Hi James,
Here is the pull request for 4.12
There are no new features here, just a small set of bug fixes since
the 4.11 pull request.
Thanks,
-John
---
The following changes since commit ef933e87785f42868980f0e3af91fec313612868:
selinux: fix kernel BUG on prlimit(..., NULL, NULL) (2017-03-01 13:11:17 +1100)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor for-security
for you to fetch changes up to 6ebcd4c271332ca4f4dd958219f2ff1b7db1ed59:
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly (2017-04-06 05:14:20 -0700)
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Johansen (3):
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
Nicolas Iooss (1):
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
Valentin Rothberg (1):
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
kbuild test robot (1):
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
security/apparmor/crypto.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------
security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lib.c | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
security/apparmor/policy.c | 6 +++--
5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a
pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg
the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus
seem incorrect.
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/policy.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index f44312a..c0a4066 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -874,9 +874,11 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
if (ns_name) {
ns = aa_prepare_ns(view, ns_name);
if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
+ op = OP_PROF_LOAD;
info = "failed to prepare namespace";
error = PTR_ERR(ns);
ns = NULL;
+ ent = NULL;
goto fail;
}
} else
@@ -1011,7 +1013,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
/* audit cause of failure */
op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
fail:
- audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
+ audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name, ent ? ent->new->base.hname : NULL,
info, error);
/* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
@@ -1021,7 +1023,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_profile *profile,
/* skip entry that caused failure */
continue;
}
- op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+ op = (!tmp->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
audit_policy(profile, op, ns_name,
tmp->new->base.hname, info, error);
}
--
2.9.3
From: kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
security/apparmor/lib.c:132:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'aa_policy_init' with return type bool
Return statements in functions returning bool should use
true/false instead of 1/0.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/boolreturn.cocci
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/lib.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 66475bd..32cafc1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -180,13 +180,13 @@ bool aa_policy_init(struct aa_policy *policy, const char *prefix,
} else
policy->hname = kstrdup(name, gfp);
if (!policy->hname)
- return 0;
+ return false;
/* base.name is a substring of fqname */
policy->name = basename(policy->hname);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->profiles);
- return 1;
+ return true;
}
/**
--
2.9.3
From: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
When building the kernel with clang, the compiler fails to build
security/apparmor/crypto.c with the following error:
security/apparmor/crypto.c:36:8: error: fields must have a constant
size: 'variable length array in structure' extension will never be
supported
char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
^
Since commit a0a77af14117 ("crypto: LLVMLinux: Add macro to remove use
of VLAIS in crypto code"), include/crypto/hash.h defines
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK to work around this issue. Use it in aa_calc_hash()
and aa_calc_profile_hash().
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/crypto.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
index de8dc78..136f2a0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/crypto.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
@@ -31,10 +31,7 @@ unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
{
- struct {
- struct shash_desc shash;
- char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
- } desc;
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, apparmor_tfm);
char *hash = NULL;
int error = -ENOMEM;
@@ -45,16 +42,16 @@ char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
if (!hash)
goto fail;
- desc.shash.tfm = apparmor_tfm;
- desc.shash.flags = 0;
+ desc->tfm = apparmor_tfm;
+ desc->flags = 0;
- error = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
+ error = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (error)
goto fail;
- error = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (u8 *) data, len);
+ error = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *) data, len);
if (error)
goto fail;
- error = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash);
+ error = crypto_shash_final(desc, hash);
if (error)
goto fail;
@@ -69,10 +66,7 @@ char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
size_t len)
{
- struct {
- struct shash_desc shash;
- char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
- } desc;
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, apparmor_tfm);
int error = -ENOMEM;
__le32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
@@ -86,19 +80,19 @@ int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
if (!profile->hash)
goto fail;
- desc.shash.tfm = apparmor_tfm;
- desc.shash.flags = 0;
+ desc->tfm = apparmor_tfm;
+ desc->flags = 0;
- error = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
+ error = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (error)
goto fail;
- error = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (u8 *) &le32_version, 4);
+ error = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *) &le32_version, 4);
if (error)
goto fail;
- error = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (u8 *) start, len);
+ error = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *) start, len);
if (error)
goto fail;
- error = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, profile->hash);
+ error = crypto_shash_final(desc, profile->hash);
if (error)
goto fail;
--
2.9.3
Boot parameters are written before apparmor is ready to answer whether
the user is policy_view_capable(). Setting the parameters at boot results
in an oops and failure to boot. Setting the parameters at boot is
obviously allowed so skip the permission check when apparmor is not
initialized.
While we are at it move the more complicated check to last.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
index fa281c2..66d8bc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
pr_err_ratelimited("AppArmor: " fmt, ##args)
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+extern int apparmor_initialized;
/* fn's in lib */
char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 5f7d4dd..77d4045 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
#include "include/procattr.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+int apparmor_initialized;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
@@ -738,78 +738,77 @@ __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return param_set_uint(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
-
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
-
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
}
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
- if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
-
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
@@ -823,11 +822,10 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
-
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
}
@@ -835,14 +833,13 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
- if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
- return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
-
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
--
2.9.3
From: Valentin Rothberg <[email protected]>
Add the _APPARMOR substring to reference the intended Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Rothberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 709eacd..5f7d4dd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
#endif
/* Debug mode */
-bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
+bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Audit mode */
--
2.9.3
The path_max parameter determines the max size of buffers allocated
but it should not be setable at run time. If can be used to cause an
oops
root@ubuntu:~# echo 16777216 > /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/path_max
root@ubuntu:~# cat /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/path_max
Killed
[ 122.141911] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880080945fff
[ 122.143497] IP: [<ffffffff81228844>] d_absolute_path+0x44/0xa0
[ 122.144742] PGD 220c067 PUD 0
[ 122.145453] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 122.146204] Modules linked in: vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock ppdev vmw_balloon snd_ens1371 btusb snd_ac97_codec gameport snd_rawmidi btrtl snd_seq_device ac97_bus btbcm btintel snd_pcm input_leds bluetooth snd_timer snd joydev soundcore serio_raw coretemp shpchp nfit parport_pc i2c_piix4 8250_fintek vmw_vmci parport mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 btrfs raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear hid_generic usbhid hid crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd vmwgfx psmouse mptspi ttm mptscsih drm_kms_helper mptbase syscopyarea scsi_transport_spi sysfillrect
[ 122.163365] ahci sysimgblt e1000 fb_sys_fops libahci drm pata_acpi fjes
[ 122.164747] CPU: 3 PID: 1501 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.4.0-59-generic #80-Ubuntu
[ 122.166250] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015
[ 122.168611] task: ffff88003496aa00 ti: ffff880076474000 task.ti: ffff880076474000
[ 122.170018] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81228844>] [<ffffffff81228844>] d_absolute_path+0x44/0xa0
[ 122.171525] RSP: 0018:ffff880076477b90 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 122.172462] RAX: ffff880080945fff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001000000
[ 122.173709] RDX: 0000000000ffffff RSI: ffff880080946000 RDI: ffff8800348a1010
[ 122.174978] RBP: ffff880076477bb8 R08: ffff880076477c80 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 122.176227] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffff88007f946000 R12: ffff88007f946000
[ 122.177496] R13: ffff880076477c80 R14: ffff8800348a1010 R15: ffff8800348a2400
[ 122.178745] FS: 00007fd459eb4700(0000) GS:ffff88007b6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 122.180176] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 122.181186] CR2: ffff880080945fff CR3: 0000000073422000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
[ 122.182469] Stack:
[ 122.182843] 00ffffff00000001 ffff880080946000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 122.184409] 00000000570f789c ffff880076477c30 ffffffff81385671 ffff88007a2e7a58
[ 122.185810] 0000000000000000 ffff880076477c88 01000000008a1000 0000000000000000
[ 122.187231] Call Trace:
[ 122.187680] [<ffffffff81385671>] aa_path_name+0x81/0x370
[ 122.188637] [<ffffffff813875dd>] profile_transition+0xbd/0xb80
[ 122.190181] [<ffffffff811af9bc>] ? zone_statistics+0x7c/0xa0
[ 122.191674] [<ffffffff81389b20>] apparmor_bprm_set_creds+0x9b0/0xac0
[ 122.193288] [<ffffffff812e1971>] ? ext4_xattr_get+0x81/0x220
[ 122.194793] [<ffffffff812e800c>] ? ext4_xattr_security_get+0x1c/0x30
[ 122.196392] [<ffffffff813449b9>] ? get_vfs_caps_from_disk+0x69/0x110
[ 122.198004] [<ffffffff81232d4f>] ? mnt_may_suid+0x3f/0x50
[ 122.199737] [<ffffffff81344b03>] ? cap_bprm_set_creds+0xa3/0x600
[ 122.201377] [<ffffffff81346e53>] security_bprm_set_creds+0x33/0x50
[ 122.203024] [<ffffffff81214ce5>] prepare_binprm+0x85/0x190
[ 122.204515] [<ffffffff81216545>] do_execveat_common.isra.33+0x485/0x710
[ 122.206200] [<ffffffff81216a6a>] SyS_execve+0x3a/0x50
[ 122.207615] [<ffffffff81838795>] stub_execve+0x5/0x5
[ 122.208978] [<ffffffff818384f2>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x71
[ 122.210615] Code: f8 31 c0 48 63 c2 83 ea 01 48 c7 45 e8 00 00 00 00 48 01 c6 85 d2 48 c7 45 f0 00 00 00 00 48 89 75 e0 89 55 dc 78 0c 48 8d 46 ff <c6> 46 ff 00 48 89 45 e0 48 8d 55 e0 48 8d 4d dc 48 8d 75 e8 e8
[ 122.217320] RIP [<ffffffff81228844>] d_absolute_path+0x44/0xa0
[ 122.218860] RSP <ffff880076477b90>
[ 122.219919] CR2: ffff880080945fff
[ 122.220936] ---[ end trace 506cdbd85eb6c55e ]---
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 77d4045..005ad43 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
-module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
* on the loaded policy is done.
--
2.9.3
On Thu, 6 Apr 2017, John Johansen wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> Here is the pull request for 4.12
>
> There are no new features here, just a small set of bug fixes since
> the 4.11 pull request.
All applied to:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>