2023-09-14 12:45:31

by Yang Weijiang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v6 22/25] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields

Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
VM-Exit sequence.

Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.

Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 41a4533f9989..ee8938818c8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
}

+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+ return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
{
return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 30373258573d..9ccc2c552f55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4375,6 +4375,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)

if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+
+ /*
+ * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
+ * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
+ * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
+ * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
+ * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
+ * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
+ * 3 and 4 for details.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, host_s_cet);
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
+ }
}

void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c85ee42ab4f1..231d4a7b6f3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE);
#endif

static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;
+u64 __read_mostly host_s_cet;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_s_cet);

#define KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)

@@ -9618,6 +9620,18 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
return -EIO;
}

+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, host_s_cet);
+ /*
+ * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
+ * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
+ * clobber the host values. Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
+ * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(host_s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
if (!x86_emulator_cache) {
pr_err("failed to allocate cache for x86 emulator\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 9a8e3a84eaf4..0d5f673338dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
extern u64 host_xcr0;
extern u64 host_xss;
extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;
+extern u64 host_s_cet;

extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;

--
2.27.0


2023-10-31 17:57:34

by Maxim Levitsky

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 22/25] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields

On Thu, 2023-09-14 at 02:33 -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
> Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
> post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
> and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
> VM-Exit sequence.
>
> Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
> to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
> to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
> before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
> SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.
>
> Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
> in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> index 41a4533f9989..ee8938818c8a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> @@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
> return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
> }
>
> +static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
> +{
> + return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
> +}
> static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
> {
> return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 30373258573d..9ccc2c552f55 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -4375,6 +4375,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>
> if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
> vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
> +
> + /*
> + * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
> + * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
> + * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
> + * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
> + * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
> + * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
> + * 3 and 4 for details.

> + */
> + if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
> + vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, host_s_cet);
> + vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
> + vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
> + }
> }
>
> void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index c85ee42ab4f1..231d4a7b6f3d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE);
> #endif
>
> static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;
> +u64 __read_mostly host_s_cet;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_s_cet);
>
> #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)
>
> @@ -9618,6 +9620,18 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
> return -EIO;
> }
>
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, host_s_cet);
> + /*
> + * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
> + * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
> + * clobber the host values. Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
> + * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(host_s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
> + return -EIO;
This is a good idea.

> + }
> +
> x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
> if (!x86_emulator_cache) {
> pr_err("failed to allocate cache for x86 emulator\n");
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index 9a8e3a84eaf4..0d5f673338dd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> extern u64 host_xcr0;
> extern u64 host_xss;
> extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;
> +extern u64 host_s_cet;
>
> extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;
>


Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>

Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky