -EACCES;
}
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(label));
/* clear exec on switching context */
aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
ctx->onexec = NULL;
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
return -ENOMEM;
aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
- cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+ set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous));
AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3d3c746fd517..16e8fb077412 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
char *lsm_names;
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
+
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
@@ -82,10 +84,22 @@ int __init security_init(void)
loadpin_add_hooks();
/*
- * Load all the remaining security modules.
+ * The first call to a module specific init function
+ * updates the blob size requirements.
+ */
+ do_security_initcalls();
+
+ /*
+ * The second call to a module specific init function
+ * adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
+ * initializations required.
*/
do_security_initcalls();
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
+ pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+#endif
+
return 0;
}
@@ -193,6 +207,73 @@ int unregister_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
+/**
+ * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (cred == NULL)
+ panic("%s: NULL cred.\n", __func__);
+ if (cred->security != NULL)
+ return;
+ rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_set_size(int *need, int *lbs)
+{
+ int offset;
+
+ if (*need > 0) {
+ offset = *lbs;
+ *lbs += *need;
+ *need = offset;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_add_blobs - Report blob sizes
+ * @needed: the size of blobs needed by the module
+ *
+ * Each LSM has to register its blobs with the infrastructure.
+ * The "needed" data tells the infrastructure how much memory
+ * the module requires for each of its blobs. On return the
+ * structure is filled with the offset that module should use
+ * from the blob pointer.
+ */
+void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
+{
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -993,17 +1074,36 @@ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ security_cred_free(cred);
+ return rc;
}
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+
+ kfree(cred->security);
+ cred->security = NULL;
}
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ security_cred_free(new);
+ return rc;
}
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 81b1715a1998..f4179eb572e8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -213,12 +213,9 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tsec)
- panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
-
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- cred->security = tsec;
}
/*
@@ -3886,53 +3883,17 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
}
-/*
- * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
- */
-static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
- if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- cred->security = tsec;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
-
- /*
- * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
- * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
- */
- BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
- cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
- kfree(tsec);
-}
-
/*
* prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*/
static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
- tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
- if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ *tsec = *old_tsec;
- new->security = tsec;
return 0;
}
@@ -6848,6 +6809,10 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
}
#endif
+struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6930,8 +6895,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
@@ -7085,11 +7048,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
+ static int finish;
+
if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
selinux_enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
+ if (!finish) {
+ security_add_blobs(&selinux_blob_sizes);
+ finish = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!selinux_enabled) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 734b6833bdff..db1c7000ada3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
@@ -158,6 +161,7 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
};
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
return cred->security;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 245160373dab..a1a389c09857 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kobject.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 0b55d6a55b26..0c6dce446825 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
/*
* Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 489d49a20b47..133774805594 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
*/
bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task;
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d9307a172ab7..bcba72d760f4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -308,29 +308,20 @@ static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
}
/**
- * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
+ * @tsp: blob to initialize
* @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
* @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
- * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
*
- * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
-static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
- struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
+ struct smack_known *forked)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp;
-
- tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
- if (tsp == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
tsp->smk_task = task;
tsp->smk_forked = forked;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
-
- return tsp;
}
/**
@@ -1957,14 +1948,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
*/
static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct task_smack *tsp;
-
- tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
- if (tsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- cred->security = tsp;
-
+ init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}
@@ -1981,10 +1965,6 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
struct list_head *l;
struct list_head *n;
- if (tsp == NULL)
- return;
- cred->security = NULL;
-
smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
@@ -1992,7 +1972,6 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
list_del(&rp->list);
kfree(rp);
}
- kfree(tsp);
}
/**
@@ -2007,14 +1986,10 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
- struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
int rc;
- new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
- if (new_tsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- new->security = new_tsp;
+ init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -2022,10 +1997,7 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
gfp);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -4622,6 +4594,10 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
return 0;
}
+struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4799,23 +4775,35 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
*/
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
- struct cred *cred;
+ static int finish;
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;
if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
return 0;
+ if (!finish) {
+ security_add_blobs(&smack_blob_sizes);
+ finish = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
if (!smack_inode_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
- tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (tsp == NULL) {
- kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ /*
+ * Set the security state for the initial task.
+ */
+ tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+ init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
+
+ /*
+ * Register with LSM
+ */
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
@@ -4829,20 +4817,9 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
#endif
- /*
- * Set the security state for the initial task.
- */
- cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
- cred->security = tsp;
-
/* initialize the smack_known_list */
init_smack_known_list();
- /*
- * Register with LSM
- */
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
-
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 539bcdd30bb8..0110bebe86e2 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -1062,6 +1063,7 @@ void tomoyo_write_log2(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt,
/********** External variable definitions. **********/
extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+extern bool tomoyo_enabled;
extern const char * const tomoyo_condition_keyword
[TOMOYO_MAX_CONDITION_KEYWORD];
extern const char * const tomoyo_dif[TOMOYO_MAX_DOMAIN_INFO_FLAGS];
@@ -1196,6 +1198,17 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
atomic_dec(&group->head.users);
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_cred - Get a pointer to the tomoyo cred security blob
+ * @cred - the relevant cred
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the tomoyo cred blob.
+ */
+static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info **tomoyo_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security;
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_domain - Get "struct tomoyo_domain_info" for current thread.
*
@@ -1203,7 +1216,9 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
*/
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
{
- return current_cred()->security;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(current_cred());
+
+ return *blob;
}
/**
@@ -1216,7 +1231,9 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
*task)
{
- return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(get_task_cred(task));
+
+ return *blob;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index f6758dad981f..b7469fdbff01 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ static int tomoyo_environ(struct tomoyo_execve *ee)
*/
int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
@@ -843,7 +844,8 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
domain = old_domain;
/* Update reference count on "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
atomic_inc(&domain->users);
- bprm->cred->security = domain;
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
+ *blob = domain;
kfree(exename.name);
if (!retval) {
ee->r.domain = domain;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 1d3d7e7a1f05..768dff9608b1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -71,9 +71,12 @@ static ssize_t tomoyo_write_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!cred) {
error = -ENOMEM;
} else {
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain =
- cred->security;
- cred->security = new_domain;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain;
+
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
+ old_domain = *blob;
+ *blob = new_domain;
atomic_inc(&new_domain->users);
atomic_dec(&old_domain->users);
commit_creds(cred);
@@ -234,10 +237,14 @@ static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const umode_t mode,
*/
static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void)
{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;
+ if (!tomoyo_enabled)
+ return 0;
+ domain = tomoyo_domain();
/* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
- if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+ if (domain != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
return 0;
tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 213b8c593668..821ca242a194 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@
*/
static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
{
- new->security = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(new);
+
+ *blob = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -34,8 +36,13 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = old->security;
- new->security = domain;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **old_blob = tomoyo_cred(old);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **new_blob = tomoyo_cred(new);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+
+ domain = *old_blob;
+ *new_blob = domain;
+
if (domain)
atomic_inc(&domain->users);
return 0;
@@ -59,7 +66,9 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*/
static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = *blob;
+
if (domain)
atomic_dec(&domain->users);
}
@@ -73,6 +82,9 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
*/
static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+
/*
* Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
* operation.
@@ -93,13 +105,14 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* stored inside "bprm->cred->security" will be acquired later inside
* tomoyo_find_next_domain().
*/
- atomic_dec(&((struct tomoyo_domain_info *)
- bprm->cred->security)->users);
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
+ domain = *blob;
+ atomic_dec(&domain->users);
/*
* Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
* execve operation.
*/
- bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+ *blob = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -112,8 +125,11 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(bprm->cred);
+ domain = *blob;
/*
* Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
* using current domain.
@@ -493,6 +509,10 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
return tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(sock, msg, size);
}
+struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct tomoyo_domain_info *),
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -531,6 +551,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
/* Lock for GC. */
DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
+bool tomoyo_enabled;
+
/**
* tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module.
*
@@ -538,14 +560,28 @@ DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
*/
static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
{
+ static int finish;
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+
+ if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo")) {
+ tomoyo_enabled = false;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tomoyo_enabled = true;
- if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
+ if (!finish) {
+ security_add_blobs(&tomoyo_blob_sizes);
+ finish = 1;
return 0;
+ }
+
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
- cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+ lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
+ *blob = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
tomoyo_mm_init();
return 0;
}
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:01:52 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 05/23] SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +++++++++---------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f4179eb572e8..1d0a4a9fa08b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
file->f_security = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
}
@@ -1869,7 +1869,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct file *file,
u32 av)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
struct file *file)
{
u32 sid = task_sid(to);
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -3524,7 +3524,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3559,7 +3559,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
u32 requested, u16 cmd)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
@@ -3811,7 +3811,7 @@ static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
}
@@ -3826,7 +3826,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
if (!signum)
perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
@@ -3850,7 +3850,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
/*
* Save inode label and policy sequence number
@@ -3990,7 +3990,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
ad.u.file = file;
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index db1c7000ada3..2586fbc7e38c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -167,4 +167,9 @@ static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
return cred->security;
}
+static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ return file->f_security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:25:23 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 11/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
security blob
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 56 +++++++++++++++------------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 +++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 +++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++++-----------------
7 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a935ab92906d..643e2fac8639 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2018,6 +2018,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_task;
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 02df9b608b7e..32d1ffe213ce 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ pr_info("LSM: superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
@@ -290,6 +291,7 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
{
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
* The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
@@ -401,6 +403,27 @@ void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode)
panic("%s: Early inode alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sb->s_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -568,12 +591,21 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
- return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sb_free(sb);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+ kfree(sb->s_security);
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
}
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 493328a1c789..5f7818d3fb16 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -334,7 +334,8 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
@@ -366,11 +367,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-
- sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sbsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -379,18 +376,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sb->s_security = sbsec;
return 0;
}
-static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- sb->s_security = NULL;
- kfree(sbsec);
-}
-
static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
{
return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
@@ -458,7 +447,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
@@ -477,7 +466,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
int rc = 0;
@@ -560,7 +549,7 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
int rc = 0, i;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
char *context = NULL;
u32 len;
char tmp;
@@ -681,7 +670,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc = 0, i;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
@@ -936,8 +925,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
const struct super_block *newsb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
@@ -969,8 +958,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
int rc = 0;
- const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
@@ -1494,7 +1484,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -1873,7 +1863,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
u32 *_new_isid)
{
- const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1904,7 +1895,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
int rc;
dsec = inode_security(dir);
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -2053,7 +2044,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
}
@@ -2684,11 +2675,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
}
-static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- superblock_free_security(sb);
-}
-
static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
{
if (plen > olen)
@@ -2785,7 +2771,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
int rc, i, *flags;
struct security_mnt_opts opts;
char *secdata, **mount_options;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
return 0;
@@ -2979,7 +2965,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
int rc;
char *context;
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
@@ -3216,7 +3202,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -6769,6 +6755,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6794,7 +6781,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 60d109caaeef..8104bac642b1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -174,4 +174,10 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(const struct inode *in
return inode->i_security;
}
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8057e19dc15f..41ab13319153 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -2766,7 +2767,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
struct sidtab *sidtab;
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 5da5bd1b9b47..d73e9def586c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -372,6 +372,12 @@ static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
return inode->i_security;
}
+static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index cfabb9f5cc9b..889283b553c8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -519,12 +519,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
*/
static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
-
- sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (sbsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -533,22 +528,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
/*
* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
*/
- sb->s_security = sbsp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
- * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
- *
- */
-static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- kfree(sb->s_security);
- sb->s_security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
* @orig: where to start
@@ -739,7 +722,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
{
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
- struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smack_known *skp;
int i;
@@ -868,7 +851,7 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
*/
static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -905,7 +888,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;
- sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
return 0;
@@ -1156,7 +1139,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*/
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
int rc;
@@ -1398,7 +1381,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
@@ -1668,7 +1651,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
- sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
return -EACCES;
@@ -3267,7 +3250,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
goto unlockandout;
sbp = inode->i_sb;
- sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
/*
* We're going to use the superblock default label
* if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4542,6 +4525,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4550,7 +4534,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:16:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 08/23] SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 334f47305551..baefd36b44df 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
struct dentry *opt_dentry,
bool may_sleep)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
{
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, boo
error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
/*
@@ -317,14 +317,14 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, boo
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
{
__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
/*
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
/*
@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
u16 sclass;
struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -1790,7 +1790,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return 0;
sid = cred_sid(cred);
- isec = inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -3118,7 +3118,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
int rc;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
@@ -4124,7 +4124,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 sid = task_sid(p);
spin_lock(&isec->lock);
@@ -6483,7 +6483,7 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 2586fbc7e38c..168a96104fa0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -172,4 +172,9 @@ static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
return file->f_security;
}
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return inode->i_security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index a1a389c09857..cbb270c9a3c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
if (ret) {
@@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
goto err;
inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:19:09 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 09/23] Smack: Abstract use of inode security blob
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/smack/smack.h | 9 +++++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 043525a52e94..5da5bd1b9b47 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -367,12 +367,17 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
return file->f_security;
}
+static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return inode->i_security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
{
- struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
}
@@ -381,7 +386,7 @@ static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
*/
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
{
- struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
return sip->smk_inode;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index da22e31312b9..b9db97470e06 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
- isp = inode->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
if (isp == NULL) {
isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
if (isp == NULL)
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->called_set_creds)
return 0;
- isp = inode->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;
@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
*/
static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
/*
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
{
- struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
/*
* Don't do anything special for these.
* XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
@@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
*/
static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
*secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
}
@@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
return 0;
- isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
@@ -2255,7 +2255,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
*/
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
isp->smk_inode = skp;
@@ -2717,7 +2717,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct socket *sock;
int rc = 0;
@@ -3304,7 +3304,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
if (inode == NULL)
return;
- isp = inode->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(inode);
mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
/*
@@ -4529,7 +4529,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
/*
* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
*/
- isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
skp = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_task = skp;
*new = new_creds;
@@ -4566,7 +4566,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
/*
* the attribute of the containing directory
*/
- isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+ isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
rcu_read_lock();
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:08:37 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 07/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security
blob
Move management of the task_struct->security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++
security/apparmor/include/task.h | 18 +++-----------
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 15 +++--------
security/security.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2268e43709d4..3ba96e406827 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2017,6 +2017,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
+ int lbs_task;
};
/*
@@ -2082,6 +2083,7 @@ extern int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
+void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
#endif
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index 55edaa1d83f8..039c1e60887a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@
#ifndef __AA_TASK_H
#define __AA_TASK_H
-#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+static inline struct aa_task_ctx *task_ctx(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return task->security;
+}
/*
* struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
@@ -36,17 +39,6 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
-/**
- * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
- * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
- *
- * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
- */
-static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
-{
- return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
-}
-
/**
* aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
* @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -57,8 +49,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
aa_put_label(ctx->nnp);
aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-
- kzfree(ctx);
}
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e986a0eed01e..5fee6ab3786e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -90,19 +90,14 @@ static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
- task_ctx(task) = NULL;
}
static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- struct aa_task_ctx *new = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!new)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
- task_ctx(task) = new;
return 0;
}
@@ -1123,6 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1439,15 +1435,10 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
- struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
lsm_early_cred(cred);
+ lsm_early_task(current);
set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
- task_ctx(current) = ctx;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ee77af08086b..b414186ad45f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
#endif
return 0;
@@ -283,6 +284,7 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
{
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
/**
@@ -306,6 +308,46 @@ int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
+ task->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (task->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (task == NULL)
+ panic("%s: task cred.\n", __func__);
+ if (task->security != NULL)
+ return;
+ rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -1112,12 +1154,22 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+ int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_task_free(task);
+ return rc;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
call_void_hook(task_free, task);
+
+ kfree(task->security);
+ task->security = NULL;
}
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:28:17 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 12/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
blob
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 10 +++++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++-------------
security/security.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++++------
security/smack/smack.h | 5 +++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 60 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++---
10 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 643e2fac8639..5c1be19167dc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2018,6 +2018,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_task;
};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index ec7228e857a9..00252fd98cc1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -55,7 +55,15 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+#else
+ return sk->sk_security;
+#endif
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 5fee6ab3786e..e3890899a10c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -745,33 +745,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -780,8 +762,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -832,7 +814,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1022,7 +1004,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1106,7 +1088,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1119,6 +1101,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1155,7 +1138,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 32d1ffe213ce..685e0aff0d36 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#include <trace/events/initcall.h>
@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ pr_info("LSM: sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
pr_info("LSM: superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
@@ -291,6 +293,7 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
{
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
@@ -403,6 +406,28 @@ void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode)
panic("%s: Early inode alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -1763,12 +1788,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5f7818d3fb16..62ac0dbf21ed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4402,7 +4402,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4459,7 +4459,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4490,7 +4490,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
family = sk->sk_family;
if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
char *addrp;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
@@ -4606,7 +4606,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4777,9 +4777,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4811,8 +4811,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4854,7 +4854,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4887,7 +4887,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4955,13 +4955,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ __user char *optval,
+ __user int *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5021,34 +5023,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5062,7 +5057,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5072,7 +5067,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5087,7 +5082,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5231,8 +5226,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5249,7 +5244,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5270,7 +5265,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5287,7 +5282,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5371,7 +5366,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5412,7 +5407,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -5553,7 +5548,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5592,7 +5587,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5684,7 +5679,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5713,7 +5708,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -6755,6 +6750,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 8104bac642b1..7e4bd14498b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -180,4 +180,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index d73e9def586c..f457dd3b4aa0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
return inode->i_security;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security;
+}
+
static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
const struct super_block *superblock)
{
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 889283b553c8..dec965eea49f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1804,7 +1804,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2213,11 +2213,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2231,11 +2227,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2244,7 +2239,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2257,9 +2251,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2377,7 +2370,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -2422,7 +2415,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2498,7 +2491,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2585,7 +2578,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2679,7 +2672,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2727,7 +2720,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2786,7 +2779,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
return 0;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
#endif
switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
@@ -3546,9 +3539,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3594,8 +3587,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3632,7 +3625,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3796,7 +3789,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3905,7 +3898,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -3955,7 +3948,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -3968,7 +3961,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4006,7 +3999,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4026,7 +4019,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4125,7 +4118,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4525,6 +4518,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4635,7 +4629,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:30:15 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 13/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +
security/security.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 116 ++++++++------------------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 12 ++++
security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 50 ++++++----------
6 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 5c1be19167dc..42535da852bc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2018,6 +2018,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_ipc;
+ int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 685e0aff0d36..9414d1a78ee5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
@@ -115,6 +116,8 @@ int __init security_init(void)
pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ pr_info("LSM: ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ pr_info("LSM: msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
pr_info("LSM: sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
pr_info("LSM: superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -293,6 +296,8 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
{
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -406,6 +411,48 @@ void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode)
panic("%s: Early inode alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
+ * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
+ kip->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (kip->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
+ * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
+ mp->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (mp->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
* @sock: the sock that needs a blob
@@ -1504,22 +1551,40 @@ void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+ int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_msg_msg_free(msg);
+ return rc;
}
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
+ kfree(msg->security);
+ msg->security = NULL;
}
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
- return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_msg_queue_free(msq);
+ return rc;
}
void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
+ kfree(msq->security);
+ msq->security = NULL;
}
int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -1546,12 +1611,21 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
{
- return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_shm_free(shp);
+ return rc;
}
void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
{
call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
+ kfree(shp->security);
+ shp->security = NULL;
}
int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -1571,12 +1645,21 @@ int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmf
int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
{
- return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sem_free(sma);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
{
call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
+ kfree(sma->security);
+ sma->security = NULL;
}
int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 62ac0dbf21ed..3911e28e3907 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5771,51 +5771,22 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}
-static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
- u16 sclass)
+static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-
- isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!isec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
isec->sclass = sclass;
isec->sid = current_sid();
- perm->security = isec;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
-{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
- perm->security = NULL;
- kfree(isec);
}
static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
- msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!msec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- msg->security = msec;
return 0;
}
-static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
-
- msg->security = NULL;
- kfree(msec);
-}
-
static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 perms)
{
@@ -5823,7 +5794,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = ipc_perms->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
@@ -5837,11 +5808,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
}
-static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- msg_msg_free_security(msg);
-}
-
/* message queue security operations */
static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
@@ -5850,11 +5816,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = msq->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -5862,16 +5825,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(msq);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
-{
- ipc_free_security(msq);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -5880,7 +5834,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = msq->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -5929,8 +5883,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- isec = msq->security;
- msec = msg->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
/*
* First time through, need to assign label to the message
@@ -5977,8 +5931,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;
- isec = msq->security;
- msec = msg->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -6001,11 +5955,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = shp->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
@@ -6013,16 +5964,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(shp);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
-{
- ipc_free_security(shp);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -6031,7 +5973,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = shp->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
@@ -6098,11 +6040,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = sma->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
@@ -6110,16 +6049,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(sma);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
-{
- ipc_free_security(sma);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
@@ -6128,7 +6058,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = sma->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
@@ -6214,7 +6144,7 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
*secid = isec->sid;
}
@@ -6750,6 +6680,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+ .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
@@ -6860,24 +6792,20 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 7e4bd14498b5..d1d883f8c552 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -180,6 +180,18 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security;
}
+static inline struct msg_security_struct *selinux_msg_msg(
+ const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
+{
+ return msg_msg->security;
+}
+
+static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
+ const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+ return ipc->security;
+}
+
static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
return sock->sk_security;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index f457dd3b4aa0..42c36e37b0bd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -383,6 +383,16 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security;
}
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ return msg->security;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+ return ipc->security;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index dec965eea49f..a419953c1004 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2833,23 +2833,12 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
- msg->security = skp;
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
- * @msg: the object
- *
- * Clears the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- msg->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
* @isp: the object
@@ -2858,7 +2847,13 @@ static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
*/
static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
{
- return (struct smack_known *)isp->security;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
+
+ return *blob;
+#else
+ return isp->security;
+#endif
}
/**
@@ -2869,23 +2864,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
*/
static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
- isp->security = skp;
+ *blob = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_ipc_free_security - Clear the security blob for ipc
- * @isp: the object
- *
- * Clears the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
-{
- isp->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
* @isp : the object
@@ -3183,7 +3167,8 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg
*/
static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
{
- struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+ struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3204,7 +3189,8 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
*/
static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
{
- struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+ struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -4518,6 +4504,8 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
+ .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4590,23 +4578,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_ipc_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:57:25 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 16/23] LSM: Sharing of security blobs
Augment the security modules that use security blobs
("Major" security modules) to allow sharing of the
infrastructure allocated blobs. When CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
is specified the blob pointer abstraction functions
introduced earlier use the offset information provided
by the infrastructure to find the data in the blob that is
for use by the acting security module.
The mechanism for specifying the active security modules
has been changed. SELinux, Smack and AppArmor have behaviors
beyond the sharing of security blobs that prevent them from
working together at this point. TOMOYO does not have this
limitation.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 14 ++++--
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +-
security/Kconfig | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 8 +++
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 9 +++-
security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 4 ++
security/apparmor/include/task.h | 4 ++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
security/security.c | 30 +++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 35 +++++++++++++-
security/smack/smack.h | 33 +++++++++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 17 +++----
security/tomoyo/common.h | 12 ++++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 3 +-
15 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
index 9842e21afd4a..d3d8af174042 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
@@ -17,10 +17,16 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
in the core functionality of Linux itself.
-The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. This may be
-followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one "major" module.
-For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux
-man-pages project.
+The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. For more details
+on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux man-pages project.
+
+Security modules that do not use the security data blobs maintained
+by the LSM infrastructure are considered "minor" modules. These may be
+included at compile time and stacked explicitly. Security modules that
+use the LSM maintained security blobs are considered "major" modules.
+These may only be stacked if the CONFIG_LSM_STACKED configuration
+option is used. If this is chosen all of the security modules selected
+will be used.
A list of the active security modules can be found by reading
``/sys/kernel/security/lsm``. This is a comma separated list, and
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 5428485750b6..7c461a8aba3e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
-extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
+extern bool __init security_module_enable(const char *lsm, const bool stacked);
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 116dba966553..8225388b81c3 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -36,6 +36,28 @@ config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
bool
default n
+config SECURITY_STACKING
+ bool "Security module stacking"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ help
+ Allows multiple major security modules to be stacked.
+ Modules are invoked in the order registered with a
+ "bail on fail" policy, in which the infrastructure
+ will stop processing once a denial is detected. Not
+ all modules can be stacked. SELinux and Smack are
+ known to be incompatible. User space components may
+ have trouble identifying the security module providing
+ data in some cases.
+
+ If you select this option you will have to select which
+ of the stackable modules you wish to be active. The
+ "Default security module" will be ignored. The boot line
+ "security=" option can be used to specify that one of
+ the modules identifed for stacking should be used instead
+ of the entire stack.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
bool "Enable debugging of the LSM infrastructure"
depends on SECURITY
@@ -251,6 +273,9 @@ source security/yama/Kconfig
source security/integrity/Kconfig
+menu "Security Module Selection"
+ visible if !SECURITY_STACKING
+
choice
prompt "Default security module"
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
@@ -290,3 +315,64 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
endmenu
+menu "Security Module Stack"
+ visible if SECURITY_STACKING
+
+choice
+ prompt "Stacked 'extreme' security module"
+ default SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED if SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED if SECURITY_SMACK
+ default SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+
+ help
+ Enable an extreme security module. These modules cannot
+ be used at the same time.
+
+ config SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED
+ bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+ help
+ This option instructs the system to use the SELinux checks.
+ At this time the Smack security module is incompatible with this
+ module.
+ At this time the AppArmor security module is incompatible with this
+ module.
+
+ config SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED
+ bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+ help
+ This option instructs the system to use the Smack checks.
+ At this time the SELinux security module is incompatible with this
+ module.
+ At this time the AppArmor security module is incompatible with this
+ module.
+
+ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED
+ bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+ help
+ This option instructs the system to use the AppArmor checks.
+ At this time the SELinux security module is incompatible with this
+ module.
+ At this time the Smack security module is incompatible with this
+ module.
+
+ config SECURITY_NOTHING_STACKED
+ bool "Use no 'extreme' security module"
+ help
+ Use none of the SELinux, Smack or AppArmor security module.
+
+endchoice
+
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED
+ bool "TOMOYO support is enabled by default"
+ depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO && SECURITY_STACKING
+ default n
+ help
+ This option instructs the system to use the TOMOYO checks.
+ If not selected the module will not be invoked.
+ Stacked security modules may interact in unexpected ways.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+endmenu
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
index a90eae76d7c1..be7575adf6f0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -25,7 +25,11 @@
static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+#else
struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+#endif
AA_BUG(!blob);
return *blob;
@@ -34,7 +38,11 @@ static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred,
struct aa_label *label)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+#else
struct aa_label **blob = cred->security;
+#endif
AA_BUG(!blob);
*blob = label;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 4c2c8ac8842f..e28811943425 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -32,7 +32,14 @@ struct path;
AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)
-#define file_ctx(X) ((struct aa_file_ctx *)(X)->f_security)
+static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(struct file *file)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return file->f_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+#else
+ return file->f_security;
+#endif
+}
/* struct aa_file_ctx - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
* @lock: lock to update the ctx
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
index 6505e1ad9e23..bbe9b384d71d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include "match.h"
@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
size_t *ns_len);
void aa_info_message(const char *str);
+/* Security blob offsets */
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes;
+
/**
* aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
* @str: a null terminated string
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index 039c1e60887a..4fbe9370e6e0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -16,7 +16,11 @@
static inline struct aa_task_ctx *task_ctx(struct task_struct *task)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return task->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_task;
+#else
return task->security;
+#endif
}
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e3890899a10c..1943ff17e0df 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1508,7 +1508,9 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
int error;
if (!finish) {
- if (apparmor_enabled && security_module_enable("apparmor"))
+ if (apparmor_enabled &&
+ security_module_enable("apparmor",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED)))
security_add_blobs(&apparmor_blob_sizes);
else
apparmor_enabled = false;
@@ -1516,7 +1518,9 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
return 0;
}
- if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
+ if (!apparmor_enabled ||
+ !security_module_enable("apparmor",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED))) {
aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
apparmor_enabled = false;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 412dba75da65..e0f01cdd1830 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
+#define MODULE_STACK "(stacking)"
struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
@@ -50,7 +51,11 @@ static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ MODULE_STACK;
+#else
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+#endif
static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
{
@@ -174,6 +179,7 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
/**
* security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
* @module: the name of the module
+ * @stacked: indicates that the module wants to be stacked
*
* Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
* to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
@@ -189,9 +195,29 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
*
* Otherwise, return false.
*/
-int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
+bool __init security_module_enable(const char *lsm, const bool stacked)
{
- return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ /*
+ * Module defined on the command line security=XXXX
+ */
+ if (strcmp(chosen_lsm, MODULE_STACK)) {
+ if (!strcmp(lsm, chosen_lsm)) {
+ pr_info("Command line sets the %s security module.\n",
+ lsm);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Module configured as stacked.
+ */
+ return stacked;
+#else
+ if (strcmp(lsm, chosen_lsm) == 0)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+#endif
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f3531e5bc3d9..1b81b74b8f84 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6906,7 +6906,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
static int finish;
- if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
+ if (!security_module_enable("selinux",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED))) {
selinux_enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 6092786c5828..da5b3eaa5a58 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -161,47 +161,80 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+#else
return cred->security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+#else
return file->f_security;
+#endif
}
-static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
+ const struct inode *inode)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return inode->i_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+#else
return inode->i_security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
const struct super_block *superblock)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+#else
return superblock->s_security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct msg_security_struct *selinux_msg_msg(
const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return msg_msg->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
+#else
return msg_msg->security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
+#else
return ipc->security;
+#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+#else
return key->security;
+#endif
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+#else
return sock->sk_security;
+#endif
}
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index e50ed4945a40..87ced0fc1a19 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
#endif
extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
@@ -359,44 +360,76 @@ extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return cred->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+#else
return cred->security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return file->f_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+#else
return file->f_security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return inode->i_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+#else
return inode->i_security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+#else
return sock->sk_security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
const struct super_block *superblock)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+#else
return superblock->s_security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct smack_known **smack_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return msg->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
+#else
return msg->security;
+#endif
}
static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
+#else
return ipc->security;
+#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+#else
return key->security;
+#endif
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c15861eb3606..4cc3d6e04e10 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3432,18 +3432,16 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
char *cp;
- int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+ cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else
return -EINVAL;
- cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (cp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- slen = strlen(cp);
*value = cp;
- return slen;
+ return strlen(cp);
}
/**
@@ -4683,7 +4681,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;
- if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
+ if (!security_module_enable("smack",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED)))
return 0;
if (!finish) {
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 0110bebe86e2..f386f92c57c5 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
extern struct tomoyo_policy_namespace tomoyo_kernel_namespace;
extern unsigned int tomoyo_memory_quota[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
extern unsigned int tomoyo_memory_used[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT];
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes;
/********** Inlined functions. **********/
@@ -1206,7 +1207,11 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group)
*/
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info **tomoyo_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return cred->security + tomoyo_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+#else
return cred->security;
+#endif
}
/**
@@ -1216,8 +1221,13 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info **tomoyo_cred(const struct cred *cred)
*/
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob = tomoyo_cred(current_cred());
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
+
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ blob = tomoyo_cred(cred);
return *blob;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 821ca242a194..eb4b886b6076 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -564,7 +564,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
struct tomoyo_domain_info **blob;
- if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo")) {
+ if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED))) {
tomoyo_enabled = false;
return 0;
}
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:32:32 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 14/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob
Move management of the key->security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 ++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 +++++++
security/smack/smack.h | 7 +++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 +++++++++++++++-----------------
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 42535da852bc..5428485750b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2019,6 +2019,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
int lbs_ipc;
+ int lbs_key;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9414d1a78ee5..359ed1137c00 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
pr_info("LSM: ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ pr_info("LSM: key blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
pr_info("LSM: msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
pr_info("LSM: sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
pr_info("LSM: superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -297,6 +300,9 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -432,6 +438,29 @@ int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
+ * @key: the key that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_key == 0) {
+ key->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ key->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (key->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/**
* lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
* @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2137,12 +2166,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_key_free(key);
+ return rc;
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
{
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+ kfree(key->security);
+ key->security = NULL;
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3911e28e3907..f3531e5bc3d9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6407,11 +6407,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct key_security_struct *ksec;
-
- ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6419,18 +6415,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
else
ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
- k->security = ksec;
return 0;
}
-static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
-{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
-
- k->security = NULL;
- kfree(ksec);
-}
-
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
unsigned perm)
@@ -6448,7 +6435,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
sid = cred_sid(cred);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- ksec = key->security;
+ ksec = selinux_key(key);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
@@ -6456,7 +6443,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
char *context = NULL;
unsigned len;
int rc;
@@ -6681,6 +6668,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6890,7 +6880,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d1d883f8c552..6092786c5828 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -192,6 +192,13 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
return ipc->security;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
return sock->sk_security;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 42c36e37b0bd..e50ed4945a40 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -393,6 +393,13 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a419953c1004..c15861eb3606 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4136,23 +4136,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- key->security = skp;
+ *blob = skp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
- * @key: the object
- *
- * Clear the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
- key->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4165,6 +4155,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
@@ -4178,7 +4170,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
* it may do so.
*/
- if (keyp->security == NULL)
+ blob = smack_key(keyp);
+ skp = *blob;
+ if (skp == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* This should not occur
@@ -4198,8 +4192,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
request = MAY_READ;
if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
request = MAY_WRITE;
- rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+ rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -4214,11 +4208,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
*/
static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+ struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
size_t length;
char *copy;
- if (key->security == NULL) {
+ if (skp == NULL) {
*_buffer = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -4505,6 +4500,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4623,7 +4621,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:33:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 15/23] LSM: Mark security blob allocation failures as unlikely
The allocation of security blobs is unlikely to fail.
Mark the checks thus for performance reasons.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 359ed1137c00..412dba75da65 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
{
int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
if (unlikely(rc))
@@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
if (unlikely(rc))
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 16:28:18 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 23/23] Netfilter: Add a selection for Smack
If you are running a single security module it's
fine to tell the netfilter system that your security
filters are for SELinux, and everything will work just
fine. If you have Smack and SELinux at the same time
you need to be able to differentiate. The netfilter
secmark (xt_SECMARK) code is set up for multiple security
modules, although as a comment points out, only one at
a time. The code wasn't set up to pass the information
about who should process the secmark in the case of
multiple security modules, so that had to be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +--
include/linux/security.h | 19 ++++++-----
include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 10 ++++++
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 5 +++
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 8 ++++-
security/security.c | 37 +++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 11 ++++++
15 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 6c4b4acaac1c..9c9ec66e32ce 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1690,8 +1690,8 @@ union security_list_options {
const struct request_sock *req);
void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(struct secids *secid);
- void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);
- void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(u8 lsm);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(u8 lsm);
void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl);
int (*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void **security);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7258daf56494..dfdff994702c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -79,13 +79,8 @@ enum lsm_event {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
struct secids {
- u32 secmark;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
u32 selinux;
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
u32 smack;
-#endif
u32 flags;
};
@@ -1290,8 +1285,9 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid);
-void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
-void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(u8 lsm);
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(u8 lsm);
+int security_secmark_mode(u8 lsm);
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security);
void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security);
int security_tun_dev_create(void);
@@ -1463,12 +1459,17 @@ static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+static inline void security_secmark_refcount_inc(u8 lsm)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void security_secmark_refcount_dec(u8 lsm)
{
}
-static inline void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+static inline int security_secmark_mode(u8 lsm)
{
+ return 0;
}
static inline int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
index 1f2a708413f5..5245a9748599 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
* packets are being marked for.
*/
#define SECMARK_MODE_SEL 0x01 /* SELinux */
+#define SECMARK_MODE_SMACK 0x02 /* Smack */
#define SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX 256
struct xt_secmark_target_info {
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0c424f107b0c..6d7c9a8f47fc 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2172,7 +2172,9 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
u32 len;
if (security_secid_to_secctx(
&n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid.secmark);
+#endif
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3ff9a59127ba..556b4eaee4d7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1207,7 +1207,9 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid.secmark);
+#endif
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 379b1651c758..78c6cc2a869d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -314,8 +314,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct secids secid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ secid.smack = ct->secmark;
+#else
secid.secmark = ct->secmark;
+#endif
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
@@ -598,8 +603,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
struct secids secid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ secid.smack = ct->secmark;
+#else
secid.secmark = ct->secmark;
+#endif
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index f55f3c02520a..e3f32622cc36 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct secids secid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ secid.smack = ct->secmark;
+#else
secid.secmark = ct->secmark;
+#endif
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 82d50d78c851..86a2d7b5e322 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -297,8 +297,13 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->secmark) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.selinux = skb->secmark;
+ secid.smack = skb->secmark;
+#else
secid.secmark = skb->secmark;
+#endif
security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, secdata, &seclen);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 6af1f4fc837d..a4646c301307 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
secmark = info->secid;
break;
+ case SECMARK_MODE_SMACK:
+ secmark = info->secid;
+ break;
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -59,7 +62,16 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
&secid);
- info->secid = secid.selinux;
+ switch (info->mode) {
+ case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
+ info->secid = secid.selinux;
+ break;
+ case SECMARK_MODE_SMACK:
+ info->secid = secid.smack;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
@@ -80,7 +92,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
- security_secmark_refcount_inc();
+ if (mode)
+ security_secmark_refcount_inc(mode);
return 0;
}
@@ -96,15 +109,23 @@ static int secmark_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (mode && mode != info->mode) {
- pr_info_ratelimited("mode already set to %hu cannot mix with rules for mode %hu\n",
- mode, info->mode);
+ if (mode) {
+ if (mode != info->mode) {
+ pr_info("mode already set to %hu cannot mix with "
+ "rules for mode %hu\n", mode, info->mode);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (security_secmark_mode(info->mode)) {
+ pr_info("mode already set and cannot mix with "
+ "rules for mode %hu\n", info->mode);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (info->mode) {
case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
break;
+ case SECMARK_MODE_SMACK:
+ break;
default:
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid mode: %hu\n", info->mode);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -123,8 +144,14 @@ static void secmark_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par)
{
switch (mode) {
case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
- security_secmark_refcount_dec();
+ break;
+ case SECMARK_MODE_SMACK:
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("invalid mode: %hu\n", mode);
+ return;
}
+ security_secmark_refcount_dec(mode);
}
static struct xt_target secmark_tg_reg __read_mostly = {
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 740db88d14f2..afc1e360b5bc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
- if (audit_info->secid.secmark != 0 &&
+ if (secid_valid(&audit_info->secid) &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->secid,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 2667b9e7fd16..43f81403212a 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid.secmark;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
secid_to_skb(&scm->secid, skb);
+#else
+ UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid.secmark;
#endif
}
@@ -158,7 +159,12 @@ static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return memcmp(&scm->secid, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid),
+ sizeof(scm->secid)) == 0;
+#else
return (scm->secid.secmark == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+#endif
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 571643cc7256..856c7506e84c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -346,10 +346,9 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
#endif
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
/*
- * Store the most likely secmark with the socket
- * so that it doesn't have to be a managed object.
+ * Store the secids with the socket for UDS.
*/
if (needed->lbs_sock && blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0)
blob_sizes.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct secids);
@@ -2192,11 +2191,17 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ int trc;
secid_init(secid);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- list)
- rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ list) {
+ trc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ rc = 0;
+ else if (trc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
+ return trc;
+ }
return rc;
#else
@@ -2286,18 +2291,32 @@ int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
-void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(u8 lsm)
{
- call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc, lsm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
-void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(u8 lsm)
{
- call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec, lsm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
+static u8 security_secmark_mode_value;
+
+int security_secmark_mode(u8 lsm)
+{
+ if (security_secmark_mode_value == 0) {
+ security_secmark_mode_value = lsm;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (security_secmark_mode_value == lsm)
+ return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_mode);
+
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
{
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9520341daa78..90122e311686 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
@@ -5296,13 +5297,21 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
}
-static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(u8 lsm)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ if (lsm != SECMARK_MODE_SEL)
+ return;
+#endif
atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
}
-static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(u8 lsm)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ if (lsm != SECMARK_MODE_SEL)
+ return;
+#endif
atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f3a2be53dd6c..5725d39808f3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
@@ -51,6 +52,11 @@
#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
#define SMK_SENDING 2
+/*
+ * SECMARK reference count
+ */
+static atomic_t smack_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
@@ -3787,6 +3793,19 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+static bool smack_owns_secmark(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
+ return false;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ return atomic_read(&smack_secmark_refcount) != 0;
+#else
+ return true;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+
/**
* smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
* @sk: socket
@@ -3817,7 +3836,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
* The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
*/
- if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
+ if (smack_owns_secmark(skb)) {
skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
goto access_check;
}
@@ -3862,7 +3881,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- if (skb)
+ if (smack_owns_secmark(skb))
skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
else
skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
@@ -3959,7 +3978,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
break;
case PF_INET:
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
- if (skb->secmark) {
+ if (smack_owns_secmark(skb)) {
s = skb->secmark;
if (s != 0)
break;
@@ -3980,7 +3999,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
break;
case PF_INET6:
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- s = skb->secmark;
+ if (smack_owns_secmark(skb))
+ s = skb->secmark;
#endif
break;
}
@@ -4058,11 +4078,9 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
* The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
*/
- if (skb) {
- if (skb->secmark != 0) {
- skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
- goto access_check;
- }
+ if (smack_owns_secmark(skb)) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ goto access_check;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
@@ -4138,6 +4156,24 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
}
+static void smack_secmark_refcount_inc(u8 lsm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ if (lsm != SECMARK_MODE_SMACK)
+ return;
+#endif
+ atomic_inc(&smack_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void smack_secmark_refcount_dec(u8 lsm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ if (lsm != SECMARK_MODE_SMACK)
+ return;
+#endif
+ atomic_dec(&smack_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
/*
* Key management security hooks
*
@@ -4643,6 +4679,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, smack_secmark_refcount_inc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, smack_secmark_refcount_dec),
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index 701a1cc1bdcc..596aba2e4d6b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <net/inet_sock.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -31,6 +32,11 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ if (security_secmark_mode(SECMARK_MODE_SMACK))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+#endif
+
if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
@@ -49,6 +55,11 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ if (security_secmark_mode(SECMARK_MODE_SMACK))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+#endif
+
if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:10:46 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 17/23] LSM: Allow mount options from multiple security modules
Both SELinux and Smack use mount options that apply to
filesystems generally. Remove the failure case where the
security modules don't recognize an option. SELinux does
not recognize Smack's options, and vis versa.
The btrfs code had some misconceptions about the generality
of security modules and mount options. That has been
corrected.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/super.c | 10 +++---
include/linux/security.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 14 ++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 54 ++++++++++++++--------------
5 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c
index 0628092b0b1b..a678d956248f 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
@@ -1487,15 +1487,15 @@ static int setup_security_options(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
return ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- if (!fs_info->security_opts.num_mnt_opts) {
+ if (fs_info->security_opts.selinux.num_mnt_opts != 0 ||
+ fs_info->security_opts.smack.num_mnt_opts != 0) {
/* first time security setup, copy sec_opts to fs_info */
memcpy(&fs_info->security_opts, sec_opts, sizeof(*sec_opts));
} else {
/*
- * Since SELinux (the only one supporting security_mnt_opts)
- * does NOT support changing context during remount/mount of
- * the same sb, this must be the same or part of the same
- * security options, just free it.
+ * Since no modules support changing context during
+ * remount/mount of the same sb, this must be the same
+ * or part of the same security options, just free it.
*/
security_free_mnt_opts(sec_opts);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9afe7a509030..221665f411c0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -161,34 +161,55 @@ typedef int (*initxattrs) (struct inode *inode,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-struct security_mnt_opts {
+struct lsm_mnt_opts {
char **mnt_opts;
int *mnt_opts_flags;
int num_mnt_opts;
};
+
+struct security_mnt_opts {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct lsm_mnt_opts selinux;
+ struct lsm_mnt_opts smack;
+#else
+ union {
+ struct lsm_mnt_opts selinux;
+ struct lsm_mnt_opts smack;
+ };
+#endif
+};
+
int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data);
int register_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
int unregister_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
static inline void security_init_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
- opts->mnt_opts = NULL;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = NULL;
- opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+ memset(opts, 0, sizeof(*opts));
}
static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
int i;
- if (opts->mnt_opts)
- for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++)
- kfree(opts->mnt_opts[i]);
- kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
- opts->mnt_opts = NULL;
- kfree(opts->mnt_opts_flags);
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = NULL;
- opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+ if (opts->selinux.mnt_opts)
+ for (i = 0; i < opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts; i++)
+ kfree(opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i]);
+ kfree(opts->selinux.mnt_opts);
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts = NULL;
+ kfree(opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags);
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags = NULL;
+ opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+ if (opts->smack.mnt_opts)
+ for (i = 0; i < opts->smack.num_mnt_opts; i++)
+ kfree(opts->smack.mnt_opts[i]);
+ kfree(opts->smack.mnt_opts);
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts = NULL;
+ kfree(opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags);
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags = NULL;
+ opts->smack.num_mnt_opts = 0;
}
/* prototypes */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e0f01cdd1830..3d1293e8b19b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -782,9 +782,17 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
- opts->num_mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
- opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
+ int nobody = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Additional security modules that use mount options
+ * need to be added here.
+ */
+ if (opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts != 0 || opts->smack.num_mnt_opts != 0)
+ nobody = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, nobody, sb, opts, kern_flags,
+ set_kern_flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1b81b74b8f84..47f672152892 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -569,21 +569,23 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
if (tmp & 0x01)
- opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+ opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts++;
tmp >>= 1;
}
/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
- opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+ opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts++;
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts,
+ sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!opts->selinux.mnt_opts) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts,
+ sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
@@ -594,8 +596,8 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
&context, &len);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i] = context;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
@@ -603,16 +605,16 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
&context, &len);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i] = context;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
&context, &len);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i] = context;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
@@ -622,15 +624,15 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
&context, &len);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i] = context;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
}
- BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
+ BUG_ON(i != opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts);
return 0;
@@ -676,9 +678,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
- char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
- int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
- int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+ char **mount_options = opts->selinux.mnt_opts;
+ int *flags = opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags;
+ int num_opts = opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts;
mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
@@ -1039,7 +1041,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
- opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+ opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts = 0;
/* Standard string-based options. */
while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
@@ -1106,41 +1108,39 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
case Opt_labelsupport:
break;
default:
- rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
- goto out_err;
-
+ break;
}
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts->selinux.mnt_opts)
goto out_err;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
+ if (!opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags)
goto out_err;
if (fscontext) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (context) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (rootcontext) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
}
if (defcontext) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
+ opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
}
- opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+ opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
return 0;
out_err:
@@ -1185,15 +1185,15 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
int i;
char *prefix;
- for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < opts->selinux.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
char *has_comma;
- if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
- has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+ if (opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i])
+ has_comma = strchr(opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i], ',');
else
has_comma = NULL;
- switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+ switch (opts->selinux.mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
case CONTEXT_MNT:
prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
break;
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
seq_puts(m, prefix);
if (has_comma)
seq_putc(m, '\"');
- seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
+ seq_escape(m, opts->selinux.mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
if (has_comma)
seq_putc(m, '\"');
}
@@ -2794,10 +2794,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
if (rc)
goto out_free_secdata;
- mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
- flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
+ mount_options = opts.selinux.mnt_opts;
+ flags = opts.selinux.mnt_opts_flags;
- for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < opts.selinux.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
u32 sid;
if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4cc3d6e04e10..6528757ef6c0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
int num_mnt_opts = 0;
int token;
- opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+ opts->smack.num_mnt_opts = 0;
if (!options)
return 0;
@@ -651,43 +651,45 @@ static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
goto out_err;
break;
default:
- rc = -EINVAL;
pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
- goto out_err;
+ break;
}
}
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts->smack.mnt_opts)
goto out_err;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags) {
+ kfree(opts->smack.mnt_opts);
goto out_err;
+ }
if (fsdefault) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
}
if (fsfloor) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
}
if (fshat) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
}
if (fsroot) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
}
if (fstransmute) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
+ opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
}
- opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+ opts->smack.num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
return 0;
out_opt_err:
@@ -726,7 +728,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smack_known *skp;
int i;
- int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+ int num_opts = opts->smack.num_mnt_opts;
int transmute = 0;
if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
@@ -760,33 +762,33 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
- switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+ switch (opts->smack.mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
- skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->smack.mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_default = skp;
break;
case FSFLOOR_MNT:
- skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->smack.mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_floor = skp;
break;
case FSHAT_MNT:
- skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->smack.mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_hat = skp;
break;
case FSROOT_MNT:
- skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->smack.mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_root = skp;
break;
case FSTRANS_MNT:
- skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->smack.mnt_opts[i], 0);
if (IS_ERR(skp))
return PTR_ERR(skp);
sp->smk_root = skp;
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:19:22 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 18/23] LSM: Use multiple secids in security module interfaces
This is the first of two parts required to change the
security module infrastructure from using a u32 to
identify extended security attributes to using a pointer
to a structure containing the information required for
the set of security modules involved. You can't put an
SELinux secid, a Smack secid and an AppArmor secid
all into a u32. They don't fit. Schemes that map a
single u32 into sets of u32s are frought with data
management issues and as a result are not suitable for
use in the variety of ways secids manifest themselves
in the Linux kernel.
This patch changes the interfaces to the security modules
to use a "struct secids" pointer where they used a u32
before. There are changes in networking code where the
layering isn't so clean as I would like it to be.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 38 +++++++++--------
include/linux/security.h | 18 +++++++++
include/net/flow.h | 5 ++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 ++--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 4 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 4 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 29 +++++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 7 ++--
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 +-
security/security.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 57 +++++++++++++-------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 9 +++--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 10 ++---
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 25 +++++++-----
security/smack/smack_access.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
security/smack/smackfs.c | 14 +++++--
22 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 153 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7c461a8aba3e..81504623afb4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer_size);
- void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid);
int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
@@ -1573,8 +1573,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
- void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct secids *secid);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -1585,7 +1585,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
- void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+ void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid);
int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
- void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct secids *secid);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
@@ -1639,8 +1639,10 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct secids *secid, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct secids *secid);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1674,20 +1676,21 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned int len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid);
int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
- void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
+ void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, struct secids *secid);
void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req);
void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
- int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid);
+ int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(struct secids *secid);
void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);
void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);
void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -1726,15 +1729,16 @@ union security_list_options {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
- u32 secid);
+ const struct secids *secid);
void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
- int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid,
- u8 dir);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir);
int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
const struct flowi *fl);
- int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
+ int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid,
+ int ckall);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
/* key management security hooks */
@@ -1751,8 +1755,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule);
int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(struct secids *secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 221665f411c0..f16c33320792 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
};
+struct secids {
+ union {
+ u32 secmark;
+ u32 selinux;
+ u32 smack;
+ };
+};
+
+static inline bool secid_valid(const struct secids *secids)
+{
+ return secids->secmark != 0;
+}
+
+static inline void secid_init(struct secids *secid)
+{
+ memset(secid, 0, sizeof(*secid));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, int audit);
diff --git a/include/net/flow.h b/include/net/flow.h
index 8ce21793094e..aa29d11bc3d7 100644
--- a/include/net/flow.h
+++ b/include/net/flow.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/flow_dissector.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ struct flowi_common {
#define FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC 0x01
#define FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH 0x02
#define FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF 0x04
- __u32 flowic_secid;
+ struct secids flowic_secid;
struct flowi_tunnel flowic_tun_key;
kuid_t flowic_uid;
};
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void flowi4_init_output(struct flowi4 *fl4, int oif,
fl4->flowi4_scope = scope;
fl4->flowi4_proto = proto;
fl4->flowi4_flags = flags;
- fl4->flowi4_secid = 0;
+ secid_init(&fl4->flowi4_secid);
fl4->flowi4_tun_key.tun_id = 0;
fl4->flowi4_uid = uid;
fl4->daddr = daddr;
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 72d6435fc16c..51dacbb88886 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;
/* NetLabel audit information */
struct netlbl_audit {
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
kuid_t loginuid;
unsigned int sessionid;
};
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
} attr;
};
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct secids *secid,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct secids *secid,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 82178cc69c96..296918dff71e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid.secmark;
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ secattr->attr.secid.secmark = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index ea7c67050792..3cdd773c425e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct secids *secid,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ secid->secmark, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c070dfc0190a..626d756cdee4 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct secids *secid)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->secid = *secid;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct secids *secid)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->secid = *secid;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct secids ids;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, &ids);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -434,7 +436,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, &ids);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -508,7 +511,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid.secmark,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -569,7 +572,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid.secmark,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1124,7 +1127,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ secid = addr4->secid.secmark;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1138,7 +1141,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ secid = addr6->secid.secmark;
}
ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
@@ -1543,7 +1546,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid.secmark);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 58495f44c62a..cb992f1cca2e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
- if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
+ if (audit_info->secid.secmark != 0 &&
+ security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid.secmark,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 4a397cde1a48..1c320ccde24c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid.secmark);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 40b54cc64243..46d332ed833a 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1069,7 +1069,8 @@ static int xfrm_policy_match(const struct xfrm_policy *pol,
match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
if (match)
- ret = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security, fl->flowi_secid,
+ ret = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
+ fl->flowi_secid.secmark,
dir);
return ret;
@@ -1182,7 +1183,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
goto out;
}
err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
- fl->flowi_secid,
+ fl->flowi_secid.secmark,
dir);
if (!err) {
if (!xfrm_pol_hold_rcu(pol))
@@ -2366,7 +2367,7 @@ int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
afinfo->decode_session(skb, fl, reverse);
- err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid);
+ err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid.secmark);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index f9d2f2233f09..a17f7b02ac32 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
xfrm_init_tempstate(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family);
memcpy(&x->mark, &pol->mark, sizeof(x->mark));
- error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, fl->flowi_secid);
+ error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, fl->flowi_secid.secmark);
if (error) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
to_put = x;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1943ff17e0df..90453dbb4fac 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1068,7 +1068,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
/* TODO: requires secid support */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3d1293e8b19b..61ffb0c04e8e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
pr_info("LSM: sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
pr_info("LSM: superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ pr_info("LSM: secid size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct secids));
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
return 0;
@@ -1249,7 +1250,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &ids);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
@@ -1459,14 +1463,20 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = 0;
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &ids);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &ids);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
@@ -1525,8 +1535,11 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = 0;
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &ids);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
@@ -1608,8 +1621,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = 0;
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &ids);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -1788,15 +1804,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &ids, secdata,
seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+ int rc;
+
+ ids.secmark = 0;
+ rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &ids);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
+
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -1927,8 +1952,14 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ skb, &ids);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
+
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
@@ -1997,7 +2028,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, &ids);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
@@ -2136,7 +2170,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, &ids);
}
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
@@ -2152,7 +2189,10 @@ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
- return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = fl_secid;
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, &ids, dir);
}
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
@@ -2181,7 +2221,13 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
+ struct secids ids;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &ids, 1);
+ *secid = ids.secmark;
+
+ return rc;
}
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
@@ -2251,7 +2297,10 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+ struct secids ids;
+
+ ids.secmark = secid;
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &ids, field, op, lsmrule,
actx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 47f672152892..81f104d9e85e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3412,15 +3412,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
return len;
}
-static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+ secid->selinux = isec->sid;
}
static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
{
- u32 sid;
+ struct secids sids;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct cred *new_creds = *new;
@@ -3432,8 +3432,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
- selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
- tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sids);
+ tsec->create_sid = sids.selinux;
*new = new_creds;
return 0;
}
@@ -3850,28 +3850,28 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
-static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct secids *secid)
{
- *secid = cred_sid(c);
+ secid->selinux = cred_sid(c);
}
/*
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, secid,
+ sid, secid->selinux,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
- tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->sid = secid->selinux;
tsec->create_sid = 0;
tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
@@ -3983,9 +3983,9 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}
-static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid)
{
- *secid = task_sid(p);
+ secid->selinux = task_sid(p);
}
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -4993,7 +4993,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid)
{
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
u16 family;
@@ -5015,7 +5015,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
out:
- *secid = peer_secid;
+ secid->selinux = peer_secid;
if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -5052,14 +5052,14 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
}
-static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, struct secids *secid)
{
if (!sk)
- *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+ secid->selinux = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- *secid = sksec->sid;
+ secid->selinux = sksec->sid;
}
}
@@ -5291,7 +5291,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
-static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 tsid;
@@ -5300,8 +5300,8 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
tsid = __tsec->sid;
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
- NULL);
+ tsid, secid->selinux, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
}
static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
@@ -5317,7 +5317,7 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl)
{
- fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
+ fl->flowi_secid.selinux = req->secid;
}
static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
@@ -6142,10 +6142,11 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
-static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+ secid->selinux = isec->sid;
}
static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
@@ -6349,16 +6350,18 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
- return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+ return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid->selinux,
secdata, seclen);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
- secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ &secid->selinux, GFP_KERNEL);
}
static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 1bdf973433cc..c9cadad5660e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct secids *sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
struct audit_context *actx);
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index a0b465316292..99bac3ccfebd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ const struct secids *secid);
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir);
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
const struct flowi *fl);
@@ -40,7 +42,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad);
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *sid,
+ int ckall);
int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index c40914a157b7..efc87a76af72 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.secid.selinux == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 41ab13319153..6bbfe1cc971f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3410,7 +3410,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct secids *sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
@@ -3431,10 +3431,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
goto out;
}
- ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
+ ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid->selinux);
if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- sid);
+ sid->selinux);
match = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
@@ -3609,7 +3609,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.secid.selinux;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3682,7 +3682,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.secid.selinux = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8ffe7e1053c4..067dd8307a9b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
* rule.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
int rc;
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
return -EINVAL;
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ fl_secid->selinux, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
}
@@ -200,14 +201,14 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
- if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
+ if (fl->flowi_secid.selinux != state_sid)
return 0;
/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
* is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
* check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+ fl->flowi_secid.selinux, state_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
@@ -261,13 +262,14 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
* LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
* incoming packet.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *sid,
+ int ckall)
{
if (skb == NULL) {
- *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ sid->selinux = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
- return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+ return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, &sid->selinux, ckall);
}
int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
@@ -344,7 +346,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
* on a secid.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ const struct secids *secid)
{
int rc;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
@@ -354,10 +357,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
if (!polsec)
return 0;
- if (secid == 0)
+ if (!secid_valid(secid))
return -EINVAL;
- rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid->selinux, &ctx_str,
&str_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -370,7 +373,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
- ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+ ctx->ctx_sid = secid->selinux;
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 133774805594..1609aac48793 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -550,7 +550,9 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.flags =
- NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL |
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid.smack = skp->smk_secid;
/*
* If direct labeling works use it.
* Otherwise use mapped labeling.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6528757ef6c0..660a55ee8a57 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1471,11 +1471,11 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
* @inode: inode to extract the info from
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
- *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
+ secid->smack = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
}
/*
@@ -1941,12 +1941,15 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
- new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
- new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
- mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+ int rc;
+
+ init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
- /* cbs copy rule list */
+ rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel,
+ &old_tsp->smk_relabel, GFP_KERNEL);
}
/**
@@ -1956,13 +1959,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct secids *secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
rcu_read_lock();
skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -1973,11 +1976,11 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid)
{
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
- new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid->smack);
return 0;
}
@@ -2063,11 +2066,11 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
}
/**
@@ -3189,12 +3192,12 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
* @ipp: the object permissions
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct secids *secid)
{
struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
- *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+ secid->smack = iskp->smk_secid;
}
/**
@@ -3707,7 +3710,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid.smack);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -3840,7 +3843,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
+ if (skb)
skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
else
skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
@@ -3911,7 +3914,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -3939,9 +3943,11 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
break;
case PF_INET:
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
- s = skb->secmark;
- if (s != 0)
- break;
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ s = skb->secmark;
+ if (s != 0)
+ break;
+ }
#endif
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -3962,7 +3968,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
#endif
break;
}
- *secid = s;
+ secid->smack = s;
if (s == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -4036,9 +4042,11 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
* The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
*/
- if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
- skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
- goto access_check;
+ if (skb) {
+ if (skb->secmark != 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ goto access_check;
+ }
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
@@ -4309,8 +4317,8 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
* whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
*/
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct secids *secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;
@@ -4323,7 +4331,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return 0;
- skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid->smack);
/*
* No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
@@ -4363,9 +4371,10 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid->smack);
if (secdata)
*secdata = skp->smk_known;
@@ -4381,14 +4390,15 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
if (skp)
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
else
- *secid = 0;
+ secid->smack = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -4411,7 +4421,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
int len = 0;
- len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+ len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, false);
if (len < 0)
return len;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 9d2dde608298..0a075c80abb4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ nap->secid.smack = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
@@ -1165,6 +1165,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
__be32 nsa;
u32 temp_mask;
+ struct secids secid;
/*
* Must have privilege.
@@ -1281,10 +1282,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.smack = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &secid, &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
@@ -2951,7 +2955,9 @@ static int __init smk_preset_netlabel(struct smack_known *skp)
{
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.flags =
- NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL |
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid.smack = skp->smk_secid;
return smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_direct, skp->smk_known,
&skp->smk_netlabel, strlen(skp->smk_known));
}
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:41:54 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 19/23] LSM: Use multiple secids in LSM interfaces
This is the second of two parts required to change the
security module infrastructure from using a u32 to
identify extended security attributes.
There's a little bit of stubbing at this point because
the "struct secid" is in fact a union of u32 entries,
and you can only use one at a time.
Because the security API is used in many interesting ways
(audit, file systems, and a variety of networking) the
change hits a lot of places.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/security.h | 75 +++++++++++--------
include/net/scm.h | 4 +-
kernel/audit.c | 23 +++---
kernel/audit.h | 9 +--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 42 ++++++-----
kernel/cred.c | 6 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 12 +++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 6 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 9 ++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 31 ++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 +++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 11 +--
security/security.c | 124 +++++++++++---------------------
27 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 631286535d0f..217814eb1925 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct secids;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *cred, struct secids *secid);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern void __init cred_init(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f16c33320792..ab70064c283f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
@@ -355,8 +355,8 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct secids *secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct secids *secid);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -413,8 +413,9 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct secids *secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -819,9 +820,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ secid->secmark = 0;
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
@@ -934,7 +936,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -985,9 +988,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ secid->secmark = 0;
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -1058,9 +1062,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ secid->secmark = 0;
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -1180,14 +1185,15 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct secids *secid)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -1236,7 +1242,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1249,7 +1256,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid);
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security);
@@ -1368,7 +1375,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
@@ -1414,7 +1423,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
{
}
-static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1511,14 +1520,16 @@ void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ const struct secids *secid);
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
+int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir);
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
const struct flowi *fl);
-int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid);
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
@@ -1551,7 +1562,8 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
}
static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ const struct secids *secid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1565,7 +1577,8 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1576,7 +1589,8 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
return 1;
}
-static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1712,8 +1726,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct secids *secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1729,8 +1743,9 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct secids *secid, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 903771c8d4e3..292575f75201 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct secids secid; /* Passed security ID */
#endif
};
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 670665c6e2a6..0c424f107b0c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+struct secids audit_sig_sid;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1421,20 +1421,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ if (secid_valid(&audit_sig_sid)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_sid, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (secid_valid(&audit_sig_sid))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (secid_valid(&audit_sig_sid)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2166,12 +2167,12 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
+ if (secid_valid(&n->osid)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ &n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid.secmark);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -2209,13 +2210,13 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
+ struct secids sid;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ if (!secid_valid(&sid))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&sid, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 214e14948370..246a4721577d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct secids osid;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct secids target_sid;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct secids osid;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
@@ -328,7 +329,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct secids audit_sig_sid;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index d7a807e81451..d3e5ef7656c7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
+ struct secids sid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1358,7 +1358,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&sid,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4e0a4ac803db..3ff9a59127ba 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct secids target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -446,10 +446,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
+ struct secids sid;
unsigned int sessionid;
- cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
+ cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred,
+ tsk == current || task_creation);
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -629,7 +630,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&sid,
+ f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule,
ctx);
@@ -646,13 +648,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
- list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
- f->op, f->lsm_rule,
- ctx)) {
+ list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list,
+ list) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
+ &n->osid,
+ f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule,
+ ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -661,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule, ctx))
++result;
@@ -969,7 +975,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ struct secids *sid, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
@@ -1191,17 +1197,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct secids osid = context->ipc.osid;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
+ if (secid_valid(&osid)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid.secmark);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
@@ -1424,7 +1430,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_sid[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1433,7 +1439,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1580,7 +1586,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ secid_init(&context->target_sid);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index fa2061ee4955..362de31fcc5b 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid)
{
return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
}
@@ -668,14 +668,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
int ret;
ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 5ad2d8ed3a3f..029d51f1157b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -129,14 +129,16 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
+ struct secids secid;
int err;
+ secid_init(&secid);
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 4c1d0c5bc268..379b1651c758 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -312,8 +312,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct secids secid;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.secmark = ct->secmark;
+
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -592,8 +596,12 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct secids secid;
+
+ secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.secmark = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 037fec54c850..f55f3c02520a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -181,8 +181,12 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct secids secid;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.secmark = ct->secmark;
+
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 74a04638ef03..82d50d78c851 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -289,13 +289,18 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct secids secid;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ secid_init(&secid);
+ secid.secmark = skb->secmark;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 4ad5fe27e08b..e67a6dc7ae1d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -52,12 +52,15 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
int err;
+ struct secids secid;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &secid);
+ info->secid = secid.secmark;
+
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -71,7 +74,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return -ENOENT;
}
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&secid);
if (err) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
return err;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 3cdd773c425e..cb8a2c790081 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid->secmark, audit_info);
+ secid, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 626d756cdee4..9bf98d54b7e9 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct secids *secid,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct secids ids;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -422,8 +421,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ids.secmark = secid;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, &ids);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -436,8 +434,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ids.secmark = secid;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, &ids);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -511,7 +508,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid.secmark,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->secid,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -572,7 +569,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid.secmark,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->secid,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -897,7 +894,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -926,7 +923,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
return ret_val;
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &secid,
&audit_info);
}
@@ -948,7 +945,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -975,7 +972,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
return ret_val;
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &secid,
&audit_info);
}
@@ -1087,7 +1084,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
@@ -1127,7 +1124,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid.secmark;
+ secid = addr4->secid;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1141,10 +1138,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid.secmark;
+ secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1546,7 +1543,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid.secmark);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 3a9e5dc9511b..2c68e9f9de13 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct secids *secid,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index cb992f1cca2e..740db88d14f2 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
audit_info->sessionid);
if (audit_info->secid.secmark != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid.secmark,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->secid,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 1c320ccde24c..4a397cde1a48 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid.secmark);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 68bb70a62afe..f0f17fc33157 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -141,17 +141,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid.secmark;
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ scm->secid.secmark = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return (scm->secid.secmark == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 46d332ed833a..9230d8046fd7 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static int xfrm_policy_match(const struct xfrm_policy *pol,
match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
if (match)
ret = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
- fl->flowi_secid.secmark,
+ &fl->flowi_secid,
dir);
return ret;
@@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
goto out;
}
err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
- fl->flowi_secid.secmark,
+ &fl->flowi_secid,
dir);
if (!err) {
if (!xfrm_pol_hold_rcu(pol))
@@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
afinfo->decode_session(skb, fl, reverse);
- err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid.secmark);
+ err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index a17f7b02ac32..838a2638c8d4 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
xfrm_init_tempstate(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family);
memcpy(&x->mark, &pol->mark, sizeof(x->mark));
- error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, fl->flowi_secid.secmark);
+ error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, &fl->flowi_secid);
if (error) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
to_put = x;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 35fe91aa1fc9..1b07d2e52efb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
};
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct secids *secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct secids *secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index bf88236b7a0b..53a3b7c8ae7d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,8 +175,9 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct secids *secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 8bd7a0733e51..2afe49caad38 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,13 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &secid, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 74d0bd7e76d7..38b28ddc3a43 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
+ struct secids *secid, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -338,11 +338,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &secid, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
}
@@ -365,16 +365,16 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0);
}
@@ -390,10 +390,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &secid, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened);
}
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct secids secid;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &secid, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func, 0);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d89bebf85421..e38527b30047 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct secids *secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
int i;
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
+ struct secids osid;
int retried = 0;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
@@ -374,8 +374,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct secids *secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 61ffb0c04e8e..cbe1a497ec5a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1248,12 +1248,10 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &ids);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
+ secid_init(secid);
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
@@ -1461,22 +1459,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &ids);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
+ secid_init(secid);
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = secid;
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &ids);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
@@ -1533,13 +1525,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &ids);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
+ secid_init(secid);
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
@@ -1619,13 +1608,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &ids);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
+ secid_init(secid);
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -1802,26 +1788,18 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = secid;
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &ids, secdata,
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
- int rc;
-
- ids.secmark = 0;
- rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &ids);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
-
- return rc;
+ secid_init(secid);
+ return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -1950,16 +1928,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, &ids);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
-
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ skb, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
@@ -2026,12 +1999,9 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
-int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = secid;
- return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, &ids);
+ return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
@@ -2168,12 +2138,10 @@ int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ const struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = secid;
- return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, &ids);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
}
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
@@ -2187,12 +2155,10 @@ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
}
-int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = fl_secid;
- return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, &ids, dir);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
}
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
@@ -2219,22 +2185,19 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
return rc;
}
-int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid)
{
- struct secids ids;
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &ids, 1);
- *secid = ids.secmark;
-
- return rc;
+ secid_init(secid);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
}
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
- int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &fl->flowi_secid,
- 0);
+ int rc;
+
+ secid_init(&fl->flowi_secid);
+ rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
BUG_ON(rc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
@@ -2294,13 +2257,10 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct secids *secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
{
- struct secids ids;
-
- ids.secmark = secid;
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &ids, field, op, lsmrule,
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
actx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:54:25 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 20/23] LSM: Move common usercopy into
security_getpeersec_stream
The modules implementing hook for getpeersec_stream
don't need to be duplicating the copy-to-user checks.
Moving the user copy part into the infrastructure makes
the security module code simpler and reduces the places
where user copy code may go awry.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++------
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++------------------
security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++++++---------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 81504623afb4..84bc9ec01931 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -841,9 +841,8 @@
* SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
* socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
* @sock is the local socket.
- * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
- * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
- * of the security state.
+ * @optval the security state.
+ * @optlen the actual length of the security state.
* @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
* by the caller.
* Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
@@ -1674,9 +1673,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
- int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned int len);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
+ int *optlen, unsigned int len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct secids *secid);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ab70064c283f..712d138e0148 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1369,8 +1369,10 @@ static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 90453dbb4fac..7444cfa689b3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1017,10 +1017,8 @@ static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
*
* Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
*/
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen,
- unsigned int len)
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
+ int *optlen, unsigned int len)
{
char *name;
int slen, error = 0;
@@ -1037,22 +1035,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
- if (slen < 0) {
+ if (slen < 0)
error = -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- if (slen > len) {
- error = -ERANGE;
- } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
- error = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- if (put_user(slen, optlen))
- error = -EFAULT;
-out:
- kfree(name);
-
+ else if (slen > len)
+ error = -ERANGE;
+ else {
+ *optlen = slen;
+ *optval = name;
}
-
+ if (error)
+ kfree(name);
done:
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index cbe1a497ec5a..6144ff52d862 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1924,8 +1924,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ char *tval = NULL;
+ u32 tlen;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ &tval, &tlen, len);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ tlen = strlen(tval) + 1;
+ if (put_user(tlen, optlen))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ else if (copy_to_user(optval, tval, tlen))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(tval);
+ }
+ return rc;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 81f104d9e85e..9520341daa78 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4955,10 +4955,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- __user char *optval,
- __user int *optlen,
- unsigned int len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
+ int *optlen, unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
@@ -4979,18 +4977,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return err;
if (scontext_len > len) {
- err = -ERANGE;
- goto out_len;
+ kfree(scontext);
+ return -ERANGE;
}
-
- if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
- err = -EFAULT;
-
-out_len:
- if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
- err = -EFAULT;
- kfree(scontext);
- return err;
+ *optval = scontext;
+ *optlen = scontext_len;
+ return 0;
}
static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 660a55ee8a57..12b00aac0c94 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3878,14 +3878,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
*
* returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
+ int *optlen, unsigned int len)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
char *rcp = "";
int slen = 1;
- int rc = 0;
ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
@@ -3894,14 +3892,13 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
}
if (slen > len)
- rc = -ERANGE;
- else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
- rc = -EFAULT;
-
- if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
- rc = -EFAULT;
+ return -ERANGE;
- return rc;
+ *optval = kstrdup(rcp, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (*optval == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *optlen = slen;
+ return 0;
}
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 16:00:42 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 21/23] LSM: Multiple concurrent major security modules
In which it becomes evident just how wildy divergent
the various networking mechanisms are.
When CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING is defined a "struct secids"
changes from a union of u32's to a structure containing
a u32 for each of the security modules using secids.
The task blob is given space to include the name of the security
module to report with security_getpeersec_stream and SO_PEERSEC.
This can be set with a new prctl PR_SET_DISPLAY_LSM.
The CIPSO local tag will pass the full struct secids,
regardless of its size. This is safe because the local tag
never leaves the box. A function has been added to the
netlabel KAPI to check if two secattr_t structures
represent compatible on-wire labels. SELinux and Smack will
check that the label they want to set on a socket are
compatible and fail if they aren't. In the netlabel configuration
on a Fedora system creating internet domain sockets will
almost always fail, as SELinux and Smack have very different
use models for CIPSO. The result will be safe, if not
especially useful.
The interfaces used to store security attributes for
checkpoint/restart will keep the attributes for all of
the security modules.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++
include/linux/security.h | 43 +++++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 ++
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 4 +
kernel/fork.c | 3 +
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 19 ++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 50 +++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 +
security/Kconfig | 25 +---
security/Makefile | 1 +
security/security.c | 329 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 8 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 25 +++-
14 files changed, 468 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 84bc9ec01931..6c4b4acaac1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
/**
* union security_list_options - Linux Security Module hook function list
@@ -2096,4 +2097,11 @@ void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+extern int lsm_sock_vet_attr(struct sock *sk,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 flags);
+#define LSM_SOCK_SELINUX 0x00000001
+#define LSM_SOCK_SMACK 0x00000002
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 712d138e0148..7258daf56494 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct msg_msg;
struct xattr;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
struct mm_struct;
+struct sk_buff;
/* If capable should audit the security request */
#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
@@ -70,6 +71,30 @@ enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
};
+/*
+ * A secid is an u32 unless stacking is involved,
+ * in which case it is a set of u32s, one for each module
+ * that uses secids.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+
+struct secids {
+ u32 secmark;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ u32 selinux;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+ u32 smack;
+#endif
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+extern void secid_from_skb(struct secids *secid, const struct sk_buff *skb);
+extern void secid_to_skb(struct secids *secid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+extern bool secid_valid(const struct secids *secids);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING */
+
struct secids {
union {
u32 secmark;
@@ -83,6 +108,8 @@ static inline bool secid_valid(const struct secids *secids)
return secids->secmark != 0;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING */
+
static inline void secid_init(struct secids *secid)
{
memset(secid, 0, sizeof(*secid));
@@ -119,7 +146,6 @@ extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
struct msghdr;
-struct sk_buff;
struct sock;
struct sockaddr;
struct socket;
@@ -805,17 +831,23 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return cap_inode_killpriv(dentry);
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
+ const char *name, void **buffer,
+ bool alloc)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode,
+ const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size,
+ int flags)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1053,7 +1085,8 @@ static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
return cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
}
-static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct inode *inode)
{ }
static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 51dacbb88886..5c7e19498a81 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -472,6 +472,8 @@ int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
u32 offset,
unsigned long bitmap,
gfp_t flags);
+bool netlbl_secattr_equal(const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_a,
+ const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_b);
/* Bitmap functions
*/
@@ -623,6 +625,12 @@ static inline int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
{
return 0;
}
+static inline bool netlbl_secattr_equal(
+ const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_a,
+ const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_b)
+{
+ return true;
+}
static inline int netlbl_enabled(void)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index af5f8c2df87a..b17797d5844c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -207,4 +207,8 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
# define PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK 0xffff
# define PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT (1 << 17) /* inherit across exec */
+/* Control the LSM specific peer information */
+#define PR_GET_DISPLAY_LSM 52
+#define PR_SET_DISPLAY_LSM 53
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index a5d21c42acfc..9336efdcaae0 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1759,6 +1759,9 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
p->sequential_io = 0;
p->sequential_io_avg = 0;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ p->security = NULL;
+#endif
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
retval = sched_fork(clone_flags, p);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 296918dff71e..b3e267ca7c19 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
@@ -120,6 +121,9 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
+ * If module stacking is not enabled or if there is exactly
+ * one security module that uses secids.
+ *
* 0 8 16 24 32
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
* | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
@@ -127,8 +131,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
* | in (host byte order)|
* +----------+----------+
*
+ * If module stacking is enabled
+ *
+ * 0 8 16 24 32
+ * +----------+----------+----------+----------+ ... +----------+----------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value | | 32-bit secid value |
+ * +----------+----------+----------+----------+ ... +----------+----------+
+ * | in (host byte order)|
+ * +----------+----------+
+ *
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct secids))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1480,7 +1493,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid.secmark;
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.secid, sizeof(struct secids));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1500,7 +1513,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid.secmark = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.secid, &tag[2], sizeof(struct secids));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index e67a6dc7ae1d..6af1f4fc837d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
&secid);
- info->secid = secid.secmark;
+ info->secid = secid.selinux;
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index cb8a2c790081..e23bad01a149 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -1461,6 +1461,56 @@ int netlbl_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
return -ENOMSG;
}
+/**
+ * netlbl_secattr_equal - Compare two lsm secattrs
+ * @secattr_a: one security attribute
+ * @secattr_b: the other security attribute
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare two lsm security attribute structures.
+ * Don't compare secid fields, as those are distinct.
+ * Returns true if they are the same, false otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+bool netlbl_secattr_equal(const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_a,
+ const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_b)
+{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter_a;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter_b;
+
+ if (secattr_a == secattr_b)
+ return true;
+ if (!secattr_a || !secattr_b)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((secattr_a->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) !=
+ (secattr_b->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((secattr_a->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) &&
+ secattr_a->attr.mls.lvl != secattr_b->attr.mls.lvl)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((secattr_a->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) !=
+ (secattr_b->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT))
+ return false;
+
+ iter_a = secattr_a->attr.mls.cat;
+ iter_b = secattr_b->attr.mls.cat;
+
+ while (iter_a && iter_b) {
+ if (iter_a->startbit != iter_b->startbit)
+ return false;
+ if (memcmp(iter_a->bitmap, iter_b->bitmap,
+ sizeof(iter_a->bitmap)))
+ return false;
+ iter_a = iter_a->next;
+ iter_b = iter_b->next;
+ }
+
+ return !iter_a && !iter_b;
+}
+
/*
* Protocol Engine Functions
*/
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index f0f17fc33157..2667b9e7fd16 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -142,11 +142,18 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid.secmark;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ secid_to_skb(&scm->secid, skb);
+#endif
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ secid_from_skb(&scm->secid, skb);
+#else
scm->secid.secmark = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+#endif
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 8225388b81c3..4573120e87ed 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -318,18 +318,8 @@ endmenu
menu "Security Module Stack"
visible if SECURITY_STACKING
-choice
- prompt "Stacked 'extreme' security module"
- default SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED if SECURITY_SELINUX
- default SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED if SECURITY_SMACK
- default SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED if SECURITY_APPARMOR
-
- help
- Enable an extreme security module. These modules cannot
- be used at the same time.
-
- config SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED
- bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED
+ bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
help
This option instructs the system to use the SELinux checks.
At this time the Smack security module is incompatible with this
@@ -337,8 +327,8 @@ choice
At this time the AppArmor security module is incompatible with this
module.
- config SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED
- bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+config SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED
+ bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
help
This option instructs the system to use the Smack checks.
At this time the SELinux security module is incompatible with this
@@ -355,13 +345,6 @@ choice
At this time the Smack security module is incompatible with this
module.
- config SECURITY_NOTHING_STACKED
- bool "Use no 'extreme' security module"
- help
- Use none of the SELinux, Smack or AppArmor security module.
-
-endchoice
-
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED
bool "TOMOYO support is enabled by default"
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO && SECURITY_STACKING
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 4d2d3782ddef..9b2b87710de8 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o
# Object file lists
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING) += stacking.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6144ff52d862..ef51783e967e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,12 +29,18 @@
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <trace/events/initcall.h>
-#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
+/*
+ * This should depend on the number of security modules
+ * that use extended attributes. At this writing it is
+ * at least EVM, SELinux and Smack.
+ */
+#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 8
/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
@@ -47,7 +53,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
+/*
+ * If stacking is enabled the task blob will always
+ * include an indicator of what security module data
+ * should be displayed. This is set with PR_SET_DISPLAY_LSM.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ .lbs_task = SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 2,
+#endif
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
@@ -331,6 +346,14 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
#endif
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+ /*
+ * Store the most likely secmark with the socket
+ * so that it doesn't have to be a managed object.
+ */
+ if (needed->lbs_sock && blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0)
+ blob_sizes.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct secids);
+#endif
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -552,6 +575,25 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+static int lsm_pick_secctx(const char *lsm, const char *from, char *to)
+{
+ char fmt[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 4];
+ char *cp;
+ int i;
+
+ sprintf(fmt, "%s='", lsm);
+ i = sscanf(from, fmt, to);
+ if (i != 1)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ cp = strchr(to, '\'');
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING */
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -874,8 +916,12 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
{
struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
- struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
- int ret;
+ struct xattr *lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr *evm_xattr;
+ struct xattr *xattr;
+ struct security_hook_list *shp;
+ int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ int rc = 0;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
@@ -883,23 +929,40 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
if (!initxattrs)
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
- &lsm_xattr->name,
- &lsm_xattr->value,
- &lsm_xattr->value_len);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
- ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
-out:
- for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
- kfree(xattr->value);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(shp, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
+ list) {
+ rc = shp->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+ &lsm_xattr->name,
+ &lsm_xattr->value,
+ &lsm_xattr->value_len);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ lsm_xattr++;
+ if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ ret = 0;
+ } else if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ ret = rc;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ rc = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
+ }
+
+ if (lsm_xattr != new_xattrs) {
+ for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
+ kfree(xattr->value);
+ }
+
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
@@ -1128,18 +1191,22 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- int ret;
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ret = -ENOSYS;
+ int trc;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- /*
- * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
- * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
- */
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size,
- flags);
- if (ret == 1)
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr, list) {
+ trc = hp->hook.inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (trc != -ENOSYS) {
+ ret = trc;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == -ENOSYS)
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1580,12 +1647,65 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+static void lsm_to_display(char *lsm)
+{
+ WARN_ON(!current->security);
+ if (current->security)
+ strncpy(lsm, current->security, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+ else
+ lsm[0] = '\0';
+}
+#endif
+
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
int thisrc;
int rc = -ENOSYS;
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ char lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+ __user char *optval = (__user char *)arg2;
+ __user int *optlen = (__user int *)arg3;
+ int dlen;
+ int len;
+
+ switch (option) {
+ case PR_GET_DISPLAY_LSM:
+ lsm_to_display(lsm);
+ len = arg4;
+ dlen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ if (dlen > len)
+ return -ERANGE;
+ if (copy_to_user(optval, lsm, dlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (put_user(dlen, optlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ case PR_SET_DISPLAY_LSM:
+ len = arg3;
+ if (len > SECURITY_NAME_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_user(lsm, optval, len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ lsm[len] = '\0';
+ /*
+ * Trust the caller to know what lsm name(s) are available.
+ */
+ if (!current) {
+ pr_info("%s BUGGER - no current!\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!current->security) {
+ pr_info("%s %s BUGGER - no security!\n", __func__,
+ current->comm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ strcpy(current->security, lsm);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
@@ -1757,7 +1877,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm && lsm[0] && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -1770,7 +1890,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm && lsm[0] && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -1790,22 +1910,60 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+
+ lsm_to_display(lsm);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list)
+ if (lsm[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#else
return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
seclen);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct secids *secid)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ lsm_to_display(lsm);
secid_init(secid);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list)
+ if (lsm[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+ return rc;
+#else
return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+
+ lsm_to_display(lsm);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (lsm[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ break;
+ }
+#else
call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -1823,13 +1981,80 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *subctx;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ subctx = kzalloc(ctxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (subctx == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx, list) {
+ rc = lsm_pick_secctx(hp->lsm, ctx, subctx);
+ if (rc) {
+ rc = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecctx(dentry, subctx, strlen(subctx));
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(subctx);
+ return rc;
+#else
return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ struct security_hook_list *rhp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ void *data;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, &data, &len);
+ if (rc) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
+ pr_info("%s: getsecctx by %s failed.\n",
+ __func__, hp->lsm);
+#endif
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (final) {
+ cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s='%s'", final,
+ hp->lsm, (char *)data);
+ kfree(final);
+ } else
+ cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s='%s'", hp->lsm,
+ (char *)data);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(rhp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx,
+ list) {
+ if (hp->lsm == rhp->lsm) {
+ rhp->hook.release_secctx(data, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ final = cp;
+ }
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = strlen(final);
+ return 0;
+#else
return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
@@ -1924,12 +2149,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
char *tval = NULL;
u32 tlen;
- int rc;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ char lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+
+ lsm_to_display(lsm);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list) {
+ if (lsm[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) {
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, &tval,
+ &tlen, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, &tval, &tlen, len);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
- rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- &tval, &tlen, len);
if (rc == 0) {
tlen = strlen(tval) + 1;
if (put_user(tlen, optlen))
@@ -1944,8 +2188,20 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct secids *secid)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ secid_init(secid);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list)
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+
+ return rc;
+#else
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
skb, secid);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
@@ -2014,7 +2270,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet,
+ list)
+ rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet(secid);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index efc87a76af72..3c31653d9a25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -417,6 +417,14 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
if (secattr == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ /* Ensure that other security modules cooperate */
+ rc = lsm_sock_vet_attr(sk, secattr, LSM_SOCK_SELINUX);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr);
switch (rc) {
case 0:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 12b00aac0c94..f3a2be53dd6c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2390,13 +2390,32 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
- labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+ labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ rc = lsm_sock_vet_attr(sk, NULL, LSM_SOCK_SMACK);
+ if (!rc)
+ netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+#else
netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
- else {
+#endif
+ } else {
skp = ssp->smk_out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+ rc = lsm_sock_vet_attr(sk, &skp->smk_netlabel, LSM_SOCK_SMACK);
+ if (rc)
+ goto unlock_out;
+#endif
rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+ if (rc == -EDESTADDRREQ) {
+ pr_info("Smack: %s set socket deferred\n", __func__);
+ rc = 0;
+ }
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING
+unlock_out:
+#endif
+
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
@@ -3809,7 +3828,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
- if (rc == 0)
+ if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
else
skp = smack_net_ambient;
--
2.14.3
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 16:23:47 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 22/23] LSM: Fix setting of the IMA data in inode init
Fix a missing assignment in the inode security initialization.
The EVM entry was not being set correctly.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ef51783e967e..571643cc7256 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -941,6 +941,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
&lsm_xattr->value_len);
if (rc == 0) {
lsm_xattr++;
+ evm_xattr = lsm_xattr;
if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
ret = 0;
} else if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
@@ -950,7 +951,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
if (ret == 0) {
- rc = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+ rc = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
if (rc == 0)
rc = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
}
--
2.14.3
On 5/10/2018 5:30 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Subject: [PATCH 00/23] LSM: Full security module stacking
>
>
Git tree: git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stacking-4.18
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 11 May 2018 13:18:11 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 24/23] LSM: Functions for deling with struct secids
These are the functions that mainipulate the collection
of secids.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
---
security/stacking.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 119 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/stacking.c
diff --git a/security/stacking.c b/security/stacking.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7c9643323a1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/stacking.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Security secid functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+/*
+ * A secids structure contains all of the modules specific
+ * secids and the secmark used to represent the combination
+ * of module specific secids. Code that uses secmarks won't
+ * know or care about module specific secids, and won't have
+ * set them in the secids nor will it look at the module specific
+ * values. Modules won't care about the secmark. If there's only
+ * one module that uses secids the mapping is one-to-one. The
+ * general case is not so simple.
+ */
+
+void secid_from_skb(struct secids *secid, const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct secids *se;
+
+ se = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ if (se)
+ *secid = *se;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secid_from_skb);
+
+void secid_to_skb(struct secids *secid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct secids *se;
+
+ se = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ if (se)
+ *se = *secid;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secid_to_skb);
+
+bool secid_valid(const struct secids *secid)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ if (secid->selinux)
+ return true;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+ if (secid->smack)
+ return true;
+#endif
+ return false;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_vet_attr - does the netlabel agree with what other LSMs want
+ * @sk: the socket in question
+ * @secattr: the desired netlabel security attributes
+ * @flags: which LSM is making the request
+ *
+ * Determine whether the calling LSM can set the security attributes
+ * on the socket without interferring with what has already been set
+ * by other LSMs. The first LSM calling will always be allowed. An
+ * LSM that resets itself will also be allowed. It will require careful
+ * configuration for any other case to succeed.
+ *
+ * If @secattr is NULL the check is for deleting the attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if there is agreement, -EACCES if there is conflict,
+ * and any error from the netlabel system.
+ */
+int lsm_sock_vet_attr(struct sock *sk, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 flags)
+{
+ struct secids *se = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr asis;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * First in always shows as allowed.
+ * Changing what this module has set is OK, too.
+ */
+ if (se->flags == 0 || se->flags == flags) {
+ se->flags = flags;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&asis);
+ rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &asis);
+
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ /*
+ * Can't delete another modules's attributes or
+ * change them if they don't match well enough.
+ */
+ if (secattr == NULL || !netlbl_secattr_equal(secattr, &asis))
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ else
+ se->flags = flags;
+ break;
+ case -ENOMSG:
+ se->flags = flags;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&asis);
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
--
2.14.3
On 05/10/2018 08:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:23:27 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH 10/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
> blob
>
> Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
> of the individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 ++
> security/security.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 32 +--------------
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +--
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 70 +++++---------------------------
> 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 3ba96e406827..a935ab92906d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2017,6 +2017,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
> struct lsm_blob_sizes {
> int lbs_cred;
> int lbs_file;
> + int lbs_inode;
> int lbs_task;
> };
>
> @@ -2080,10 +2081,12 @@ static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
> #endif
>
> extern int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
> +extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
> void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
> +void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode);
> #endif
>
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b414186ad45f..02df9b608b7e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
> static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
>
> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> +static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>
> char *lsm_names;
> static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
> @@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
> blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
> SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
> + lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
> + blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
> + SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> /*
> * The second call to a module specific init function
> * adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
> @@ -108,8 +113,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
> pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
> pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> + pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> -#endif
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -285,6 +291,13 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
> lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
> lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + /*
> + * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
> + * what the modules might need.
> + */
> + if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
> + blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
> + lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -348,6 +361,46 @@ void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
> + * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
> + *
> + * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
> + *
> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
> + */
> +int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
> + inode->i_security = NULL;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
Should be GFP_NOFS (and was that way in SELinux and Smack).
> + if (inode->i_security == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_early_inode - during initialization allocate a composite inode blob
> + * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
> + *
> + * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules if it's not already there
> + */
> +void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (inode == NULL)
> + panic("%s: NULL inode.\n", __func__);
> + if (inode->i_security != NULL)
> + return;
> + rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
> + if (rc)
> + panic("%s: Early inode alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Hook list operation macros.
> *
> @@ -594,14 +647,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
>
> int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> {
> - inode->i_security = NULL;
> - return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
> + int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
> +
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + return rc;
> + rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + security_inode_free(inode);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> +{
> + /*
> + * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
> + */
> + kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
> }
>
> void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
> {
> integrity_inode_free(inode);
> call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
> + /*
> + * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
> + * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
> + * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
> + * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
> + * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
> + * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
> + * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
> + */
> + if (inode->i_security)
> + call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
> + inode_free_by_rcu);
> }
>
> int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index baefd36b44df..493328a1c789 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -148,8 +148,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
> }
> __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
>
> -static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
> -
> /**
> * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
> *
> @@ -245,13 +243,9 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
>
> static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
> {
> - struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
> u32 sid = current_sid();
>
> - isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (!isec)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
> isec->inode = inode;
> @@ -259,7 +253,6 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
> isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
> isec->task_sid = sid;
> isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
> - inode->i_security = isec;
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -338,14 +331,6 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
> return selinux_inode(inode);
> }
>
> -static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> -{
> - struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> -
> - isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
> - kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
> -}
> -
> static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
> {
> struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
> @@ -366,17 +351,6 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
> list_del_init(&isec->list);
> spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
> }
> -
> - /*
> - * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
> - * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
> - * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
> - * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
> - * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
> - * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
> - * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
> - */
> - call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
> }
>
> static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
> @@ -6794,6 +6768,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
> + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -7061,9 +7036,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>
> default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
>
> - sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
> - sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> - 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> avc_init();
>
> avtab_cache_init();
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 168a96104fa0..60d109caaeef 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -59,10 +59,7 @@ enum label_initialized {
>
> struct inode_security_struct {
> struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
> - union {
> - struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
> - struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
> - };
> + struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
> u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
> u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
> u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index b9db97470e06..cfabb9f5cc9b 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -287,24 +287,18 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
> }
>
> /**
> - * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
> + * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
> + * @isp: the blob to initialize
> * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
> *
> - * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
> */
> -static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
> +static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
> {
> - struct inode_smack *isp;
> -
> - isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
> - if (isp == NULL)
> - return NULL;
> + struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
>
> isp->smk_inode = skp;
> isp->smk_flags = 0;
> mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
> -
> - return isp;
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -823,17 +817,13 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> /*
> * Initialize the root inode.
> */
> - isp = smack_inode(inode);
> - if (isp == NULL) {
> - isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
> - if (isp == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - inode->i_security = isp;
> - } else
> - isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
> + lsm_early_inode(inode);
> + init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
>
> - if (transmute)
> + if (transmute) {
> + isp = smack_inode(inode);
> isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
> + }
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -962,48 +952,10 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
> {
> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>
> - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
> - if (inode->i_security == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache
> - * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer
> - *
> - * Call back function called from call_rcu() to free
> - * the i_security blob pointer in inode
> - */
> -static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> -{
> - struct inode_smack *issp;
> -
> - issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu);
> - kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp);
> -}
> -
> -/**
> - * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu()
> - * @inode: the inode with a blob
> - *
> - * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU
> - */
> -static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
> -{
> - struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
> -
> - /*
> - * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
> - * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made
> - * after smack_inode_free_security() is called.
> - * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU
> - * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
> - * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
> - */
> - call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu);
> -}
> -
> /**
> * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
> * @inode: the newly created inode
> @@ -4589,6 +4541,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -4607,7 +4560,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
>
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
>
On 05/10/2018 08:55 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:54:25 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH 20/23] LSM: Move common usercopy into
> security_getpeersec_stream
>
> The modules implementing hook for getpeersec_stream
> don't need to be duplicating the copy-to-user checks.
> Moving the user copy part into the infrastructure makes
> the security module code simpler and reduces the places
> where user copy code may go awry.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++------
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++--
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++------------------
> security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++++++---------------
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
> 6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 81504623afb4..84bc9ec01931 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -841,9 +841,8 @@
> * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
> * socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
> * @sock is the local socket.
> - * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
> - * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
> - * of the security state.
> + * @optval the security state.
> + * @optlen the actual length of the security state.
> * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
> * by the caller.
> * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
> @@ -1674,9 +1673,8 @@ union security_list_options {
> int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
> int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
> int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> - int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
> - char __user *optval,
> - int __user *optlen, unsigned int len);
> + int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
> + int *optlen, unsigned int len);
> int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
> struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct secids *secid);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ab70064c283f..712d138e0148 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1369,8 +1369,10 @@ static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> + char __user *optval,
> + int __user *optlen,
> + unsigned int len)
> {
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 90453dbb4fac..7444cfa689b3 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1017,10 +1017,8 @@ static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
> *
> * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
> */
> -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> - char __user *optval,
> - int __user *optlen,
> - unsigned int len)
> +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
> {
> char *name;
> int slen, error = 0;
> @@ -1037,22 +1035,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
> /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
> - if (slen < 0) {
> + if (slen < 0)
> error = -ENOMEM;
> - } else {
> - if (slen > len) {
> - error = -ERANGE;
> - } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
> - error = -EFAULT;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - if (put_user(slen, optlen))
> - error = -EFAULT;
> -out:
> - kfree(name);
> -
> + else if (slen > len)
> + error = -ERANGE;
> + else {
> + *optlen = slen;
> + *optval = name;
> }
> -
> + if (error)
> + kfree(name);
> done:
> end_current_label_crit_section(label);
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index cbe1a497ec5a..6144ff52d862 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1924,8 +1924,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - optval, optlen, len);
> + char *tval = NULL;
> + u32 tlen;
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> + &tval, &tlen, len);
> + if (rc == 0) {
> + tlen = strlen(tval) + 1;
Why are you recomputing tlen here from what the module provided, and further presuming it must be nul-terminated?
> + if (put_user(tlen, optlen))
> + rc = -EFAULT;
> + else if (copy_to_user(optval, tval, tlen))
> + rc = -EFAULT;
> + kfree(tval);
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
>
> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 81f104d9e85e..9520341daa78 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4955,10 +4955,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return err;
> }
>
> -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> - __user char *optval,
> - __user int *optlen,
> - unsigned int len)
> +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
> {
> int err = 0;
> char *scontext;
> @@ -4979,18 +4977,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> return err;
>
> if (scontext_len > len) {
> - err = -ERANGE;
> - goto out_len;
> + kfree(scontext);
> + return -ERANGE;
> }
> -
> - if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
> - err = -EFAULT;
> -
> -out_len:
> - if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
> - err = -EFAULT;
> - kfree(scontext);
> - return err;
> + *optval = scontext;
> + *optlen = scontext_len;
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 660a55ee8a57..12b00aac0c94 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3878,14 +3878,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> *
> * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
> */
> -static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> - char __user *optval,
> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> +static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
> {
> struct socket_smack *ssp;
> char *rcp = "";
> int slen = 1;
> - int rc = 0;
>
> ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
> @@ -3894,14 +3892,13 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> }
>
> if (slen > len)
> - rc = -ERANGE;
> - else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
> - rc = -EFAULT;
> -
> - if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
> - rc = -EFAULT;
> + return -ERANGE;
>
> - return rc;
> + *optval = kstrdup(rcp, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (*optval == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + *optlen = slen;
> + return 0;
> }
>
>
>
On 5/14/2018 8:04 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 05/10/2018 08:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>> Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:23:27 -0700
>> Subject: [PATCH 10/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
>> blob
>>
>> Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
>> of the individual security modules and into the security
>> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
>> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
>> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 ++
>> security/security.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 32 +--------------
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +--
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 70 +++++---------------------------
>> 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
>> <SNIP>
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index b414186ad45f..02df9b608b7e 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
>> static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
>>
>> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>> +static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>>
>> char *lsm_names;
>> static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
>> @@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>> lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
>> blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
>> SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
>> + lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
>> + blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
>> + SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>> /*
>> * The second call to a module specific init function
>> * adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
>> @@ -108,8 +113,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
>> pr_info("LSM: cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>> pr_info("LSM: file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
>> + pr_info("LSM: inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
>> pr_info("LSM: task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>> -#endif
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
>>
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -285,6 +291,13 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
>> lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>> lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
>> lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>> + /*
>> + * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
>> + * what the modules might need.
>> + */
>> + if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
>> + blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
>> + lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -348,6 +361,46 @@ void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
>> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
>> }
>>
>> +/**
>> + * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
>> + * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
>> + *
>> + * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
>> + */
>> +int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>> +{
>> + if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
>> + inode->i_security = NULL;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> + inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> Should be GFP_NOFS (and was that way in SELinux and Smack).
Yes, you're correct. I'll make the change.
On 05/14/2018 11:12 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 05/10/2018 08:55 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>> Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:54:25 -0700
>> Subject: [PATCH 20/23] LSM: Move common usercopy into
>> security_getpeersec_stream
>>
>> The modules implementing hook for getpeersec_stream
>> don't need to be duplicating the copy-to-user checks.
>> Moving the user copy part into the infrastructure makes
>> the security module code simpler and reduces the places
>> where user copy code may go awry.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++------
>> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++--
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++------------------
>> security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++++++---------------
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
>> 6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 81504623afb4..84bc9ec01931 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -841,9 +841,8 @@
>> * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
>> * socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
>> * @sock is the local socket.
>> - * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
>> - * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
>> - * of the security state.
>> + * @optval the security state.
>> + * @optlen the actual length of the security state.
>> * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
>> * by the caller.
>> * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
>> @@ -1674,9 +1673,8 @@ union security_list_options {
>> int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
>> int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
>> int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>> - int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
>> - char __user *optval,
>> - int __user *optlen, unsigned int len);
>> + int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
>> + int *optlen, unsigned int len);
>> int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
>> struct sk_buff *skb,
>> struct secids *secid);
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index ab70064c283f..712d138e0148 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -1369,8 +1369,10 @@ static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> + char __user *optval,
>> + int __user *optlen,
>> + unsigned int len)
>> {
>> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> index 90453dbb4fac..7444cfa689b3 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> @@ -1017,10 +1017,8 @@ static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
>> *
>> * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
>> */
>> -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> - char __user *optval,
>> - int __user *optlen,
>> - unsigned int len)
>> +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
>> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
>> {
>> char *name;
>> int slen, error = 0;
>> @@ -1037,22 +1035,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
>> FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
>> /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
>> - if (slen < 0) {
>> + if (slen < 0)
>> error = -ENOMEM;
>> - } else {
>> - if (slen > len) {
>> - error = -ERANGE;
>> - } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
>> - error = -EFAULT;
>> - goto out;
>> - }
>> - if (put_user(slen, optlen))
>> - error = -EFAULT;
>> -out:
>> - kfree(name);
>> -
>> + else if (slen > len)
>> + error = -ERANGE;
>> + else {
>> + *optlen = slen;
>> + *optval = name;
>> }
>> -
>> + if (error)
>> + kfree(name);
>> done:
>> end_current_label_crit_section(label);
>>
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index cbe1a497ec5a..6144ff52d862 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -1924,8 +1924,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
>> - optval, optlen, len);
>> + char *tval = NULL;
>> + u32 tlen;
>> + int rc;
>> +
>> + rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
>> + &tval, &tlen, len);
>> + if (rc == 0) {
>> + tlen = strlen(tval) + 1;
>
> Why are you recomputing tlen here from what the module provided, and further presuming it must be nul-terminated?
Also, at least for SELinux, we copy out the length even when returning ERANGE, and libselinux uses that to realloc the buffer and try again.
>
>> + if (put_user(tlen, optlen))
>> + rc = -EFAULT;
>> + else if (copy_to_user(optval, tval, tlen))
>> + rc = -EFAULT;
>> + kfree(tval);
>> + }
>> + return rc;
>> }
>>
>> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 81f104d9e85e..9520341daa78 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -4955,10 +4955,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> return err;
>> }
>>
>> -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> - __user char *optval,
>> - __user int *optlen,
>> - unsigned int len)
>> +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
>> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
>> {
>> int err = 0;
>> char *scontext;
>> @@ -4979,18 +4977,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> return err;
>>
>> if (scontext_len > len) {
>> - err = -ERANGE;
>> - goto out_len;
>> + kfree(scontext);
>> + return -ERANGE;
>> }
>> -
>> - if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
>> - err = -EFAULT;
>> -
>> -out_len:
>> - if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
>> - err = -EFAULT;
>> - kfree(scontext);
>> - return err;
>> + *optval = scontext;
>> + *optlen = scontext_len;
>> + return 0;
>> }
>>
>> static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid)
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index 660a55ee8a57..12b00aac0c94 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -3878,14 +3878,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> *
>> * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
>> */
>> -static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> - char __user *optval,
>> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>> +static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
>> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
>> {
>> struct socket_smack *ssp;
>> char *rcp = "";
>> int slen = 1;
>> - int rc = 0;
>>
>> ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
>> if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
>> @@ -3894,14 +3892,13 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>> }
>>
>> if (slen > len)
>> - rc = -ERANGE;
>> - else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
>> - rc = -EFAULT;
>> -
>> - if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
>> - rc = -EFAULT;
>> + return -ERANGE;
>>
>> - return rc;
>> + *optval = kstrdup(rcp, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> + if (*optval == NULL)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + *optlen = slen;
>> + return 0;
>> }
>>
>>
>>
>
>
On 5/14/2018 9:53 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 05/14/2018 11:12 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 05/10/2018 08:55 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>>> Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 15:54:25 -0700
>>> Subject: [PATCH 20/23] LSM: Move common usercopy into
>>> security_getpeersec_stream
>>>
>>> The modules implementing hook for getpeersec_stream
>>> don't need to be duplicating the copy-to-user checks.
>>> Moving the user copy part into the infrastructure makes
>>> the security module code simpler and reduces the places
>>> where user copy code may go awry.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++------
>>> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++--
>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 28 ++++++++++------------------
>>> security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++++++---------------
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
>>> 6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> index 81504623afb4..84bc9ec01931 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> @@ -841,9 +841,8 @@
>>> * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
>>> * socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
>>> * @sock is the local socket.
>>> - * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
>>> - * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
>>> - * of the security state.
>>> + * @optval the security state.
>>> + * @optlen the actual length of the security state.
>>> * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
>>> * by the caller.
>>> * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
>>> @@ -1674,9 +1673,8 @@ union security_list_options {
>>> int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
>>> int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
>>> int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>>> - int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
>>> - char __user *optval,
>>> - int __user *optlen, unsigned int len);
>>> + int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
>>> + int *optlen, unsigned int len);
>>> int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
>>> struct sk_buff *skb,
>>> struct secids *secid);
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>>> index ab70064c283f..712d138e0148 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>>> @@ -1369,8 +1369,10 @@ static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>>> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>>> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>>> + char __user *optval,
>>> + int __user *optlen,
>>> + unsigned int len)
>>> {
>>> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>>> }
>>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>>> index 90453dbb4fac..7444cfa689b3 100644
>>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>>> @@ -1017,10 +1017,8 @@ static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
>>> *
>>> * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
>>> */
>>> -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>>> - char __user *optval,
>>> - int __user *optlen,
>>> - unsigned int len)
>>> +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,
>>> + int *optlen, unsigned int len)
>>> {
>>> char *name;
>>> int slen, error = 0;
>>> @@ -1037,22 +1035,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
>>> FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
>>> FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
>>> - if (slen < 0) {
>>> + if (slen < 0)
>>> error = -ENOMEM;
>>> - } else {
>>> - if (slen > len) {
>>> - error = -ERANGE;
>>> - } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
>>> - error = -EFAULT;
>>> - goto out;
>>> - }
>>> - if (put_user(slen, optlen))
>>> - error = -EFAULT;
>>> -out:
>>> - kfree(name);
>>> -
>>> + else if (slen > len)
>>> + error = -ERANGE;
>>> + else {
>>> + *optlen = slen;
>>> + *optval = name;
>>> }
>>> -
>>> + if (error)
>>> + kfree(name);
>>> done:
>>> end_current_label_crit_section(label);
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>> index cbe1a497ec5a..6144ff52d862 100644
>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>> @@ -1924,8 +1924,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>>> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
>>> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>>> {
>>> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
>>> - optval, optlen, len);
>>> + char *tval = NULL;
>>> + u32 tlen;
>>> + int rc;
>>> +
>>> + rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
>>> + &tval, &tlen, len);
>>> + if (rc == 0) {
>>> + tlen = strlen(tval) + 1;
>> Why are you recomputing tlen here from what the module provided, and further presuming it must be nul-terminated?
> Also, at least for SELinux, we copy out the length even when returning ERANGE, and libselinux uses that to realloc the buffer and try again.
All points acked and will be repaired. Thanks.