This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.2.99 release.
There are 79 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Tue Feb 13 12:00:00 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
All the patches have also been committed to the linux-3.2.y-rc branch of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bwh/linux-stable-rc.git .
A shortlog and diffstat can be found below.
Ben.
-------------
Al Viro (2):
autofs4: autofs4_wait() vs. autofs4_catatonic_mode() race
[4041bcdc7bef06a2fb29c57394c713a74bd13b08]
autofs4: catatonic_mode vs. notify_daemon race
[8753333266be67ff3a984ac1f6566d31c260bee4]
Alan (1):
usbip: Fix sscanf handling
[2d32927127f44d755780aa5fa88c8c34e72558f8]
Alan Stern (1):
USB: usbfs: compute urb->actual_length for isochronous
[2ef47001b3ee3ded579b7532ebdcf8680e4d8c54]
Alex Chen (1):
ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
[28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300]
Alexander Potapenko (1):
sctp: fully initialize the IPv6 address in sctp_v6_to_addr()
[15339e441ec46fbc3bf3486bb1ae4845b0f1bb8d]
Alexander Steffen (1):
tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
[ee70bc1e7b63ac8023c9ff9475d8741e397316e7]
Alexandre Belloni (1):
rtc: set the alarm to the next expiring timer
[74717b28cb32e1ad3c1042cafd76b264c8c0f68d]
Andreas Rohner (1):
nilfs2: fix race condition that causes file system corruption
[31ccb1f7ba3cfe29631587d451cf5bb8ab593550]
Arnd Bergmann (2):
Input: adxl34x - do not treat FIFO_MODE() as boolean
[1dbc080c9ef6bcfba652ef0d6ae919b8c7c85a1d]
isofs: fix timestamps beyond 2027
[34be4dbf87fc3e474a842305394534216d428f5d]
Bart Van Assche (1):
IB/srp: Avoid that a cable pull can trigger a kernel crash
[8a0d18c62121d3c554a83eb96e2752861d84d937]
Bart Westgeest (1):
staging: usbip: removed #if 0'd out code
[34c09578179f5838e5958c45e8aed4edc9c6c3b8]
Bernhard Rosenkraenzer (1):
USB: Add delay-init quirk for Corsair K70 LUX keyboards
[a0fea6027f19c62727315aba1a7fae75a9caa842]
Brent Taylor (1):
mtd: nand: Fix writing mtdoops to nand flash.
[30863e38ebeb500a31cecee8096fb5002677dd9b]
Chuck Lever (1):
nfs: Fix ugly referral attributes
[c05cefcc72416a37eba5a2b35f0704ed758a9145]
Colin Ian King (1):
rtc: interface: ignore expired timers when enqueuing new timers
[2b2f5ff00f63847d95adad6289bd8b05f5983dd5]
Dan Carpenter (2):
eCryptfs: use after free in ecryptfs_release_messaging()
[db86be3a12d0b6e5c5b51c2ab2a48f06329cb590]
scsi: bfa: integer overflow in debugfs
[3e351275655d3c84dc28abf170def9786db5176d]
Eric Biggers (1):
dm bufio: fix integer overflow when limiting maximum cache size
[74d4108d9e681dbbe4a2940ed8fdff1f6868184c]
Eric Dumazet (1):
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doff
[2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901]
Eric W. Biederman (1):
net/sctp: Always set scope_id in sctp_inet6_skb_msgname
[7c8a61d9ee1df0fb4747879fa67a99614eb62fec]
Felipe Balbi (1):
usb: add helper to extract bits 12:11 of wMaxPacketSize
[541b6fe63023f3059cf85d47ff2767a3e42a8e44]
Gabriele Paoloni (1):
PCI/AER: Report non-fatal errors only to the affected endpoint
[86acc790717fb60fb51ea3095084e331d8711c74]
Guenter Roeck (1):
kaiser: Set _PAGE_NX only if supported
[61e9b3671007a5da8127955a1a3bda7e0d5f42e8]
Guillaume Nault (5):
l2tp: don't register sessions in l2tp_session_create()
[3953ae7b218df4d1e544b98a393666f9ae58a78c]
l2tp: ensure sessions are freed after their PPPOL2TP socket
[cdd10c9627496ad25c87ce6394e29752253c69d3]
l2tp: initialise PPP sessions before registering them
[f98be6c6359e7e4a61aaefb9964c1db31cb9ec0c]
l2tp: initialise l2tp_eth sessions before registering them
[ee28de6bbd78c2e18111a0aef43ea746f28d2073]
l2tp: protect sock pointer of struct pppol2tp_session with RCU
[ee40fb2e1eb5bc0ddd3f2f83c6e39a454ef5a741]
Hou Tao (1):
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
[b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed]
Jan Harkes (1):
coda: fix 'kernel memory exposure attempt' in fsync
[d337b66a4c52c7b04eec661d86c2ef6e168965a2]
Jason Gunthorpe (1):
sctp: Fixup v4mapped behaviour to comply with Sock API
[299ee123e19889d511092347f5fc14db0f10e3a6]
Jens Axboe (1):
blktrace: fix unlocked access to init/start-stop/teardown
[1f2cac107c591c24b60b115d6050adc213d10fc0]
Johan Hovold (2):
USB: serial: garmin_gps: fix I/O after failed probe and remove
[19a565d9af6e0d828bd0d521d3bafd5017f4ce52]
USB: serial: garmin_gps: fix memory leak on probe errors
[74d471b598444b7f2d964930f7234779c80960a0]
Ladi Prosek (1):
KVM: nVMX: set IDTR and GDTR limits when loading L1 host state
[21f2d551183847bc7fbe8d866151d00cdad18752]
Ladislav Michl (1):
video: udlfb: Fix read EDID timeout
[c98769475575c8a585f5b3952f4b5f90266f699b]
Lepton Wu (1):
kaiser: Set _PAGE_NX only if supported
[not upstream; specific to KAISER backport]
Mark Bloch (1):
IB/mlx4: Increase maximal message size under UD QP
[5f22a1d87c5315a98981ecf93cd8de226cffe6ca]
Markus Elfring (1):
media: omap_vout: Fix a possible null pointer dereference in omap_vout_open()
[bfba2b3e21b9426c0f9aca00f3cad8631b2da170]
Masami Hiramatsu (1):
x86/decoder: Add new TEST instruction pattern
[12a78d43de767eaf8fb272facb7a7b6f2dc6a9df]
Mauro Carvalho Chehab (1):
[media] cx231xx: Fix the max number of interfaces
[139d28826b8e2bc7a9232fde0d2f14812914f501]
Michele Baldessari (1):
media: Don't do DMA on stack for firmware upload in the AS102 driver
[b3120d2cc447ee77b9d69bf4ad7b452c9adb4d39]
Mike Snitzer (1):
dm: discard support requires all targets in a table support discards
[8a74d29d541cd86569139c6f3f44b2d210458071]
Mohamed Ghannam (2):
RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
[c095508770aebf1b9218e77026e48345d719b17c]
RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op
[7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737]
Nadav Amit (1):
KVM: vmx: Inject #GP on invalid PAT CR
[4566654bb9be9e8864df417bb72ceee5136b6a6a]
NeilBrown (2):
autofs: don't fail mount for transient error
[ecc0c469f27765ed1e2b967be0aa17cee1a60b76]
autofs: fix careless error in recent commit
[302ec300ef8a545a7fc7f667e5fd743b091c2eeb]
Pablo Neira Ayuso (3):
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: fix handling of malformed TCP header and options
[71ffe9c77dd7a2b62207953091efa8dafec958dd]
netfilter: xt_TCPOPTSTRIP: don't use tcp_hdr()
[ed82c437320c48a4032492f4a55a7e2c934158b6]
netfilter: xt_TCPOPTSTRIP: fix possible mangling beyond packet boundary
[bc6bcb59dd7c184d229f9e86d08aa56059938a4c]
Paolo Bonzini (1):
KVM: SVM: obey guest PAT
[15038e14724799b8c205beb5f20f9e54896013c3]
Phil Oester (2):
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: Fix missing fragmentation handling
[b396966c4688522863572927cb30aa874b3ec504]
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: correct return value in tcpmss_mangle_packet
[1205e1fa615805c9efa97303b552cf445965752a]
Rusty Russell (1):
x86/smp: Don't ever patch back to UP if we unplug cpus
[816afe4ff98ee10b1d30fd66361be132a0a5cee6]
Sean Young (1):
media: rc: check for integer overflow
[3e45067f94bbd61dec0619b1c32744eb0de480c8]
Shuah Khan (4):
usbip: fix stub_rx: get_pipe() to validate endpoint number
[635f545a7e8be7596b9b2b6a43cab6bbd5a88e43]
usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
[c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366]
usbip: fix stub_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null transfer_buffer
[be6123df1ea8f01ee2f896a16c2b7be3e4557a5a]
usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address
[2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5]
Stanislaw Gruszka (1):
rt2x00usb: mark device removed when get ENOENT usb error
[bfa62a52cad93686bb8d8171ea5288813248a7c6]
Takashi Iwai (6):
ALSA: seq: Make ioctls race-free
[b3defb791b26ea0683a93a4f49c77ec45ec96f10]
ALSA: timer: Remove kernel warning at compat ioctl error paths
[3d4e8303f2c747c8540a0a0126d0151514f6468b]
ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity checks in v2 clock parsers
[0a62d6c966956d77397c32836a5bbfe3af786fc1]
ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity checks to FE parser
[d937cd6790a2bef2d07b500487646bd794c039bb]
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential out-of-bound access at parsing SU
[f658f17b5e0e339935dca23e77e0f3cad591926b]
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential zero-division at parsing FU
[8428a8ebde2db1e988e41a58497a28beb7ce1705]
Tom Parkin (3):
l2tp: add session reorder queue purge function to core
[48f72f92b31431c40279b0fba6c5588e07e67d95]
l2tp: purge session reorder queue on delete
[4c6e2fd35460208596fa099ee0750a4b0438aa5c]
l2tp: push all ppp pseudowire shutdown through .release handler
[cf2f5c886a209377daefd5d2ba0bcd49c3887813]
Tuomas Tynkkynen (2):
fs/9p: Compare qid.path in v9fs_test_inode
[8ee031631546cf2f7859cc69593bd60bbdd70b46]
net/9p: Switch to wait_event_killable()
[9523feac272ccad2ad8186ba4fcc89103754de52]
Vasily Gorbik (1):
s390/disassembler: increase show_code buffer size
[b192571d1ae375e0bbe0aa3ccfa1a3c3704454b9]
Vijendar Mukunda (1):
ALSA: hda: Add Raven PCI ID
[9ceace3c9c18c67676e75141032a65a8e01f9a7a]
Waiman Long (1):
blktrace: Fix potential deadlock between delete & sysfs ops
[5acb3cc2c2e9d3020a4fee43763c6463767f1572]
Younger Liu (1):
ocfs2: fix issue that ocfs2_setattr() does not deal with new_i_size==i_size
[d62e74be1270c89fbaf7aada8218bfdf62d00a58]
Zhou Chengming (1):
kprobes, x86/alternatives: Use text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modules
[e846d13958066828a9483d862cc8370a72fadbb6]
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 -
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/s390/kernel/dis.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 129 +++-------
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 20 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 7 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 +
arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/xen/smp.c | 6 +-
block/blk-core.c | 3 +
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 6 +
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c | 2 +-
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 23 +-
drivers/input/misc/adxl34x.c | 2 +-
drivers/md/dm-bufio.c | 15 +-
drivers/md/dm-table.c | 32 ++-
drivers/md/dm.c | 12 +-
drivers/media/rc/ir-lirc-codec.c | 9 +-
drivers/media/video/cx231xx/cx231xx-cards.c | 3 +-
drivers/media/video/omap/omap_vout.c | 3 +-
drivers/mtd/nand/nand_base.c | 9 +-
drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c | 6 +-
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c | 9 +-
drivers/rtc/interface.c | 16 +-
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_debugfs.c | 5 +-
drivers/staging/media/as102/as102_fw.c | 28 ++-
drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c | 58 +++--
drivers/staging/usbip/stub_tx.c | 7 +
drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
.../staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/usbip_common.c | 2 +-
.../staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 +-
drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 39 ---
drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 20 +-
drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 14 ++
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +
drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c | 22 +-
drivers/video/udlfb.c | 10 +-
fs/9p/vfs_inode.c | 3 +
fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 3 +
fs/autofs4/waitq.c | 45 +++-
fs/coda/upcall.c | 3 +-
fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 8 +-
fs/isofs/isofs.h | 2 +-
fs/isofs/rock.h | 2 +-
fs/isofs/util.c | 2 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 18 +-
fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 6 +-
fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 2 +-
fs/ocfs2/file.c | 18 +-
include/linux/blkdev.h | 1 +
include/linux/usb/ch9.h | 19 ++
include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 2 +
include/net/sctp/structs.h | 8 +-
kernel/cpu.c | 11 -
kernel/extable.c | 2 +
kernel/trace/blktrace.c | 76 ++++--
net/9p/client.c | 3 +-
net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 13 +-
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 42 ++--
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 3 +
net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c | 96 +++++--
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 276 ++++++++++++---------
net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c | 43 ++--
net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c | 19 +-
net/rds/rdma.c | 4 +
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 160 ++++++------
net/sctp/protocol.c | 12 +-
net/sctp/socket.c | 33 ++-
net/sctp/transport.c | 4 +-
net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 2 +-
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 10 +-
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h | 1 +
sound/core/timer_compat.c | 12 +-
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 +
sound/usb/clock.c | 9 +-
sound/usb/mixer.c | 19 +-
80 files changed, 916 insertions(+), 641 deletions(-)
--
Ben Hutchings
Sturgeon's Law: Ninety percent of everything is crap.
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 3e351275655d3c84dc28abf170def9786db5176d upstream.
We could allocate less memory than intended because we do:
bfad->regdata = kzalloc(len << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
The shift can overflow leading to a crash. This is debugfs code so the
impact is very small. I fixed the network version of this in March with
commit 13e2d5187f6b ("bna: integer overflow bug in debugfs").
Fixes: ab2a9ba189e8 ("[SCSI] bfa: add debugfs support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_debugfs.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_debugfs.c
@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ bfad_debugfs_write_regrd(struct file *fi
struct bfad_s *bfad = port->bfad;
struct bfa_s *bfa = &bfad->bfa;
struct bfa_ioc_s *ioc = &bfa->ioc;
- int addr, len, rc, i;
+ int addr, rc, i;
+ u32 len;
u32 *regbuf;
void __iomem *rb, *reg_addr;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ bfad_debugfs_write_regrd(struct file *fi
}
rc = sscanf(kern_buf, "%x:%x", &addr, &len);
- if (rc < 2) {
+ if (rc < 2 || len > (UINT_MAX >> 2)) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"bfad[%d]: %s failed to read user buf\n",
bfad->inst_no, __func__);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Younger Liu <[email protected]>
commit d62e74be1270c89fbaf7aada8218bfdf62d00a58 upstream.
The issue scenario is as following:
- Create a small file and fallocate a large disk space for a file with
FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE option.
- ftruncate the file back to the original size again. but the disk free
space is not changed back. This is a real bug that be fixed in this
patch.
In order to solve the issue above, we modified ocfs2_setattr(), if
attr->ia_size != i_size_read(inode), It calls ocfs2_truncate_file(), and
truncate disk space to attr->ia_size.
Signed-off-by: Younger Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jie Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Sunil Mushran <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jensen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 2 +-
fs/ocfs2/file.c | 9 ++-------
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
@@ -7127,7 +7127,7 @@ int ocfs2_truncate_inline(struct inode *
if (end > i_size_read(inode))
end = i_size_read(inode);
- BUG_ON(start >= end);
+ BUG_ON(start > end);
if (!(OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) ||
!(le16_to_cpu(di->i_dyn_features) & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) ||
--- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
@@ -474,11 +474,6 @@ static int ocfs2_truncate_file(struct in
goto bail;
}
- /* lets handle the simple truncate cases before doing any more
- * cluster locking. */
- if (new_i_size == le64_to_cpu(fe->i_size))
- goto bail;
-
down_write(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_resv_discard(&osb->osb_la_resmap,
@@ -1149,14 +1144,14 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
goto bail_unlock_rw;
}
- if (size_change && attr->ia_size != i_size_read(inode)) {
+ if (size_change) {
status = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (status)
goto bail_unlock;
inode_dio_wait(inode);
- if (i_size_read(inode) > attr->ia_size) {
+ if (i_size_read(inode) >= attr->ia_size) {
if (ocfs2_should_order_data(inode)) {
status = ocfs2_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,
attr->ia_size);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
commit 12a78d43de767eaf8fb272facb7a7b6f2dc6a9df upstream.
The kbuild test robot reported this build warning:
Warning: arch/x86/tools/test_get_len found difference at <jump_table>:ffffffff8103dd2c
Warning: ffffffff8103dd82: f6 09 d8 testb $0xd8,(%rcx)
Warning: objdump says 3 bytes, but insn_get_length() says 2
Warning: decoded and checked 1569014 instructions with 1 warnings
This sequence seems to be a new instruction not in the opcode map in the Intel SDM.
The instruction sequence is "F6 09 d8", means Group3(F6), MOD(00)REG(001)RM(001), and 0xd8.
Intel SDM vol2 A.4 Table A-6 said the table index in the group is "Encoding of Bits 5,4,3 of
the ModR/M Byte (bits 2,1,0 in parenthesis)"
In that table, opcodes listed by the index REG bits as:
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
TEST Ib/Iz,(undefined),NOT,NEG,MUL AL/rAX,IMUL AL/rAX,DIV AL/rAX,IDIV AL/rAX
So, it seems TEST Ib is assigned to 001.
Add the new pattern.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ EndTable
GrpTable: Grp3_1
0: TEST Eb,Ib
-1:
+1: TEST Eb,Ib
2: NOT Eb
3: NEG Eb
4: MUL AL,Eb
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit b3defb791b26ea0683a93a4f49c77ec45ec96f10 upstream.
The ALSA sequencer ioctls have no protection against racy calls while
the concurrent operations may lead to interfere with each other. As
reported recently, for example, the concurrent calls of setting client
pool with a combination of write calls may lead to either the
unkillable dead-lock or UAF.
As a slightly big hammer solution, this patch introduces the mutex to
make each ioctl exclusive. Although this may reduce performance via
parallel ioctl calls, usually it's not demanded for sequencer usages,
hence it should be negligible.
Reported-by: Luo Quan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: ioctl dispatch is done from snd_seq_do_ioctl();
take the mutex and add ret variable there.]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 10 ++++++++--
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ static struct snd_seq_client *seq_create
rwlock_init(&client->ports_lock);
mutex_init(&client->ports_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&client->ports_list_head);
+ mutex_init(&client->ioctl_mutex);
/* find free slot in the client table */
spin_lock_irqsave(&clients_lock, flags);
@@ -2188,6 +2189,7 @@ static int snd_seq_do_ioctl(struct snd_s
void __user *arg)
{
struct seq_ioctl_table *p;
+ int ret;
switch (cmd) {
case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_PVERSION:
@@ -2201,8 +2203,12 @@ static int snd_seq_do_ioctl(struct snd_s
if (! arg)
return -EFAULT;
for (p = ioctl_tables; p->cmd; p++) {
- if (p->cmd == cmd)
- return p->func(client, arg);
+ if (p->cmd == cmd) {
+ mutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
+ ret = p->func(client, arg);
+ mutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
+ return ret;
+ }
}
snd_printd("seq unknown ioctl() 0x%x (type='%c', number=0x%02x)\n",
cmd, _IOC_TYPE(cmd), _IOC_NR(cmd));
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct snd_seq_client {
struct list_head ports_list_head;
rwlock_t ports_lock;
struct mutex ports_mutex;
+ struct mutex ioctl_mutex;
int convert32; /* convert 32->64bit */
/* output pool */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
commit 5acb3cc2c2e9d3020a4fee43763c6463767f1572 upstream.
The lockdep code had reported the following unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(s_active#228);
lock(&bdev->bd_mutex/1);
lock(s_active#228);
lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
The deadlock may happen when one task (CPU1) is trying to delete a
partition in a block device and another task (CPU0) is accessing
tracing sysfs file (e.g. /sys/block/dm-1/trace/act_mask) in that
partition.
The s_active isn't an actual lock. It is a reference count (kn->count)
on the sysfs (kernfs) file. Removal of a sysfs file, however, require
a wait until all the references are gone. The reference count is
treated like a rwsem using lockdep instrumentation code.
The fact that a thread is in the sysfs callback method or in the
ioctl call means there is a reference to the opended sysfs or device
file. That should prevent the underlying block structure from being
removed.
Instead of using bd_mutex in the block_device structure, a new
blk_trace_mutex is now added to the request_queue structure to protect
access to the blk_trace structure.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Fix typo in patch subject line, and prune a comment detailing how
the code used to work.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
block/blk-core.c | 3 +++
include/linux/blkdev.h | 1 +
kernel/trace/blktrace.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/block/blk-core.c
+++ b/block/blk-core.c
@@ -499,6 +499,9 @@ struct request_queue *blk_alloc_queue_no
kobject_init(&q->kobj, &blk_queue_ktype);
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE
+ mutex_init(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+#endif
mutex_init(&q->sysfs_lock);
spin_lock_init(&q->__queue_lock);
--- a/include/linux/blkdev.h
+++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ struct request_queue {
int node;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE
struct blk_trace *blk_trace;
+ struct mutex blk_trace_mutex;
#endif
/*
* for flush operations
--- a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
@@ -631,6 +631,12 @@ int blk_trace_startstop(struct request_q
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_trace_startstop);
+/*
+ * When reading or writing the blktrace sysfs files, the references to the
+ * opened sysfs or device files should prevent the underlying block device
+ * from being removed. So no further delete protection is really needed.
+ */
+
/**
* blk_trace_ioctl: - handle the ioctls associated with tracing
* @bdev: the block device
@@ -648,7 +654,7 @@ int blk_trace_ioctl(struct block_device
if (!q)
return -ENXIO;
- mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
switch (cmd) {
case BLKTRACESETUP:
@@ -674,7 +680,7 @@ int blk_trace_ioctl(struct block_device
break;
}
- mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -1660,7 +1666,7 @@ static ssize_t sysfs_blk_trace_attr_show
if (q == NULL)
goto out_bdput;
- mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
if (attr == &dev_attr_enable) {
ret = sprintf(buf, "%u\n", !!q->blk_trace);
@@ -1679,7 +1685,7 @@ static ssize_t sysfs_blk_trace_attr_show
ret = sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", q->blk_trace->end_lba);
out_unlock_bdev:
- mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
out_bdput:
bdput(bdev);
out:
@@ -1721,7 +1727,7 @@ static ssize_t sysfs_blk_trace_attr_stor
if (q == NULL)
goto out_bdput;
- mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
if (attr == &dev_attr_enable) {
if (value)
@@ -1747,7 +1753,7 @@ static ssize_t sysfs_blk_trace_attr_stor
}
out_unlock_bdev:
- mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
out_bdput:
bdput(bdev);
out:
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
commit e846d13958066828a9483d862cc8370a72fadbb6 upstream.
We use alternatives_text_reserved() to check if the address is in
the fixed pieces of alternative reserved, but the problem is that
we don't hold the smp_alt mutex when call this function. So the list
traversal may encounter a deleted list_head if another path is doing
alternatives_smp_module_del().
One solution is that we can hold smp_alt mutex before call this
function, but the difficult point is that the callers of this
functions, arch_prepare_kprobe() and arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(),
are called inside the text_mutex. So we must hold smp_alt mutex
before we go into these arch dependent code. But we can't now,
the smp_alt mutex is the arch dependent part, only x86 has it.
Maybe we can export another arch dependent callback to solve this.
But there is a simpler way to handle this problem. We can reuse the
text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modules instead of using another mutex.
And all the arch dependent checks of kprobes are inside the text_mutex,
so it's safe now.
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 2cfa197 "ftrace/alternatives: Introducing *_text_reserved functions"
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
kernel/extable.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_lock(const
{
const s32 *poff;
- mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
for (poff = start; poff < end; poff++) {
u8 *ptr = (u8 *)poff + *poff;
@@ -417,7 +416,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_lock(const
if (*ptr == 0x3e)
text_poke(ptr, ((unsigned char []){0xf0}), 1);
};
- mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
static void alternatives_smp_unlock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
@@ -425,7 +423,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_unlock(cons
{
const s32 *poff;
- mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
for (poff = start; poff < end; poff++) {
u8 *ptr = (u8 *)poff + *poff;
@@ -435,7 +432,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_unlock(cons
if (*ptr == 0xf0)
text_poke(ptr, ((unsigned char []){0x3E}), 1);
};
- mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
struct smp_alt_module {
@@ -454,8 +450,7 @@ struct smp_alt_module {
struct list_head next;
};
static LIST_HEAD(smp_alt_modules);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(smp_alt);
-static bool uniproc_patched = false; /* protected by smp_alt */
+static bool uniproc_patched = false; /* protected by text_mutex */
void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_add(struct module *mod,
char *name,
@@ -464,7 +459,7 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_m
{
struct smp_alt_module *smp;
- mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
+ mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
if (!uniproc_patched)
goto unlock;
@@ -491,14 +486,14 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_m
smp_unlock:
alternatives_smp_unlock(locks, locks_end, text, text_end);
unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
+ mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_del(struct module *mod)
{
struct smp_alt_module *item;
- mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
+ mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(item, &smp_alt_modules, next) {
if (mod != item->mod)
continue;
@@ -506,7 +501,7 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_m
kfree(item);
break;
}
- mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
+ mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
@@ -527,7 +522,7 @@ void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
/* Why bother if there are no other CPUs? */
BUG_ON(num_possible_cpus() == 1);
- mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
+ mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
if (uniproc_patched) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SMP alternatives: switching to SMP code\n");
@@ -539,10 +534,13 @@ void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
mod->text, mod->text_end);
uniproc_patched = false;
}
- mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
+ mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
-/* Return 1 if the address range is reserved for smp-alternatives */
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the address range is reserved for SMP-alternatives.
+ * Must hold text_mutex.
+ */
int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end)
{
struct smp_alt_module *mod;
@@ -550,6 +548,8 @@ int alternatives_text_reserved(void *sta
u8 *text_start = start;
u8 *text_end = end;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);
+
list_for_each_entry(mod, &smp_alt_modules, next) {
if (mod->text > text_end || mod->text_end < text_start)
continue;
--- a/kernel/extable.c
+++ b/kernel/extable.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
* mutex protecting text section modification (dynamic code patching).
* some users need to sleep (allocating memory...) while they hold this lock.
*
+ * Note: Also protects SMP-alternatives modification on x86.
+ *
* NOT exported to modules - patching kernel text is a really delicate matter.
*/
DEFINE_MUTEX(text_mutex);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
commit 816afe4ff98ee10b1d30fd66361be132a0a5cee6 upstream.
We still patch SMP instructions to UP variants if we boot with a
single CPU, but not at any other time. In particular, not if we
unplug CPUs to return to a single cpu.
Paul McKenney points out:
mean offline overhead is 6251/48=130.2 milliseconds.
If I remove the alternatives_smp_switch() from the offline
path [...] the mean offline overhead is 550/42=13.1 milliseconds
Basically, we're never going to get those 120ms back, and the
code is pretty messy.
We get rid of:
1) The "smp-alt-once" boot option. It's actually "smp-alt-boot", the
documentation is wrong. It's now the default.
2) The skip_smp_alternatives flag used by suspend.
3) arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_begin() and arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_end()
which were only used to set this one flag.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 -
arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 107 +++++++++---------------------------
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 20 +------
arch/x86/xen/smp.c | 6 +-
kernel/cpu.c | 11 ----
6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2440,9 +2440,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
smart2= [HW]
Format: <io1>[,<io2>[,...,<io8>]]
- smp-alt-once [X86-32,SMP] On a hotplug CPU system, only
- attempt to substitute SMP alternatives once at boot.
-
smsc-ircc2.nopnp [HW] Don't use PNP to discover SMC devices
smsc-ircc2.ircc_cfg= [HW] Device configuration I/O port
smsc-ircc2.ircc_sir= [HW] SIR base I/O port
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ extern void alternatives_smp_module_add(
void *locks, void *locks_end,
void *text, void *text_end);
extern void alternatives_smp_module_del(struct module *mod);
-extern void alternatives_smp_switch(int smp);
+extern void alternatives_enable_smp(void);
extern int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end);
extern bool skip_smp_alternatives;
#else
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static inline void alternatives_smp_modu
void *locks, void *locks_end,
void *text, void *text_end) {}
static inline void alternatives_smp_module_del(struct module *mod) {}
-static inline void alternatives_smp_switch(int smp) {}
+static inline void alternatives_enable_smp(void) {}
static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end)
{
return 0;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -21,19 +21,6 @@
#define MAX_PATCH_LEN (255-1)
-#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
-static int smp_alt_once;
-
-static int __init bootonly(char *str)
-{
- smp_alt_once = 1;
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("smp-alt-boot", bootonly);
-#else
-#define smp_alt_once 1
-#endif
-
static int __initdata_or_module debug_alternative;
static int __init debug_alt(char *str)
@@ -438,9 +425,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_unlock(cons
{
const s32 *poff;
- if (noreplace_smp)
- return;
-
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
for (poff = start; poff < end; poff++) {
u8 *ptr = (u8 *)poff + *poff;
@@ -471,7 +455,7 @@ struct smp_alt_module {
};
static LIST_HEAD(smp_alt_modules);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smp_alt);
-static int smp_mode = 1; /* protected by smp_alt */
+static bool uniproc_patched = false; /* protected by smp_alt */
void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_add(struct module *mod,
char *name,
@@ -480,19 +464,18 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_m
{
struct smp_alt_module *smp;
- if (noreplace_smp)
- return;
+ mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
+ if (!uniproc_patched)
+ goto unlock;
- if (smp_alt_once) {
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UP))
- alternatives_smp_unlock(locks, locks_end,
- text, text_end);
- return;
- }
+ if (num_possible_cpus() == 1)
+ /* Don't bother remembering, we'll never have to undo it. */
+ goto smp_unlock;
smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == smp)
- return; /* we'll run the (safe but slow) SMP code then ... */
+ /* we'll run the (safe but slow) SMP code then ... */
+ goto unlock;
smp->mod = mod;
smp->name = name;
@@ -504,11 +487,10 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_m
smp->locks, smp->locks_end,
smp->text, smp->text_end, smp->name);
- mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
list_add_tail(&smp->next, &smp_alt_modules);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UP))
- alternatives_smp_unlock(smp->locks, smp->locks_end,
- smp->text, smp->text_end);
+smp_unlock:
+ alternatives_smp_unlock(locks, locks_end, text, text_end);
+unlock:
mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
}
@@ -516,24 +498,18 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_m
{
struct smp_alt_module *item;
- if (smp_alt_once || noreplace_smp)
- return;
-
mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
list_for_each_entry(item, &smp_alt_modules, next) {
if (mod != item->mod)
continue;
list_del(&item->next);
- mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
- DPRINTK("%s\n", item->name);
kfree(item);
- return;
+ break;
}
mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
}
-bool skip_smp_alternatives;
-void alternatives_smp_switch(int smp)
+void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
{
struct smp_alt_module *mod;
@@ -548,34 +524,21 @@ void alternatives_smp_switch(int smp)
printk("lockdep: fixing up alternatives.\n");
#endif
- if (noreplace_smp || smp_alt_once || skip_smp_alternatives)
- return;
- BUG_ON(!smp && (num_online_cpus() > 1));
+ /* Why bother if there are no other CPUs? */
+ BUG_ON(num_possible_cpus() == 1);
mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
- /*
- * Avoid unnecessary switches because it forces JIT based VMs to
- * throw away all cached translations, which can be quite costly.
- */
- if (smp == smp_mode) {
- /* nothing */
- } else if (smp) {
+ if (uniproc_patched) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SMP alternatives: switching to SMP code\n");
+ BUG_ON(num_online_cpus() != 1);
clear_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_UP);
clear_cpu_cap(&cpu_data(0), X86_FEATURE_UP);
list_for_each_entry(mod, &smp_alt_modules, next)
alternatives_smp_lock(mod->locks, mod->locks_end,
mod->text, mod->text_end);
- } else {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SMP alternatives: switching to UP code\n");
- set_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_UP);
- set_cpu_cap(&cpu_data(0), X86_FEATURE_UP);
- list_for_each_entry(mod, &smp_alt_modules, next)
- alternatives_smp_unlock(mod->locks, mod->locks_end,
- mod->text, mod->text_end);
+ uniproc_patched = false;
}
- smp_mode = smp;
mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
}
@@ -652,40 +615,22 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(voi
apply_alternatives(__alt_instructions, __alt_instructions_end);
- /* switch to patch-once-at-boottime-only mode and free the
- * tables in case we know the number of CPUs will never ever
- * change */
-#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
- if (num_possible_cpus() < 2)
- smp_alt_once = 1;
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- if (smp_alt_once) {
- if (1 == num_possible_cpus()) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SMP alternatives: switching to UP code\n");
- set_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_UP);
- set_cpu_cap(&cpu_data(0), X86_FEATURE_UP);
-
- alternatives_smp_unlock(__smp_locks, __smp_locks_end,
- _text, _etext);
- }
- } else {
+ /* Patch to UP if other cpus not imminent. */
+ if (!noreplace_smp && (num_present_cpus() == 1 || setup_max_cpus <= 1)) {
+ uniproc_patched = true;
alternatives_smp_module_add(NULL, "core kernel",
__smp_locks, __smp_locks_end,
_text, _etext);
-
- /* Only switch to UP mode if we don't immediately boot others */
- if (num_present_cpus() == 1 || setup_max_cpus <= 1)
- alternatives_smp_switch(0);
}
-#endif
- apply_paravirt(__parainstructions, __parainstructions_end);
- if (smp_alt_once)
+ if (!uniproc_patched || num_possible_cpus() == 1)
free_init_pages("SMP alternatives",
(unsigned long)__smp_locks,
(unsigned long)__smp_locks_end);
+#endif
+
+ apply_paravirt(__parainstructions, __parainstructions_end);
restart_nmi();
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -689,7 +689,8 @@ static int __cpuinit do_boot_cpu(int api
INIT_WORK_ONSTACK(&c_idle.work, do_fork_idle);
- alternatives_smp_switch(1);
+ /* Just in case we booted with a single CPU. */
+ alternatives_enable_smp();
c_idle.idle = get_idle_for_cpu(cpu);
@@ -1109,20 +1110,6 @@ out:
preempt_enable();
}
-void arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)
-{
- /*
- * Avoid the smp alternatives switch during the disable_nonboot_cpus().
- * In the suspend path, we will be back in the SMP mode shortly anyways.
- */
- skip_smp_alternatives = true;
-}
-
-void arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_end(void)
-{
- skip_smp_alternatives = false;
-}
-
void arch_enable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)
{
set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init();
@@ -1321,9 +1308,6 @@ void native_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
if (per_cpu(cpu_state, cpu) == CPU_DEAD) {
if (system_state == SYSTEM_RUNNING)
pr_info("CPU %u is now offline\n", cpu);
-
- if (1 == num_online_cpus())
- alternatives_smp_switch(0);
return;
}
msleep(100);
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
@@ -368,7 +368,8 @@ static int __cpuinit xen_cpu_up(unsigned
return rc;
if (num_online_cpus() == 1)
- alternatives_smp_switch(1);
+ /* Just in case we booted with a single CPU. */
+ alternatives_enable_smp();
rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu);
if (rc)
@@ -414,9 +415,6 @@ static void xen_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu
unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu), NULL);
xen_uninit_lock_cpu(cpu);
xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
-
- if (num_online_cpus() == 1)
- alternatives_smp_switch(0);
}
static void __cpuinit xen_play_dead(void) /* used only with HOTPLUG_CPU */
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -406,14 +406,6 @@ out:
#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP
static cpumask_var_t frozen_cpus;
-void __weak arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)
-{
-}
-
-void __weak arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_end(void)
-{
-}
-
int disable_nonboot_cpus(void)
{
int cpu, first_cpu, error = 0;
@@ -425,7 +417,6 @@ int disable_nonboot_cpus(void)
* with the userspace trying to use the CPU hotplug at the same time
*/
cpumask_clear(frozen_cpus);
- arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_begin();
printk("Disabling non-boot CPUs ...\n");
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
@@ -441,8 +432,6 @@ int disable_nonboot_cpus(void)
}
}
- arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_end();
-
if (!error) {
BUG_ON(num_online_cpus() > 1);
/* Make sure the CPUs won't be enabled by someone else */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 19a565d9af6e0d828bd0d521d3bafd5017f4ce52 upstream.
Make sure to stop any submitted interrupt and bulk-out URBs before
returning after failed probe and when the port is being unbound to avoid
later NULL-pointer dereferences in the completion callbacks.
Also fix up the related and broken I/O cancellation on failed open and
on close. (Note that port->write_urb was never submitted.)
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct garmin_data {
__u8 privpkt[4*6];
spinlock_t lock;
struct list_head pktlist;
+ struct usb_anchor write_urbs;
};
@@ -923,7 +924,7 @@ static int garmin_init_session(struct us
sizeof(GARMIN_START_SESSION_REQ), 0);
if (status < 0)
- break;
+ goto err_kill_urbs;
}
if (status > 0)
@@ -931,6 +932,12 @@ static int garmin_init_session(struct us
}
return status;
+
+err_kill_urbs:
+ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&garmin_data_p->write_urbs);
+ usb_kill_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb);
+
+ return status;
}
@@ -950,7 +957,6 @@ static int garmin_open(struct tty_struct
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&garmin_data_p->lock, flags);
/* shutdown any bulk reads that might be going on */
- usb_kill_urb(port->write_urb);
usb_kill_urb(port->read_urb);
if (garmin_data_p->state == STATE_RESET)
@@ -977,7 +983,7 @@ static void garmin_close(struct usb_seri
/* shutdown our urbs */
usb_kill_urb(port->read_urb);
- usb_kill_urb(port->write_urb);
+ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&garmin_data_p->write_urbs);
/* keep reset state so we know that we must start a new session */
if (garmin_data_p->state != STATE_RESET)
@@ -1069,12 +1075,14 @@ static int garmin_write_bulk(struct usb_
}
/* send it down the pipe */
+ usb_anchor_urb(urb, &garmin_data_p->write_urbs);
status = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s - usb_submit_urb(write bulk) failed with status = %d\n",
__func__, status);
count = status;
+ usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
kfree(buffer);
}
@@ -1464,6 +1472,7 @@ static int garmin_attach(struct usb_seri
garmin_data_p->state = 0;
garmin_data_p->flags = 0;
garmin_data_p->count = 0;
+ init_usb_anchor(&garmin_data_p->write_urbs);
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, garmin_data_p);
status = garmin_init_session(port);
@@ -1479,6 +1488,7 @@ static void garmin_disconnect(struct usb
dbg("%s", __func__);
+ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&garmin_data_p->write_urbs);
usb_kill_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb);
del_timer_sync(&garmin_data_p->timer);
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Harkes <[email protected]>
commit d337b66a4c52c7b04eec661d86c2ef6e168965a2 upstream.
When an application called fsync on a file in Coda a small request with
just the file identifier was allocated, but the declared length was set
to the size of union of all possible upcall requests.
This bug has been around for a very long time and is now caught by the
extra checking in usercopy that was introduced in Linux-4.8.
The exposure happens when the Coda cache manager process reads the fsync
upcall request at which point it is killed. As a result there is nobody
servicing any further upcalls, trapping any processes that try to access
the mounted Coda filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/coda/upcall.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/coda/upcall.c
+++ b/fs/coda/upcall.c
@@ -447,8 +447,7 @@ int venus_fsync(struct super_block *sb,
UPARG(CODA_FSYNC);
inp->coda_fsync.VFid = *fid;
- error = coda_upcall(coda_vcp(sb), sizeof(union inputArgs),
- &outsize, inp);
+ error = coda_upcall(coda_vcp(sb), insize, &outsize, inp);
CODA_FREE(inp, insize);
return error;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
commit bfa62a52cad93686bb8d8171ea5288813248a7c6 upstream.
ENOENT usb error mean "specified interface or endpoint does not exist or
is not enabled". Mark device not present when we encounter this error
similar like we do with ENODEV error.
Otherwise we can have infinite loop in rt2x00usb_work_rxdone(), because
we remove and put again RX entries to the queue infinitely.
We can have similar situation when submit urb will fail all the time
with other error, so we need consider to limit number of entries
processed by rxdone work. But for now, since the patch fixes
reproducible soft lockup issue on single processor systems
and taken ENOENT error meaning, let apply this fix.
Patch adds additional ENOENT check not only in rx kick routine, but
also on other places where we check for ENODEV error.
Reported-by: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int rt2x00usb_vendor_request(struct rt2x
* -ENODEV: Device has disappeared, no point continuing.
* All other errors: Try again.
*/
- else if (status == -ENODEV) {
+ else if (status == -ENODEV || status == -ENOENT) {
clear_bit(DEVICE_STATE_PRESENT, &rt2x00dev->flags);
break;
}
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static bool rt2x00usb_kick_tx_entry(stru
status = usb_submit_urb(entry_priv->urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status) {
- if (status == -ENODEV)
+ if (status == -ENODEV || status == -ENOENT)
clear_bit(DEVICE_STATE_PRESENT, &rt2x00dev->flags);
set_bit(ENTRY_DATA_IO_FAILED, &entry->flags);
rt2x00lib_dmadone(entry);
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static bool rt2x00usb_kick_rx_entry(stru
status = usb_submit_urb(entry_priv->urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status) {
- if (status == -ENODEV)
+ if (status == -ENODEV || status == -ENOENT)
clear_bit(DEVICE_STATE_PRESENT, &rt2x00dev->flags);
set_bit(ENTRY_DATA_IO_FAILED, &entry->flags);
rt2x00lib_dmadone(entry);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
commit 2ef47001b3ee3ded579b7532ebdcf8680e4d8c54 upstream.
The USB kerneldoc says that the actual_length field "is read in
non-iso completion functions", but the usbfs driver uses it for all
URB types in processcompl(). Since not all of the host controller
drivers set actual_length for isochronous URBs, programs using usbfs
with some host controllers don't work properly. For example, Minas
reports that a USB camera controlled by libusb doesn't work properly
with a dwc2 controller.
It doesn't seem worthwhile to change the HCDs and the documentation,
since the in-kernel USB class drivers evidently don't rely on
actual_length for isochronous transfers. The easiest solution is for
usbfs to calculate the actual_length value for itself, by adding up
the lengths of the individual packets in an isochronous transfer.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: Minas Harutyunyan <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: wlf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -1402,6 +1402,18 @@ static int proc_unlinkurb(struct dev_sta
return 0;
}
+static void compute_isochronous_actual_length(struct urb *urb)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (urb->number_of_packets > 0) {
+ urb->actual_length = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < urb->number_of_packets; i++)
+ urb->actual_length +=
+ urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length;
+ }
+}
+
static int processcompl(struct async *as, void __user * __user *arg)
{
struct urb *urb = as->urb;
@@ -1409,6 +1421,7 @@ static int processcompl(struct async *as
void __user *addr = as->userurb;
unsigned int i;
+ compute_isochronous_actual_length(urb);
if (as->userbuffer && urb->actual_length) {
if (urb->number_of_packets > 0) /* Isochronous */
i = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
@@ -1581,6 +1594,7 @@ static int processcompl_compat(struct as
void __user *addr = as->userurb;
unsigned int i;
+ compute_isochronous_actual_length(urb);
if (as->userbuffer && urb->actual_length) {
if (urb->number_of_packets > 0) /* Isochronous */
i = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
commit 31ccb1f7ba3cfe29631587d451cf5bb8ab593550 upstream.
There is a race condition between nilfs_dirty_inode() and
nilfs_set_file_dirty().
When a file is opened, nilfs_dirty_inode() is called to update the
access timestamp in the inode. It calls __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() in a
separate transaction. __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() caches the ifile
buffer_head in the i_bh field of the inode info structure and marks it
as dirty.
After some data was written to the file in another transaction, the
function nilfs_set_file_dirty() is called, which adds the inode to the
ns_dirty_files list.
Then the segment construction calls nilfs_segctor_collect_dirty_files(),
which goes through the ns_dirty_files list and checks the i_bh field.
If there is a cached buffer_head in i_bh it is not marked as dirty
again.
Since nilfs_dirty_inode() and nilfs_set_file_dirty() use separate
transactions, it is possible that a segment construction that writes out
the ifile occurs in-between the two. If this happens the inode is not
on the ns_dirty_files list, but its ifile block is still marked as dirty
and written out.
In the next segment construction, the data for the file is written out
and nilfs_bmap_propagate() updates the b-tree. Eventually the bmap root
is written into the i_bh block, which is not dirty, because it was
written out in another segment construction.
As a result the bmap update can be lost, which leads to file system
corruption. Either the virtual block address points to an unallocated
DAT block, or the DAT entry will be reused for something different.
The error can remain undetected for a long time. A typical error
message would be one of the "bad btree" errors or a warning that a DAT
entry could not be found.
This bug can be reproduced reliably by a simple benchmark that creates
and overwrites millions of 4k files.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andreas Rohner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
@@ -1880,8 +1880,6 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_collect_dirty_f
"failed to get inode block.\n");
return err;
}
- mark_buffer_dirty(ibh);
- nilfs_mdt_mark_dirty(ifile);
spin_lock(&nilfs->ns_inode_lock);
if (likely(!ii->i_bh))
ii->i_bh = ibh;
@@ -1890,6 +1888,10 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_collect_dirty_f
goto retry;
}
+ // Always redirty the buffer to avoid race condition
+ mark_buffer_dirty(ii->i_bh);
+ nilfs_mdt_mark_dirty(ifile);
+
clear_bit(NILFS_I_QUEUED, &ii->i_state);
set_bit(NILFS_I_BUSY, &ii->i_state);
list_move_tail(&ii->i_dirty, &sci->sc_dirty_files);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: alex chen <[email protected]>
commit 28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300 upstream.
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/ocfs2/file.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
@@ -1130,6 +1130,13 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
dquot_initialize(inode);
size_change = S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE;
if (size_change) {
+ /*
+ * Here we should wait dio to finish before inode lock
+ * to avoid a deadlock between ocfs2_setattr() and
+ * ocfs2_dio_end_io_write()
+ */
+ inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
status = ocfs2_rw_lock(inode, 1);
if (status < 0) {
mlog_errno(status);
@@ -1149,8 +1156,6 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
if (status)
goto bail_unlock;
- inode_dio_wait(inode);
-
if (i_size_read(inode) >= attr->ia_size) {
if (ocfs2_should_order_data(inode)) {
status = ocfs2_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Markus Elfring <[email protected]>
commit bfba2b3e21b9426c0f9aca00f3cad8631b2da170 upstream.
Move a debug message so that a null pointer access can not happen
for the variable "vout" in this function.
Fixes: 5c7ab6348e7b3fcca2b8ee548306c774472971e2 ("V4L/DVB: V4L2: Add support for OMAP2/3 V4L2 display driver on top of DSS2")
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/video/omap/omap_vout.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/media/video/omap/omap_vout.c
+++ b/drivers/media/video/omap/omap_vout.c
@@ -1003,11 +1003,12 @@ static int omap_vout_open(struct file *f
struct omap_vout_device *vout = NULL;
vout = video_drvdata(file);
- v4l2_dbg(1, debug, &vout->vid_dev->v4l2_dev, "Entering %s\n", __func__);
if (vout == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
+ v4l2_dbg(1, debug, &vout->vid_dev->v4l2_dev, "Entering %s\n", __func__);
+
/* for now, we only support single open */
if (vout->opened)
return -EBUSY;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
commit ee28de6bbd78c2e18111a0aef43ea746f28d2073 upstream.
Sessions must be initialised before being made externally visible by
l2tp_session_register(). Otherwise the session may be concurrently
deleted before being initialised, which can confuse the deletion path
and eventually lead to kernel oops.
Therefore, we need to move l2tp_session_register() down in
l2tp_eth_create(), but also handle the intermediate step where only the
session or the netdevice has been registered.
We can't just call l2tp_session_register() in ->ndo_init() because
we'd have no way to properly undo this operation in ->ndo_uninit().
Instead, let's register the session and the netdevice in two different
steps and protect the session's device pointer with RCU.
And now that we allow the session's .dev field to be NULL, we don't
need to prevent the netdevice from being removed anymore. So we can
drop the dev_hold() and dev_put() calls in l2tp_eth_create() and
l2tp_eth_dev_uninit().
Fixes: d9e31d17ceba ("l2tp: Add L2TP ethernet pseudowire support")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Update another 'goto out' in l2tp_eth_create()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ struct l2tp_eth {
/* via l2tp_session_priv() */
struct l2tp_eth_sess {
- struct net_device *dev;
+ struct net_device __rcu *dev;
};
@@ -60,7 +60,14 @@ static int l2tp_eth_dev_init(struct net_
static void l2tp_eth_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
- dev_put(dev);
+ struct l2tp_eth *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
+ struct l2tp_eth_sess *spriv;
+
+ spriv = l2tp_session_priv(priv->session);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(spriv->dev, NULL);
+ /* No need for synchronize_net() here. We're called by
+ * unregister_netdev*(), which does the synchronisation for us.
+ */
}
static int l2tp_eth_dev_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
@@ -93,7 +100,7 @@ static void l2tp_eth_dev_setup(struct ne
static void l2tp_eth_dev_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
{
struct l2tp_eth_sess *spriv = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- struct net_device *dev = spriv->dev;
+ struct net_device *dev;
if (session->debug & L2TP_MSG_DATA) {
unsigned int length;
@@ -125,14 +132,22 @@ static void l2tp_eth_dev_recv(struct l2t
skb_dst_drop(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ dev = rcu_dereference(spriv->dev);
+ if (!dev)
+ goto error_rcu;
+
if (dev_forward_skb(dev, skb) == NET_RX_SUCCESS) {
dev->stats.rx_packets++;
dev->stats.rx_bytes += data_len;
} else
dev->stats.rx_errors++;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return;
+error_rcu:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
error:
dev->stats.rx_errors++;
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -145,11 +160,15 @@ static void l2tp_eth_delete(struct l2tp_
if (session) {
spriv = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- dev = spriv->dev;
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+ dev = rtnl_dereference(spriv->dev);
if (dev) {
- unregister_netdev(dev);
- spriv->dev = NULL;
+ unregister_netdevice(dev);
+ rtnl_unlock();
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+ } else {
+ rtnl_unlock();
}
}
}
@@ -159,9 +178,20 @@ static void l2tp_eth_show(struct seq_fil
{
struct l2tp_session *session = arg;
struct l2tp_eth_sess *spriv = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- struct net_device *dev = spriv->dev;
+ struct net_device *dev;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ dev = rcu_dereference(spriv->dev);
+ if (!dev) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
+ dev_hold(dev);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
seq_printf(m, " interface %s\n", dev->name);
+
+ dev_put(dev);
}
#endif
@@ -181,7 +211,7 @@ static int l2tp_eth_create(struct net *n
if (dev) {
dev_put(dev);
rc = -EEXIST;
- goto out;
+ goto err;
}
strlcpy(name, cfg->ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
} else
@@ -191,20 +221,13 @@ static int l2tp_eth_create(struct net *n
peer_session_id, cfg);
if (IS_ERR(session)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(session);
- goto out;
- }
-
- l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
- rc = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
- if (rc < 0) {
- kfree(session);
- goto out;
+ goto err;
}
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*priv), name, l2tp_eth_dev_setup);
if (!dev) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_del_session;
+ goto err_sess;
}
dev_net_set(dev, net);
@@ -225,28 +248,48 @@ static int l2tp_eth_create(struct net *n
#endif
spriv = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- spriv->dev = dev;
- rc = register_netdev(dev);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto out_del_dev;
+ l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+
+ /* Register both device and session while holding the rtnl lock. This
+ * ensures that l2tp_eth_delete() will see that there's a device to
+ * unregister, even if it happened to run before we assign spriv->dev.
+ */
+ rc = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ goto err_sess_dev;
+ }
+
+ rc = register_netdevice(dev);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ l2tp_session_delete(session);
+ l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
+ free_netdev(dev);
+
+ return rc;
+ }
- __module_get(THIS_MODULE);
- /* Must be done after register_netdev() */
strlcpy(session->ifname, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(spriv->dev, dev);
+
+ rtnl_unlock();
+
l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
- dev_hold(dev);
+ __module_get(THIS_MODULE);
return 0;
-out_del_dev:
- free_netdev(dev);
- spriv->dev = NULL;
-out_del_session:
- l2tp_session_delete(session);
+err_sess_dev:
l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
-out:
+ free_netdev(dev);
+err_sess:
+ kfree(session);
+err:
return rc;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Bloch <[email protected]>
commit 5f22a1d87c5315a98981ecf93cd8de226cffe6ca upstream.
Maximal message should be used as a limit to the max message payload allowed,
without the headers. The ConnectX-3 check is done against this value includes
the headers. When the payload is 4K this will cause the NIC to drop packets.
Increase maximal message to 8K as workaround, this shouldn't change current
behaviour because we continue to set the MTU to 4k.
To reproduce;
set MTU to 4296 on the corresponding interface, for example:
ifconfig eth0 mtu 4296 (both server and client)
On server:
ib_send_bw -c UD -d mlx4_0 -s 4096 -n 1000000 -i1 -m 4096
On client:
ib_send_bw -d mlx4_0 -c UD <server_ip> -s 4096 -n 1000000 -i 1 -m 4096
Fixes: 6e0d733d9215 ("IB/mlx4: Allow 4K messages for UD QPs")
Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Majd Dibbiny <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ static int __mlx4_ib_modify_qp(struct ib
context->mtu_msgmax = (IB_MTU_4096 << 5) |
ilog2(dev->dev->caps.max_gso_sz);
else
- context->mtu_msgmax = (IB_MTU_4096 << 5) | 12;
+ context->mtu_msgmax = (IB_MTU_4096 << 5) | 13;
} else if (attr_mask & IB_QP_PATH_MTU) {
if (attr->path_mtu < IB_MTU_256 || attr->path_mtu > IB_MTU_4096) {
printk(KERN_ERR "path MTU (%u) is invalid\n",
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <[email protected]>
commit a0fea6027f19c62727315aba1a7fae75a9caa842 upstream.
Without this patch, K70 LUX keyboards don't work, saying
usb 3-3: unable to read config index 0 descriptor/all
usb 3-3: can't read configurations, error -110
usb usb3-port3: unable to enumerate USB device
Signed-off-by: Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
@@ -205,6 +205,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_qu
/* Corsair Strafe RGB */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1b1c, 0x1b20), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT },
+ /* Corsair K70 LUX */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x1b1c, 0x1b36), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT },
+
/* MIDI keyboard WORLDE MINI */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1c75, 0x0204), .driver_info =
USB_QUIRK_CONFIG_INTF_STRINGS },
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit 34be4dbf87fc3e474a842305394534216d428f5d upstream.
isofs uses a 'char' variable to load the number of years since
1900 for an inode timestamp. On architectures that use a signed
char type by default, this results in an invalid date for
anything beyond 2027.
This changes the function argument to a 'u8' array, which
is defined the same way on all architectures, and unambiguously
lets us use years until 2155.
This should be backported to all kernels that might still be
in use by that date.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/isofs/isofs.h | 2 +-
fs/isofs/rock.h | 2 +-
fs/isofs/util.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/isofs/isofs.h
+++ b/fs/isofs/isofs.h
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline unsigned int isonum_733(ch
/* Ignore bigendian datum due to broken mastering programs */
return get_unaligned_le32(p);
}
-extern int iso_date(char *, int);
+extern int iso_date(u8 *, int);
struct inode; /* To make gcc happy */
--- a/fs/isofs/rock.h
+++ b/fs/isofs/rock.h
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct RR_PL_s {
};
struct stamp {
- char time[7];
+ __u8 time[7]; /* actually 6 unsigned, 1 signed */
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct RR_TF_s {
--- a/fs/isofs/util.c
+++ b/fs/isofs/util.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* to GMT. Thus we should always be correct.
*/
-int iso_date(char * p, int flag)
+int iso_date(u8 *p, int flag)
{
int year, month, day, hour, minute, second, tz;
int crtime, days, i;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
commit f98be6c6359e7e4a61aaefb9964c1db31cb9ec0c upstream.
pppol2tp_connect() initialises L2TP sessions after they've been exposed
to the rest of the system by l2tp_session_register(). This puts
sessions into transient states that are the source of several races, in
particular with session's deletion path.
This patch centralises the initialisation code into
pppol2tp_session_init(), which is called before the registration phase.
The only field that can't be set before session registration is the
pppol2tp socket pointer, which has already been converted to RCU. So
pppol2tp_connect() should now be race-free.
The session's .session_close() callback is now set before registration.
Therefore, it's always called when l2tp_core deletes the session, even
if it was created by pppol2tp_session_create() and hasn't been plugged
to a pppol2tp socket yet. That'd prevent session free because the extra
reference taken by pppol2tp_session_close() wouldn't be dropped by the
socket's ->sk_destruct() callback (pppol2tp_session_destruct()).
We could set .session_close() only while connecting a session to its
pppol2tp socket, or teach pppol2tp_session_close() to avoid grabbing a
reference when the session isn't connected, but that'd require adding
some form of synchronisation to be race free.
Instead of that, we can just let the pppol2tp socket hold a reference
on the session as soon as it starts depending on it (that is, in
pppol2tp_connect()). Then we don't need to utilise
pppol2tp_session_close() to hold a reference at the last moment to
prevent l2tp_core from dropping it.
When releasing the socket, pppol2tp_release() now deletes the session
using the standard l2tp_session_delete() function, instead of merely
removing it from hash tables. l2tp_session_delete() drops the reference
the sessions holds on itself, but also makes sure it doesn't remove a
session twice. So it can safely be called, even if l2tp_core already
tried, or is concurrently trying, to remove the session.
Finally, pppol2tp_session_destruct() drops the reference held by the
socket.
Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -478,9 +478,6 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_close(struc
inet_shutdown(sk->sk_socket, SEND_SHUTDOWN);
sock_put(sk);
}
-
- /* Don't let the session go away before our socket does */
- l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
return;
}
@@ -541,7 +538,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socke
if (session != NULL) {
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
- l2tp_session_queue_purge(session);
+ l2tp_session_delete(session);
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
@@ -636,6 +633,35 @@ static void pppol2tp_show(struct seq_fil
}
#endif
+static void pppol2tp_session_init(struct l2tp_session *session)
+{
+ struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+ session->recv_skb = pppol2tp_recv;
+ session->session_close = pppol2tp_session_close;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS)
+ session->show = pppol2tp_show;
+#endif
+
+ ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ mutex_init(&ps->sk_lock);
+ ps->tunnel_sock = session->tunnel->sock;
+ ps->owner = current->pid;
+
+ /* If PMTU discovery was enabled, use the MTU that was discovered */
+ dst = sk_dst_get(session->tunnel->sock);
+ if (dst) {
+ u32 pmtu = dst_mtu(dst);
+
+ if (pmtu) {
+ session->mtu = pmtu - PPPOL2TP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
+ session->mru = pmtu - PPPOL2TP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
+ }
+ dst_release(dst);
+ }
+}
+
/* connect() handler. Attach a PPPoX socket to a tunnel UDP socket
*/
static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
@@ -648,7 +674,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
struct l2tp_session *session = NULL;
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
- struct dst_entry *dst;
struct l2tp_session_cfg cfg = { 0, };
int error = 0;
u32 tunnel_id, peer_tunnel_id;
@@ -772,8 +797,8 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
goto end;
}
+ pppol2tp_session_init(session);
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- mutex_init(&ps->sk_lock);
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
@@ -786,26 +811,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
drop_refcnt = true;
}
- ps->owner = current->pid;
- ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
-
- session->recv_skb = pppol2tp_recv;
- session->session_close = pppol2tp_session_close;
-#if defined(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS) || defined(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS_MODULE)
- session->show = pppol2tp_show;
-#endif
-
- /* If PMTU discovery was enabled, use the MTU that was discovered */
- dst = sk_dst_get(tunnel->sock);
- if (dst != NULL) {
- u32 pmtu = dst_mtu(dst);
-
- if (pmtu != 0)
- session->mtu = session->mru = pmtu -
- PPPOL2TP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
- dst_release(dst);
- }
-
/* Special case: if source & dest session_id == 0x0000, this
* socket is being created to manage the tunnel. Just set up
* the internal context for use by ioctl() and sockopt()
@@ -839,6 +844,12 @@ out_no_ppp:
rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
+ /* Keep the reference we've grabbed on the session: sk doesn't expect
+ * the session to disappear. pppol2tp_session_destruct() is responsible
+ * for dropping it.
+ */
+ drop_refcnt = false;
+
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
PRINTK(session->debug, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL, KERN_INFO,
"%s: created\n", session->name);
@@ -862,7 +873,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_create(struc
{
int error;
struct l2tp_session *session;
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
/* Error if tunnel socket is not prepped */
if (!tunnel->sock) {
@@ -885,9 +895,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_create(struc
goto err;
}
- ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- mutex_init(&ps->sk_lock);
- ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
+ pppol2tp_session_init(session);
error = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
if (error < 0)
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
commit ee40fb2e1eb5bc0ddd3f2f83c6e39a454ef5a741 upstream.
pppol2tp_session_create() registers sessions that can't have their
corresponding socket initialised. This socket has to be created by
userspace, then connected to the session by pppol2tp_connect().
Therefore, we need to protect the pppol2tp socket pointer of L2TP
sessions, so that it can safely be updated when userspace is connecting
or closing the socket. This will eventually allow pppol2tp_connect()
to avoid generating transient states while initialising its parts of the
session.
To this end, this patch protects the pppol2tp socket pointer using RCU.
The pppol2tp socket pointer is still set in pppol2tp_connect(), but
only once we know the function isn't going to fail. It's eventually
reset by pppol2tp_release(), which now has to wait for a grace period
to elapse before it can drop the last reference on the socket. This
ensures that pppol2tp_session_get_sock() can safely grab a reference
on the socket, even after ps->sk is reset to NULL but before this
operation actually gets visible from pppol2tp_session_get_sock().
The rest is standard RCU conversion: pppol2tp_recv(), which already
runs in atomic context, is simply enclosed by rcu_read_lock() and
rcu_read_unlock(), while other functions are converted to use
pppol2tp_session_get_sock() followed by sock_put().
pppol2tp_session_setsockopt() is a special case. It used to retrieve
the pppol2tp socket from the L2TP session, which itself was retrieved
from the pppol2tp socket. Therefore we can just avoid dereferencing
ps->sk and directly use the original socket pointer instead.
With all users of ps->sk now handling NULL and concurrent updates, the
L2TP ->ref() and ->deref() callbacks aren't needed anymore. Therefore,
rather than converting pppol2tp_session_sock_hold() and
pppol2tp_session_sock_put(), we can just drop them.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -126,8 +126,11 @@
struct pppol2tp_session {
int owner; /* pid that opened the socket */
- struct sock *sock; /* Pointer to the session
+ struct mutex sk_lock; /* Protects .sk */
+ struct sock __rcu *sk; /* Pointer to the session
* PPPoX socket */
+ struct sock *__sk; /* Copy of .sk, for cleanup */
+ struct rcu_head rcu; /* For asynchronous release */
struct sock *tunnel_sock; /* Pointer to the tunnel UDP
* socket */
int flags; /* accessed by PPPIOCGFLAGS.
@@ -142,6 +145,24 @@ static const struct ppp_channel_ops pppo
static const struct proto_ops pppol2tp_ops;
+/* Retrieves the pppol2tp socket associated to a session.
+ * A reference is held on the returned socket, so this function must be paired
+ * with sock_put().
+ */
+static struct sock *pppol2tp_session_get_sock(struct l2tp_session *session)
+{
+ struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ sk = rcu_dereference(ps->sk);
+ if (sk)
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sk;
+}
+
/* Helpers to obtain tunnel/session contexts from sockets.
*/
static inline struct l2tp_session *pppol2tp_sock_to_session(struct sock *sk)
@@ -229,7 +250,8 @@ static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_se
/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
* queue it on the session socket.
*/
- sk = ps->sock;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ sk = rcu_dereference(ps->sk);
if (sk == NULL)
goto no_sock;
@@ -265,31 +287,17 @@ static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_se
session->stats.rx_errors++;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return;
no_sock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
PRINTK(session->debug, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, KERN_INFO,
"%s: no socket\n", session->name);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
-static void pppol2tp_session_sock_hold(struct l2tp_session *session)
-{
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-
- if (ps->sock)
- sock_hold(ps->sock);
-}
-
-static void pppol2tp_session_sock_put(struct l2tp_session *session)
-{
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-
- if (ps->sock)
- sock_put(ps->sock);
-}
-
/************************************************************************
* Transmit handling
***********************************************************************/
@@ -459,15 +467,17 @@ abort:
*/
static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- struct sock *sk = ps->sock;
- struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ struct sock *sk;
BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
- if (sock)
- inet_shutdown(sock, 2);
+ sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
+ if (sk) {
+ if (sk->sk_socket)
+ inet_shutdown(sk->sk_socket, SEND_SHUTDOWN);
+ sock_put(sk);
+ }
/* Don't let the session go away before our socket does */
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
@@ -495,6 +505,14 @@ out:
return;
}
+static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
+ ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
+ sock_put(ps->__sk);
+}
+
/* Called when the PPPoX socket (session) is closed.
*/
static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
@@ -520,10 +538,23 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socke
session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
- /* Purge any queued data */
if (session != NULL) {
+ struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
l2tp_session_queue_purge(session);
- sock_put(sk);
+
+ ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
+ ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
+ call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
+
+ /* Rely on the sock_put() call at the end of the function for
+ * dropping the reference held by pppol2tp_sock_to_session().
+ * The last reference will be dropped by pppol2tp_put_sk().
+ */
}
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
@@ -593,12 +624,14 @@ out:
static void pppol2tp_show(struct seq_file *m, void *arg)
{
struct l2tp_session *session = arg;
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
+ if (sk) {
+ struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
- if (ps) {
- struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(ps->sock);
- if (po)
- seq_printf(m, " interface %s\n", ppp_dev_name(&po->chan));
+ seq_printf(m, " interface %s\n", ppp_dev_name(&po->chan));
+ sock_put(sk);
}
}
#endif
@@ -712,13 +745,17 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
/* Using a pre-existing session is fine as long as it hasn't
* been connected yet.
*/
- if (ps->sock) {
+ mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
+ if (rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock))) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
error = -EEXIST;
goto end;
}
/* consistency checks */
if (ps->tunnel_sock != tunnel->sock) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
error = -EEXIST;
goto end;
}
@@ -735,19 +772,21 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
goto end;
}
+ ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ mutex_init(&ps->sk_lock);
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
+
+ mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
error = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
if (error < 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
kfree(session);
goto end;
}
drop_refcnt = true;
}
- /* Associate session with its PPPoL2TP socket */
- ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
ps->owner = current->pid;
- ps->sock = sk;
ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
session->recv_skb = pppol2tp_recv;
@@ -756,12 +795,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
session->show = pppol2tp_show;
#endif
- /* We need to know each time a skb is dropped from the reorder
- * queue.
- */
- session->ref = pppol2tp_session_sock_hold;
- session->deref = pppol2tp_session_sock_put;
-
/* If PMTU discovery was enabled, use the MTU that was discovered */
dst = sk_dst_get(tunnel->sock);
if (dst != NULL) {
@@ -795,12 +828,17 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
po->chan.mtu = session->mtu;
error = ppp_register_net_channel(sock_net(sk), &po->chan);
- if (error)
+ if (error) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
goto end;
+ }
out_no_ppp:
/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
sk->sk_user_data = session;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
+ mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
+
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
PRINTK(session->debug, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL, KERN_INFO,
"%s: created\n", session->name);
@@ -848,6 +886,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_create(struc
}
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+ mutex_init(&ps->sk_lock);
ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
error = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
@@ -979,12 +1018,10 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_ioctl(struct
"%s: pppol2tp_session_ioctl(cmd=%#x, arg=%#lx)\n",
session->name, cmd, arg);
- sk = ps->sock;
+ sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
if (!sk)
return -EBADR;
- sock_hold(sk);
-
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGIFMTU:
err = -ENXIO;
@@ -1260,7 +1297,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_setsockopt(s
int optname, int val)
{
int err = 0;
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
switch (optname) {
case PPPOL2TP_SO_RECVSEQ:
@@ -1280,8 +1316,8 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_setsockopt(s
}
session->send_seq = val ? -1 : 0;
{
- struct sock *ssk = ps->sock;
- struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(ssk);
+ struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
+
po->chan.hdrlen = val ? PPPOL2TP_L2TP_HDR_SIZE_SEQ :
PPPOL2TP_L2TP_HDR_SIZE_NOSEQ;
}
@@ -1616,8 +1652,9 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_session_show(st
{
struct l2tp_session *session = v;
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
- struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(ps->sock);
+ unsigned char state;
+ char user_data_ok;
+ struct sock *sk;
u32 ip = 0;
u16 port = 0;
@@ -1627,6 +1664,15 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_session_show(st
port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
}
+ sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
+ if (sk) {
+ state = sk->sk_state;
+ user_data_ok = (session == sk->sk_user_data) ? 'Y' : 'N';
+ } else {
+ state = 0;
+ user_data_ok = 'N';
+ }
+
seq_printf(m, " SESSION '%s' %08X/%d %04X/%04X -> "
"%04X/%04X %d %c\n",
session->name, ip, port,
@@ -1634,9 +1680,7 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_session_show(st
session->session_id,
tunnel->peer_tunnel_id,
session->peer_session_id,
- ps->sock->sk_state,
- (session == ps->sock->sk_user_data) ?
- 'Y' : 'N');
+ state, user_data_ok);
seq_printf(m, " %d/%d/%c/%c/%s %08x %u\n",
session->mtu, session->mru,
session->recv_seq ? 'R' : '-',
@@ -1653,8 +1697,12 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_session_show(st
(unsigned long long)session->stats.rx_bytes,
(unsigned long long)session->stats.rx_errors);
- if (po)
+ if (sk) {
+ struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
+
seq_printf(m, " interface %s\n", ppp_dev_name(&po->chan));
+ sock_put(sk);
+ }
}
static int pppol2tp_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brent Taylor <[email protected]>
commit 30863e38ebeb500a31cecee8096fb5002677dd9b upstream.
When mtdoops calls mtd_panic_write(), it eventually calls
panic_nand_write() in nand_base.c. In order to properly wait for the
nand chip to be ready in panic_nand_wait(), the chip must first be
selected.
When using the atmel nand flash controller, a panic would occur due to
a NULL pointer exception.
Fixes: 2af7c6539931 ("mtd: Add panic_write for NAND flashes")
Signed-off-by: Brent Taylor <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/nand/nand_base.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/nand_base.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/nand_base.c
@@ -2290,6 +2290,7 @@ static int panic_nand_write(struct mtd_i
size_t *retlen, const uint8_t *buf)
{
struct nand_chip *chip = mtd->priv;
+ int chipnr = (int)(to >> chip->chip_shift);
struct mtd_oob_ops ops;
int ret;
@@ -2299,12 +2300,14 @@ static int panic_nand_write(struct mtd_i
if (!len)
return 0;
- /* Wait for the device to get ready */
- panic_nand_wait(mtd, chip, 400);
-
/* Grab the device */
panic_nand_get_device(chip, mtd, FL_WRITING);
+ chip->select_chip(mtd, chipnr);
+
+ /* Wait for the device to get ready */
+ panic_nand_wait(mtd, chip, 400);
+
ops.len = len;
ops.datbuf = (uint8_t *)buf;
ops.oobbuf = NULL;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
commit 15339e441ec46fbc3bf3486bb1ae4845b0f1bb8d upstream.
KMSAN reported use of uninitialized sctp_addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr and
sctp_addr->v6.sin6_scope_id in sctp_v6_cmp_addr() (see below).
Make sure all fields of an IPv6 address are initialized, which
guarantees that the IPv4 fields are also initialized.
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0
net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
CPU: 2 PID: 31056 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2944
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:42
is_logbuf_locked mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:59 [inline]
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:938
native_save_fl arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:18 [inline]
arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:72 [inline]
arch_local_irq_save arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:113 [inline]
__msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:467
sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x8c7/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:290
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x66d/0x16f0 net/sctp/associola.c:651
sctp_sendmsg+0x35a5/0x4f90 net/sctp/socket.c:1871
inet_sendmsg+0x498/0x670 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643 [inline]
SYSC_sendto+0x608/0x710 net/socket.c:1696
SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1664
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
RIP: 0033:0x44b479
RSP: 002b:00007f6213f21c08 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000000 RCX: 000000000044b479
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000020edd000 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00000000007080a8 R08: 0000000020b85fe4 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040005 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000003760 R14: 00000000006e5820 R15: 0000000000ff8000
origin description: ----dst_saddr@sctp_v6_get_dst
local variable created at:
sk_fullsock include/net/sock.h:2321 [inline]
inet6_sk include/linux/ipv6.h:309 [inline]
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x91/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:241
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0
net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
CPU: 2 PID: 31056 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2944
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:42
is_logbuf_locked mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:59 [inline]
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:938
native_save_fl arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:18 [inline]
arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:72 [inline]
arch_local_irq_save arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:113 [inline]
__msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:467
sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x8c7/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:290
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x66d/0x16f0 net/sctp/associola.c:651
sctp_sendmsg+0x35a5/0x4f90 net/sctp/socket.c:1871
inet_sendmsg+0x498/0x670 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643 [inline]
SYSC_sendto+0x608/0x710 net/socket.c:1696
SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1664
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
RIP: 0033:0x44b479
RSP: 002b:00007f6213f21c08 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000000 RCX: 000000000044b479
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000020edd000 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00000000007080a8 R08: 0000000020b85fe4 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040005 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000003760 R14: 00000000006e5820 R15: 0000000000ff8000
origin description: ----dst_saddr@sctp_v6_get_dst
local variable created at:
sk_fullsock include/net/sock.h:2321 [inline]
inet6_sk include/linux/ipv6.h:309 [inline]
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x91/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:241
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -487,7 +487,9 @@ static void sctp_v6_to_addr(union sctp_a
{
addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
addr->v6.sin6_port = port;
+ addr->v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
ipv6_addr_copy(&addr->v6.sin6_addr, saddr);
+ addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
}
/* Compare addresses exactly.
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
commit b192571d1ae375e0bbe0aa3ccfa1a3c3704454b9 upstream.
Current buffer size of 64 is too small. objdump shows that there are
instructions which would require up to 75 bytes buffer (with current
formating). 128 bytes "ought to be enough for anybody".
Also replaces 8 spaces with a single tab to reduce the memory footprint.
Fixes the following KASAN finding:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in number+0x3fe/0x538
Write of size 1 at addr 000000005a4a75a0 by task bash/1282
CPU: 1 PID: 1282 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.14.0+ #215
Hardware name: IBM 2964 N96 702 (z/VM 6.4.0)
Call Trace:
([<000000000011eeb6>] show_stack+0x56/0x88)
[<0000000000e1ce1a>] dump_stack+0x15a/0x1b0
[<00000000004e2994>] print_address_description+0xf4/0x288
[<00000000004e2cf2>] kasan_report+0x13a/0x230
[<0000000000e38ae6>] number+0x3fe/0x538
[<0000000000e3dfe4>] vsnprintf+0x194/0x948
[<0000000000e3ea42>] sprintf+0xa2/0xb8
[<00000000001198dc>] print_insn+0x374/0x500
[<0000000000119346>] show_code+0x4ee/0x538
[<000000000011f234>] show_registers+0x34c/0x388
[<000000000011f2ae>] show_regs+0x3e/0xa8
[<000000000011f502>] die+0x1ea/0x2e8
[<0000000000138f0e>] do_no_context+0x106/0x168
[<0000000000139a1a>] do_protection_exception+0x4da/0x7d0
[<0000000000e55914>] pgm_check_handler+0x16c/0x1c0
[<000000000090639e>] sysrq_handle_crash+0x46/0x58
([<0000000000000007>] 0x7)
[<00000000009073fa>] __handle_sysrq+0x102/0x218
[<0000000000907c06>] write_sysrq_trigger+0xd6/0x100
[<000000000061d67a>] proc_reg_write+0xb2/0x128
[<0000000000520be6>] __vfs_write+0xee/0x368
[<0000000000521222>] vfs_write+0x21a/0x278
[<000000000052156a>] SyS_write+0xda/0x178
[<0000000000e555cc>] system_call+0xc4/0x270
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000003d1016929c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff00000000
raw: 0000000000000100 0000000000000200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
000000005a4a7480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
000000005a4a7500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
>000000005a4a7580: 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
000000005a4a7600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f8 f8
000000005a4a7680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f8 f8 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/kernel/dis.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/dis.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/dis.c
@@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ void show_code(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
char *mode = (regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE) ? "User" : "Krnl";
unsigned char code[64];
- char buffer[64], *ptr;
+ char buffer[128], *ptr;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
unsigned long addr;
int start, end, opsize, hops, i;
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ void show_code(struct pt_regs *regs)
start += opsize;
printk(buffer);
ptr = buffer;
- ptr += sprintf(ptr, "\n ");
+ ptr += sprintf(ptr, "\n\t ");
hops++;
}
printk("\n");
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
commit c05cefcc72416a37eba5a2b35f0704ed758a9145 upstream.
Before traversing a referral and performing a mount, the mounted-on
directory looks strange:
dr-xr-xr-x. 2 4294967294 4294967294 0 Dec 31 1969 dir.0
nfs4_get_referral is wiping out any cached attributes with what was
returned via GETATTR(fs_locations), but the bit mask for that
operation does not request any file attributes.
Retrieve owner and timestamp information so that the memcpy in
nfs4_get_referral fills in more attributes.
Changes since v1:
- Don't request attributes that the client unconditionally replaces
- Request only MOUNTED_ON_FILEID or FILEID attribute, not both
- encode_fs_locations() doesn't use the third bitmask word
Fixes: 6b97fd3da1ea ("NFSv4: Follow a referral")
Suggested-by: Pradeep Thomas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 18 ++++++++----------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -151,15 +151,12 @@ const u32 nfs4_fsinfo_bitmap[3] = { FATT
};
const u32 nfs4_fs_locations_bitmap[2] = {
- FATTR4_WORD0_TYPE
- | FATTR4_WORD0_CHANGE
+ FATTR4_WORD0_CHANGE
| FATTR4_WORD0_SIZE
| FATTR4_WORD0_FSID
| FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID
| FATTR4_WORD0_FS_LOCATIONS,
- FATTR4_WORD1_MODE
- | FATTR4_WORD1_NUMLINKS
- | FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER
+ FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER
| FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP
| FATTR4_WORD1_RAWDEV
| FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED
@@ -4805,9 +4802,7 @@ int nfs4_proc_fs_locations(struct inode
struct nfs4_fs_locations *fs_locations, struct page *page)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
- u32 bitmask[2] = {
- [0] = FATTR4_WORD0_FSID | FATTR4_WORD0_FS_LOCATIONS,
- };
+ u32 bitmask[2];
struct nfs4_fs_locations_arg args = {
.dir_fh = NFS_FH(dir),
.name = name,
@@ -4826,12 +4821,15 @@ int nfs4_proc_fs_locations(struct inode
dprintk("%s: start\n", __func__);
+ bitmask[0] = nfs4_fattr_bitmap[0] | FATTR4_WORD0_FS_LOCATIONS;
+ bitmask[1] = nfs4_fattr_bitmap[1];
+
/* Ask for the fileid of the absent filesystem if mounted_on_fileid
* is not supported */
if (NFS_SERVER(dir)->attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID)
- bitmask[1] |= FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID;
+ bitmask[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID;
else
- bitmask[0] |= FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID;
+ bitmask[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID;
nfs_fattr_init(&fs_locations->fattr);
fs_locations->server = server;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit db86be3a12d0b6e5c5b51c2ab2a48f06329cb590 upstream.
We're freeing the list iterator so we should be using the _safe()
version of hlist_for_each_entry().
Fixes: 88b4a07e6610 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
@@ -550,17 +550,17 @@ void ecryptfs_release_messaging(void)
mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
}
if (ecryptfs_daemon_hash) {
- struct hlist_node *elem;
struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon;
+ struct hlist_node *elem, *n;
int i;
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
for (i = 0; i < (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits); i++) {
int rc;
- hlist_for_each_entry(daemon, elem,
- &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[i],
- euid_chain) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(daemon, elem, n,
+ &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[i],
+ euid_chain) {
rc = ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(daemon);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error whilst "
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
commit b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed upstream.
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/dm.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm.c
@@ -2685,11 +2685,15 @@ struct mapped_device *dm_get_from_kobjec
md = container_of(kobj, struct mapped_device, kobj_holder.kobj);
- if (test_bit(DMF_FREEING, &md->flags) ||
- dm_deleting_md(md))
- return NULL;
-
+ spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
+ if (test_bit(DMF_FREEING, &md->flags) || dm_deleting_md(md)) {
+ md = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
dm_get(md);
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
+
return md;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michele Baldessari <[email protected]>
commit b3120d2cc447ee77b9d69bf4ad7b452c9adb4d39 upstream.
Firmware load on AS102 is using the stack which is not allowed any
longer. We currently fail with:
kernel: transfer buffer not dma capable
kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 598 at drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1595 usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x41d/0x620
kernel: Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod(-) edac_mce_amd as102_fe dvb_as102(+) kvm_amd kvm snd_hda_codec_realtek dvb_core snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq ghash_clmulni_intel sp5100_tco fam15h_power wmi k10temp i2c_piix4 snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer parport_pc parport tpm_infineon snd tpm_tis soundcore tpm_tis_core tpm shpchp acpi_cpufreq xfs libcrc32c amdgpu amdkfd amd_iommu_v2 radeon hid_logitech_hidpp i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper crc32c_intel ttm drm r8169 mii hid_logitech_dj
kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 598 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.13.10-200.fc26.x86_64 #1
kernel: Hardware name: ASUS All Series/AM1I-A, BIOS 0505 03/13/2014
kernel: task: ffff979933b24c80 task.stack: ffffaf83413a4000
kernel: RIP: 0010:usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x41d/0x620
systemd-fsck[659]: /dev/sda2: clean, 49/128016 files, 268609/512000 blocks
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffaf83413a7728 EFLAGS: 00010282
systemd-udevd[604]: link_config: autonegotiation is unset or enabled, the speed and duplex are not writable.
kernel: RAX: 000000000000001f RBX: ffff979930bce780 RCX: 0000000000000000
kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff97993ec0e118 RDI: ffff97993ec0e118
kernel: RBP: ffffaf83413a7768 R08: 000000000000039a R09: 0000000000000000
kernel: R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 00000000fffffff5
kernel: R13: 0000000001400000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff979930806800
kernel: FS: 00007effaca5c8c0(0000) GS:ffff97993ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
kernel: CR2: 00007effa9fca962 CR3: 0000000233089000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x493/0xb40
kernel: ? page_cache_tree_insert+0x100/0x100
kernel: ? xfs_iunlock+0xd5/0x100 [xfs]
kernel: ? xfs_file_buffered_aio_read+0x57/0xc0 [xfs]
kernel: usb_submit_urb+0x22d/0x560
kernel: usb_start_wait_urb+0x6e/0x180
kernel: usb_bulk_msg+0xb8/0x160
kernel: as102_send_ep1+0x49/0xe0 [dvb_as102]
kernel: ? devres_add+0x3f/0x50
kernel: as102_firmware_upload.isra.0+0x1dc/0x210 [dvb_as102]
kernel: as102_fw_upload+0xb6/0x1f0 [dvb_as102]
kernel: as102_dvb_register+0x2af/0x2d0 [dvb_as102]
kernel: as102_usb_probe+0x1f3/0x260 [dvb_as102]
kernel: usb_probe_interface+0x124/0x300
kernel: driver_probe_device+0x2ff/0x450
kernel: __driver_attach+0xa4/0xe0
kernel: ? driver_probe_device+0x450/0x450
kernel: bus_for_each_dev+0x6e/0xb0
kernel: driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
kernel: bus_add_driver+0x1c7/0x270
kernel: driver_register+0x60/0xe0
kernel: usb_register_driver+0x81/0x150
kernel: ? 0xffffffffc0807000
kernel: as102_usb_driver_init+0x1e/0x1000 [dvb_as102]
kernel: do_one_initcall+0x50/0x190
kernel: ? __vunmap+0x81/0xb0
kernel: ? kfree+0x154/0x170
kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15f/0x1c0
kernel: ? do_init_module+0x27/0x1e9
kernel: do_init_module+0x5f/0x1e9
kernel: load_module+0x2602/0x2c30
kernel: SYSC_init_module+0x170/0x1a0
kernel: ? SYSC_init_module+0x170/0x1a0
kernel: SyS_init_module+0xe/0x10
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x67/0x140
kernel: entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7effab6cf3ea
kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff5cfcbbc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af
kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005569e0b83760 RCX: 00007effab6cf3ea
kernel: RDX: 00007effac2099c5 RSI: 0000000000009a13 RDI: 00005569e0b98c50
kernel: RBP: 00007effac2099c5 R08: 00005569e0b83ed0 R09: 0000000000001d80
kernel: R10: 00007effab98db00 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005569e0b98c50
kernel: R13: 00005569e0b81c60 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 00005569dfadfdf7
kernel: Code: 48 39 c8 73 30 80 3d 59 60 9d 00 00 41 bc f5 ff ff ff 0f 85 26 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 b8 6b d0 92 c6 05 3f 60 9d 00 01 e8 24 3d ad ff <0f> ff 8b 53 64 e9 09 ff ff ff 65 48 8b 0c 25 00 d3 00 00 48 8b
kernel: ---[ end trace c4cae366180e70ec ]---
kernel: as10x_usb: error during firmware upload part1
Let's allocate the the structure dynamically so we can get the firmware
loaded correctly:
[ 14.243057] as10x_usb: firmware: as102_data1_st.hex loaded with success
[ 14.500777] as10x_usb: firmware: as102_data2_st.hex loaded with success
Signed-off-by: Michele Baldessari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/media/as102/as102_fw.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/media/as102/as102_fw.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/media/as102/as102_fw.c
@@ -106,20 +106,25 @@ static int as102_firmware_upload(struct
unsigned char *cmd,
const struct firmware *firmware) {
- struct as10x_fw_pkt_t fw_pkt;
+ struct as10x_fw_pkt_t *fw_pkt;
int total_read_bytes = 0, errno = 0;
unsigned char addr_has_changed = 0;
ENTER();
+ fw_pkt = kmalloc(sizeof(*fw_pkt), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fw_pkt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+
for (total_read_bytes = 0; total_read_bytes < firmware->size; ) {
int read_bytes = 0, data_len = 0;
/* parse intel hex line */
read_bytes = parse_hex_line(
(u8 *) (firmware->data + total_read_bytes),
- fw_pkt.raw.address,
- fw_pkt.raw.data,
+ fw_pkt->raw.address,
+ fw_pkt->raw.data,
&data_len,
&addr_has_changed);
@@ -129,28 +134,28 @@ static int as102_firmware_upload(struct
/* detect the end of file */
total_read_bytes += read_bytes;
if (total_read_bytes == firmware->size) {
- fw_pkt.u.request[0] = 0x00;
- fw_pkt.u.request[1] = 0x03;
+ fw_pkt->u.request[0] = 0x00;
+ fw_pkt->u.request[1] = 0x03;
/* send EOF command */
errno = bus_adap->ops->upload_fw_pkt(bus_adap,
(uint8_t *)
- &fw_pkt, 2, 0);
+ fw_pkt, 2, 0);
if (errno < 0)
goto error;
} else {
if (!addr_has_changed) {
/* prepare command to send */
- fw_pkt.u.request[0] = 0x00;
- fw_pkt.u.request[1] = 0x01;
+ fw_pkt->u.request[0] = 0x00;
+ fw_pkt->u.request[1] = 0x01;
- data_len += sizeof(fw_pkt.u.request);
- data_len += sizeof(fw_pkt.raw.address);
+ data_len += sizeof(fw_pkt->u.request);
+ data_len += sizeof(fw_pkt->raw.address);
/* send cmd to device */
errno = bus_adap->ops->upload_fw_pkt(bus_adap,
(uint8_t *)
- &fw_pkt,
+ fw_pkt,
data_len,
0);
if (errno < 0)
@@ -159,6 +164,7 @@ static int as102_firmware_upload(struct
}
}
error:
+ kfree(fw_pkt);
LEAVE();
return (errno == 0) ? total_read_bytes : errno;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ladislav Michl <[email protected]>
commit c98769475575c8a585f5b3952f4b5f90266f699b upstream.
While usb_control_msg function expects timeout in miliseconds, a value
of HZ is used. Replace it with USB_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT and also fix error
message which looks like:
udlfb: Read EDID byte 78 failed err ffffff92
as error is either negative errno or number of bytes transferred use %d
format specifier.
Returned EDID is in second byte, so return error when less than two bytes
are received.
Fixes: 18dffdf8913a ("staging: udlfb: enhance EDID and mode handling support")
Signed-off-by: Ladislav Michl <[email protected]>
Cc: Bernie Thompson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/video/udlfb.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/video/udlfb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/udlfb.c
@@ -765,11 +765,11 @@ static int dlfb_get_edid(struct dlfb_dat
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
ret = usb_control_msg(dev->udev,
- usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0), (0x02),
- (0x80 | (0x02 << 5)), i << 8, 0xA1, rbuf, 2,
- HZ);
- if (ret < 1) {
- pr_err("Read EDID byte %d failed err %x\n", i, ret);
+ usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0), 0x02,
+ (0x80 | (0x02 << 5)), i << 8, 0xA1,
+ rbuf, 2, USB_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT);
+ if (ret < 2) {
+ pr_err("Read EDID byte %d failed: %d\n", i, ret);
i--;
break;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit 1f2cac107c591c24b60b115d6050adc213d10fc0 upstream.
sg.c calls into the blktrace functions without holding the proper queue
mutex for doing setup, start/stop, or teardown.
Add internal unlocked variants, and export the ones that do the proper
locking.
Fixes: 6da127ad0918 ("blktrace: Add blktrace ioctls to SCSI generic devices")
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
kernel/trace/blktrace.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void blk_trace_cleanup(struct blk
blk_unregister_tracepoints();
}
-int blk_trace_remove(struct request_queue *q)
+static int __blk_trace_remove(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct blk_trace *bt;
@@ -309,6 +309,17 @@ int blk_trace_remove(struct request_queu
return 0;
}
+
+int blk_trace_remove(struct request_queue *q)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+ ret = __blk_trace_remove(q);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_trace_remove);
static int blk_dropped_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
@@ -538,9 +549,8 @@ err:
return ret;
}
-int blk_trace_setup(struct request_queue *q, char *name, dev_t dev,
- struct block_device *bdev,
- char __user *arg)
+static int __blk_trace_setup(struct request_queue *q, char *name, dev_t dev,
+ struct block_device *bdev, char __user *arg)
{
struct blk_user_trace_setup buts;
int ret;
@@ -559,6 +569,19 @@ int blk_trace_setup(struct request_queue
}
return 0;
}
+
+int blk_trace_setup(struct request_queue *q, char *name, dev_t dev,
+ struct block_device *bdev,
+ char __user *arg)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+ ret = __blk_trace_setup(q, name, dev, bdev, arg);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_trace_setup);
#if defined(CONFIG_COMPAT) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
@@ -596,7 +619,7 @@ static int compat_blk_trace_setup(struct
}
#endif
-int blk_trace_startstop(struct request_queue *q, int start)
+static int __blk_trace_startstop(struct request_queue *q, int start)
{
int ret;
struct blk_trace *bt = q->blk_trace;
@@ -629,6 +652,17 @@ int blk_trace_startstop(struct request_q
return ret;
}
+
+int blk_trace_startstop(struct request_queue *q, int start)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+ ret = __blk_trace_startstop(q, start);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_trace_startstop);
/*
@@ -659,7 +693,7 @@ int blk_trace_ioctl(struct block_device
switch (cmd) {
case BLKTRACESETUP:
bdevname(bdev, b);
- ret = blk_trace_setup(q, b, bdev->bd_dev, bdev, arg);
+ ret = __blk_trace_setup(q, b, bdev->bd_dev, bdev, arg);
break;
#if defined(CONFIG_COMPAT) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
case BLKTRACESETUP32:
@@ -670,10 +704,10 @@ int blk_trace_ioctl(struct block_device
case BLKTRACESTART:
start = 1;
case BLKTRACESTOP:
- ret = blk_trace_startstop(q, start);
+ ret = __blk_trace_startstop(q, start);
break;
case BLKTRACETEARDOWN:
- ret = blk_trace_remove(q);
+ ret = __blk_trace_remove(q);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOTTY;
@@ -691,10 +725,14 @@ int blk_trace_ioctl(struct block_device
**/
void blk_trace_shutdown(struct request_queue *q)
{
+ mutex_lock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
+
if (q->blk_trace) {
- blk_trace_startstop(q, 0);
- blk_trace_remove(q);
+ __blk_trace_startstop(q, 0);
+ __blk_trace_remove(q);
}
+
+ mutex_unlock(&q->blk_trace_mutex);
}
/*
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vijendar Mukunda <[email protected]>
commit 9ceace3c9c18c67676e75141032a65a8e01f9a7a upstream.
This commit adds PCI ID for Raven platform
Signed-off-by: Vijendar Mukunda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
@@ -3045,6 +3045,9 @@ static DEFINE_PCI_DEVICE_TABLE(azx_ids)
/* AMD Hudson */
{ PCI_DEVICE(0x1022, 0x780d),
.driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_GENERIC | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB },
+ /* AMD Raven */
+ { PCI_DEVICE(0x1022, 0x15e3),
+ .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_GENERIC | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB },
/* ATI HDMI */
{ PCI_DEVICE(0x1002, 0x793b),
.driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_ATIHDMI | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_HDMI },
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 3d4e8303f2c747c8540a0a0126d0151514f6468b upstream.
Some timer compat ioctls have NULL checks of timer instance with
snd_BUG_ON() that bring up WARN_ON() when the debug option is set.
Actually the condition can be met in the normal situation and it's
confusing and bad to spew kernel warnings with stack trace there.
Let's remove snd_BUG_ON() invocation and replace with the simple
checks. Also, correct the error code to EBADFD to follow the native
ioctl error handling.
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/timer_compat.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/timer_compat.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer_compat.c
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ static int snd_timer_user_info_compat(st
struct snd_timer *t;
tu = file->private_data;
- if (snd_BUG_ON(!tu->timeri))
- return -ENXIO;
+ if (!tu->timeri)
+ return -EBADFD;
t = tu->timeri->timer;
- if (snd_BUG_ON(!t))
- return -ENXIO;
+ if (!t)
+ return -EBADFD;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.card = t->card ? t->card->number : -1;
if (t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE)
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ static int snd_timer_user_status_compat(
struct snd_timer_status32 status;
tu = file->private_data;
- if (snd_BUG_ON(!tu->timeri))
- return -ENXIO;
+ if (!tu->timeri)
+ return -EBADFD;
memset(&status, 0, sizeof(status));
status.tstamp.tv_sec = tu->tstamp.tv_sec;
status.tstamp.tv_nsec = tu->tstamp.tv_nsec;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alan <[email protected]>
commit 2d32927127f44d755780aa5fa88c8c34e72558f8 upstream.
Scan only to the length permitted by the buffer
One of a set of sscanf problems noted by Jackie Chang
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/usbip_common.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/usbip_common.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int read_attr_speed(struct sysfs_device
goto err;
}
- ret = sscanf(attr->value, "%s\n", speed);
+ ret = sscanf(attr->value, "%99s\n", speed);
if (ret < 1) {
dbg("sscanf failed");
goto err;
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int parse_status(char *value)
unsigned long socket;
char lbusid[SYSFS_BUS_ID_SIZE];
- ret = sscanf(c, "%d %d %d %x %lx %s\n",
+ ret = sscanf(c, "%d %d %d %x %lx %31s\n",
&port, &status, &speed,
&devid, &socket, lbusid);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
commit 541b6fe63023f3059cf85d47ff2767a3e42a8e44 upstream.
According to USB Specification 2.0 table 9-4,
wMaxPacketSize is a bitfield. Endpoint's maxpacket
is laid out in bits 10:0. For high-speed,
high-bandwidth isochronous endpoints, bits 12:11
contain a multiplier to tell us how many
transactions we want to try per uframe.
This means that if we want an isochronous endpoint
to issue 3 transfers of 1024 bytes per uframe,
wMaxPacketSize should contain the value:
1024 | (2 << 11)
or 5120 (0x1400). In order to make Host and
Peripheral controller drivers' life easier, we're
adding a helper which returns bits 12:11. Note that
no care is made WRT to checking endpoint type and
gadget's speed. That's left for drivers to handle.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/usb/ch9.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/include/linux/usb/ch9.h
+++ b/include/linux/usb/ch9.h
@@ -390,6 +390,11 @@ struct usb_endpoint_descriptor {
#define USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT 3
#define USB_ENDPOINT_MAX_ADJUSTABLE 0x80
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT 11
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK (3 << USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(m) \
+ (((m) & USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK) >> USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+
#define USB_ENDPOINT_SYNCTYPE 0x0c
#define USB_ENDPOINT_SYNC_NONE (0 << 2)
#define USB_ENDPOINT_SYNC_ASYNC (1 << 2)
@@ -592,6 +597,20 @@ static inline int usb_endpoint_maxp(cons
return __le16_to_cpu(epd->wMaxPacketSize);
}
+/**
+ * usb_endpoint_maxp_mult - get endpoint's transactional opportunities
+ * @epd: endpoint to be checked
+ *
+ * Return @epd's wMaxPacketSize[12:11] + 1
+ */
+static inline int
+usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd)
+{
+ int maxp = __le16_to_cpu(epd->wMaxPacketSize);
+
+ return USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(maxp) + 1;
+}
+
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* USB_DT_SS_ENDPOINT_COMP: SuperSpeed Endpoint Companion descriptor */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 8428a8ebde2db1e988e41a58497a28beb7ce1705 upstream.
parse_audio_feature_unit() contains a code dividing potentially with
zero when a malformed FU descriptor is passed. Although there is
already a sanity check, it checks only the value zero, hence it can
still lead to a zero-division when a value 1 is passed there.
Fix it by correcting the sanity check (and the error message
thereof).
Fixes: 23caaf19b11e ("ALSA: usb-mixer: Add support for Audio Class v2.0")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/usb/mixer.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -1262,9 +1262,9 @@ static int parse_audio_feature_unit(stru
return -EINVAL;
}
csize = hdr->bControlSize;
- if (!csize) {
+ if (csize <= 1) {
snd_printdd(KERN_ERR "usbaudio: unit %u: "
- "invalid bControlSize == 0\n", unitid);
+ "invalid bControlSize <= 1\n", unitid);
return -EINVAL;
}
channels = (hdr->bLength - 7) / csize - 1;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 0a62d6c966956d77397c32836a5bbfe3af786fc1 upstream.
The helper functions to parse and look for the clock source, selector
and multiplier unit may return the descriptor with a too short length
than required, while there is no sanity check in the caller side.
Add some sanity checks in the parsers, at least, to guarantee the
given descriptor size, for avoiding the potential crashes.
Fixes: 79f920fbff56 ("ALSA: usb-audio: parse clock topology of UAC2 devices")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/usb/clock.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/usb/clock.c
+++ b/sound/usb/clock.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static struct uac_clock_source_descripto
while ((cs = snd_usb_find_csint_desc(ctrl_iface->extra,
ctrl_iface->extralen,
cs, UAC2_CLOCK_SOURCE))) {
- if (cs->bClockID == clock_id)
+ if (cs->bLength >= sizeof(*cs) && cs->bClockID == clock_id)
return cs;
}
@@ -58,8 +58,11 @@ static struct uac_clock_selector_descrip
while ((cs = snd_usb_find_csint_desc(ctrl_iface->extra,
ctrl_iface->extralen,
cs, UAC2_CLOCK_SELECTOR))) {
- if (cs->bClockID == clock_id)
+ if (cs->bLength >= sizeof(*cs) && cs->bClockID == clock_id) {
+ if (cs->bLength < 5 + cs->bNrInPins)
+ return NULL;
return cs;
+ }
}
return NULL;
@@ -74,7 +77,7 @@ static struct uac_clock_multiplier_descr
while ((cs = snd_usb_find_csint_desc(ctrl_iface->extra,
ctrl_iface->extralen,
cs, UAC2_CLOCK_MULTIPLIER))) {
- if (cs->bClockID == clock_id)
+ if (cs->bLength >= sizeof(*cs) && cs->bClockID == clock_id)
return cs;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
commit 299ee123e19889d511092347f5fc14db0f10e3a6 upstream.
The SCTP socket extensions API document describes the v4mapping option as
follows:
8.1.15. Set/Clear IPv4 Mapped Addresses (SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR)
This socket option is a Boolean flag which turns on or off the
mapping of IPv4 addresses. If this option is turned on, then IPv4
addresses will be mapped to V6 representation. If this option is
turned off, then no mapping will be done of V4 addresses and a user
will receive both PF_INET6 and PF_INET type addresses on the socket.
See [RFC3542] for more details on mapped V6 addresses.
This description isn't really in line with what the code does though.
Introduce addr_to_user (renamed addr_v4map), which should be called
before any sockaddr is passed back to user space. The new function
places the sockaddr into the correct format depending on the
SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR option.
Audit all places that touched v4mapped and either sanely construct
a v4 or v6 address then call addr_to_user, or drop the
unnecessary v4mapped check entirely.
Audit all places that call addr_to_user and verify they are on a sycall
return path.
Add a custom getname that formats the address properly.
Several bugs are addressed:
- SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR=0 often returned garbage for
addresses to user space
- The addr_len returned from recvmsg was not correct when
returning AF_INET on a v6 socket
- flowlabel and scope_id were not zerod when promoting
a v4 to v6
- Some syscalls like bind and connect behaved differently
depending on v4mapped
Tested bind, getpeername, getsockname, connect, and recvmsg for proper
behaviour in v4mapped = 1 and 0 cases.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 2 +
include/net/sctp/structs.h | 8 +--
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
net/sctp/protocol.c | 12 ++--
net/sctp/socket.c | 33 +++++-----
net/sctp/transport.c | 4 +-
net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 2 +-
7 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
@@ -705,6 +705,8 @@ static inline void sctp_v6_map_v4(union
static inline void sctp_v4_map_v6(union sctp_addr *addr)
{
addr->v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ addr->v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
+ addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
addr->v6.sin6_port = addr->v4.sin_port;
addr->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] = addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
addr->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[0] = 0;
--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
@@ -603,10 +603,6 @@ struct sctp_af {
int saddr);
void (*from_sk) (union sctp_addr *,
struct sock *sk);
- void (*to_sk_saddr) (union sctp_addr *,
- struct sock *sk);
- void (*to_sk_daddr) (union sctp_addr *,
- struct sock *sk);
void (*from_addr_param) (union sctp_addr *,
union sctp_addr_param *,
__be16 port, int iif);
@@ -647,7 +643,9 @@ struct sctp_pf {
int (*supported_addrs)(const struct sctp_sock *, __be16 *);
struct sock *(*create_accept_sk) (struct sock *sk,
struct sctp_association *asoc);
- void (*addr_v4map) (struct sctp_sock *, union sctp_addr *);
+ int (*addr_to_user)(struct sctp_sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr);
+ void (*to_sk_saddr)(union sctp_addr *, struct sock *sk);
+ void (*to_sk_daddr)(union sctp_addr *, struct sock *sk);
struct sctp_af *af;
};
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static void sctp_v6_from_sk(union sctp_a
/* Initialize sk->sk_rcv_saddr from sctp_addr. */
static void sctp_v6_to_sk_saddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk)
{
- if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped) {
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[0] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[1] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[2] = htonl(0x0000ffff);
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static void sctp_v6_to_sk_saddr(union sc
/* Initialize sk->sk_daddr from sctp_addr. */
static void sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk)
{
- if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped) {
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
inet6_sk(sk)->daddr.s6_addr32[0] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->daddr.s6_addr32[1] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->daddr.s6_addr32[2] = htonl(0x0000ffff);
@@ -554,8 +554,6 @@ static int sctp_v6_available(union sctp_
if (IPV6_ADDR_ANY == type)
return 1;
if (type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
- if (sp && !sp->v4mapped)
- return 0;
if (sp && ipv6_only_sock(sctp_opt2sk(sp)))
return 0;
sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
@@ -585,8 +583,6 @@ static int sctp_v6_addr_valid(union sctp
/* Note: This routine is used in input, so v4-mapped-v6
* are disallowed here when there is no sctp_sock.
*/
- if (!sp || !sp->v4mapped)
- return 0;
if (sp && ipv6_only_sock(sctp_opt2sk(sp)))
return 0;
sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
@@ -682,11 +678,23 @@ out:
return newsk;
}
-/* Map v4 address to mapped v6 address */
-static void sctp_v6_addr_v4map(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
+/* Format a sockaddr for return to user space. This makes sure the return is
+ * AF_INET or AF_INET6 depending on the SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR option.
+ */
+static int sctp_v6_addr_to_user(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
{
- if (sp->v4mapped && AF_INET == addr->sa.sa_family)
- sctp_v4_map_v6(addr);
+ if (sp->v4mapped) {
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ sctp_v4_map_v6(addr);
+ } else {
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
+ ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr))
+ sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
+ }
+
+ if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
}
/* Where did this skb come from? */
@@ -713,82 +721,68 @@ static void sctp_v6_ecn_capable(struct s
inet6_sk(sk)->tclass |= INET_ECN_ECT_0;
}
-/* Initialize a PF_INET6 socket msg_name. */
-static void sctp_inet6_msgname(char *msgname, int *addr_len)
-{
- struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
-
- sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)msgname;
- sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
- sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0; /*FIXME */
- *addr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-}
-
/* Initialize a PF_INET msgname from a ulpevent. */
static void sctp_inet6_event_msgname(struct sctp_ulpevent *event,
char *msgname, int *addrlen)
{
- struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6, *sin6from;
-
- if (msgname) {
- union sctp_addr *addr;
- struct sctp_association *asoc;
-
- asoc = event->asoc;
- sctp_inet6_msgname(msgname, addrlen);
- sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)msgname;
- sin6->sin6_port = htons(asoc->peer.port);
- addr = &asoc->peer.primary_addr;
-
- /* Note: If we go to a common v6 format, this code
- * will change.
- */
-
- /* Map ipv4 address into v4-mapped-on-v6 address. */
- if (sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk)->v4mapped &&
- AF_INET == addr->sa.sa_family) {
- sctp_v4_map_v6((union sctp_addr *)sin6);
- sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] =
- addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
- return;
- }
-
- sin6from = &asoc->peer.primary_addr.v6;
- ipv6_addr_copy(&sin6->sin6_addr, &sin6from->sin6_addr);
- if (ipv6_addr_type(&sin6->sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
- sin6->sin6_scope_id = sin6from->sin6_scope_id;
+ union sctp_addr *addr;
+ struct sctp_association *asoc;
+ union sctp_addr *paddr;
+
+ if (!msgname)
+ return;
+
+ addr = (union sctp_addr *)msgname;
+ asoc = event->asoc;
+ paddr = &asoc->peer.primary_addr;
+
+ if (paddr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
+ addr->v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr->v4.sin_port = htons(asoc->peer.port);
+ addr->v4.sin_addr = paddr->v4.sin_addr;
+ } else {
+ addr->v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ addr->v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
+ if (ipv6_addr_type(&paddr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
+ addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = paddr->v6.sin6_scope_id;
+ else
+ addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
+ addr->v6.sin6_port = htons(asoc->peer.port);
+ addr->v6.sin6_addr = paddr->v6.sin6_addr;
}
+
+ *addrlen = sctp_v6_addr_to_user(sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk), addr);
}
/* Initialize a msg_name from an inbound skb. */
static void sctp_inet6_skb_msgname(struct sk_buff *skb, char *msgname,
int *addr_len)
{
+ union sctp_addr *addr;
struct sctphdr *sh;
- struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
- if (msgname) {
- sctp_inet6_msgname(msgname, addr_len);
- sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)msgname;
- sh = sctp_hdr(skb);
- sin6->sin6_port = sh->source;
-
- /* Map ipv4 address into v4-mapped-on-v6 address. */
- if (sctp_sk(skb->sk)->v4mapped &&
- ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
- sctp_v4_map_v6((union sctp_addr *)sin6);
- sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
- return;
- }
+ if (!msgname)
+ return;
- /* Otherwise, just copy the v6 address. */
- ipv6_addr_copy(&sin6->sin6_addr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
- if (ipv6_addr_type(&sin6->sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
+ addr = (union sctp_addr *)msgname;
+ sh = sctp_hdr(skb);
+
+ if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+ addr->v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr->v4.sin_port = sh->source;
+ addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ } else {
+ addr->v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ addr->v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
+ addr->v6.sin6_port = sh->source;
+ addr->v6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
struct sctp_ulpevent *ev = sctp_skb2event(skb);
- sin6->sin6_scope_id = ev->iif;
+ addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = ev->iif;
}
}
+
+ *addr_len = sctp_v6_addr_to_user(sctp_sk(skb->sk), addr);
}
/* Do we support this AF? */
@@ -864,9 +858,6 @@ static int sctp_inet6_bind_verify(struct
return 0;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
- } else if (type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
- if (!opt->v4mapped)
- return 0;
}
af = opt->pf->af;
@@ -921,6 +912,23 @@ static int sctp_inet6_supported_addrs(co
return 1;
}
+/* Handle SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR for getpeername() and getsockname() */
+static int sctp_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
+ int *uaddr_len, int peer)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = inet6_getname(sock, uaddr, uaddr_len, peer);
+
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ *uaddr_len = sctp_v6_addr_to_user(sctp_sk(sock->sk),
+ (union sctp_addr *)uaddr);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static const struct proto_ops inet6_seqpacket_ops = {
.family = PF_INET6,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -929,7 +937,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops inet6_seqp
.connect = inet_dgram_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.accept = inet_accept,
- .getname = inet6_getname,
+ .getname = sctp_getname,
.poll = sctp_poll,
.ioctl = inet6_ioctl,
.listen = sctp_inet_listen,
@@ -983,8 +991,6 @@ static struct sctp_af sctp_af_inet6 = {
.copy_addrlist = sctp_v6_copy_addrlist,
.from_skb = sctp_v6_from_skb,
.from_sk = sctp_v6_from_sk,
- .to_sk_saddr = sctp_v6_to_sk_saddr,
- .to_sk_daddr = sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr,
.from_addr_param = sctp_v6_from_addr_param,
.to_addr_param = sctp_v6_to_addr_param,
.cmp_addr = sctp_v6_cmp_addr,
@@ -1014,7 +1020,9 @@ static struct sctp_pf sctp_pf_inet6 = {
.send_verify = sctp_inet6_send_verify,
.supported_addrs = sctp_inet6_supported_addrs,
.create_accept_sk = sctp_v6_create_accept_sk,
- .addr_v4map = sctp_v6_addr_v4map,
+ .addr_to_user = sctp_v6_addr_to_user,
+ .to_sk_saddr = sctp_v6_to_sk_saddr,
+ .to_sk_daddr = sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr,
.af = &sctp_af_inet6,
};
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -615,10 +615,10 @@ out:
return newsk;
}
-/* Map address, empty for v4 family */
-static void sctp_v4_addr_v4map(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
+static int sctp_v4_addr_to_user(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
{
- /* Empty */
+ /* No address mapping for V4 sockets */
+ return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
}
/* Dump the v4 addr to the seq file. */
@@ -1010,7 +1010,9 @@ static struct sctp_pf sctp_pf_inet = {
.send_verify = sctp_inet_send_verify,
.supported_addrs = sctp_inet_supported_addrs,
.create_accept_sk = sctp_v4_create_accept_sk,
- .addr_v4map = sctp_v4_addr_v4map,
+ .addr_to_user = sctp_v4_addr_to_user,
+ .to_sk_saddr = sctp_v4_to_sk_saddr,
+ .to_sk_daddr = sctp_v4_to_sk_daddr,
.af = &sctp_af_inet
};
@@ -1081,8 +1083,6 @@ static struct sctp_af sctp_af_inet = {
.copy_addrlist = sctp_v4_copy_addrlist,
.from_skb = sctp_v4_from_skb,
.from_sk = sctp_v4_from_sk,
- .to_sk_saddr = sctp_v4_to_sk_saddr,
- .to_sk_daddr = sctp_v4_to_sk_daddr,
.from_addr_param = sctp_v4_from_addr_param,
.to_addr_param = sctp_v4_to_addr_param,
.cmp_addr = sctp_v4_cmp_addr,
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static struct sctp_transport *sctp_addr_
if (id_asoc && (id_asoc != addr_asoc))
return NULL;
- sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sctp_sk(sk),
+ sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(sctp_sk(sk),
(union sctp_addr *)addr);
return transport;
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock
/* Copy back into socket for getsockname() use. */
if (!ret) {
inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num);
- af->to_sk_saddr(addr, sk);
+ sp->pf->to_sk_saddr(addr, sk);
}
return ret;
@@ -1061,7 +1061,6 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* s
struct sctp_association *asoc2;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
union sctp_addr to;
- struct sctp_af *af;
sctp_scope_t scope;
long timeo;
int err = 0;
@@ -1089,6 +1088,8 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* s
/* Walk through the addrs buffer and count the number of addresses. */
addr_buf = kaddrs;
while (walk_size < addrs_size) {
+ struct sctp_af *af;
+
if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrs_size) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
@@ -1212,8 +1213,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* s
/* Initialize sk's dport and daddr for getpeername() */
inet_sk(sk)->inet_dport = htons(asoc->peer.port);
- af = sctp_get_af_specific(sa_addr->sa.sa_family);
- af->to_sk_daddr(sa_addr, sk);
+ sp->pf->to_sk_daddr(sa_addr, sk);
sk->sk_err = 0;
/* in-kernel sockets don't generally have a file allocated to them
@@ -4080,7 +4080,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_sctp_status(s
memcpy(&status.sstat_primary.spinfo_address, &transport->ipaddr,
transport->af_specific->sockaddr_len);
/* Map ipv4 address into v4-mapped-on-v6 address. */
- sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sctp_sk(sk),
+ sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(sctp_sk(sk),
(union sctp_addr *)&status.sstat_primary.spinfo_address);
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_state = transport->state;
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_cwnd = transport->cwnd;
@@ -4239,8 +4239,8 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_peeloff(struct s
struct socket **sockp)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
+ struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct socket *sock;
- struct sctp_af *af;
int err = 0;
/* Do not peel off from one netns to another one. */
@@ -4269,8 +4269,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_peeloff(struct s
/* Make peeled-off sockets more like 1-1 accepted sockets.
* Set the daddr and initialize id to something more random
*/
- af = sctp_get_af_specific(asoc->peer.primary_addr.sa.sa_family);
- af->to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, sk);
+ sp->pf->to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, sk);
/* Populate the fields of the newsk from the oldsk and migrate the
* asoc to the newsk.
@@ -4645,8 +4644,8 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs(st
list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
memcpy(&temp, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(temp));
- sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sp, &temp);
- addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
+ addrlen = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)
+ ->addr_to_user(sp, &temp);
if (space_left < addrlen)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_to_user(to, &temp, addrlen))
@@ -4689,9 +4688,9 @@ static int sctp_copy_laddrs(struct sock
if (!temp.v4.sin_port)
temp.v4.sin_port = htons(port);
- sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sctp_sk(sk),
- &temp);
- addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
+ addrlen = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)
+ ->addr_to_user(sctp_sk(sk), &temp);
+
if (space_left < addrlen) {
cnt = -ENOMEM;
break;
@@ -4779,8 +4778,8 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs(s
*/
list_for_each_entry(addr, &bp->address_list, list) {
memcpy(&temp, &addr->a, sizeof(temp));
- sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sp, &temp);
- addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
+ addrlen = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)
+ ->addr_to_user(sp, &temp);
if (space_left < addrlen) {
err = -ENOMEM; /*fixme: right error?*/
goto out;
@@ -4839,7 +4838,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_primary_addr(
memcpy(&prim.ssp_addr, &asoc->peer.primary_path->ipaddr,
asoc->peer.primary_path->af_specific->sockaddr_len);
- sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sp,
+ sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(sp,
(union sctp_addr *)&prim.ssp_addr);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
--- a/net/sctp/transport.c
+++ b/net/sctp/transport.c
@@ -274,8 +274,8 @@ void sctp_transport_route(struct sctp_tr
*/
if (asoc && (!asoc->peer.primary_path ||
(transport == asoc->peer.active_path)))
- opt->pf->af->to_sk_saddr(&transport->saddr,
- asoc->base.sk);
+ opt->pf->to_sk_saddr(&transport->saddr,
+ asoc->base.sk);
} else
transport->pathmtu = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT;
}
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make
memcpy(&spc->spc_aaddr, aaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
/* Map ipv4 address into v4-mapped-on-v6 address. */
- sctp_get_pf_specific(asoc->base.sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(
+ sctp_get_pf_specific(asoc->base.sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(
sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk),
(union sctp_addr *)&spc->spc_aaddr);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Steffen <[email protected]>
commit ee70bc1e7b63ac8023c9ff9475d8741e397316e7 upstream.
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the number
of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it relies on the
commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within the buffer.
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the buffer, so
that the commandSize field is present and b) the commandSize field does not
announce more data than has been written to the buffer.
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but apparently
a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- s/priv/chip/
- Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1114,6 +1114,12 @@ ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, con
return -EFAULT;
}
+ if (in_size < 6 ||
+ in_size < be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (chip->data_buffer + 2)))) {
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* atomic tpm command send and result receive */
out_size = tpm_transmit(chip, chip->data_buffer, TPM_BUFSIZE);
if (out_size < 0) {
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Westgeest <[email protected]>
commit 34c09578179f5838e5958c45e8aed4edc9c6c3b8 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Bart Westgeest <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c | 9 ---------
drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 39 ---------------------------------------
2 files changed, 48 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -367,15 +367,6 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
}
epd = &ep->desc;
-#if 0
- /* epnum 0 is always control */
- if (epnum == 0) {
- if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
- return usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0);
- else
- return usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0);
- }
-#endif
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, epnum);
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
@@ -391,29 +391,6 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_h
dum->port_status[rhport] |=
USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE;
}
-#if 0
- if (dum->driver) {
- dum->port_status[rhport] |=
- USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE;
- /* give it the best speed we agree on */
- dum->gadget.speed = dum->driver->speed;
- dum->gadget.ep0->maxpacket = 64;
- switch (dum->gadget.speed) {
- case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
- dum->port_status[rhport] |=
- USB_PORT_STAT_HIGH_SPEED;
- break;
- case USB_SPEED_LOW:
- dum->gadget.ep0->maxpacket = 8;
- dum->port_status[rhport] |=
- USB_PORT_STAT_LOW_SPEED;
- break;
- default:
- dum->gadget.speed = USB_SPEED_FULL;
- break;
- }
- }
-#endif
}
((u16 *) buf)[0] = cpu_to_le16(dum->port_status[rhport]);
((u16 *) buf)[1] = cpu_to_le16(dum->port_status[rhport] >> 16);
@@ -430,15 +407,6 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_h
case USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND:
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh(" SetPortFeature: "
"USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND\n");
-#if 0
- dum->port_status[rhport] |=
- (1 << USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND);
- if (dum->driver->suspend) {
- spin_unlock(&dum->lock);
- dum->driver->suspend(&dum->gadget);
- spin_lock(&dum->lock);
- }
-#endif
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET:
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh(" SetPortFeature: "
@@ -449,13 +417,6 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_h
~(USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE |
USB_PORT_STAT_LOW_SPEED |
USB_PORT_STAT_HIGH_SPEED);
-#if 0
- if (dum->driver) {
- dev_dbg(hardware, "disconnect\n");
- stop_activity(dum, dum->driver);
- }
-#endif
-
/* FIXME test that code path! */
}
/* 50msec reset signaling */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tuomas Tynkkynen <[email protected]>
commit 8ee031631546cf2f7859cc69593bd60bbdd70b46 upstream.
Commit fd2421f54423 ("fs/9p: When doing inode lookup compare qid details
and inode mode bits.") transformed v9fs_qid_iget() to use iget5_locked()
instead of iget_locked(). However, the test() callback is not checking
fid.path at all, which means that a lookup in the inode cache can now
accidentally locate a completely wrong inode from the same inode hash
bucket if the other fields (qid.type and qid.version) match.
Fixes: fd2421f54423 ("fs/9p: When doing inode lookup compare qid details and inode mode bits.")
Reviewed-by: Latchesar Ionkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tuomas Tynkkynen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/9p/vfs_inode.c | 3 +++
fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
+++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
@@ -469,6 +469,9 @@ static int v9fs_test_inode(struct inode
if (v9inode->qid.type != st->qid.type)
return 0;
+
+ if (v9inode->qid.path != st->qid.path)
+ return 0;
return 1;
}
--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
+++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static int v9fs_test_inode_dotl(struct i
if (v9inode->qid.type != st->qid.type)
return 0;
+
+ if (v9inode->qid.path != st->qid.path)
+ return 0;
return 1;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Young <[email protected]>
commit 3e45067f94bbd61dec0619b1c32744eb0de480c8 upstream.
The ioctl LIRC_SET_REC_TIMEOUT would set a timeout of 704ns if called
with a timeout of 4294968us.
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code U32_MAX]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/rc/ir-lirc-codec.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/rc/ir-lirc-codec.c
+++ b/drivers/media/rc/ir-lirc-codec.c
@@ -255,11 +255,14 @@ static long ir_lirc_ioctl(struct file *f
if (!dev->max_timeout)
return -ENOSYS;
+ /* Check for multiply overflow */
+ if (val > (u32)(-1) / 1000)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
tmp = val * 1000;
- if (tmp < dev->min_timeout ||
- tmp > dev->max_timeout)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (tmp < dev->min_timeout || tmp > dev->max_timeout)
+ return -EINVAL;
dev->timeout = tmp;
break;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit f658f17b5e0e339935dca23e77e0f3cad591926b upstream.
The usb-audio driver may trigger an out-of-bound access at parsing a
malformed selector unit, as it checks the header length only after
evaluating bNrInPins field, which can be already above the given
length. Fix it by adding the length check beforehand.
Fixes: 99fc86450c43 ("ALSA: usb-mixer: parse descriptors with structs")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/usb/mixer.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -1845,7 +1845,8 @@ static int parse_audio_selector_unit(str
const struct usbmix_name_map *map;
char **namelist;
- if (!desc->bNrInPins || desc->bLength < 5 + desc->bNrInPins) {
+ if (desc->bLength < 5 || !desc->bNrInPins ||
+ desc->bLength < 5 + desc->bNrInPins) {
snd_printk(KERN_ERR "invalid SELECTOR UNIT descriptor %d\n", unitid);
return -EINVAL;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit 2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5 upstream.
When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is
locally leaking a socket pointer address via the
/sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug
output when "usbip --debug port" is run.
Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment
and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}.
As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with
sockfd.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- usbip port status does not include hub type
- Adjust filenames, context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.h
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct usbip_device {
/* lock for status */
spinlock_t lock;
+ int sockfd;
struct socket *tcp_socket;
struct task_struct *tcp_rx;
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -38,13 +38,18 @@ static ssize_t show_status(struct device
/*
* output example:
- * prt sta spd dev socket local_busid
- * 000 004 000 000 c5a7bb80 1-2.3
- * 001 004 000 000 d8cee980 2-3.4
+ * prt sta spd dev sockfd local_busid
+ * 000 004 000 000 3 1-2.3
+ * 001 004 000 000 4 2-3.4
+ *
+ * Output includes socket fd instead of socket pointer address to avoid
+ * leaking kernel memory address in:
+ * /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd.0/status and in debug output.
+ * The socket pointer address is not used at the moment and it was made
+ * visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket pointer
+ * address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. As this opens a security
+ * hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead.
*
- * IP address can be retrieved from a socket pointer address by looking
- * up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. Also, a userland program may remember a
- * port number and its peer IP address.
*/
out += sprintf(out, "prt sta spd bus dev socket "
"local_busid\n");
@@ -58,7 +63,7 @@ static ssize_t show_status(struct device
if (vdev->ud.status == VDEV_ST_USED) {
out += sprintf(out, "%03u %08x ",
vdev->speed, vdev->devid);
- out += sprintf(out, "%16p ", vdev->ud.tcp_socket);
+ out += sprintf(out, "%u", vdev->ud.sockfd);
out += sprintf(out, "%s", dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev));
} else {
@@ -215,6 +220,7 @@ static ssize_t store_attach(struct devic
vdev->devid = devid;
vdev->speed = speed;
+ vdev->ud.sockfd = sockfd;
vdev->ud.tcp_socket = socket;
vdev->ud.status = VDEV_ST_NOTASSIGNED;
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/userspace/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
@@ -63,12 +63,12 @@ static int parse_status(char *value)
while (*c != '\0') {
int port, status, speed, devid;
- unsigned long socket;
+ int sockfd;
char lbusid[SYSFS_BUS_ID_SIZE];
- ret = sscanf(c, "%d %d %d %x %lx %31s\n",
+ ret = sscanf(c, "%d %d %d %x %u %31s\n",
&port, &status, &speed,
- &devid, &socket, lbusid);
+ &devid, &sockfd, lbusid);
if (ret < 5) {
dbg("sscanf failed: %d", ret);
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int parse_status(char *value)
dbg("port %d status %d speed %d devid %x",
port, status, speed, devid);
- dbg("socket %lx lbusid %s", socket, lbusid);
+ dbg("sockfd %u lbusid %s", sockfd, lbusid);
/* if a device is connected, look at it */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit d937cd6790a2bef2d07b500487646bd794c039bb upstream.
When the usb-audio descriptor contains the malformed feature unit
description with a too short length, the driver may access
out-of-bounds. Add a sanity check of the header size at the beginning
of parse_audio_feature_unit().
Fixes: 23caaf19b11e ("ALSA: usb-mixer: Add support for Audio Class v2.0")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: use snd_printk() for logging]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
sound/usb/mixer.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -1255,6 +1255,12 @@ static int parse_audio_feature_unit(stru
__u8 *bmaControls;
if (state->mixer->protocol == UAC_VERSION_1) {
+ if (hdr->bLength < 7) {
+ snd_printk(KERN_ERR
+ "usbaudio: unit %u: invalid UAC_FEATURE_UNIT descriptor\n",
+ unitid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
csize = hdr->bControlSize;
if (!csize) {
snd_printdd(KERN_ERR "usbaudio: unit %u: "
@@ -1271,6 +1277,12 @@ static int parse_audio_feature_unit(stru
}
} else {
struct uac2_feature_unit_descriptor *ftr = _ftr;
+ if (hdr->bLength < 6) {
+ snd_printk(KERN_ERR
+ "usbaudio: unit %u: invalid UAC_FEATURE_UNIT descriptor\n",
+ unitid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
csize = 4;
channels = (hdr->bLength - 6) / 4 - 1;
bmaControls = ftr->bmaControls;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit 302ec300ef8a545a7fc7f667e5fd743b091c2eeb upstream.
Commit ecc0c469f277 ("autofs: don't fail mount for transient error") was
meant to replace an 'if' with a 'switch', but instead added the 'switch'
leaving the case in place.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: ecc0c469f277 ("autofs: don't fail mount for transient error")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: autofs4_write() doesn't take an autofs_sb_info
pointer]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/autofs4/waitq.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
+++ b/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ static void autofs4_notify_daemon(struct
mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
- if (autofs4_write(pipe, &pkt, pktsz))
switch (ret = autofs4_write(pipe, &pkt, pktsz)) {
case 0:
break;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 74d4108d9e681dbbe4a2940ed8fdff1f6868184c upstream.
The default max_cache_size_bytes for dm-bufio is meant to be the lesser
of 25% of the size of the vmalloc area and 2% of the size of lowmem.
However, on 32-bit systems the intermediate result in the expression
(VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START) * DM_BUFIO_VMALLOC_PERCENT / 100
overflows, causing the wrong result to be computed. For example, on a
32-bit system where the vmalloc area is 520093696 bytes, the result is
1174405 rather than the expected 130023424, which makes the maximum
cache size much too small (far less than 2% of lowmem). This causes
severe performance problems for dm-verity users on affected systems.
Fix this by using mult_frac() to correctly multiply by a percentage. Do
this for all places in dm-bufio that multiply by a percentage. Also
replace (VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START) with VMALLOC_TOTAL, which contrary
to the comment is now defined in include/linux/vmalloc.h.
Depends-on: 9993bc635 ("sched/x86: Fix overflow in cyc2ns_offset")
Fixes: 95d402f057f2 ("dm: add bufio")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: keep open-coded VMALLOC_TOTAL]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/dm-bufio.c | 15 ++++++---------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
@@ -839,7 +839,8 @@ static void __get_memory_limit(struct dm
buffers = DM_BUFIO_MIN_BUFFERS;
*limit_buffers = buffers;
- *threshold_buffers = buffers * DM_BUFIO_WRITEBACK_PERCENT / 100;
+ *threshold_buffers = mult_frac(buffers,
+ DM_BUFIO_WRITEBACK_PERCENT, 100);
}
/*
@@ -1620,19 +1621,15 @@ static int __init dm_bufio_init(void)
memset(&dm_bufio_caches, 0, sizeof dm_bufio_caches);
memset(&dm_bufio_cache_names, 0, sizeof dm_bufio_cache_names);
- mem = (__u64)((totalram_pages - totalhigh_pages) *
- DM_BUFIO_MEMORY_PERCENT / 100) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ mem = (__u64)mult_frac(totalram_pages - totalhigh_pages,
+ DM_BUFIO_MEMORY_PERCENT, 100) << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (mem > ULONG_MAX)
mem = ULONG_MAX;
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
- /*
- * Get the size of vmalloc space the same way as VMALLOC_TOTAL
- * in fs/proc/internal.h
- */
- if (mem > (VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START) * DM_BUFIO_VMALLOC_PERCENT / 100)
- mem = (VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START) * DM_BUFIO_VMALLOC_PERCENT / 100;
+ if (mem > mult_frac(VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START, DM_BUFIO_VMALLOC_PERCENT, 100))
+ mem = mult_frac(VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START, DM_BUFIO_VMALLOC_PERCENT, 100);
#endif
dm_bufio_default_cache_size = mem;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
commit 8a74d29d541cd86569139c6f3f44b2d210458071 upstream.
A DM device with a mix of discard capabilities (due to some underlying
devices not having discard support) _should_ just return -EOPNOTSUPP for
the region of the device that doesn't support discards (even if only by
way of the underlying driver formally not supporting discards). BUT,
that does ask the underlying driver to handle something that it never
advertised support for. In doing so we're exposing users to the
potential for a underlying disk driver hanging if/when a discard is
issued a the device that is incapable and never claimed to support
discards.
Fix this by requiring that each DM target in a DM table provide discard
support as a prereq for a DM device to advertise support for discards.
This may cause some configurations that were happily supporting discards
(even in the face of a mix of discard support) to stop supporting
discards -- but the risk of users hitting driver hangs, and forced
reboots, outweighs supporting those fringe mixed discard
configurations.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/dm-table.c | 33 ++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c
@@ -1584,12 +1584,12 @@ struct mapped_device *dm_table_get_md(st
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(dm_table_get_md);
-static int device_discard_capable(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev,
- sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data)
+static int device_not_discard_capable(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev,
+ sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data)
{
struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(dev->bdev);
- return q && blk_queue_discard(q);
+ return q && !blk_queue_discard(q);
}
bool dm_table_supports_discards(struct dm_table *t)
@@ -1597,26 +1597,22 @@ bool dm_table_supports_discards(struct d
struct dm_target *ti;
unsigned i = 0;
- /*
- * Unless any target used by the table set discards_supported,
- * require at least one underlying device to support discards.
- * t->devices includes internal dm devices such as mirror logs
- * so we need to use iterate_devices here, which targets
- * supporting discard selectively must provide.
- */
while (i < dm_table_get_num_targets(t)) {
ti = dm_table_get_target(t, i++);
if (!ti->num_discard_requests)
- continue;
+ return false;
- if (ti->discards_supported)
- return 1;
-
- if (ti->type->iterate_devices &&
- ti->type->iterate_devices(ti, device_discard_capable, NULL))
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * Either the target provides discard support (as implied by setting
+ * 'discards_supported') or it relies on _all_ data devices having
+ * discard support.
+ */
+ if (!ti->discards_supported &&
+ (!ti->type->iterate_devices ||
+ ti->type->iterate_devices(ti, device_not_discard_capable, NULL)))
+ return false;
}
- return 0;
+ return true;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
commit 4566654bb9be9e8864df417bb72ceee5136b6a6a upstream.
Guest which sets the PAT CR to invalid value should get a #GP. Currently, if
vmx supports loading PAT CR during entry, then the value is not checked. This
patch makes the required check in that case.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +++--
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -2204,6 +2204,8 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+ if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
+ return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
vcpu->arch.pat = data;
break;
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ static bool valid_mtrr_type(unsigned t)
return t < 8 && (1 << t) & 0x73; /* 0, 1, 4, 5, 6 */
}
-static bool mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
+bool kvm_mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
int i;
@@ -1300,12 +1300,13 @@ static bool mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *
/* variable MTRRs */
return valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mtrr_valid);
static int set_msr_mtrr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
u64 *p = (u64 *)&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.fixed_ranges;
- if (!mtrr_valid(vcpu, msr, data))
+ if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, msr, data))
return 1;
if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct x
gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception);
+bool kvm_mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data);
+
extern unsigned int min_timer_period_us;
#endif
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 8753333266be67ff3a984ac1f6566d31c260bee4 upstream.
we need to hold ->wq_mutex while we are forming the packet to send,
lest we have autofs4_catatonic_mode() setting wq->name.name to NULL
just as autofs4_notify_daemon() decides to memcpy() from it...
We do have check for catatonic mode immediately after that (under
->wq_mutex, as it ought to be) and packet won't be actually sent,
but it'll be too late for us if we oops on that memcpy() from NULL...
Fix is obvious - just extend the area covered by ->wq_mutex over
that switch and check whether it's catatonic *before* doing anything
else.
Acked-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/autofs4/waitq.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
+++ b/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ static void autofs4_notify_daemon(struct
pkt.hdr.proto_version = sbi->version;
pkt.hdr.type = type;
+ mutex_lock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+
+ /* Check if we have become catatonic */
+ if (sbi->catatonic) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+ return;
+ }
switch (type) {
/* Kernel protocol v4 missing and expire packets */
case autofs_ptype_missing:
@@ -163,22 +170,18 @@ static void autofs4_notify_daemon(struct
}
default:
printk("autofs4_notify_daemon: bad type %d!\n", type);
+ mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
return;
}
- /* Check if we have become catatonic */
- mutex_lock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
- if (!sbi->catatonic) {
- pipe = sbi->pipe;
- get_file(pipe);
- }
+ pipe = sbi->pipe;
+ get_file(pipe);
+
mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
- if (pipe) {
- if (autofs4_write(pipe, &pkt, pktsz))
- autofs4_catatonic_mode(sbi);
- fput(pipe);
- }
+ if (autofs4_write(pipe, &pkt, pktsz))
+ autofs4_catatonic_mode(sbi);
+ fput(pipe);
}
static int autofs4_getpath(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi,
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit ecc0c469f27765ed1e2b967be0aa17cee1a60b76 upstream.
Currently if the autofs kernel module gets an error when writing to the
pipe which links to the daemon, then it marks the whole moutpoint as
catatonic, and it will stop working.
It is possible that the error is transient. This can happen if the
daemon is slow and more than 16 requests queue up. If a subsequent
process tries to queue a request, and is then signalled, the write to
the pipe will return -ERESTARTSYS and autofs will take that as total
failure.
So change the code to assess -ERESTARTSYS and -ENOMEM as transient
failures which only abort the current request, not the whole mountpoint.
It isn't a crash or a data corruption, but having autofs mountpoints
suddenly stop working is rather inconvenient.
Ian said:
: And given the problems with a half dozen (or so) user space applications
: consuming large amounts of CPU under heavy mount and umount activity this
: could happen more easily than we expect.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: autofs4_write() doesn't take an autofs_sb_info
pointer]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/autofs4/waitq.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
+++ b/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ static int autofs4_write(struct file *fi
spin_unlock_irqrestore(¤t->sighand->siglock, flags);
}
- return (bytes > 0);
+ /* if 'wr' returned 0 (impossible) we assume -EIO (safe) */
+ return bytes == 0 ? 0 : wr < 0 ? wr : -EIO;
}
static void autofs4_notify_daemon(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi,
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static void autofs4_notify_daemon(struct
} pkt;
struct file *pipe = NULL;
size_t pktsz;
+ int ret;
DPRINTK("wait id = 0x%08lx, name = %.*s, type=%d",
(unsigned long) wq->wait_queue_token, wq->name.len, wq->name.name, type);
@@ -180,7 +182,18 @@ static void autofs4_notify_daemon(struct
mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
if (autofs4_write(pipe, &pkt, pktsz))
+ switch (ret = autofs4_write(pipe, &pkt, pktsz)) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -ENOMEM:
+ case -ERESTARTSYS:
+ /* Just fail this one */
+ autofs4_wait_release(sbi, wq->wait_queue_token, ret);
+ break;
+ default:
autofs4_catatonic_mode(sbi);
+ break;
+ }
fput(pipe);
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
commit 3953ae7b218df4d1e544b98a393666f9ae58a78c upstream.
Sessions created by l2tp_session_create() aren't fully initialised:
some pseudo-wire specific operations need to be done before making the
session usable. Therefore the PPP and Ethernet pseudo-wires continue
working on the returned l2tp session while it's already been exposed to
the rest of the system.
This can lead to various issues. In particular, the session may enter
the deletion process before having been fully initialised, which will
confuse the session removal code.
This patch moves session registration out of l2tp_session_create(), so
that callers can control when the session is exposed to the rest of the
system. This is done by the new l2tp_session_register() function.
Only pppol2tp_session_create() can be easily converted to avoid
modifying its session after registration (the debug message is dropped
in order to avoid the need for holding a reference on the session).
For pppol2tp_connect() and l2tp_eth_create()), more work is needed.
That'll be done in followup patches. For now, let's just register the
session right after its creation, like it was done before. The only
difference is that we can easily take a reference on the session before
registering it, so, at least, we're sure it's not going to be freed
while we're working on it.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 21 +++++++--------------
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 3 +++
net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c | 9 +++++++++
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -327,8 +327,8 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_by
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_get_by_ifname);
-static int l2tp_session_add_to_tunnel(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel,
- struct l2tp_session *session)
+int l2tp_session_register(struct l2tp_session *session,
+ struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
{
struct l2tp_session *session_walk;
struct hlist_head *g_head;
@@ -377,6 +377,10 @@ static int l2tp_session_add_to_tunnel(st
hlist_add_head(&session->hlist, head);
write_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
+ /* Ignore management session in session count value */
+ if (session->session_id != 0)
+ atomic_inc(&l2tp_session_count);
+
return 0;
err_tlock_pnlock:
@@ -386,6 +390,7 @@ err_tlock:
return err;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_register);
/* Lookup a tunnel by id
*/
@@ -1703,7 +1708,6 @@ static void l2tp_session_set_header_len(
struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_create(int priv_size, struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, u32 session_id, u32 peer_session_id, struct l2tp_session_cfg *cfg)
{
struct l2tp_session *session;
- int err;
session = kzalloc(sizeof(struct l2tp_session) + priv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (session != NULL) {
@@ -1752,17 +1756,6 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_create
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
- err = l2tp_session_add_to_tunnel(tunnel, session);
- if (err) {
- kfree(session);
-
- return ERR_PTR(err);
- }
-
- /* Ignore management session in session count value */
- if (session->session_id != 0)
- atomic_inc(&l2tp_session_count);
-
return session;
}
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ extern struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_f
extern int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 peer_tunnel_id, struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg *cfg, struct l2tp_tunnel **tunnelp);
extern int l2tp_tunnel_delete(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel);
extern struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_create(int priv_size, struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, u32 session_id, u32 peer_session_id, struct l2tp_session_cfg *cfg);
+int l2tp_session_register(struct l2tp_session *session,
+ struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel);
extern int l2tp_session_delete(struct l2tp_session *session);
extern void l2tp_session_free(struct l2tp_session *session);
extern void l2tp_recv_common(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char *ptr, unsigned char *optr, u16 hdrflags, int length, int (*payload_hook)(struct sk_buff *skb));
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static int l2tp_eth_create(struct net *n
goto out;
}
+ l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
+ rc = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(session);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*priv), name, l2tp_eth_dev_setup);
if (!dev) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -227,6 +234,7 @@ static int l2tp_eth_create(struct net *n
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
/* Must be done after register_netdev() */
strlcpy(session->ifname, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
+ l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
dev_hold(dev);
@@ -237,6 +245,7 @@ out_del_dev:
spriv->dev = NULL;
out_del_session:
l2tp_session_delete(session);
+ l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
out:
return rc;
}
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -734,6 +734,14 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
error = PTR_ERR(session);
goto end;
}
+
+ l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
+ error = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
+ if (error < 0) {
+ kfree(session);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ drop_refcnt = true;
}
/* Associate session with its PPPoL2TP socket */
@@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_create(struc
/* Error if tunnel socket is not prepped */
if (!tunnel->sock) {
error = -ENOENT;
- goto out;
+ goto err;
}
/* Default MTU values. */
@@ -836,18 +844,21 @@ static int pppol2tp_session_create(struc
peer_session_id, cfg);
if (IS_ERR(session)) {
error = PTR_ERR(session);
- goto out;
+ goto err;
}
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
- PRINTK(session->debug, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL, KERN_INFO,
- "%s: created\n", session->name);
-
- error = 0;
-
-out:
+ error = l2tp_session_register(session, tunnel);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto err_sess;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_sess:
+ kfree(session);
+err:
return error;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901 upstream.
Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use
after free in xt_TCPMSS
I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or
in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible
impact.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + tcphoff);
tcp_hdrlen = tcph->doff * 4;
- if (len < tcp_hdrlen)
+ if (len < tcp_hdrlen || tcp_hdrlen < sizeof(struct tcphdr))
return -1;
if (info->mss == XT_TCPMSS_CLAMP_PMTU) {
@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
if (len > tcp_hdrlen)
return 0;
+ /* tcph->doff has 4 bits, do not wrap it to 0 */
+ if (tcp_hdrlen >= 15 * 4)
+ return 0;
+
/*
* MSS Option not found ?! add it..
*/
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
commit 7c8a61d9ee1df0fb4747879fa67a99614eb62fec upstream.
Alexandar Potapenko while testing the kernel with KMSAN and syzkaller
discovered that in some configurations sctp would leak 4 bytes of
kernel stack.
Working with his reproducer I discovered that those 4 bytes that
are leaked is the scope id of an ipv6 address returned by recvmsg.
With a little code inspection and a shrewd guess I discovered that
sctp_inet6_skb_msgname only initializes the scope_id field for link
local ipv6 addresses to the interface index the link local address
pertains to instead of initializing the scope_id field for all ipv6
addresses.
That is almost reasonable as scope_id's are meaniningful only for link
local addresses. Set the scope_id in all other cases to 0 which is
not a valid interface index to make it clear there is nothing useful
in the scope_id field.
There should be no danger of breaking userspace as the stack leak
guaranteed that previously meaningless random data was being returned.
Fixes: 372f525b495c ("SCTP: Resync with LKSCTP tree.")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- Add braces]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -781,6 +781,8 @@ static void sctp_inet6_skb_msgname(struc
if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
struct sctp_ulpevent *ev = sctp_skb2event(skb);
addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = ev->iif;
+ } else {
+ addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
}
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tuomas Tynkkynen <[email protected]>
commit 9523feac272ccad2ad8186ba4fcc89103754de52 upstream.
Because userspace gets Very Unhappy when calls like stat() and execve()
return -EINTR on 9p filesystem mounts. For instance, when bash is
looking in PATH for things to execute and some SIGCHLD interrupts
stat(), bash can throw a spurious 'command not found' since it doesn't
retry the stat().
In practice, hitting the problem is rare and needs a really
slow/bogged down 9p server.
Signed-off-by: Tuomas Tynkkynen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Drop changes in trans_xen.c
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/net/9p/client.c
+++ b/net/9p/client.c
@@ -740,8 +740,7 @@ p9_client_rpc(struct p9_client *c, int8_
goto reterr;
}
/* Wait for the response */
- err = wait_event_interruptible(*req->wq,
- req->status >= REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
+ err = wait_event_killable(*req->wq, req->status >= REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
if (req->status == REQ_STATUS_ERROR) {
P9_DPRINTK(P9_DEBUG_ERROR, "req_status error %d\n", req->t_err);
--- a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c
+++ b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c
@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ req_retry:
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
chan->ring_bufs_avail = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags);
- err = wait_event_interruptible(*chan->vc_wq,
- chan->ring_bufs_avail);
+ err = wait_event_killable(*chan->vc_wq,
+ chan->ring_bufs_avail);
if (err == -ERESTARTSYS)
return err;
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int p9_get_mapped_pages(struct vi
* Other zc request to finish here
*/
if (atomic_read(&vp_pinned) >= chan->p9_max_pages) {
- err = wait_event_interruptible(vp_wq,
+ err = wait_event_killable(vp_wq,
(atomic_read(&vp_pinned) < chan->p9_max_pages));
if (err == -ERESTARTSYS)
return err;
@@ -419,8 +419,8 @@ req_retry_pinned:
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
chan->ring_bufs_avail = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags);
- err = wait_event_interruptible(*chan->vc_wq,
- chan->ring_bufs_avail);
+ err = wait_event_killable(*chan->vc_wq,
+ chan->ring_bufs_avail);
if (err == -ERESTARTSYS)
goto err_out;
@@ -438,8 +438,7 @@ req_retry_pinned:
virtqueue_kick(chan->vq);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags);
P9_DPRINTK(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "9p debug: virtio request kicked\n");
- err = wait_event_interruptible(*req->wq,
- req->status >= REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
+ err = wait_event_killable(*req->wq, req->status >= REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
/*
* Non kernel buffers are pinned, unpin them
*/
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 4041bcdc7bef06a2fb29c57394c713a74bd13b08 upstream.
We need to recheck ->catatonic after autofs4_wait() got ->wq_mutex
for good, or we might end up with wq inserted into queue after
autofs4_catatonic_mode() had done its thing. It will stick there
forever, since there won't be anything to clear its ->name.name.
A bit of a complication: validate_request() drops and regains ->wq_mutex.
It actually ends up the most convenient place to stick the check into...
Acked-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
fs/autofs4/waitq.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
+++ b/fs/autofs4/waitq.c
@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ static int validate_request(struct autof
struct autofs_wait_queue *wq;
struct autofs_info *ino;
+ if (sbi->catatonic)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
/* Wait in progress, continue; */
wq = autofs4_find_wait(sbi, qstr);
if (wq) {
@@ -289,6 +292,9 @@ static int validate_request(struct autof
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&sbi->wq_mutex))
return -EINTR;
+ if (sbi->catatonic)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
wq = autofs4_find_wait(sbi, qstr);
if (wq) {
*wait = wq;
@@ -389,7 +395,7 @@ int autofs4_wait(struct autofs_sb_info *
ret = validate_request(&wq, sbi, &qstr, dentry, notify);
if (ret <= 0) {
- if (ret == 0)
+ if (ret != -EINTR)
mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
kfree(qstr.name);
return ret;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 71ffe9c77dd7a2b62207953091efa8dafec958dd upstream.
Make sure the packet has enough room for the TCP header and
that it is not malformed.
While at it, store tcph->doff*4 in a variable, as it is used
several times.
This patch also fixes a possible off by one in case of malformed
TCP options.
Reported-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
{
const struct xt_tcpmss_info *info = par->targinfo;
struct tcphdr *tcph;
- unsigned int tcplen, i;
+ int len, tcp_hdrlen;
+ unsigned int i;
__be16 oldval;
u16 newmss;
u8 *opt;
@@ -63,11 +64,14 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
if (!skb_make_writable(skb, skb->len))
return -1;
- tcplen = skb->len - tcphoff;
+ len = skb->len - tcphoff;
+ if (len < (int)sizeof(struct tcphdr))
+ return -1;
+
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + tcphoff);
+ tcp_hdrlen = tcph->doff * 4;
- /* Header cannot be larger than the packet */
- if (tcplen < tcph->doff*4)
+ if (len < tcp_hdrlen)
return -1;
if (info->mss == XT_TCPMSS_CLAMP_PMTU) {
@@ -88,9 +92,8 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
newmss = info->mss;
opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph;
- for (i = sizeof(struct tcphdr); i < tcph->doff*4; i += optlen(opt, i)) {
- if (opt[i] == TCPOPT_MSS && tcph->doff*4 - i >= TCPOLEN_MSS &&
- opt[i+1] == TCPOLEN_MSS) {
+ for (i = sizeof(struct tcphdr); i <= tcp_hdrlen - TCPOLEN_MSS; i += optlen(opt, i)) {
+ if (opt[i] == TCPOPT_MSS && opt[i+1] == TCPOLEN_MSS) {
u_int16_t oldmss;
oldmss = (opt[i+2] << 8) | opt[i+3];
@@ -113,9 +116,10 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
}
/* There is data after the header so the option can't be added
- without moving it, and doing so may make the SYN packet
- itself too large. Accept the packet unmodified instead. */
- if (tcplen > tcph->doff*4)
+ * without moving it, and doing so may make the SYN packet
+ * itself too large. Accept the packet unmodified instead.
+ */
+ if (len > tcp_hdrlen)
return 0;
/*
@@ -132,10 +136,10 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
skb_put(skb, TCPOLEN_MSS);
opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
- memmove(opt + TCPOLEN_MSS, opt, tcplen - sizeof(struct tcphdr));
+ memmove(opt + TCPOLEN_MSS, opt, len - sizeof(struct tcphdr));
inet_proto_csum_replace2(&tcph->check, skb,
- htons(tcplen), htons(tcplen + TCPOLEN_MSS), 1);
+ htons(len), htons(len + TCPOLEN_MSS), 1);
opt[0] = TCPOPT_MSS;
opt[1] = TCPOLEN_MSS;
opt[2] = (newmss & 0xff00) >> 8;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
commit 15038e14724799b8c205beb5f20f9e54896013c3 upstream.
For many years some users of assigned devices have reported worse
performance on AMD processors with NPT than on AMD without NPT,
Intel or bare metal.
The reason turned out to be that SVM is discarding the guest PAT
setting and uses the default (PA0=PA4=WB, PA1=PA5=WT, PA2=PA6=UC-,
PA3=UC). The guest might be using a different setting, and
especially might want write combining but isn't getting it
(instead getting slow UC or UC- accesses).
Thanks a lot to [email protected] for noticing the relation
to the g_pat setting. The patch has been tested also by a bunch
of people on VFIO users forums.
Fixes: 709ddebf81cb40e3c36c6109a7892e8b93a09464
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196409
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Nick Sarnie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3040,6 +3040,13 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
switch (ecx) {
+ case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+ if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
+ return 1;
+ vcpu->arch.pat = data;
+ svm->vmcb->save.g_pat = data;
+ mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, data);
break;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit be6123df1ea8f01ee2f896a16c2b7be3e4557a5a upstream.
stub_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a potential null transfer_buffer,
when it replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain
a null buffer. Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and
transfer_buffer is null.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Device for logging purposes is &sdev->interface->dev
- Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/stub_tx.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_tx.c
@@ -178,6 +178,13 @@ static int stub_send_ret_submit(struct s
memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev,
+ "urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_ISOCHRONOUS)
iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
else
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit 635f545a7e8be7596b9b2b6a43cab6bbd5a88e43 upstream.
get_pipe() routine doesn't validate the input endpoint number
and uses to reference ep_in and ep_out arrays. Invalid endpoint
number can trigger BUG(). Range check the epnum and returning
error instead of calling BUG().
Change caller stub_recv_cmd_submit() to handle the get_pipe()
error return.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -356,15 +356,15 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
+ goto err_ret;
+
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_IN)
ep = udev->ep_in[epnum & 0x7f];
else
ep = udev->ep_out[epnum & 0x7f];
- if (!ep) {
- dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "no such endpoint?, %d\n",
- epnum);
- BUG();
- }
+ if (!ep)
+ goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
@@ -395,9 +395,10 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
return usb_rcvisocpipe(udev, epnum);
}
+err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "get pipe, epnum %d\n", epnum);
- return 0;
+ dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ return -1;
}
static void masking_bogus_flags(struct urb *urb)
@@ -463,6 +464,9 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ if (pipe == -1)
+ return;
+
priv = stub_priv_alloc(sdev, pdu);
if (!priv)
return;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit bc6bcb59dd7c184d229f9e86d08aa56059938a4c upstream.
This target assumes that tcph->doff is well-formed, that may be well
not the case. Add extra sanity checkings to avoid possible crash due
to read/write out of the real packet boundary. After this patch, the
default action on malformed TCP packets is to drop them. Moreover,
fragments are skipped.
Reported-by: Rafal Kupka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c
@@ -30,17 +30,28 @@ static inline unsigned int optlen(const
static unsigned int
tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct xt_tcpoptstrip_target_info *info,
+ const struct xt_action_param *par,
unsigned int tcphoff, unsigned int minlen)
{
+ const struct xt_tcpoptstrip_target_info *info = par->targinfo;
unsigned int optl, i, j;
struct tcphdr *tcph;
u_int16_t n, o;
u_int8_t *opt;
+ int len;
+
+ /* This is a fragment, no TCP header is available */
+ if (par->fragoff != 0)
+ return XT_CONTINUE;
if (!skb_make_writable(skb, skb->len))
return NF_DROP;
+ len = skb->len - tcphoff;
+ if (len < (int)sizeof(struct tcphdr) ||
+ tcp_hdr(skb)->doff * 4 > len)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + tcphoff);
opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph;
@@ -76,7 +87,7 @@ tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff
static unsigned int
tcpoptstrip_tg4(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
{
- return tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(skb, par->targinfo, ip_hdrlen(skb),
+ return tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(skb, par, ip_hdrlen(skb),
sizeof(struct iphdr) + sizeof(struct tcphdr));
}
@@ -93,7 +104,7 @@ tcpoptstrip_tg6(struct sk_buff *skb, con
if (tcphoff < 0)
return NF_DROP;
- return tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(skb, par->targinfo, tcphoff,
+ return tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(skb, par, tcphoff,
sizeof(*ipv6h) + sizeof(struct tcphdr));
}
#endif
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit ed82c437320c48a4032492f4a55a7e2c934158b6 upstream.
In (bc6bcb5 netfilter: xt_TCPOPTSTRIP: fix possible mangling beyond
packet boundary), the use of tcp_hdr was introduced. However, we
cannot assume that skb->transport_header is set for non-local packets.
Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Phil Oester <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.c
@@ -48,11 +48,13 @@ tcpoptstrip_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff
return NF_DROP;
len = skb->len - tcphoff;
- if (len < (int)sizeof(struct tcphdr) ||
- tcp_hdr(skb)->doff * 4 > len)
+ if (len < (int)sizeof(struct tcphdr))
return NF_DROP;
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + tcphoff);
+ if (tcph->doff * 4 > len)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph;
/*
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Phil Oester <[email protected]>
commit b396966c4688522863572927cb30aa874b3ec504 upstream.
Similar to commit bc6bcb59 ("netfilter: xt_TCPOPTSTRIP: fix
possible mangling beyond packet boundary"), add safe fragment
handling to xt_TCPMSS.
Signed-off-by: Phil Oester <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: Change parameters for tcpmss_mangle_packet() as
done upstream in commit 70d19f805f8c "netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: Fix IPv6 default
MSS too"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
@@ -44,17 +44,22 @@ optlen(const u_int8_t *opt, unsigned int
static int
tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct xt_tcpmss_info *info,
+ const struct xt_action_param *par,
unsigned int in_mtu,
unsigned int tcphoff,
unsigned int minlen)
{
+ const struct xt_tcpmss_info *info = par->targinfo;
struct tcphdr *tcph;
unsigned int tcplen, i;
__be16 oldval;
u16 newmss;
u8 *opt;
+ /* This is a fragment, no TCP header is available */
+ if (par->fragoff != 0)
+ return XT_CONTINUE;
+
if (!skb_make_writable(skb, skb->len))
return -1;
@@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ tcpmss_tg4(struct sk_buff *skb, const st
__be16 newlen;
int ret;
- ret = tcpmss_mangle_packet(skb, par->targinfo,
+ ret = tcpmss_mangle_packet(skb, par,
tcpmss_reverse_mtu(skb, PF_INET),
iph->ihl * 4,
sizeof(*iph) + sizeof(struct tcphdr));
@@ -211,7 +216,7 @@ tcpmss_tg6(struct sk_buff *skb, const st
tcphoff = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, sizeof(*ipv6h), &nexthdr);
if (tcphoff < 0)
return NF_DROP;
- ret = tcpmss_mangle_packet(skb, par->targinfo,
+ ret = tcpmss_mangle_packet(skb, par,
tcpmss_reverse_mtu(skb, PF_INET6),
tcphoff,
sizeof(*ipv6h) + sizeof(struct tcphdr));
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Parkin <[email protected]>
commit 4c6e2fd35460208596fa099ee0750a4b0438aa5c upstream.
Add calls to l2tp_session_queue_purge as a part of l2tp_tunnel_closeall
and l2tp_session_delete. Pseudowire implementations which are deleted only
via. l2tp_core l2tp_session_delete calls can dispense with their own code for
flushing the reorder queue.
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -1347,6 +1347,8 @@ again:
synchronize_rcu();
}
+ l2tp_session_queue_purge(session);
+
if (session->session_close != NULL)
(*session->session_close)(session);
@@ -1669,6 +1671,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_free);
*/
int l2tp_session_delete(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
+ l2tp_session_queue_purge(session);
+
if (session->session_close != NULL)
(*session->session_close)(session);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Phil Oester <[email protected]>
commit 1205e1fa615805c9efa97303b552cf445965752a upstream.
In commit b396966c4 (netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: Fix missing fragmentation handling),
I attempted to add safe fragment handling to xt_TCPMSS. However, Andy Padavan
of Project N56U correctly points out that returning XT_CONTINUE in this
function does not work. The callers (tcpmss_tg[46]) expect to receive a value
of 0 in order to return XT_CONTINUE.
Signed-off-by: Phil Oester <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb
/* This is a fragment, no TCP header is available */
if (par->fragoff != 0)
- return XT_CONTINUE;
+ return 0;
if (!skb_make_writable(skb, skb->len))
return -1;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
commit c095508770aebf1b9218e77026e48345d719b17c upstream.
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/rds/rdma.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -516,6 +516,9 @@ int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
+ if (args->nr_local == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
commit 139d28826b8e2bc7a9232fde0d2f14812914f501 upstream.
The max number of interfaces was read from the wrong descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/video/cx231xx/cx231xx-cards.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/video/cx231xx/cx231xx-cards.c
+++ b/drivers/media/video/cx231xx/cx231xx-cards.c
@@ -1070,8 +1070,7 @@ static int cx231xx_usb_probe(struct usb_
dev->vbi_or_sliced_cc_mode = 0;
/* get maximum no.of IAD interfaces */
- assoc_desc = udev->actconfig->intf_assoc[0];
- dev->max_iad_interface_count = assoc_desc->bInterfaceCount;
+ dev->max_iad_interface_count = udev->config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
/* init CIR module TBD */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 upstream.
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early in get_pipe() and return
failure.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Device for logging purposes is &sdev->interface->dev
- Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -350,11 +350,13 @@ static struct stub_priv *stub_priv_alloc
return priv;
}
-static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
+static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ int epnum = pdu->base.ep;
+ int dir = pdu->base.direction;
if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
goto err_ret;
@@ -367,6 +369,15 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
+
+ /* validate transfer_buffer_length */
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > INT_MAX) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: -EMSGSIZE transfer_buffer_length %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, epnum);
@@ -389,6 +400,21 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
}
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(epd)) {
+ /* validate packet size and number of packets */
+ unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+ maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
+ maxp *= usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(epd);
+ bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+ packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndisocpipe(udev, epnum);
else
@@ -397,7 +423,7 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "CMD_SUBMIT: invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
return -1;
}
@@ -462,7 +488,7 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
struct stub_priv *priv;
struct usbip_device *ud = &sdev->ud;
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
- int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);
if (pipe == -1)
return;
@@ -485,7 +511,8 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
}
/* set priv->urb->transfer_buffer */
- if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0) {
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0 &&
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length <= INT_MAX) {
priv->urb->transfer_buffer =
kzalloc(pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length,
GFP_KERNEL);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Parkin <[email protected]>
commit cf2f5c886a209377daefd5d2ba0bcd49c3887813 upstream.
If userspace deletes a ppp pseudowire using the netlink API, either by
directly deleting the session or by deleting the tunnel that contains the
session, we need to tear down the corresponding pppox channel.
Rather than trying to manage two pppox unbind codepaths, switch the netlink
and l2tp_core session_close handlers to close via. the l2tp_ppp socket
.release handler.
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 53 ++++++++++-------------------------------------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
@@ -460,34 +461,16 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_close(struc
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
struct sock *sk = ps->sock;
- struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
- if (session->session_id == 0)
- goto out;
-
- if (sk != NULL) {
- lock_sock(sk);
-
- if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_CONNECTED | PPPOX_BOUND)) {
- pppox_unbind_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_state = PPPOX_DEAD;
- sk->sk_state_change(sk);
- }
-
- /* Purge any queued data */
- skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
- skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
- while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&session->reorder_q))) {
- kfree_skb(skb);
- sock_put(sk);
- }
- release_sock(sk);
+ if (sock) {
+ inet_shutdown(sock, 2);
+ /* Don't let the session go away before our socket does */
+ l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
}
-
-out:
return;
}
@@ -538,16 +521,12 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socke
session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
/* Purge any queued data */
- skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
- skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
if (session != NULL) {
- struct sk_buff *skb;
- while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&session->reorder_q))) {
- kfree_skb(skb);
- sock_put(sk);
- }
+ l2tp_session_queue_purge(session);
sock_put(sk);
}
+ skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
release_sock(sk);
@@ -872,18 +851,6 @@ out:
return error;
}
-/* Called when deleting sessions via the netlink interface.
- */
-static int pppol2tp_session_delete(struct l2tp_session *session)
-{
- struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-
- if (ps->sock == NULL)
- l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_L2TP_V3 */
/* getname() support.
@@ -1801,7 +1768,7 @@ static const struct pppox_proto pppol2tp
static const struct l2tp_nl_cmd_ops pppol2tp_nl_cmd_ops = {
.session_create = pppol2tp_session_create,
- .session_delete = pppol2tp_session_delete,
+ .session_delete = l2tp_session_delete,
};
#endif /* CONFIG_L2TP_V3 */
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Parkin <[email protected]>
commit 48f72f92b31431c40279b0fba6c5588e07e67d95 upstream.
If an l2tp session is deleted, it is necessary to delete skbs in-flight
on the session's reorder queue before taking it down.
Rather than having each pseudowire implementation reaching into the
l2tp_session struct to handle this itself, provide a function in l2tp_core to
purge the session queue.
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: use non-atomic increment on rx_errors]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -830,6 +830,23 @@ discard:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(l2tp_recv_common);
+/* Drop skbs from the session's reorder_q
+ */
+int l2tp_session_queue_purge(struct l2tp_session *session)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+ BUG_ON(!session);
+ BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&session->reorder_q))) {
+ session->stats.rx_errors++;
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ if (session->deref)
+ (*session->deref)(session);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_queue_purge);
+
/* Internal UDP receive frame. Do the real work of receiving an L2TP data frame
* here. The skb is not on a list when we get here.
* Returns 0 if the packet was a data packet and was successfully passed on.
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ extern struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session
extern int l2tp_session_delete(struct l2tp_session *session);
extern void l2tp_session_free(struct l2tp_session *session);
extern void l2tp_recv_common(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char *ptr, unsigned char *optr, u16 hdrflags, int length, int (*payload_hook)(struct sk_buff *skb));
+extern int l2tp_session_queue_purge(struct l2tp_session *session);
extern int l2tp_udp_encap_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
extern int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
This resolves a crash if loaded under qemu + haxm under windows.
See https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2689835.html for details.
Here is a boot log (the log is from chromeos-4.4, but Tao Wu says that
the same log is also seen with vanilla v4.4.110-rc1).
[ 0.712750] Freeing unused kernel memory: 552K
[ 0.721821] init: Corrupted page table at address 57b029b332e0
[ 0.722761] PGD 80000000bb238067 PUD bc36a067 PMD bc369067 PTE 45d2067
[ 0.722761] Bad pagetable: 000b [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 0.722761] Modules linked in:
[ 0.722761] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 4.4.96 #31
[ 0.722761] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.7.5.1-0-g8936dbb-20141113_115728-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[ 0.722761] task: ffff8800bc290000 ti: ffff8800bc28c000 task.ti: ffff8800bc28c000
[ 0.722761] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff83f4129e>] [<ffffffff83f4129e>] __clear_user+0x42/0x67
[ 0.722761] RSP: 0000:ffff8800bc28fcf8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 0.722761] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000001a4 RCX: 00000000000001a4
[ 0.722761] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 000057b029b332e0
[ 0.722761] RBP: ffff8800bc28fd08 R08: ffff8800bc290000 R09: ffff8800bb2f4000
[ 0.722761] R10: ffff8800bc290000 R11: ffff8800bb2f4000 R12: 000057b029b332e0
[ 0.722761] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000057b029b33340 R15: ffff8800bb1e2a00
[ 0.722761] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 0.722761] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 0.722761] CR2: 000057b029b332e0 CR3: 00000000bb2f8000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 0.722761] Stack:
[ 0.722761] 000057b029b332e0 ffff8800bb95fa80 ffff8800bc28fd18 ffffffff83f4120c
[ 0.722761] ffff8800bc28fe18 ffffffff83e9e7a1 ffff8800bc28fd68 0000000000000000
[ 0.722761] ffff8800bc290000 ffff8800bc290000 ffff8800bc290000 ffff8800bc290000
[ 0.722761] Call Trace:
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83f4120c>] clear_user+0x2e/0x30
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83e9e7a1>] load_elf_binary+0xa7f/0x18f7
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83de2088>] search_binary_handler+0x86/0x19c
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83de389e>] do_execveat_common.isra.26+0x909/0xf98
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff844febe0>] ? rest_init+0x87/0x87
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83de40be>] do_execve+0x23/0x25
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83c002e3>] run_init_process+0x2b/0x2d
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff844fec4d>] kernel_init+0x6d/0xda
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff84505b2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff844febe0>] ? rest_init+0x87/0x87
[ 0.722761] Code: 86 84 be 12 00 00 00 e8 87 0d e8 ff 66 66 90 48 89 d8 48 c1
eb 03 4c 89 e7 83 e0 07 48 89 d9 be 08 00 00 00 31 d2 48 85 c9 74 0a <48> 89 17
48 01 f7 ff c9 75 f6 48 89 c1 85 c9 74 09 88 17 48 ff
[ 0.722761] RIP [<ffffffff83f4129e>] __clear_user+0x42/0x67
[ 0.722761] RSP <ffff8800bc28fcf8>
[ 0.722761] ---[ end trace def703879b4ff090 ]---
[ 0.722761] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /mnt/host/source/src/third_party/kernel/v4.4/kernel/locking/rwsem.c:21
[ 0.722761] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 1, name: init
[ 0.722761] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G D 4.4.96 #31
[ 0.722761] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5.1-0-g8936dbb-20141113_115728-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[ 0.722761] 0000000000000086 dcb5d76098c89836 ffff8800bc28fa30 ffffffff83f34004
[ 0.722761] ffffffff84839dc2 0000000000000015 ffff8800bc28fa40 ffffffff83d57dc9
[ 0.722761] ffff8800bc28fa68 ffffffff83d57e6a ffffffff84a53640 0000000000000000
[ 0.722761] Call Trace:
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83f34004>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x63
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83d57dc9>] ___might_sleep+0x13a/0x13c
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83d57e6a>] __might_sleep+0x9f/0xa6
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff84502788>] down_read+0x20/0x31
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83cc5d9b>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x35/0x63
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83cc5ddd>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x16
[ 0.800374] usb 1-1: new full-speed USB device number 2 using uhci_hcd
[ 0.722761] [<ffffffff83cefe97>] profile_task_exit+0x1a/0x1c
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83cac84e>] do_exit+0x39/0xe7f
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83ce5938>] ? vprintk_default+0x1d/0x1f
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83d7bb95>] ? printk+0x57/0x73
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83c46e25>] oops_end+0x80/0x85
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83c7b747>] pgtable_bad+0x8a/0x95
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83ca7f4a>] __do_page_fault+0x8c/0x352
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83eefba5>] ? file_has_perm+0xc4/0xe5
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83ca821c>] do_page_fault+0xc/0xe
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff84507682>] page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83f4129e>] ? __clear_user+0x42/0x67
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83f4127f>] ? __clear_user+0x23/0x67
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83f4120c>] clear_user+0x2e/0x30
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83e9e7a1>] load_elf_binary+0xa7f/0x18f7
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83de2088>] search_binary_handler+0x86/0x19c
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83de389e>] do_execveat_common.isra.26+0x909/0xf98
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff844febe0>] ? rest_init+0x87/0x87
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83de40be>] do_execve+0x23/0x25
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff83c002e3>] run_init_process+0x2b/0x2d
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff844fec4d>] kernel_init+0x6d/0xda
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff84505b2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 0.802309] [<ffffffff844febe0>] ? rest_init+0x87/0x87
[ 0.830559] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
[ 0.830559]
[ 0.831305] Kernel Offset: 0x2c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[ 0.831305] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
The crash part of this problem may be solved with the following patch
(thanks to Hugh for the hint). There is still another problem, though -
with this patch applied, the qemu session aborts with "VCPU Shutdown
request", whatever that means.
Cc: lepton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit b33c3c64c4786cd724ccde6fa97c87ada49f6a73 linux-4.4.y)
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -411,7 +411,8 @@ pgd_t kaiser_set_shadow_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp,
* get out to userspace running on the kernel CR3,
* userspace will crash instead of running.
*/
- pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
+ if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
+ pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
}
} else if (!pgd.pgd) {
/*
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit 8a0d18c62121d3c554a83eb96e2752861d84d937 upstream.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Workqueue: ib_mad2 timeout_sends [ib_core]
Call Trace:
ib_sa_path_rec_callback+0x1c4/0x1d0 [ib_core]
send_handler+0xb2/0xd0 [ib_core]
timeout_sends+0x14d/0x220 [ib_core]
process_one_work+0x200/0x630
worker_thread+0x4e/0x3b0
kthread+0x113/0x150
Fixes: commit aef9ec39c47f ("IB: Add SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) initiator")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c
@@ -310,10 +310,19 @@ static void srp_path_rec_completion(int
static int srp_lookup_path(struct srp_target_port *target)
{
+ int ret = -ENODEV;
+
target->path.numb_path = 1;
init_completion(&target->done);
+ /*
+ * Avoid that the SCSI host can be removed by srp_remove_target()
+ * before srp_path_rec_completion() is called.
+ */
+ if (!scsi_host_get(target->scsi_host))
+ goto out;
+
target->path_query_id = ib_sa_path_rec_get(&srp_sa_client,
target->srp_host->srp_dev->dev,
target->srp_host->port,
@@ -327,16 +336,22 @@ static int srp_lookup_path(struct srp_ta
GFP_KERNEL,
srp_path_rec_completion,
target, &target->path_query);
- if (target->path_query_id < 0)
- return target->path_query_id;
+ ret = target->path_query_id;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto put;
wait_for_completion(&target->done);
- if (target->status < 0)
+ ret = target->status;
+ if (ret < 0)
shost_printk(KERN_WARNING, target->scsi_host,
PFX "Path record query failed\n");
- return target->status;
+put:
+ scsi_host_put(target->scsi_host);
+
+out:
+ return ret;
}
static int srp_send_req(struct srp_target_port *target)
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
commit 7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737 upstream.
set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails
or the user supplied address is invalid,
this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op()
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/rds/rdma.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -855,6 +855,7 @@ int rds_cmsg_atomic(struct rds_sock *rs,
err:
if (page)
put_page(page);
+ rm->atomic.op_active = 0;
kfree(rm->atomic.op_notifier);
return ret;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
commit 74717b28cb32e1ad3c1042cafd76b264c8c0f68d upstream.
If there is any non expired timer in the queue, the RTC alarm is never set.
This is an issue when adding a timer that expires before the next non
expired timer.
Ensure the RTC alarm is set in that case.
Fixes: 2b2f5ff00f63 ("rtc: interface: ignore expired timers when enqueuing new timers")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code ktime_before()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/rtc/interface.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/rtc/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/interface.c
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ static int rtc_timer_enqueue(struct rtc_
}
timerqueue_add(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node);
- if (!next) {
+ if (!next || timer->node.expires.tv64 < next->expires.tv64) {
struct rtc_wkalrm alarm;
int err;
alarm.time = rtc_ktime_to_tm(timer->node.expires);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit 1dbc080c9ef6bcfba652ef0d6ae919b8c7c85a1d upstream.
FIFO_MODE() is a macro expression with a '<<' operator, which gcc points
out could be misread as a '<':
drivers/input/misc/adxl34x.c: In function 'adxl34x_probe':
drivers/input/misc/adxl34x.c:799:36: error: '<<' in boolean context, did you mean '<' ? [-Werror=int-in-bool-context]
While utility of this warning is being disputed (Chief Penguin: "This
warning is clearly pure garbage.") FIFO_MODE() extracts range of values,
with 0 being FIFO_BYPASS, and not something that is logically boolean.
This converts the test to an explicit comparison with FIFO_BYPASS,
making it clearer to gcc and the reader what is intended.
Fixes: e27c729219ad ("Input: add driver for ADXL345/346 Digital Accelerometers")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/input/misc/adxl34x.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/input/misc/adxl34x.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/adxl34x.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ struct adxl34x *adxl34x_probe(struct dev
if (pdata->watermark) {
ac->int_mask |= WATERMARK;
- if (!FIFO_MODE(pdata->fifo_mode))
+ if (FIFO_MODE(pdata->fifo_mode) == FIFO_BYPASS)
ac->pdata.fifo_mode |= FIFO_STREAM;
} else {
ac->int_mask |= DATA_READY;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
commit cdd10c9627496ad25c87ce6394e29752253c69d3 upstream.
If l2tp_tunnel_delete() or l2tp_tunnel_closeall() deletes a session
right after pppol2tp_release() orphaned its socket, then the 'sock'
variable of the pppol2tp_session_close() callback is NULL. Yet the
session is still used by pppol2tp_release().
Therefore we need to take an extra reference in any case, to prevent
l2tp_tunnel_delete() or l2tp_tunnel_closeall() from freeing the session.
Since the pppol2tp_session_close() callback is only set if the session
is associated to a PPPOL2TP socket and that both l2tp_tunnel_delete()
and l2tp_tunnel_closeall() hold the PPPOL2TP socket before calling
pppol2tp_session_close(), we're sure that pppol2tp_session_close() and
pppol2tp_session_destruct() are paired and called in the right order.
So the reference taken by the former will be released by the later.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -466,11 +466,11 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_close(struc
BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
- if (sock) {
+ if (sock)
inet_shutdown(sock, 2);
- /* Don't let the session go away before our socket does */
- l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
- }
+
+ /* Don't let the session go away before our socket does */
+ l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
return;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 74d471b598444b7f2d964930f7234779c80960a0 upstream.
Make sure to free the port private data before returning after a failed
probe attempt.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/garmin_gps.c
@@ -1476,6 +1476,12 @@ static int garmin_attach(struct usb_seri
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, garmin_data_p);
status = garmin_init_session(port);
+ if (status)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ return 0;
+err_free:
+ kfree(garmin_data_p);
return status;
}
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
commit 2b2f5ff00f63847d95adad6289bd8b05f5983dd5 upstream.
This patch fixes a RTC wakealarm issue, namely, the event fires during
hibernate and is not cleared from the list, causing hwclock to block.
The current enqueuing does not trigger an alarm if any expired timers
already exist on the timerqueue. This can occur when a RTC wake alarm
is used to wake a machine out of hibernate and the resumed state has
old expired timers that have not been removed from the timer queue.
This fix skips over any expired timers and triggers an alarm if there
are no pending timers on the timerqueue. Note that the skipped expired
timer will get reaped later on, so there is no need to clean it up
immediately.
The issue can be reproduced by putting a machine into hibernate and
waking it with the RTC wakealarm. Running the example RTC test program
from tools/testing/selftests/timers/rtctest.c after the hibernate will
block indefinitely. With the fix, it no longer blocks after the
hibernate resume.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1333569
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/rtc/interface.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/rtc/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/interface.c
@@ -749,9 +749,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_irq_set_freq);
*/
static int rtc_timer_enqueue(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_timer *timer)
{
+ struct timerqueue_node *next = timerqueue_getnext(&rtc->timerqueue);
+ struct rtc_time tm;
+ ktime_t now;
+
timer->enabled = 1;
+ __rtc_read_time(rtc, &tm);
+ now = rtc_tm_to_ktime(tm);
+
+ /* Skip over expired timers */
+ while (next) {
+ if (next->expires.tv64 >= now.tv64)
+ break;
+ next = timerqueue_iterate_next(next);
+ }
+
timerqueue_add(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node);
- if (&timer->node == timerqueue_getnext(&rtc->timerqueue)) {
+ if (!next) {
struct rtc_wkalrm alarm;
int err;
alarm.time = rtc_ktime_to_tm(timer->node.expires);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ladi Prosek <[email protected]>
commit 21f2d551183847bc7fbe8d866151d00cdad18752 upstream.
Intel SDM 27.5.2 Loading Host Segment and Descriptor-Table Registers:
"The GDTR and IDTR limits are each set to FFFFH."
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -7076,6 +7076,8 @@ void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_v
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_idtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_gdtr_base);
+ vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xFFFF);
+ vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xFFFF);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, vmcs12->host_tr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, vmcs12->host_gs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, vmcs12->host_fs_base);
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]>
commit 86acc790717fb60fb51ea3095084e331d8711c74 upstream.
Previously, if an non-fatal error was reported by an endpoint, we
called report_error_detected() for the endpoint, every sibling on the
bus, and their descendents. If any of them did not implement the
.error_detected() method, do_recovery() failed, leaving all these
devices unrecovered.
For example, the system described in the bugzilla below has two devices:
0000:74:02.0 [19e5:a230] SAS controller, driver has .error_detected()
0000:74:03.0 [19e5:a235] SATA controller, driver lacks .error_detected()
When a device such as 74:02.0 reported a non-fatal error, do_recovery()
failed because 74:03.0 lacked an .error_detected() method. But per PCIe
r3.1, sec 6.2.2.2.2, such an error does not compromise the Link and
does not affect 74:03.0:
Non-fatal errors are uncorrectable errors which cause a particular
transaction to be unreliable but the Link is otherwise fully functional.
Isolating Non-fatal from Fatal errors provides Requester/Receiver logic
in a device or system management software the opportunity to recover from
the error without resetting the components on the Link and disturbing
other transactions in progress. Devices not associated with the
transaction in error are not impacted by the error.
Report non-fatal errors only to the endpoint that reported them. We really
want to check for AER_NONFATAL here, but the current code structure doesn't
allow that. Looking for pci_channel_io_normal is the best we can do now.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197055
Fixes: 6c2b374d7485 ("PCI-Express AER implemetation: AER core and aerdriver")
Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dongdong Liu <[email protected]>
[bhelgaas: changelog]
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c
@@ -367,7 +367,14 @@ static pci_ers_result_t broadcast_error_
* If the error is reported by an end point, we think this
* error is related to the upstream link of the end point.
*/
- pci_walk_bus(dev->bus, cb, &result_data);
+ if (state == pci_channel_io_normal)
+ /*
+ * the error is non fatal so the bus is ok, just invoke
+ * the callback for the function that logged the error.
+ */
+ cb(dev, &result_data);
+ else
+ pci_walk_bus(dev->bus, cb, &result_data);
}
return result_data.result;
3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lepton Wu <[email protected]>
This finally resolve crash if loaded under qemu + haxm. Haitao Shan pointed
out that the reason of that crash is that NX bit get set for page tables.
It seems we missed checking if _PAGE_NX is supported in kaiser_add_user_map
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2689835.html
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lepton Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
(backported from Greg K-H's 4.4 stable-queue)
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ static int kaiser_add_user_map(const voi
* requires that not to be #defined to 0): so mask it off here.
*/
flags &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
+ if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
+ flags &= ~_PAGE_NX;
if (flags & _PAGE_USER)
BUG_ON(address < FIXADDR_START || end_addr >= FIXADDR_TOP);
Hi Ben,
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() was introduced in 4.6 and the problem this patch
fixes is only exist in the kernel 4.6 and above 4.6.
Thanks,
Alex
On 2018/2/11 12:20, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> 3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: alex chen <[email protected]>
>
> commit 28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300 upstream.
>
> we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
> ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
>
> process 1 process 2 process 3
> truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
> ocfs2_setattr
> ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
> ocfs2_inode_lock_full
> inode_dio_wait
> __inode_dio_wait
> -->waiting for all dio
> requests finish
> dlm_proxy_ast_handler
> dlm_do_local_bast
> ocfs2_blocking_ast
> ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
> set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
> dio_end_io
> dio_bio_end_aio
> dio_complete
> ocfs2_dio_end_io
> ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
> ocfs2_inode_lock
> __ocfs2_cluster_lock
> ocfs2_wait_for_mask
> -->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
> flag to be cleared, that is waiting
> for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
> inode_dio_end
> -->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
> be called, so a deadlock happened.
>
> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
> Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/file.c | 9 +++++++--
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
> @@ -1130,6 +1130,13 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> dquot_initialize(inode);
> size_change = S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE;
> if (size_change) {
> + /*
> + * Here we should wait dio to finish before inode lock
> + * to avoid a deadlock between ocfs2_setattr() and
> + * ocfs2_dio_end_io_write()
> + */
> + inode_dio_wait(inode);
> +
> status = ocfs2_rw_lock(inode, 1);
> if (status < 0) {
> mlog_errno(status);
> @@ -1149,8 +1156,6 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> if (status)
> goto bail_unlock;
>
> - inode_dio_wait(inode);
> -
> if (i_size_read(inode) >= attr->ia_size) {
> if (ocfs2_should_order_data(inode)) {
> status = ocfs2_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,
>
>
> .
>
On 02/10/2018 08:20 PM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.2.99 release.
> There are 79 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Feb 13 12:00:00 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 86 pass: 86 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 69 pass: 69 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
On Sun, 2018-02-11 at 15:39 +0800, alex chen wrote:
> Hi Ben,
>
> ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() was introduced in 4.6 and the problem this patch
> fixes is only exist in the kernel 4.6 and above 4.6.
Thanks for the reminder. I'll drop this from the 3.2 and 3.16 patch
queues.
Ben.
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
> On 2018/2/11 12:20, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > 3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: alex chen <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit 28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300 upstream.
> >
> > we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
> > ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
> >
> > process 1 process 2 process 3
> > truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
> > ocfs2_setattr
> > ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
> > ocfs2_inode_lock_full
> > inode_dio_wait
> > __inode_dio_wait
> > -->waiting for all dio
> > requests finish
> > dlm_proxy_ast_handler
> > dlm_do_local_bast
> > ocfs2_blocking_ast
> > ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
> > set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
> > dio_end_io
> > dio_bio_end_aio
> > dio_complete
> > ocfs2_dio_end_io
> > ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
> > ocfs2_inode_lock
> > __ocfs2_cluster_lock
> > ocfs2_wait_for_mask
> > -->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
> > flag to be cleared, that is waiting
> > for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
> > inode_dio_end
> > -->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
> > be called, so a deadlock happened.
> >
> > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
> > Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
> > Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > fs/ocfs2/file.c | 9 +++++++--
> > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > --- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
> > +++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
> > @@ -1130,6 +1130,13 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > dquot_initialize(inode);
> > size_change = S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE;
> > if (size_change) {
> > + /*
> > + * Here we should wait dio to finish before inode lock
> > + * to avoid a deadlock between ocfs2_setattr() and
> > + * ocfs2_dio_end_io_write()
> > + */
> > + inode_dio_wait(inode);
> > +
> > status = ocfs2_rw_lock(inode, 1);
> > if (status < 0) {
> > mlog_errno(status);
> > @@ -1149,8 +1156,6 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > if (status)
> > goto bail_unlock;
> >
> > - inode_dio_wait(inode);
> > -
> > if (i_size_read(inode) >= attr->ia_size) {
> > if (ocfs2_should_order_data(inode)) {
> > status = ocfs2_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,
> >
> >
> > .
> >
>
>
--
Ben Hutchings
Sturgeon's Law: Ninety percent of everything is crap.
On Sun, 11 Feb 2018 05:20:06 +0100,
Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
> 3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
>
> commit 8428a8ebde2db1e988e41a58497a28beb7ce1705 upstream.
Please drop this. This patch is broken, and was reverted in the later
commit 3c02a6d94665.
thanks,
Takashi
>
> parse_audio_feature_unit() contains a code dividing potentially with
> zero when a malformed FU descriptor is passed. Although there is
> already a sanity check, it checks only the value zero, hence it can
> still lead to a zero-division when a value 1 is passed there.
>
> Fix it by correcting the sanity check (and the error message
> thereof).
>
> Fixes: 23caaf19b11e ("ALSA: usb-mixer: Add support for Audio Class v2.0")
> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
> ---
> sound/usb/mixer.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
> +++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
> @@ -1262,9 +1262,9 @@ static int parse_audio_feature_unit(stru
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> csize = hdr->bControlSize;
> - if (!csize) {
> + if (csize <= 1) {
> snd_printdd(KERN_ERR "usbaudio: unit %u: "
> - "invalid bControlSize == 0\n", unitid);
> + "invalid bControlSize <= 1\n", unitid);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> channels = (hdr->bLength - 7) / csize - 1;
>
On Mon, 2018-02-12 at 07:59 +0100, Takashi Iwai wrote:
> On Sun, 11 Feb 2018 05:20:06 +0100,
> Ben Hutchings wrote:
> >
> > 3.2.99-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit 8428a8ebde2db1e988e41a58497a28beb7ce1705 upstream.
>
> Please drop this. This patch is broken, and was reverted in the later
> commit 3c02a6d94665.
Thanks, I've dropped this from 3.2 and 3.16 patch queues.
Ben.
> thanks,
>
> Takashi
>
>
> >
> > parse_audio_feature_unit() contains a code dividing potentially with
> > zero when a malformed FU descriptor is passed. Although there is
> > already a sanity check, it checks only the value zero, hence it can
> > still lead to a zero-division when a value 1 is passed there.
> >
> > Fix it by correcting the sanity check (and the error message
> > thereof).
> >
> > Fixes: 23caaf19b11e ("ALSA: usb-mixer: Add support for Audio Class v2.0")
> > Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
> > [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > sound/usb/mixer.c | 4 ++--
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > --- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
> > +++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
> > @@ -1262,9 +1262,9 @@ static int parse_audio_feature_unit(stru
> > return -EINVAL;
> > }
> > csize = hdr->bControlSize;
> > - if (!csize) {
> > + if (csize <= 1) {
> > snd_printdd(KERN_ERR "usbaudio: unit %u: "
> > - "invalid bControlSize == 0\n", unitid);
> > + "invalid bControlSize <= 1\n", unitid);
> > return -EINVAL;
> > }
> > channels = (hdr->bLength - 7) / csize - 1;
> >
--
Ben Hutchings
friends: People who know you well, but like you anyway.