>From siliconvalley.com's GMSV column today:
No one expects the Spanish Inquisition, "the white screen of
death"" A small Texas venture with roots in the intelligence
community has developed a digital copy protection scheme that
it says is nearly unbeatable. Infraworks' InTether utility
can not only limit the number of times a recipient can view or
play a file, it can determine how long that file can be viewed
or played. More intriguing still, InTether can make a file
self-destruct if it's tampered with. The utility is enabled
with 11 layers of security defenses, all of which must be
successfully navigated to disable the system. These layers
range from a series of forced reboots designed to thwart
automated hacking tools to something called "the white screen
of death" which destroys the software and all files stored
inside it. Infraworks CEO George Friedman says the
application's system-level control is possible largely because
it is firmly anchored into users' C drives during
installation. "We're fairly deep in the operating system,"
Friedman told Inside.com, "so we see what's going on and we
either permit or deny it from happening in relation ... to the
files under our control." While InTether has been dismissed
by some -- most notably encryption expert Bruce Schneier -- as
untenable, the technology has sparked the interest of some
publishing concerns, among them Time Inc.and McGraw-Hill.
Se if these bozos get into the kernel anytime soon...
Andre Hedrick
Linux ATA Development
Andre Hedrick wrote:
> >From siliconvalley.com's GMSV column today:
> self-destruct if it's tampered with. The utility is enabled
> with 11 layers of security defenses, all of which must be
> successfully navigated to disable the system. These layers
> range from a series of forced reboots designed to thwart
> automated hacking tools to something called "the white screen
> of death" which destroys the software and all files stored
> inside it. Infraworks CEO George Friedman says the
> application's system-level control is possible largely because
> it is firmly anchored into users' C drives during
> installation. "We're fairly deep in the operating system,"
Not much help if you put the disk in another box without their
system installed (or mount in linux/BSD/MacOS) to break the
encryption/controls. Once that's done, A floppy based OS
and tool could break open the files on a disk, when their
apps aren't running.
If it can be decrypted "legally" it can
be done "illegally" too.
-Thomas
On Tue, 13 Mar 2001, Thomas Dodd wrote:
> Andre Hedrick wrote:
> > >From siliconvalley.com's GMSV column today:
> > self-destruct if it's tampered with. The utility is enabled
> > with 11 layers of security defenses, all of which must be
> > successfully navigated to disable the system. These layers
> > range from a series of forced reboots designed to thwart
> > automated hacking tools to something called "the white screen
> > of death" which destroys the software and all files stored
> > inside it. Infraworks CEO George Friedman says the
> > application's system-level control is possible largely because
> > it is firmly anchored into users' C drives during
> > installation. "We're fairly deep in the operating system,"
>
> Not much help if you put the disk in another box without their
> system installed (or mount in linux/BSD/MacOS) to break the
> encryption/controls. Once that's done, A floppy based OS
> and tool could break open the files on a disk, when their
> apps aren't running.
>
> If it can be decrypted "legally" it can
> be done "illegally" too.
Indeed. The whole concept is fatally flawed; probably the biggest
challenge facing a cracker attacking this system is choosing which of the
many avenues to start with :-)
1. The drivers. I really like displaying audio and video via my hard
drive, so I use drivers which do that...
2. Debugger: I'll stick a breakpoint in a suitable point, so just after
decryption the program is frozen and dumped to disk. Ooh look -
unencrypted content!
3. Rebuild the Windows kernel with the functions they rely on disabled.
When the kernel's out to get you, you're thoroughly screwed.
4. Run it under VMWare, and snapshot the screen with the content
displayed.
5. Don't buy this "protected" content crap, and watch their share price
go round the S-bend.
6. Run it under Wine, with a few API tweaks.
I'm sure there are plenty of other approaches, but this is rather OT for
lkml...
James.
>Indeed. The whole concept is fatally flawed; probably the biggest
>challenge facing a cracker attacking this system is choosing which of the
>many avenues to start with :-)
>
>1. The drivers. I really like displaying audio and video via my hard
>drive, so I use drivers which do that...
Or you could take the hardware approach. Hmm, this 8-bit microcontroller
on an ISA card looks *just* like a SoundBlaster AWE32, but it's got a 2.5"
HD attached to it. And this custom piece of hardware which I just plugged
into my DVI port is a perfect video-capture device, complete with a
FireWire interface which I can stream into an ordinary Macintosh, or
digital camcorder. Combine the two and you can brute-force your way out of
any copy-protection system under the sun which is intended to run on a
consumer-level PC.
Sorry, but these people make me laugh.
The small-time pirate can simply copy analogue-to-analogue - it'll be
slightly off quality but more than good enough for the average Joe (look at
the number of low-grade 128kbps MP3s out there). The big-time pirate can
*always* get hold of enough exotic hardware and/or hackery to get around
the "protection schemes". Who loses out? The ordinary consumer who's paid
their $$$ like a good citizen.
Strange that I haven't made much use of the DVD capability on my PowerBook.
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