The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
appraise modes be disabled.
This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
Test results as follows:
-> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
[ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
-> powerpc with secure boot disabled
[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
-> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
filesystem labeling:
type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
uid=root auid=root ses=2
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
res=no
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <[email protected]>
---
v6:
- explictly print the bootparam being ignored to the user (Mimi)
v5:
- add pr_info() to inform user the ima_appraise= boot param is being
ignored due to secure boot enabled (Nayna)
- add some testing results to commit log
v4:
- instead of change arch_policy loading code, check secure boot state at
"ima_appraise=" parameter handler (Mimi)
v3:
- extend secure boot arch checker to also consider trusted boot
- enforce IMA appraisal when secure boot is effectively enabled (Nayna)
- fix ima_appraise flag assignment by or'ing it (Mimi)
v2:
- pr_info() message prefix correction
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index edde88dbe576..62dc11a5af01 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
- depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
default y
help
This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..28a59508c6bd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+ if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
+ str);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
--
2.26.2
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 01:48:30PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
> modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
> specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents properly labeling the
> filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
> platform. ?Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
> appraise modes be disabled.
>
> This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
>
> Test results as follows:
>
> -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
>
> [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
>
> -> powerpc with secure boot disabled
>
> [ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> [ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
>
> -> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
>
> CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
> CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
>
> Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
> filesystem labeling:
>
> type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
> uid=root auid=root ses=2
> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
> cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
> res=no
>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
> Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <[email protected]>
> ---
> v6:
> - explictly print the bootparam being ignored to the user (Mimi)
> v5:
> - add pr_info() to inform user the ima_appraise= boot param is being
> ignored due to secure boot enabled (Nayna)
> - add some testing results to commit log
> v4:
> - instead of change arch_policy loading code, check secure boot state at
> "ima_appraise=" parameter handler (Mimi)
> v3:
> - extend secure boot arch checker to also consider trusted boot
> - enforce IMA appraisal when secure boot is effectively enabled (Nayna)
> - fix ima_appraise flag assignment by or'ing it (Mimi)
> v2:
> - pr_info() message prefix correction
> security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++++++
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index edde88dbe576..62dc11a5af01 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
>
> config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
> - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> + depends on IMA_APPRAISE
> default y
> help
> This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a9649b04b9f1..28a59508c6bd 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
> static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> + pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
> + str);
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> ima_appraise = 0;
> else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> --
> 2.26.2
>
Ping for review.
Many thanks.
--
bmeneg
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
On 7/13/20 12:48 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
> modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
> specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
> filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
> platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
> appraise modes be disabled.
>
> This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
>
> Test results as follows:
>
> -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
>
> [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
>
> -> powerpc with secure boot disabled
>
> [ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> [ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
>
> -> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
>
> CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
> CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
>
> Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
> filesystem labeling:
>
> type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
> uid=root auid=root ses=2
> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
> cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
> res=no
>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
> Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
Tested-by: Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 10:40 -0400, Nayna wrote:
> On 7/13/20 12:48 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
> > modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
> > specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
> > filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
> > platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
> > appraise modes be disabled.
> >
> > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> >
> > Test results as follows:
> >
> > -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
> >
> > [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> > [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
> >
Is it common to have two colons in the same line? Is the colon being
used as a delimiter when parsing the kernel logs? Should the second
colon be replaced with a hyphen? (No need to repost. I'll fix it
up.)
> > -> powerpc with secure boot disabled
> >
> > [ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> > [ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
> >
> > -> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
> >
> > CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
> > CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
> >
> > Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
> > filesystem labeling:
> >
> > type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
> > uid=root auid=root ses=2
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
> > cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
> > res=no
> >
> > Cc: [email protected]
> > Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
> > Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <[email protected]>
>
>
> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
> Tested-by: Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
Thanks, Nayna.
Mimi
On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 10:56:55AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 10:40 -0400, Nayna wrote:
> > On 7/13/20 12:48 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
> > > modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
> > > specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents properly labeling the
> > > filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
> > > platform. ?Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
> > > appraise modes be disabled.
> > >
> > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > >
> > > Test results as follows:
> > >
> > > -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
> > >
> > > [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> > > [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
> > >
>
> Is it common to have two colons in the same line? ?Is the colon being
> used as a delimiter when parsing the kernel logs? ?Should the second
> colon be replaced with a hyphen? ?(No need to repost. ?I'll fix it
> up.)
> ?
AFAICS it has been used without any limitations, e.g:
PM: hibernation: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000fff]
clocksource: hpet: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 133484873504 ns
microcode: CPU0: patch_level=0x08701013
Lockdown: modprobe: unsigned module loading is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
...
I'd say we're fine using it.
>
> > > -> powerpc with secure boot disabled
> > >
> > > [ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> > > [ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
> > >
> > > -> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
> > >
> > > CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
> > > CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
> > >
> > > Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
> > > filesystem labeling:
> > >
> > > type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
> > > uid=root auid=root ses=2
> > > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
> > > cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
> > > res=no
> > >
> > > Cc: [email protected]
> > > Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
> > > Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <[email protected]>
> >
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
> > Tested-by: Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
>
> Thanks, Nayna.
>
> Mimi
>
--
bmeneg
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 12:38 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 10:56:55AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 10:40 -0400, Nayna wrote:
> > > On 7/13/20 12:48 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
> > > > modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
> > > > specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
> > > > filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
> > > > platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
> > > > appraise modes be disabled.
> > > >
> > > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > > >
> > > > Test results as follows:
> > > >
> > > > -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
> > > >
> > > > [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> > > > [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
> > > >
> >
> > Is it common to have two colons in the same line? Is the colon being
> > used as a delimiter when parsing the kernel logs? Should the second
> > colon be replaced with a hyphen? (No need to repost. I'll fix it
> > up.)
> >
>
> AFAICS it has been used without any limitations, e.g:
>
> PM: hibernation: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000fff]
> clocksource: hpet: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 133484873504 ns
> microcode: CPU0: patch_level=0x08701013
> Lockdown: modprobe: unsigned module loading is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
> ...
>
> I'd say we're fine using it.
Ok. FYI, it's now in next-integrity.
Mimi
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 01:26:16PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 12:38 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 10:56:55AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 10:40 -0400, Nayna wrote:
> > > > On 7/13/20 12:48 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > > > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
> > > > > modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
> > > > > specific policies are enabled. ?This prevents properly labeling the
> > > > > filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
> > > > > platform. ?Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
> > > > > appraise modes be disabled.
> > > > >
> > > > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> > > > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> > > > >
> > > > > Test results as follows:
> > > > >
> > > > > -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
> > > > >
> > > > > [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
> > > > > [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
> > > > >
> > >
> > > Is it common to have two colons in the same line? ?Is the colon being
> > > used as a delimiter when parsing the kernel logs? ?Should the second
> > > colon be replaced with a hyphen? ?(No need to repost. ?I'll fix it
> > > up.)
> > > ?
> >
> > AFAICS it has been used without any limitations, e.g:
> >
> > PM: hibernation: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000fff]
> > clocksource: hpet: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 133484873504 ns
> > microcode: CPU0: patch_level=0x08701013
> > Lockdown: modprobe: unsigned module loading is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
> > ...
> >
> > I'd say we're fine using it.
>
> Ok. ?FYI, it's now in next-integrity.
>
> Mimi
>
Thanks Mimi.
--
bmeneg
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt