On 11/05/2017 01:56 PM, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> Previously, the only capability effectively required to operate on the
> /proc/scsi interface was CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (or for some other files,
> having an fsuid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID was enough). This means that
> semi-privileged processes could interfere with core components of a
> system (such as causing a DoS by removing the underlying SCSI device of
> the host's / mount).
An alternative to this patch would be to make the open(2) call fail, if
you try to open it write-only or read-write. Not sure which would be
preferred (should it be possible to pass /proc/scsi/scsi to a
semi-privileged process to write to?).
--
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
https://www.cyphar.com/
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