Quoting Andy Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> Every now and then, someone wants to let unprivileged programs change
> something about their execution environment (think unsharing namespaces,
> changing capabilities, disabling networking, chrooting, mounting and
> unmounting filesystems). Whether or not any of these abilities are good
> ideas, there's a recurring problem that gets most of these patches shot
> down: setuid executables.
>
> The obvious solution is to allow a process to opt out of setuid
> semantics and require processes to do this before using these shiny new
> features. [1] [2]
>
> But there's a problem with this, too: with LSMs running, execve can do
> pretty much anything, and even unprivileged users running unprivileged
> programs can have crazy security implications. (Take a look at a
> default install of Fedora. If you can understand the security
> implications of disabling setuid, you get a cookie. If you can figure
> out which programs will result in a change of security label when
> exec'd, you get another cookie.)
>
> So here's another solution, based on the idea that in a sane world,
> execve should be a lot less magical than it is. Any unprivileged
> program can open an executable, parse its headers, map it, and run it,
> although getting all the details right is tedious at best (and there's
> no good way to get all of the threading semantics right from userspace).
>
> Patch 1 adds a new syscall execve_nosecurity. It does an exec, but
> without changing any security properties. This means no setuid, no
> setgid, no LSM credential hooks (e.g. no SELinux type transitions), and
> no ptrace restrictions. (You have to have read access to the program,
> because disabling security stuff could allow someone to ptrace a program
> that they couldn't otherwise ptrace.) This shouldn't be particularly
> scary -- any process could do much the same thing with open and mmap.
> (You can easily shoot yourself in the foot with this syscall -- think
> LD_PRELOAD or running some program with insufficient error checking that
> can get subverted when run in the wrong security context. So don't do
> that.)
>
> Patch 2 adds a prctl that irrevocably disables execve. Making execve do
> something different that could confuse LSMs is dangerous. Turning the
> whole thing off shouldn't be. (Of course, with execve disabled, you can
> still use execve_nosecurity. But any program that does that should take
> precautions not to shoot itself in the foot.) (In a future revision,
> this should probably be a new syscall.)
>
> Sadly, programs that have opted out of execve might want to use
> subprocesses that in turn run execve. This will fail. So patch 3
> (which is ugly, but I don't see anything fundamentally wrong with it)
> allows processes to set a flag that turns execve into execve_nosecurity.
> This flag survives exec. Of course, this could be used to subvert
> setuid programs, so you can't set this flag unless you disable ordinary
> exec first.
>
> [1] Unprivileged: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/12/30/265
> [2] securebit approach: http://lwn.net/Articles/368600/
No responses for a month after this was sent. Really, thanks, I do
appreciate the work at another approach.
I'll be honest, I prefer option [1]. Though I think it's reasonable
to require privilege for prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID). Make it a separate
capability, and on most systems it should be safe to have a file
sitting in /bin with cap_set_nosuid+pe. If OTOH you know you have
legacy or poorly coded privileged programs which would not be safe
bc they don't verify that they have the needed privs, you just don't
provide the program to do prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID) for unprivileged users.
( I did like using new securebits as in [2], but I prefer the
automatic not-raising-privs of [1] to simply -EPERM on uid/gid
change and lack kof checking for privs raising of [2]. )
Really the trick will be finding a balance to satisfy those wanting
this as a separate LSM, without traipsing into LSM stacking territory.
I myself think this feature fits very nicely with established semantics,
but not everyone agrees, so chances are my view is a bit tainted, and
we should defer to those wanting this to be an LSM.
Of course, another alternative is to skip this feature altogether and
push toward targeted capabilties. The problem is that path amounts
to playing whack-a-mole to catch all the places where privilege might
leak to a parent namespace, whereas [1] simply, cleanly cuts them all
off at the source.
thanks,
-serge
On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 1:26 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>> Every now and then, someone wants to let unprivileged programs change
>> something about their execution environment (think unsharing namespaces,
>> changing capabilities, disabling networking, chrooting, mounting and
>> unmounting filesystems). ?Whether or not any of these abilities are good
>> ideas, there's a recurring problem that gets most of these patches shot
>> down: setuid executables.
>>
>> The obvious solution is to allow a process to opt out of setuid
>> semantics and require processes to do this before using these shiny new
>> features. [1] [2]
>>
>> But there's a problem with this, too: with LSMs running, execve can do
>> pretty much anything, and even unprivileged users running unprivileged
>> programs can have crazy security implications. ?(Take a look at a
>> default install of Fedora. ?If you can understand the security
>> implications of disabling setuid, you get a cookie. ?If you can figure
>> out which programs will result in a change of security label when
>> exec'd, you get another cookie.)
>>
>> So here's another solution, based on the idea that in a sane world,
>> execve should be a lot less magical than it is. ?Any unprivileged
>> program can open an executable, parse its headers, map it, and run it,
>> although getting all the details right is tedious at best (and there's
>> no good way to get all of the threading semantics right from userspace).
>>
>> Patch 1 adds a new syscall execve_nosecurity. ?It does an exec, but
>> without changing any security properties. ?This means no setuid, no
>> setgid, no LSM credential hooks (e.g. no SELinux type transitions), and
>> no ptrace restrictions. ?(You have to have read access to the program,
>> because disabling security stuff could allow someone to ptrace a program
>> that they couldn't otherwise ptrace.) ?This shouldn't be particularly
>> scary -- any process could do much the same thing with open and mmap.
>> (You can easily shoot yourself in the foot with this syscall -- think
>> LD_PRELOAD or running some program with insufficient error checking that
>> can get subverted when run in the wrong security context. ?So don't do
>> that.)
>>
>> Patch 2 adds a prctl that irrevocably disables execve. ?Making execve do
>> something different that could confuse LSMs is dangerous. ?Turning the
>> whole thing off shouldn't be. ?(Of course, with execve disabled, you can
>> still use execve_nosecurity. ?But any program that does that should take
>> precautions not to shoot itself in the foot.) ?(In a future revision,
>> this should probably be a new syscall.)
>>
>> Sadly, programs that have opted out of execve might want to use
>> subprocesses that in turn run execve. ?This will fail. ?So patch 3
>> (which is ugly, but I don't see anything fundamentally wrong with it)
>> allows processes to set a flag that turns execve into execve_nosecurity.
>> This flag survives exec. ?Of course, this could be used to subvert
>> setuid programs, so you can't set this flag unless you disable ordinary
>> exec first.
>>
>> [1] Unprivileged: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/12/30/265
>> [2] securebit approach: http://lwn.net/Articles/368600/
>
> No responses for a month after this was sent. ?Really, thanks, I do
> appreciate the work at another approach.
>
> I'll be honest, I prefer option [1]. ?Though I think it's reasonable
> to require privilege for prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID). ?Make it a separate
> capability, and on most systems it should be safe to have a file
> sitting in /bin with cap_set_nosuid+pe. ?If OTOH you know you have
> legacy or poorly coded privileged programs which would not be safe
> bc they don't verify that they have the needed privs, you just don't
> provide the program to do prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID) for unprivileged users.
Both approaches result in two kinds of exec: the normal kind that
respects setuid, file capabilities, and LSMs, and the restricted kind
that is supposed to be safe when programs have unshared namespaces and
other crazy things.
Eric's approach [1] adds a restricted kind of exec that ignores setuid
but still (AFAICT) respects file capabilities and LSM transitions. I
think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
question is well-written.
2. File capabilities are just as dangerous as setuid, and I wouldn't
even know how to write a program that's safe when it has extra
capabilities granted by fE (or fP or whatever it is) and the caller
has, say, an unshared fs namespace and the ability to rearrange the
namespace arbitrarily.
In short, I think that this nosuid exec is both dangerous in and of
itself *and* doesn't actually solve the problem it was supposed to
solve.
I also don't like relying on the admin to decide that it's safe to
allow PR_SET_NOSUID (or whatever you call it) and having to install a
special privileged program to enable it. If sandbox-like features
require explicit action by root, then they won't be as widely used as
they should be. And how many admins will have any clue whether
enabling this feature is safe?
My approach introduces what I think is a much more obviously safe
restricted exec, and I think it's so safe that no privilege or special
configuration should be required to use it.
As for what to call it (execve_nosecurity or PR_SET_NOSUID) or whether
to have a special syscall so that programs that aren't restricted can
use the restricted exec, I don't care all that much. I just think
that the separate syscall might be useful in its own right and
required almost no additional code, so I added it.
>
> ( I did like using new securebits as in [2], but I prefer the
> automatic not-raising-privs of [1] to simply -EPERM on uid/gid
> change and lack kof checking for privs raising of [2]. )
>
> Really the trick will be finding a balance to satisfy those wanting
> this as a separate LSM, without traipsing into LSM stacking territory.
I think that making this an LSM is absurd. Containers (and anything
else people want to do with namespaces or with other new features that
interact badly with setuid) are features that people should be able to
use easily, and system's choice of LSM shouldn't have anything to do
with them. Not to mention that we're trying to *add* rights (e.g.
unprivileged unshare), and LSM is about *removing* rights.
>
> I myself think this feature fits very nicely with established semantics,
> but not everyone agrees, so chances are my view is a bit tainted, and
> we should defer to those wanting this to be an LSM.
>
> Of course, another alternative is to skip this feature altogether and
> push toward targeted capabilties. ?The problem is that path amounts
> to playing whack-a-mole to catch all the places where privilege might
> leak to a parent namespace, whereas [1] simply, cleanly cuts them all
> off at the source.
Agreed, that sounds painful. My secret goal is real
userspace-controlled (by unprivileged users, no less) sandboxes, in
which case in-kernel target capabilities are probably impossible.
--Andy
Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 1:26 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Quoting Andy Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> >> Every now and then, someone wants to let unprivileged programs change
> >> something about their execution environment (think unsharing namespaces,
> >> changing capabilities, disabling networking, chrooting, mounting and
> >> unmounting filesystems). ?Whether or not any of these abilities are good
> >> ideas, there's a recurring problem that gets most of these patches shot
> >> down: setuid executables.
> >>
> >> The obvious solution is to allow a process to opt out of setuid
> >> semantics and require processes to do this before using these shiny new
> >> features. [1] [2]
> >>
> >> But there's a problem with this, too: with LSMs running, execve can do
> >> pretty much anything, and even unprivileged users running unprivileged
> >> programs can have crazy security implications. ?(Take a look at a
> >> default install of Fedora. ?If you can understand the security
> >> implications of disabling setuid, you get a cookie. ?If you can figure
> >> out which programs will result in a change of security label when
> >> exec'd, you get another cookie.)
> >>
> >> So here's another solution, based on the idea that in a sane world,
> >> execve should be a lot less magical than it is. ?Any unprivileged
> >> program can open an executable, parse its headers, map it, and run it,
> >> although getting all the details right is tedious at best (and there's
> >> no good way to get all of the threading semantics right from userspace).
> >>
> >> Patch 1 adds a new syscall execve_nosecurity. ?It does an exec, but
> >> without changing any security properties. ?This means no setuid, no
> >> setgid, no LSM credential hooks (e.g. no SELinux type transitions), and
> >> no ptrace restrictions. ?(You have to have read access to the program,
> >> because disabling security stuff could allow someone to ptrace a program
> >> that they couldn't otherwise ptrace.) ?This shouldn't be particularly
> >> scary -- any process could do much the same thing with open and mmap.
> >> (You can easily shoot yourself in the foot with this syscall -- think
> >> LD_PRELOAD or running some program with insufficient error checking that
> >> can get subverted when run in the wrong security context. ?So don't do
> >> that.)
> >>
> >> Patch 2 adds a prctl that irrevocably disables execve. ?Making execve do
> >> something different that could confuse LSMs is dangerous. ?Turning the
> >> whole thing off shouldn't be. ?(Of course, with execve disabled, you can
> >> still use execve_nosecurity. ?But any program that does that should take
> >> precautions not to shoot itself in the foot.) ?(In a future revision,
> >> this should probably be a new syscall.)
> >>
> >> Sadly, programs that have opted out of execve might want to use
> >> subprocesses that in turn run execve. ?This will fail. ?So patch 3
> >> (which is ugly, but I don't see anything fundamentally wrong with it)
> >> allows processes to set a flag that turns execve into execve_nosecurity.
> >> This flag survives exec. ?Of course, this could be used to subvert
> >> setuid programs, so you can't set this flag unless you disable ordinary
> >> exec first.
> >>
> >> [1] Unprivileged: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/12/30/265
> >> [2] securebit approach: http://lwn.net/Articles/368600/
> >
> > No responses for a month after this was sent. ?Really, thanks, I do
> > appreciate the work at another approach.
> >
> > I'll be honest, I prefer option [1]. ?Though I think it's reasonable
> > to require privilege for prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID). ?Make it a separate
> > capability, and on most systems it should be safe to have a file
> > sitting in /bin with cap_set_nosuid+pe. ?If OTOH you know you have
> > legacy or poorly coded privileged programs which would not be safe
> > bc they don't verify that they have the needed privs, you just don't
> > provide the program to do prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID) for unprivileged users.
>
> Both approaches result in two kinds of exec: the normal kind that
> respects setuid, file capabilities, and LSMs, and the restricted kind
> that is supposed to be safe when programs have unshared namespaces and
> other crazy things.
>
> Eric's approach [1] adds a restricted kind of exec that ignores setuid
> but still (AFAICT) respects file capabilities
No, please see the rest of that thread - that was an oversight.
> and LSM transitions. I
> think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
> 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
> them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
> them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
> question is well-written.
hmm...
A good point.
> 2. File capabilities are just as dangerous as setuid, and I wouldn't
> even know how to write a program that's safe when it has extra
> capabilities granted by fE (or fP or whatever it is) and the caller
> has, say, an unshared fs namespace and the ability to rearrange the
> namespace arbitrarily.
Absolutely these should not be ignored, and Eric didn't mean to ignore
them.
> In short, I think that this nosuid exec is both dangerous in and of
> itself *and* doesn't actually solve the problem it was supposed to
> solve.
>
> I also don't like relying on the admin to decide that it's safe to
> allow PR_SET_NOSUID (or whatever you call it) and having to install a
> special privileged program to enable it. If sandbox-like features
> require explicit action by root, then they won't be as widely used as
> they should be. And how many admins will have any clue whether
> enabling this feature is safe?
I do not agree with deciding the admins are not competent to admin
their system and therefore we should bypass them and let users decide.
But it's moot, as I think you've convinced me with your point 1. above
to take another look at your patches.
> My approach introduces what I think is a much more obviously safe
> restricted exec, and I think it's so safe that no privilege or special
> configuration should be required to use it.
>
> As for what to call it (execve_nosecurity or PR_SET_NOSUID) or whether
> to have a special syscall so that programs that aren't restricted can
> use the restricted exec, I don't care all that much. I just think
> that the separate syscall might be useful in its own right and
> required almost no additional code, so I added it.
>
>
> >
> > ( I did like using new securebits as in [2], but I prefer the
> > automatic not-raising-privs of [1] to simply -EPERM on uid/gid
> > change and lack kof checking for privs raising of [2]. )
> >
> > Really the trick will be finding a balance to satisfy those wanting
> > this as a separate LSM, without traipsing into LSM stacking territory.
>
> I think that making this an LSM is absurd. Containers (and anything
> else people want to do with namespaces or with other new features that
> interact badly with setuid) are features that people should be able to
Yes, but that's a reason to aim for targeted caps. Exec_nopriv or
whatever is more a sandbox than a namespace feature.
> use easily, and system's choice of LSM shouldn't have anything to do
> with them. Not to mention that we're trying to *add* rights (e.g.
> unprivileged unshare), and LSM is about *removing* rights.
>
> >
> > I myself think this feature fits very nicely with established semantics,
> > but not everyone agrees, so chances are my view is a bit tainted, and
> > we should defer to those wanting this to be an LSM.
> >
> > Of course, another alternative is to skip this feature altogether and
> > push toward targeted capabilties. ?The problem is that path amounts
> > to playing whack-a-mole to catch all the places where privilege might
> > leak to a parent namespace, whereas [1] simply, cleanly cuts them all
> > off at the source.
>
> Agreed, that sounds painful. My secret goal is real
> userspace-controlled (by unprivileged users, no less) sandboxes, in
> which case in-kernel target capabilities are probably impossible.
Not sure what you mean by that last part - inside the sandbox, you won't
get capabilities, targeted or otherwise, but certainly targeted capabilities
and a sandbox are not mutually exclusive.
Thanks for responding, I'll take another look at your patchset in detail.
thanks,
-serge
On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 5:39 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>> >
>> > ( I did like using new securebits as in [2], but I prefer the
>> > automatic not-raising-privs of [1] to simply -EPERM on uid/gid
>> > change and lack kof checking for privs raising of [2]. )
>> >
>> > Really the trick will be finding a balance to satisfy those wanting
>> > this as a separate LSM, without traipsing into LSM stacking territory.
>>
>> I think that making this an LSM is absurd. ?Containers (and anything
>> else people want to do with namespaces or with other new features that
>> interact badly with setuid) are features that people should be able to
>
> Yes, but that's a reason to aim for targeted caps. ?Exec_nopriv or
> whatever is more a sandbox than a namespace feature.
>
>> use easily, and system's choice of LSM shouldn't have anything to do
>> with them. ?Not to mention that we're trying to *add* rights (e.g.
>> unprivileged unshare), and LSM is about *removing* rights.
Is a targeted cap something like "process A can call setdomainname,
but only on one particular UTS namespace?"
>>
>> >
>> > I myself think this feature fits very nicely with established semantics,
>> > but not everyone agrees, so chances are my view is a bit tainted, and
>> > we should defer to those wanting this to be an LSM.
>> >
>> > Of course, another alternative is to skip this feature altogether and
>> > push toward targeted capabilties. ?The problem is that path amounts
>> > to playing whack-a-mole to catch all the places where privilege might
>> > leak to a parent namespace, whereas [1] simply, cleanly cuts them all
>> > off at the source.
>>
>> Agreed, that sounds painful. ?My secret goal is real
>> userspace-controlled (by unprivileged users, no less) sandboxes, in
>> which case in-kernel target capabilities are probably impossible.
>
> Not sure what you mean by that last part - inside the sandbox, you won't
> get capabilities, targeted or otherwise, but certainly targeted capabilities
> and a sandbox are not mutually exclusive.
Agreed.
What I want is a syscall that says "make me a sandbox" and then for
that program to be able to intercept and modify most (all?) syscalls
issued from inside the sandbox. But programs in the sandbox probably
need to call exec, and if the sandbox's owner can muck around with
exec'd programs, then exec had better have no security effect. Hence
a need for some kind of restricted exec. The sandbox owner would
then make up own targeted capabilities if needed.
But yes, targeted capabilities for kernel containers are probably
orthogonal to sandboxes.
>
> Thanks for responding, I'll take another look at your patchset in detail.
Thanks!
--Andy
Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 5:39 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> >> >
> >> > ( I did like using new securebits as in [2], but I prefer the
> >> > automatic not-raising-privs of [1] to simply -EPERM on uid/gid
> >> > change and lack kof checking for privs raising of [2]. )
> >> >
> >> > Really the trick will be finding a balance to satisfy those wanting
> >> > this as a separate LSM, without traipsing into LSM stacking territory.
> >>
> >> I think that making this an LSM is absurd. ?Containers (and anything
> >> else people want to do with namespaces or with other new features that
> >> interact badly with setuid) are features that people should be able to
> >
> > Yes, but that's a reason to aim for targeted caps. ?Exec_nopriv or
> > whatever is more a sandbox than a namespace feature.
> >
> >> use easily, and system's choice of LSM shouldn't have anything to do
> >> with them. ?Not to mention that we're trying to *add* rights (e.g.
> >> unprivileged unshare), and LSM is about *removing* rights.
>
> Is a targeted cap something like "process A can call setdomainname,
> but only on one particular UTS namespace?"
Right, only to the UTS ns in which you live. See for instance
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.containers/15934 . It's
how we express for instance that root in a child user_namespace has
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE over files in the container, but not over the host.
-serge
On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> > On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 1:26 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > Quoting Andy Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> > >> Every now and then, someone wants to let unprivileged programs change
> > >> something about their execution environment (think unsharing namespaces,
> > >> changing capabilities, disabling networking, chrooting, mounting and
> > >> unmounting filesystems). ?Whether or not any of these abilities are good
> > >> ideas, there's a recurring problem that gets most of these patches shot
> > >> down: setuid executables.
> > >>
> > >> The obvious solution is to allow a process to opt out of setuid
> > >> semantics and require processes to do this before using these shiny new
> > >> features. [1] [2]
> > >>
> > >> But there's a problem with this, too: with LSMs running, execve can do
> > >> pretty much anything, and even unprivileged users running unprivileged
> > >> programs can have crazy security implications. ?(Take a look at a
> > >> default install of Fedora. ?If you can understand the security
> > >> implications of disabling setuid, you get a cookie. ?If you can figure
> > >> out which programs will result in a change of security label when
> > >> exec'd, you get another cookie.)
> > >>
> > >> So here's another solution, based on the idea that in a sane world,
> > >> execve should be a lot less magical than it is. ?Any unprivileged
> > >> program can open an executable, parse its headers, map it, and run it,
> > >> although getting all the details right is tedious at best (and there's
> > >> no good way to get all of the threading semantics right from userspace).
> > >>
> > >> Patch 1 adds a new syscall execve_nosecurity. ?It does an exec, but
> > >> without changing any security properties. ?This means no setuid, no
> > >> setgid, no LSM credential hooks (e.g. no SELinux type transitions), and
> > >> no ptrace restrictions. ?(You have to have read access to the program,
> > >> because disabling security stuff could allow someone to ptrace a program
> > >> that they couldn't otherwise ptrace.) ?This shouldn't be particularly
> > >> scary -- any process could do much the same thing with open and mmap.
> > >> (You can easily shoot yourself in the foot with this syscall -- think
> > >> LD_PRELOAD or running some program with insufficient error checking that
> > >> can get subverted when run in the wrong security context. ?So don't do
> > >> that.)
> > >>
> > >> Patch 2 adds a prctl that irrevocably disables execve. ?Making execve do
> > >> something different that could confuse LSMs is dangerous. ?Turning the
> > >> whole thing off shouldn't be. ?(Of course, with execve disabled, you can
> > >> still use execve_nosecurity. ?But any program that does that should take
> > >> precautions not to shoot itself in the foot.) ?(In a future revision,
> > >> this should probably be a new syscall.)
> > >>
> > >> Sadly, programs that have opted out of execve might want to use
> > >> subprocesses that in turn run execve. ?This will fail. ?So patch 3
> > >> (which is ugly, but I don't see anything fundamentally wrong with it)
> > >> allows processes to set a flag that turns execve into execve_nosecurity.
> > >> This flag survives exec. ?Of course, this could be used to subvert
> > >> setuid programs, so you can't set this flag unless you disable ordinary
> > >> exec first.
> > >>
> > >> [1] Unprivileged: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/12/30/265
> > >> [2] securebit approach: http://lwn.net/Articles/368600/
> > >
> > > No responses for a month after this was sent. ?Really, thanks, I do
> > > appreciate the work at another approach.
> > >
> > > I'll be honest, I prefer option [1]. ?Though I think it's reasonable
> > > to require privilege for prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID). ?Make it a separate
> > > capability, and on most systems it should be safe to have a file
> > > sitting in /bin with cap_set_nosuid+pe. ?If OTOH you know you have
> > > legacy or poorly coded privileged programs which would not be safe
> > > bc they don't verify that they have the needed privs, you just don't
> > > provide the program to do prctl(PR_SET_NOSUID) for unprivileged users.
> >
> > Both approaches result in two kinds of exec: the normal kind that
> > respects setuid, file capabilities, and LSMs, and the restricted kind
> > that is supposed to be safe when programs have unshared namespaces and
> > other crazy things.
> >
> > Eric's approach [1] adds a restricted kind of exec that ignores setuid
> > but still (AFAICT) respects file capabilities
>
> No, please see the rest of that thread - that was an oversight.
>
> > and LSM transitions. I
> > think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
> > 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
> > question is well-written.
>
> hmm...
>
> A good point.
At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
SELinux test accordingly.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>> > and LSM ?transitions. ?I
>> > think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
>> > ? 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
>> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
>> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
>> > question is well-written.
>>
>> hmm...
>>
>> A good point.
>
> At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> SELinux test accordingly.
>
True, but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
(and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
wrong or at best misguided.
Can you think of anything that an LSM should do (or even should be
able to do) when a nosuid process calls exec, other than denying the
request outright? With my patch, LSMs can still reject the open_exec
call.
--Andy
Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>
> >> > and LSM ?transitions. ?I
> >> > think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
> >> > ? 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
> >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
> >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
> >> > question is well-written.
> >>
> >> hmm...
> >>
> >> A good point.
> >
> > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> > SELinux test accordingly.
> >
>
> True, but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
> wrong or at best misguided.
I could be wrong, but I think the point is that your reasoning is
correct, and that the same reasoning must apply if we're just
executing a file out of an fs which has been mounted with '-o nosuid'.
> Can you think of anything that an LSM should do (or even should be
> able to do) when a nosuid process calls exec, other than denying the
> request outright? With my patch, LSMs can still reject the open_exec
> call.
>
> --Andy
> --
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On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 10:35 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> True, ?but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
>> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
>> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
>> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
>> wrong or at best misguided.
>
> I could be wrong, but I think the point is that your reasoning is
> correct, and that the same reasoning must apply if we're just
> executing a file out of an fs which has been mounted with '-o nosuid'.
I tend to agree, except that only root can set nosuid (presumably) and
making that change will change existing behavior. Is that a problem?
--Andy
On Tue, 2010-04-20 at 10:23 -0400, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>
> >> > and LSM transitions. I
> >> > think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
> >> > 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
> >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
> >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
> >> > question is well-written.
> >>
> >> hmm...
> >>
> >> A good point.
> >
> > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> > SELinux test accordingly.
> >
>
> True, but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
> wrong or at best misguided.
>
> Can you think of anything that an LSM should do (or even should be
> able to do) when a nosuid process calls exec, other than denying the
> request outright? With my patch, LSMs can still reject the open_exec
> call.
In the case where the context transition would shed permissions rather
than gain permissions, it has been suggested that we shouldn't disable
the transition even in the presence of nosuid. But automatically
computing that for a domain transition is non-trivial, so we have the
present behavior for SELinux.
There also can be state updates even in the non-suid exec case, e.g.
saved uids, clearing capabilities, etc.
But as far as the access control goes, it should suffice to check read
and execute access to the file, just as with the userland ELF loader
scenario (which gets handled by the mmap hook).
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 11:34 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> True, ?but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
>> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
>> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
>> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
>> wrong or at best misguided.
>>
>> Can you think of anything that an LSM should do (or even should be
>> able to do) when a nosuid process calls exec, other than denying the
>> request outright? ?With my patch, LSMs can still reject the open_exec
>> call.
>
> In the case where the context transition would shed permissions rather
> than gain permissions, it has been suggested that we shouldn't disable
> the transition even in the presence of nosuid. ?But automatically
> computing that for a domain transition is non-trivial, so we have the
> present behavior for SELinux.
>
> There also can be state updates even in the non-suid exec case, e.g.
> saved uids, clearing capabilities, etc.
Ah, right.
In my patch, execve_nosecurity is (or will be, anyway) documented to
skip all of this, and it's a new syscall, so nothing should need to be
done. It doesn't allow anything that a userland ELF loader couldn't
already do. (I'm not thrilled with changing the behavior of the
original execve syscall, but one way or another, any nosuid mechanism
will probably allow programs to exec other things without losing
permissions that the admin might have expected. I don't see this is a
real problem, though.)
Is it even possible to purely drop permissions in SELinux? If your
original type was orig_t and your new type is new_t, and if the rights
granted to orig_t and new_t overlap nontrivially, then what are you
supposed to do? Check both types for each hook? (Some annoying admin
could even *change* the rights for orig_t or new_t after execve
finishes.)
>
> But as far as the access control goes, it should suffice to check read
> and execute access to the file, just as with the userland ELF loader
> scenario (which gets handled by the mmap hook).
>
> --
> Stephen Smalley
> National Security Agency
>
>
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>> > ? 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
>> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
>> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
>> > question is well-written.
>>
>> hmm...
>>
>> A good point.
>
> At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> SELinux test accordingly.
I don't see that code in current -linus, nor do I see where SELinux
affects dumpability. What's supposed to happen? I'm writing a patch
right now to clean this stuff up.
--Andy
Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> >> > ? 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
> >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
> >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
> >> > question is well-written.
> >>
> >> hmm...
> >>
> >> A good point.
> >
> > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> > SELinux test accordingly.
>
> I don't see that code in current -linus, nor do I see where SELinux
> affects dumpability. What's supposed to happen? I'm writing a patch
> right now to clean this stuff up.
check out security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_bprm_set_creds()
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
I assume that's it?
-serge
On Tue, 2010-04-20 at 11:53 -0400, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 11:34 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>
> >> True, but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
> >> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
> >> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
> >> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
> >> wrong or at best misguided.
> >>
> >> Can you think of anything that an LSM should do (or even should be
> >> able to do) when a nosuid process calls exec, other than denying the
> >> request outright? With my patch, LSMs can still reject the open_exec
> >> call.
> >
> > In the case where the context transition would shed permissions rather
> > than gain permissions, it has been suggested that we shouldn't disable
> > the transition even in the presence of nosuid. But automatically
> > computing that for a domain transition is non-trivial, so we have the
> > present behavior for SELinux.
> >
> > There also can be state updates even in the non-suid exec case, e.g.
> > saved uids, clearing capabilities, etc.
>
> Ah, right.
>
> In my patch, execve_nosecurity is (or will be, anyway) documented to
> skip all of this, and it's a new syscall, so nothing should need to be
> done. It doesn't allow anything that a userland ELF loader couldn't
> already do. (I'm not thrilled with changing the behavior of the
> original execve syscall, but one way or another, any nosuid mechanism
> will probably allow programs to exec other things without losing
> permissions that the admin might have expected. I don't see this is a
> real problem, though.)
The further you deviate from existing execve semantics, the less likely
your solution will work cleanly as a transparent replacement for execve
for userland running in this nosuid state, and the less compelling the
case for implementing execve_nosecurity in the kernel vs. just userspace
emulation of it.
> Is it even possible to purely drop permissions in SELinux? If your
> original type was orig_t and your new type is new_t, and if the rights
> granted to orig_t and new_t overlap nontrivially, then what are you
> supposed to do? Check both types for each hook? (Some annoying admin
> could even *change* the rights for orig_t or new_t after execve
> finishes.)
It has always been possible to configure policy such that one type is
less privileged than its caller, and the typebounds construct introduced
in more recent SELinux provides a kernel-enforced mechanism for ensuring
that one type is strictly bounded by the permissions of another type.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 10:35 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>>
>> >> > and LSM ?transitions. ?I
>> >> > think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
>> >> > ? 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
>> >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
>> >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
>> >> > question is well-written.
>> >>
>> >> hmm...
>> >>
>> >> A good point.
>> >
>> > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
>> > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
>> > SELinux test accordingly.
>> >
>>
>> True, ?but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
>> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
>> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
>> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
>> wrong or at best misguided.
>
> I could be wrong, but I think the point is that your reasoning is
> correct, and that the same reasoning must apply if we're just
> executing a file out of an fs which has been mounted with '-o nosuid'.
I think Stephen has just convinced me that MNT_NOSUID will never make
sense -- there's odd legacy behavior in there and we'll probably never
get anyone to change it.
So if we give up on changing nosuid, there are a couple of things we
might want to do:
1. A mode where execve acts like all filesystems are MNT_NOSUID. This
sounds like a bad idea (if nothing else, it will cause apps that use
selinux's exec_sid mechanism (runcon?) to silently malfunction).
2. A mode where execve (or a new syscall?) has no effect on
credentials at all. This is conceptually simple and it would be great
for new userspace code, especially code that wants to do something
sandbox-like. For simplicity, even things like the effective and
inherited capability sets should probably remain unchanged. In this
mode, we'll have to disallow execing unreadable files. securebits are
(almost) irrelevant. This is what my patch does. Dealing with
AT_SECURE will be awkward at best, so programs that enter this mode
should sanitize their own environments and should be very careful if
they were setuid. (But they should do that anyway.)
There are a couple of annoyances to deal with. First, there are LSM
API issues, like this code in SELinux:
new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
and this code in commoncap:
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
I have no problem keeping these.
The other annoyance is cap_effective. We could clear it on every exec
(what commoncap does for non-legacy executables, I think), but that
would completely break any legacy code running as root. We could set
it to cap_permitted on every exec, which sounds like bad engineering
even though I don't see any specific problem with it. We could also
just leave it alone across exec, which might have odd side effects for
programs which change their effective set and then call exec without
thinking. (We could also emulate current behavior: in SECURE_NOROOT
mode, clear effective, and otherwise set it depending on euid. This
may be the best idea, since securebits already affects setuid(). This
emulation should *not* extend to cap_permitted or cap_inheritable.)
Empirically, my Fedora system is almost completely usable in this mode
(with cap_effective just passing through unchanged).
3. Some intermediate mode meant for userspace code that wants to
create containers or otherwise manipulate dangerous things but that
still want to execute legacy code. Breaking out of containers on exec
sounds like a really bad idea. Off the top of my head, I can think of
a couple of possibilities:
3a. Treat all executables like they have some standard (safe) label.
This could be: fP = 0, fI = everything, no setuid/setgid, and whatever
LSM label makes sense (file_t or something new for selinux, perhaps).
LSMs might want to add weird rules for what can exec what, but they
*must not* ever increase permission. Decreasing permission (with
selinux typebounds?) could be done, but I'm happy to leave that for
new features that the LSM people could add if they want.
3b. Whatever the final version of Eric's patch was.
Any thoughts on what we want to do? (2) seems most likely to survive
bashing on LKML.
--Andy
P.S. Rather than targeted capabilities, why not have namespaces come
with file descriptors that let you control them? sethostname and
setdomainname could be ioctls on the UTS namespace fd, and a network
namespace could come with two fds: one would be (or function as) a
netlink socket and the other would either let you bind low-numbered
ports just by possessing it or would have ioctls or something that
replace bind. FS namespaces still seem scary.
Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
> So if we give up on changing nosuid, there are a couple of things we
> might want to do:
>
> 1. A mode where execve acts like all filesystems are MNT_NOSUID. This
> sounds like a bad idea (if nothing else, it will cause apps that use
> selinux's exec_sid mechanism (runcon?) to silently malfunction).
I think at this point we've lost track of exactly what we're trying
to do.
The goal, at least for myself and (I think) Eric, was to prevent
certain changes in environment, initiated by an unprivileged user,
from confusing setuid-root programs (initiated by the user).
A concrete example was the proposed disablenet feature, with which
an unprivileged task can remove its ability to open any new network
connections.
With that in mind, I think option 1 is actually the best option.
I especially hate option 2 because of the resulting temptation to
fudge with pE :) If you're going to fudge with pE, then IMO it
MUST be done in a new securebits mode.
Now actually, re-reading my msg, given our original goal, I dare
say that Andrew Morgan's approach of simply returning -EPERM for
any app which tries to setuid or change privileges on exec just
might be the sanest way, at least to start with.
-serge
On Apr 21, 2010, at 6:30 PM, "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski ([email protected]):
>> So if we give up on changing nosuid, there are a couple of things we
>> might want to do:
>>
>> 1. A mode where execve acts like all filesystems are MNT_NOSUID.
>> This
>> sounds like a bad idea (if nothing else, it will cause apps that use
>> selinux's exec_sid mechanism (runcon?) to silently malfunction).
>
> I think at this point we've lost track of exactly what we're trying
> to do.
>
> The goal, at least for myself and (I think) Eric, was to prevent
> certain changes in environment, initiated by an unprivileged user,
> from confusing setuid-root programs (initiated by the user).
>
> A concrete example was the proposed disablenet feature, with which
> an unprivileged task can remove its ability to open any new network
> connections.
>
> With that in mind, I think option 1 is actually the best option.
I think the show-stopper for number 1 is the fact that nosuid has
really strange semantics, and I'm a bit scared of making them more
widespread. For example, selinux-aware apps can request a type change
on exec, and nosuid causes that request to be silently ignored. This
could silently break otherwise-working selinux sandboxes. Stephen
doesn't want to change it...
> I especially hate option 2 because of the resulting temptation to
> fudge with pE :) If you're going to fudge with pE, then IMO it
> MUST be done in a new securebits mode.
I'll fight that fight later. (I wish the original rule had been pE' =
pE except when setuid root, but it's way too late for that...)
>
> Now actually, re-reading my msg, given our original goal, I dare
> say that Andrew Morgan's approach of simply returning -EPERM for
> any app which tries to setuid or change privileges on exec just
> might be the sanest way, at least to start with.
>
Fair enough. It'll annoy some selinux users, but maybe the selinux
people will figure out how to fix it when enough users complain.
I'll hack up and submit a patch series to add PR_EXEC_DISALLOW_PRIVS
and allow CLONE_NEWNET when it's set. Then I'll argue with Alan Cox
for a week or three, I suppose :)
I think I'll arrange it so that PR_EXEC_DISALLOW_PRIVS & uid==0 &&
(pP != all) && !SECURE_ROOT will cause execve to always fail. nonoot
&& pP != 0 && !KEEPCAPS will fail as well, since it seems silly to add
a special case (if you're nonroot and create an unprivileged
container, drop the caps yourself).
--Andy
(My system has a setuid binary that does unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC), drops
privs and execs it's argument. I'll be happy to get rid of it.)