Lots of little patches that should be good to merge.
Signed-off-by: Russell Coker <[email protected]>
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
@@ -305,7 +305,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
/usr/sbin/sesh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/smrsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
-/usr/share/mdadm/checkarray -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm\.py.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
/usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb\.py.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_all_executables'
corecmd_search_bin($1)
read_files_pattern($1, exec_type, exec_type)
+ allow $1 exec_type:file map;
')
########################################
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
@@ -4323,6 +4323,42 @@ interface(`dev_mount_sysfs',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## remount a sysfs filesystem
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dev_remount_sysfs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type sysfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem remount;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## unmount a sysfs filesystem
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dev_unmount_sysfs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type sysfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem unmount;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Do not audit getting the attributes of sysfs filesystem
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ interface(`domain_read_all_domains_state
########################################
## <summary>
-## Get the attributes of all domains of all domains.
+## Get the attributes of all domains
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
@@ -5408,6 +5408,25 @@ interface(`files_delete_kernel_symbol_ta
########################################
## <summary>
+## Delete a system.map in the /boot directory.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type boot_t, system_map_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 boot_t:dir list_dir_perms;
+ allow $1 system_map_t:file mounton;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Search the contents of /var.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
@@ -159,6 +159,24 @@ interface(`selinux_unmount_fs',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Mount on the selinuxfs filesystem.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`selinux_mounton_fs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type security_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 security_t:dir mounton;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Get the attributes of the selinuxfs filesystem
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ fs_associate_tmpfs(devpts_t)
fs_xattr_type(devpts_t)
fs_use_trans devpts gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0);
+# for systemd-nspawn
+allow console_device_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
+
#
# devtty_t is the type of /dev/tty.
#
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
@@ -98,12 +98,13 @@ optional_policy(`
allow chkpwd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid };
dontaudit chkpwd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-allow chkpwd_t self:process { getattr signal };
+allow chkpwd_t self:process { getcap getattr signal };
allow chkpwd_t shadow_t:file read_file_perms;
files_list_etc(chkpwd_t)
kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t)
+kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chkpwd_t)
domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(chkpwd_t)
files_dontaudit_search_var(chkpwd_t)
fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chkpwd_t)
+fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(chkpwd_t)
selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ mount_exec(fsadm_t)
# for /run/mount/utab
mount_getattr_runtime_files(fsadm_t)
+mount_rw_runtime_files(fsadm_t)
+
seutil_read_config(fsadm_t)
userdom_use_user_terminals(fsadm_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/init.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.if
@@ -191,6 +191,24 @@ interface(`init_domain',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Allow a domain to be transitioned to from init_t with nnp_transition
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain to transition
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`init_nnp_domain',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type init_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow init_t $1:process2 nnp_transition;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Create a domain which can be started by init,
## with a range transition.
## </summary>
@@ -3029,6 +3047,24 @@ interface(`init_relabel_utmp',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Watch utmp.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`init_watch_utmp',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type initrc_runtime_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 initrc_runtime_t:file watch;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Create files in /var/run with the
## utmp file type.
## </summary>
@@ -3248,6 +3284,24 @@ interface(`init_read_pid_pipes',`
init_read_runtime_pipes($1)
')
+######################################
+## <summary>
+## restart systemd units, for /run/systemd/transient/*
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`init_restart_units',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type init_var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 init_var_run_t:service { start status stop };
+')
+
########################################
## <summary>
## Read init unnamed pipes.
@@ -3575,6 +3629,24 @@ interface(`init_manage_all_unit_files',`
')
########################################
+## <summary>
+## stat systemd unit files
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`init_getattr_all_unit_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ attribute systemdunit;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 systemdunit:file getattr;
+')
+
+########################################
## <summary>
## Allow unconfined access to send instructions to init
## </summary>
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/init.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
allow init_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_socket_perms };
allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
- allow init_t self:system { status reboot halt reload };
+ # why does kernel 4.9 make it need start and stop while 4.19 does not?
+ allow init_t self:system { start stop status reboot halt reload };
# Until systemd is fixed
allow init_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow init_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
@@ -1002,6 +1003,7 @@ ifdef(`enabled_mls',`
ifdef(`init_systemd',`
allow initrc_t init_t:system { start status reboot halt reload };
+ allow init_t initrc_t:process2 nnp_transition;
manage_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_lock_t, initrc_lock_t)
files_lock_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_lock_t, file)
@@ -1043,6 +1045,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
init_get_all_units_status(initrc_t)
init_manage_var_lib_files(initrc_t)
init_rw_stream_sockets(initrc_t)
+ init_stop_system(initrc_t)
# Create /etc/audit.rules.prev after firstboot remediation
logging_manage_audit_config(initrc_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ auth_manage_pam_runtime_files(local_logi
auth_manage_pam_console_data(local_login_t)
auth_domtrans_pam_console(local_login_t)
-init_dontaudit_use_fds(local_login_t)
+# if local_login_t can not inherit fd from init it takes ages to login
+init_use_fds(local_login_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(local_login_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/logging.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/logging.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/logging.te
@@ -515,7 +515,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
# for systemd-journal
allow syslogd_t self:netlink_audit_socket connected_socket_perms;
allow syslogd_t self:capability2 audit_read;
- allow syslogd_t self:capability { chown setgid setuid sys_ptrace };
+ allow syslogd_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search setgid setuid sys_ptrace audit_control };
+ allow syslogd_t self:cap_userns sys_ptrace;
allow syslogd_t self:netlink_audit_socket { getattr getopt read setopt write nlmsg_write };
# remove /run/log/journal when switching to permanent storage
@@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
domain_getattr_all_domains(syslogd_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(syslogd_t)
+ domain_signull_all_domains(syslogd_t)
init_create_runtime_dirs(syslogd_t)
init_daemon_runtime_file(syslogd_runtime_t, dir, "syslogd")
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/lvm.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.if
@@ -247,3 +247,21 @@ interface(`lvm_admin',`
files_search_tmp($1)
admin_pattern($1, lvm_tmp_t)
')
+
+######################################
+## <summary>
+## Allow lvm_t to use a semaphore
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain that created the semaphore
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`lvm_use_sem',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type lvm_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow lvm_t $1:sem all_sem_perms;
+')
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
@@ -345,6 +345,8 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ apt_use_fds(lvm_t)
+
dpkg_script_rw_pipes(lvm_t)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
/etc/pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
/etc/pki/.*/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0)
/etc/ssl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
+/etc/ssl/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0)
+/etc/letsencrypt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0)
/etc/timezone -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
ifdef(`distro_debian',`
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
# insmod local policy
#
-allow kmod_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config };
+allow kmod_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config };
allow kmod_t self:process { execmem sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal };
# for the radeon/amdgpu modules
dontaudit kmod_t self:capability sys_admin;
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(kmod_t)
fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(kmod_t)
fs_search_tracefs(kmod_t)
+init_nnp_domain(kmod_t)
init_rw_initctl(kmod_t)
init_use_fds(kmod_t)
init_use_script_fds(kmod_t)
@@ -138,6 +139,8 @@ optional_policy(`
dpkg_manage_script_tmp_files(kmod_t)
dpkg_map_script_tmp_files(kmod_t)
dpkg_read_script_tmp_symlinks(kmod_t)
+ apt_use_fds(kmod_t)
+ apt_use_ptys(kmod_t)
')
optional_policy(`
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/mount.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/mount.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/mount.te
@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ optional_policy(`
samba_run_smbmount(mount_t, mount_roles)
')
+optional_policy(`
+ ssh_rw_pipes(mount_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ xen_read_image_files(mount_t)
+')
+
########################################
#
# Unconfined mount local policy
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.fc
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/raid.fc
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.fc
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
/usr/bin/mdmpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/raid-check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/share/mdadm/checkarray -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0)
+
# Systemd unit files
/usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*mdadm-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_unit_t,s0)
/usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*mdmon.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_unit_t,s0)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/raid.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.te
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(mdad
dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(mdadm_t)
dev_read_realtime_clock(mdadm_t)
+domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(mdadm_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(mdadm_t)
files_read_etc_files(mdadm_t)
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mda
optional_policy(`
cron_system_entry(mdadm_t, mdadm_exec_t)
+ cron_rw_tmp_files(mdadm_t)
')
optional_policy(`
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
/run/log/journal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_journal_t,s0)
-/usr/bin/systemd-analyze -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_analyze_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/systemd-cgtop -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_cgtop_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/systemd-coredump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_coredump_exec_t,s0)
/usr/bin/systemd-detect-virt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_detect_virt_exec_t,s0)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -355,10 +355,11 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
#
allow systemd_coredump_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create write connect getopt setopt };
-allow systemd_coredump_t self:capability { setgid setuid setpcap };
+allow systemd_coredump_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setgid setuid setpcap sys_ptrace };
allow systemd_coredump_t self:process { getcap setcap setfscreate };
manage_files_pattern(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t)
+allow systemd_coredump_t systemd_coredump_var_lib_t:file map;
kernel_domtrans_to(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_exec_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(systemd_coredump_t)
@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(systemd_coredump_t)
files_search_var_lib(systemd_coredump_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(systemd_coredump_t)
+fs_search_tmpfs(systemd_coredump_t)
selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_coredump_t)
@@ -397,6 +399,8 @@ allow systemd_generator_t self:fifo_file
allow systemd_generator_t self:capability dac_override;
allow systemd_generator_t self:process setfscreate;
+allow systemd_generator_t systemd_unit_t:file getattr;
+
corecmd_getattr_bin_files(systemd_generator_t)
dev_read_sysfs(systemd_generator_t)
@@ -407,6 +411,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(systemd_generator_t
files_search_runtime(systemd_generator_t)
files_list_boot(systemd_generator_t)
files_read_boot_files(systemd_generator_t)
+files_read_config_files(systemd_generator_t)
files_search_all_mountpoints(systemd_generator_t)
files_list_usr(systemd_generator_t)
@@ -414,6 +419,8 @@ fs_list_efivars(systemd_generator_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(systemd_generator_t)
init_create_runtime_files(systemd_generator_t)
+init_read_all_script_files(systemd_generator_t)
+init_getattr_all_unit_files(systemd_generator_t)
init_manage_runtime_dirs(systemd_generator_t)
init_manage_runtime_symlinks(systemd_generator_t)
init_read_runtime_files(systemd_generator_t)
@@ -618,12 +625,17 @@ init_dbus_send_script(systemd_logind_t)
init_get_all_units_status(systemd_logind_t)
init_get_system_status(systemd_logind_t)
init_read_utmp(systemd_logind_t)
+init_restart_units(systemd_logind_t)
init_service_start(systemd_logind_t)
init_service_status(systemd_logind_t)
init_start_all_units(systemd_logind_t)
init_stop_all_units(systemd_logind_t)
init_start_system(systemd_logind_t)
init_stop_system(systemd_logind_t)
+init_watch_utmp(systemd_logind_t)
+
+# for /run/systemd/transient/*
+init_restart_units(systemd_logind_t)
locallogin_read_state(systemd_logind_t)
@@ -880,6 +892,9 @@ allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability {
allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability2 wake_alarm;
allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_dgram_socket connected_socket_perms;
allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_journal_t:dir search;
@@ -916,6 +931,9 @@ dev_getattr_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
dev_manage_sysfs_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
dev_mounton_sysfs_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
dev_mount_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
+dev_remount_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
+dev_unmount_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
+dev_read_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
dev_read_rand(systemd_nspawn_t)
dev_read_urand(systemd_nspawn_t)
@@ -928,6 +946,7 @@ files_mounton_tmp(systemd_nspawn_t)
files_read_kernel_symbol_table(systemd_nspawn_t)
files_setattr_runtime_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
+fs_getattr_cgroup(systemd_nspawn_t)
fs_getattr_tmpfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
fs_manage_tmpfs_chr_files(systemd_nspawn_t)
fs_mount_tmpfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
@@ -951,6 +970,7 @@ init_write_runtime_socket(systemd_nspawn
init_spec_domtrans_script(systemd_nspawn_t)
miscfiles_manage_localization(systemd_nspawn_t)
+udev_read_runtime_files(systemd_nspawn_t)
# for writing inside chroot
sysnet_manage_config(systemd_nspawn_t)
@@ -967,8 +987,14 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n
# manage etc symlinks for /etc/localtime
files_manage_etc_symlinks(systemd_nspawn_t)
files_mounton_runtime_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
+ files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table(systemd_nspawn_t)
files_search_home(systemd_nspawn_t)
+ files_tmp_filetrans(systemd_nspawn_t, systemd_nspawn_runtime_t, fifo_file)
+ allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
+ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(systemd_nspawn_t, systemd_nspawn_runtime_t, sock_file)
+ allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms;
+
fs_getattr_cgroup(systemd_nspawn_t)
fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
@@ -986,6 +1012,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n
selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
selinux_remount_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
selinux_search_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
+ selinux_mounton_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
init_domtrans(systemd_nspawn_t)
@@ -1013,7 +1040,7 @@ optional_policy(`
# systemd_passwd_agent_t local policy
#
-allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:capability { chown sys_tty_config dac_override };
+allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:capability { chown sys_tty_config dac_override sys_resource };
allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:process { setfscreate setsockcreate signal };
allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -1024,14 +1051,19 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(systemd_passwd
manage_fifo_files_pattern(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_runtime_t, systemd_passwd_runtime_t)
init_runtime_filetrans(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_runtime_t, { dir fifo_file file })
+can_exec(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t)
+
kernel_read_system_state(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
kernel_stream_connect(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
dev_create_generic_dirs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
dev_read_generic_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+dev_read_sysfs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+dev_write_sysfs_dirs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
dev_write_generic_sock_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
dev_write_kmsg(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+corecmd_search_bin(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
files_read_etc_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
@@ -1040,6 +1072,7 @@ selinux_get_enforce_mode(systemd_passwd_
selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
term_read_console(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
+term_use_unallocated_ttys(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
@@ -1100,6 +1133,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_pstore_t
allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create getattr read setopt };
+allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
+
manage_dirs_pattern(systemd_rfkill_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t)
manage_files_pattern(systemd_rfkill_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t)
init_var_lib_filetrans(systemd_rfkill_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t, dir)
@@ -1264,6 +1299,8 @@ allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_journal
allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_type:file read_file_perms;
+allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file unlink;
+
kernel_getattr_proc(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
kernel_read_network_state(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
@@ -1495,6 +1532,8 @@ systemd_dbus_chat_logind(systemd_user_ru
seutil_read_file_contexts(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
seutil_libselinux_linked(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
+userdom_delete_user_tmp_dirs(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
+userdom_delete_user_tmp_named_pipes(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
userdom_search_user_runtime_root(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
userdom_user_runtime_root_filetrans_user_runtime(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t, dir)
userdom_manage_user_runtime_dirs(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/udev.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/udev.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/udev.te
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ selinux_compute_access_vector(udev_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(udev_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(udev_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(udev_t)
+selinux_use_status_page(udev_t)
storage_watch_fixed_disk(udev_t)
@@ -351,6 +352,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
raid_domtrans_mdadm(udev_t)
+ raid_read_mdadm_runtime_files(udev_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -400,6 +402,10 @@ allow udevadm_t udev_runtime_t:dir watch
dev_rw_sysfs(udevadm_t)
dev_read_urand(udevadm_t)
+fs_getattr_cgroup(udevadm_t)
+fs_getattr_tmpfs(udevadm_t)
+fs_search_cgroup_dirs(udevadm_t)
+
files_read_etc_files(udevadm_t)
files_read_usr_files(udevadm_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ interface(`unconfined_domain_noaudit',`
# Use most Linux capabilities
allow $1 self:{ capability cap_userns } { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write audit_control setfcap };
- allow $1 self:{ capability2 cap2_userns } { syslog wake_alarm };
+ allow $1 self:{ capability2 cap2_userns } { syslog wake_alarm bpf perfmon };
allow $1 self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
# Transition to myself, to make get_ordered_context_list happy.
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ certbot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
cron_unconfined_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t)
')
@@ -121,6 +125,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
lvm_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
+ lvm_use_sem(unconfined_t)
')
optional_policy(`
Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
@@ -2167,6 +2167,8 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_conten
')
read_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
+ allow $1 user_home_t:file map;
+ allow $1 user_home_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
files_search_home($1)
')
Russell Coker <[email protected]> writes:
> Lots of little patches that should be good to merge.
>
> Signed-off-by: Russell Coker <[email protected]>
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
> @@ -305,7 +305,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
> /usr/sbin/sesh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/sbin/smrsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0)
>
> -/usr/share/mdadm/checkarray -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
> /usr/share/(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
> /usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm\.py.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
> /usr/share/ajaxterm/qweb\.py.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
> @@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_all_executables'
>
> corecmd_search_bin($1)
> read_files_pattern($1, exec_type, exec_type)
> + allow $1 exec_type:file map;
create a corecmd_map_read_all_executables() instead. This macro name is
"read_all_executables" if you extend it with this rule then you
effectively do several things:
1. you make the name of the interface inaccurate because the rules no
longer reflect the name
2. you give all existing callers of this interface access to map
exec_file files.
3. Youre essentially shutting the door for just read access to exec_type
files because the interface name has already been taken for "read + map"
> ')
>
> ########################################
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
> @@ -4323,6 +4323,42 @@ interface(`dev_mount_sysfs',`
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## remount a sysfs filesystem
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`dev_remount_sysfs',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type sysfs_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem remount;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> +## unmount a sysfs filesystem
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`dev_unmount_sysfs',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type sysfs_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem unmount;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Do not audit getting the attributes of sysfs filesystem
> ## </summary>
> ## <param name="domain">
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if
> @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ interface(`domain_read_all_domains_state
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> -## Get the attributes of all domains of all domains.
> +## Get the attributes of all domains
> ## </summary>
> ## <param name="domain">
> ## <summary>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
> @@ -5408,6 +5408,25 @@ interface(`files_delete_kernel_symbol_ta
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## Delete a system.map in the /boot directory.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type boot_t, system_map_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 boot_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> + allow $1 system_map_t:file mounton;
mount != listing boot_t dirs (i know its semi-related but you might want
to mount on symbox table and not list boot_t and this will shut the door
on that)
instead you should probably imply getattr here:
allow $1 system_map_t:file { getattr mounton };
Would be even better to declare "mounton_file_perms" on a lower level
and use that
define(`mounton_file_perms',`{ getattr mounton }')
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Search the contents of /var.
> ## </summary>
> ## <param name="domain">
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
> @@ -159,6 +159,24 @@ interface(`selinux_unmount_fs',`
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## Mount on the selinuxfs filesystem.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`selinux_mounton_fs',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type security_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 security_t:dir mounton;
getattr should probably be implied here
a mounton_dir_perms would be even better:
define(`mounton_dir_perms',`{ getattr mounton }')
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Get the attributes of the selinuxfs filesystem
> ## </summary>
> ## <param name="domain">
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
> @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ fs_associate_tmpfs(devpts_t)
> fs_xattr_type(devpts_t)
> fs_use_trans devpts gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0);
>
> +# for systemd-nspawn
> +allow console_device_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
I am a fairly big user of systemd_nspawn and i have never ever
encountered this. only pty devices should ever associate with devpts_t
filesystems AFAIK
> +
> #
> # devtty_t is the type of /dev/tty.
> #
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
> @@ -98,12 +98,13 @@ optional_policy(`
>
> allow chkpwd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid };
> dontaudit chkpwd_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
> -allow chkpwd_t self:process { getattr signal };
> +allow chkpwd_t self:process { getcap getattr signal };
>
> allow chkpwd_t shadow_t:file read_file_perms;
> files_list_etc(chkpwd_t)
>
> kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t)
> +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chkpwd_t)
>
> domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)
>
> @@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(chkpwd_t)
> files_dontaudit_search_var(chkpwd_t)
>
> fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chkpwd_t)
> +fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(chkpwd_t)
>
> selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t)
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/fstools.te
> @@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ mount_exec(fsadm_t)
> # for /run/mount/utab
> mount_getattr_runtime_files(fsadm_t)
>
> +mount_rw_runtime_files(fsadm_t)
> +
> seutil_read_config(fsadm_t)
>
> userdom_use_user_terminals(fsadm_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/init.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.if
> @@ -191,6 +191,24 @@ interface(`init_domain',`
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## Allow a domain to be transitioned to from init_t with nnp_transition
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain to transition
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`init_nnp_domain',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type init_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow init_t $1:process2 nnp_transition;
> +')
This is redundant. In systems with systemd (ifdef init_systemd) this access is already allowed.
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Create a domain which can be started by init,
> ## with a range transition.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -3029,6 +3047,24 @@ interface(`init_relabel_utmp',`
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## Watch utmp.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`init_watch_utmp',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type initrc_runtime_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 initrc_runtime_t:file watch;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Create files in /var/run with the
> ## utmp file type.
> ## </summary>
> @@ -3248,6 +3284,24 @@ interface(`init_read_pid_pipes',`
> init_read_runtime_pipes($1)
> ')
>
> +######################################
> +## <summary>
> +## restart systemd units, for /run/systemd/transient/*
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`init_restart_units',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type init_var_run_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 init_var_run_t:service { start status stop };
> +')
i would probably create a private type for "runtime units"
but also in another patch you create another "restart_units" interface
and that has different permissions (probably best to associate
consistent permissions with interface names)
not where "restart_units" means something different somewhere else
> +
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> ## Read init unnamed pipes.
> @@ -3575,6 +3629,24 @@ interface(`init_manage_all_unit_files',`
> ')
>
> ########################################
> +## <summary>
> +## stat systemd unit files
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`init_getattr_all_unit_files',`
> + gen_require(`
> + attribute systemdunit;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 systemdunit:file getattr;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> ## <summary>
> ## Allow unconfined access to send instructions to init
> ## </summary>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/init.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
> @@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
> allow init_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_socket_perms };
> allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
> - allow init_t self:system { status reboot halt reload };
> + # why does kernel 4.9 make it need start and stop while 4.19 does not?
> + allow init_t self:system { start stop status reboot halt reload
> };
I would remove the above change. might have been a bug in 4.9, no need
to support bugs besides kernel 4.9 is old.
> # Until systemd is fixed
> allow init_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
> allow init_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
> @@ -1002,6 +1003,7 @@ ifdef(`enabled_mls',`
>
> ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> allow initrc_t init_t:system { start status reboot halt reload };
> + allow init_t initrc_t:process2 nnp_transition;
this is dedundant. Should already be allowed
>
> manage_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_lock_t, initrc_lock_t)
> files_lock_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_lock_t, file)
> @@ -1043,6 +1045,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> init_get_all_units_status(initrc_t)
> init_manage_var_lib_files(initrc_t)
> init_rw_stream_sockets(initrc_t)
> + init_stop_system(initrc_t)
>
> # Create /etc/audit.rules.prev after firstboot remediation
> logging_manage_audit_config(initrc_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
> @@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ auth_manage_pam_runtime_files(local_logi
> auth_manage_pam_console_data(local_login_t)
> auth_domtrans_pam_console(local_login_t)
>
> -init_dontaudit_use_fds(local_login_t)
> +# if local_login_t can not inherit fd from init it takes ages to login
> +init_use_fds(local_login_t)
Yes i think youre right but i think this applies to all processes forked
by systemd. I believe that addressing rules associated with systemd
forked processes should probably be addressed on a lower level instead
for example:
init_domain is obviously systemd forked in a systemd system (init_domain
is allowed to use init fd via domtrans_pattern(init_t, $1, $2) in
init_domain().
Howver local_login is not a direct fork of systemd (its not an
init_daemon) and instead its a indirect forked process of systemd (it
gets executed by a init domain but not by init itself)
I would create a type attribute "systemd_forked_type" and then associate
the forked related rules to that and then use that
i think these (or somthing like it):
allow $1 systemd_forked_type:fd use;
allow $1 systemd_forked_type:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
These these can be removed:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/ea6002ddf9c09a307dccc4bf662ff7efa2395572/policy/modules/system/init.if#L186
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/master/policy/modules/system/init.if#L149
etc
otherwise you end up with very decentralized policy which is hard to maintain.
>
> miscfiles_read_localization(local_login_t)
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/logging.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/logging.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/logging.te
> @@ -515,7 +515,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> # for systemd-journal
> allow syslogd_t self:netlink_audit_socket connected_socket_perms;
> allow syslogd_t self:capability2 audit_read;
> - allow syslogd_t self:capability { chown setgid setuid sys_ptrace };
> + allow syslogd_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search setgid setuid sys_ptrace audit_control };
> + allow syslogd_t self:cap_userns sys_ptrace;
> allow syslogd_t self:netlink_audit_socket { getattr getopt read setopt write nlmsg_write };
>
> # remove /run/log/journal when switching to permanent storage
> @@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>
> domain_getattr_all_domains(syslogd_t)
> domain_read_all_domains_state(syslogd_t)
> + domain_signull_all_domains(syslogd_t)
>
> init_create_runtime_dirs(syslogd_t)
> init_daemon_runtime_file(syslogd_runtime_t, dir, "syslogd")
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/lvm.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.if
> @@ -247,3 +247,21 @@ interface(`lvm_admin',`
> files_search_tmp($1)
> admin_pattern($1, lvm_tmp_t)
> ')
> +
> +######################################
> +## <summary>
> +## Allow lvm_t to use a semaphore
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain that created the semaphore
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`lvm_use_sem',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type lvm_t;
> + ')
> +
> + allow lvm_t $1:sem all_sem_perms;
Thats not allowed like this generally
> +')
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> @@ -345,6 +345,8 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + apt_use_fds(lvm_t)
> +
> dpkg_script_rw_pipes(lvm_t)
> ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc
> @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
> /etc/pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
> /etc/pki/.*/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0)
> /etc/ssl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0)
> +/etc/ssl/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0)
> +/etc/letsencrypt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tls_privkey_t,s0)
> /etc/timezone -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0)
>
> ifdef(`distro_debian',`
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/modutils.te
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> # insmod local policy
> #
>
> -allow kmod_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config };
> +allow kmod_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config };
> allow kmod_t self:process { execmem sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal };
> # for the radeon/amdgpu modules
> dontaudit kmod_t self:capability sys_admin;
> @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(kmod_t)
> fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(kmod_t)
> fs_search_tracefs(kmod_t)
>
> +init_nnp_domain(kmod_t)
shouldnt be needed : kmod is a init_system_domain which is a
init_domain, and systemd can already nnp transition to all init_domain
if ifdef init_systemd is set
> init_rw_initctl(kmod_t)
> init_use_fds(kmod_t)
> init_use_script_fds(kmod_t)
> @@ -138,6 +139,8 @@ optional_policy(`
> dpkg_manage_script_tmp_files(kmod_t)
> dpkg_map_script_tmp_files(kmod_t)
> dpkg_read_script_tmp_symlinks(kmod_t)
> + apt_use_fds(kmod_t)
> + apt_use_ptys(kmod_t)
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/mount.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/mount.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/mount.te
> @@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ optional_policy(`
> samba_run_smbmount(mount_t, mount_roles)
> ')
>
> +optional_policy(`
> + ssh_rw_pipes(mount_t)
> +')
> +
> +optional_policy(`
> + xen_read_image_files(mount_t)
> +')
> +
> ########################################
> #
> # Unconfined mount local policy
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.fc
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/raid.fc
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.fc
> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
> /usr/bin/mdmpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/bin/raid-check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0)
>
> +/usr/share/mdadm/checkarray -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0)
> +
> # Systemd unit files
> /usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*mdadm-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_unit_t,s0)
> /usr/lib/systemd/system/[^/]*mdmon.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_unit_t,s0)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/raid.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/raid.te
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(mdad
> dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(mdadm_t)
> dev_read_realtime_clock(mdadm_t)
>
> +domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(mdadm_t)
> domain_use_interactive_fds(mdadm_t)
>
> files_read_etc_files(mdadm_t)
> @@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mda
>
> optional_policy(`
> cron_system_entry(mdadm_t, mdadm_exec_t)
> + cron_rw_tmp_files(mdadm_t)
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc
> @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
>
> /run/log/journal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_journal_t,s0)
>
> -/usr/bin/systemd-analyze -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_analyze_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/bin/systemd-cgtop -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_cgtop_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/bin/systemd-coredump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_coredump_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/bin/systemd-detect-virt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_detect_virt_exec_t,s0)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
> @@ -355,10 +355,11 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`
> #
>
> allow systemd_coredump_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create write connect getopt setopt };
> -allow systemd_coredump_t self:capability { setgid setuid setpcap };
> +allow systemd_coredump_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setgid setuid setpcap sys_ptrace };
> allow systemd_coredump_t self:process { getcap setcap setfscreate };
>
> manage_files_pattern(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t)
> +allow systemd_coredump_t systemd_coredump_var_lib_t:file map;
>
> kernel_domtrans_to(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_exec_t)
> kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(systemd_coredump_t)
> @@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(systemd_coredump_t)
> files_search_var_lib(systemd_coredump_t)
>
> fs_getattr_xattr_fs(systemd_coredump_t)
> +fs_search_tmpfs(systemd_coredump_t)
>
> selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_coredump_t)
>
> @@ -397,6 +399,8 @@ allow systemd_generator_t self:fifo_file
> allow systemd_generator_t self:capability dac_override;
> allow systemd_generator_t self:process setfscreate;
>
> +allow systemd_generator_t systemd_unit_t:file getattr;
> +
> corecmd_getattr_bin_files(systemd_generator_t)
>
> dev_read_sysfs(systemd_generator_t)
> @@ -407,6 +411,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(systemd_generator_t
> files_search_runtime(systemd_generator_t)
> files_list_boot(systemd_generator_t)
> files_read_boot_files(systemd_generator_t)
> +files_read_config_files(systemd_generator_t)
> files_search_all_mountpoints(systemd_generator_t)
> files_list_usr(systemd_generator_t)
>
> @@ -414,6 +419,8 @@ fs_list_efivars(systemd_generator_t)
> fs_getattr_xattr_fs(systemd_generator_t)
>
> init_create_runtime_files(systemd_generator_t)
> +init_read_all_script_files(systemd_generator_t)
> +init_getattr_all_unit_files(systemd_generator_t)
> init_manage_runtime_dirs(systemd_generator_t)
> init_manage_runtime_symlinks(systemd_generator_t)
> init_read_runtime_files(systemd_generator_t)
> @@ -618,12 +625,17 @@ init_dbus_send_script(systemd_logind_t)
> init_get_all_units_status(systemd_logind_t)
> init_get_system_status(systemd_logind_t)
> init_read_utmp(systemd_logind_t)
> +init_restart_units(systemd_logind_t)
> init_service_start(systemd_logind_t)
> init_service_status(systemd_logind_t)
> init_start_all_units(systemd_logind_t)
> init_stop_all_units(systemd_logind_t)
> init_start_system(systemd_logind_t)
> init_stop_system(systemd_logind_t)
> +init_watch_utmp(systemd_logind_t)
> +
> +# for /run/systemd/transient/*
> +init_restart_units(systemd_logind_t)
>
> locallogin_read_state(systemd_logind_t)
>
> @@ -880,6 +892,9 @@ allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability {
> allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability2 wake_alarm;
> allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_dgram_socket connected_socket_perms;
> allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
> +allow systemd_nspawn_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
> +allow systemd_nspawn_t self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms;
> +allow systemd_nspawn_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
probably just create_socket_perms
>
> allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_journal_t:dir search;
>
> @@ -916,6 +931,9 @@ dev_getattr_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> dev_manage_sysfs_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> dev_mounton_sysfs_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> dev_mount_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> +dev_remount_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> +dev_unmount_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> +dev_read_sysfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> dev_read_rand(systemd_nspawn_t)
> dev_read_urand(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> @@ -928,6 +946,7 @@ files_mounton_tmp(systemd_nspawn_t)
> files_read_kernel_symbol_table(systemd_nspawn_t)
> files_setattr_runtime_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> +fs_getattr_cgroup(systemd_nspawn_t)
> fs_getattr_tmpfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> fs_manage_tmpfs_chr_files(systemd_nspawn_t)
> fs_mount_tmpfs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> @@ -951,6 +970,7 @@ init_write_runtime_socket(systemd_nspawn
> init_spec_domtrans_script(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> miscfiles_manage_localization(systemd_nspawn_t)
> +udev_read_runtime_files(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> # for writing inside chroot
> sysnet_manage_config(systemd_nspawn_t)
> @@ -967,8 +987,14 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n
> # manage etc symlinks for /etc/localtime
> files_manage_etc_symlinks(systemd_nspawn_t)
> files_mounton_runtime_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> + files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table(systemd_nspawn_t)
> files_search_home(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> + files_tmp_filetrans(systemd_nspawn_t, systemd_nspawn_runtime_t, fifo_file)
> + allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
> + fs_tmpfs_filetrans(systemd_nspawn_t, systemd_nspawn_runtime_t, sock_file)
> + allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms;
> +
> fs_getattr_cgroup(systemd_nspawn_t)
> fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> @@ -986,6 +1012,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_nspawn_labeled_n
> selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> selinux_remount_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> selinux_search_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
> + selinux_mounton_fs(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> init_domtrans(systemd_nspawn_t)
>
> @@ -1013,7 +1040,7 @@ optional_policy(`
> # systemd_passwd_agent_t local policy
> #
>
> -allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:capability { chown sys_tty_config dac_override };
> +allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:capability { chown sys_tty_config dac_override sys_resource };
> allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:process { setfscreate setsockcreate signal };
> allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
>
> @@ -1024,14 +1051,19 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(systemd_passwd
> manage_fifo_files_pattern(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_runtime_t, systemd_passwd_runtime_t)
> init_runtime_filetrans(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_runtime_t, { dir fifo_file file })
>
> +can_exec(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t)
> +
> kernel_read_system_state(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> kernel_stream_connect(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>
> dev_create_generic_dirs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> dev_read_generic_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> +dev_read_sysfs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> +dev_write_sysfs_dirs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> dev_write_generic_sock_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> dev_write_kmsg(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>
> +corecmd_search_bin(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> files_read_etc_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>
> fs_getattr_xattr_fs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> @@ -1040,6 +1072,7 @@ selinux_get_enforce_mode(systemd_passwd_
> selinux_getattr_fs(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>
> term_read_console(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> +term_use_unallocated_ttys(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>
> auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>
> @@ -1100,6 +1133,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_pstore_t
>
> allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create getattr read setopt };
>
> +allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
thats not a stream socket, do this instead:
- allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create getattr read setopt };
+ allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
> +
> manage_dirs_pattern(systemd_rfkill_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t)
> manage_files_pattern(systemd_rfkill_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t)
> init_var_lib_filetrans(systemd_rfkill_t, systemd_rfkill_var_lib_t, dir)
> @@ -1264,6 +1299,8 @@ allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_journal
> allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_type:file read_file_perms;
>
> +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file unlink;
questionable
> +
> kernel_getattr_proc(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
> kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
> kernel_read_network_state(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
> @@ -1495,6 +1532,8 @@ systemd_dbus_chat_logind(systemd_user_ru
> seutil_read_file_contexts(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
> seutil_libselinux_linked(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
>
> +userdom_delete_user_tmp_dirs(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
> +userdom_delete_user_tmp_named_pipes(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
> userdom_search_user_runtime_root(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
> userdom_user_runtime_root_filetrans_user_runtime(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t, dir)
> userdom_manage_user_runtime_dirs(systemd_user_runtime_dir_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/udev.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/udev.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/udev.te
> @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ selinux_compute_access_vector(udev_t)
> selinux_compute_create_context(udev_t)
> selinux_compute_relabel_context(udev_t)
> selinux_compute_user_contexts(udev_t)
> +selinux_use_status_page(udev_t)
>
> storage_watch_fixed_disk(udev_t)
>
> @@ -351,6 +352,7 @@ optional_policy(`
>
> optional_policy(`
> raid_domtrans_mdadm(udev_t)
> + raid_read_mdadm_runtime_files(udev_t)
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> @@ -400,6 +402,10 @@ allow udevadm_t udev_runtime_t:dir watch
> dev_rw_sysfs(udevadm_t)
> dev_read_urand(udevadm_t)
>
> +fs_getattr_cgroup(udevadm_t)
> +fs_getattr_tmpfs(udevadm_t)
> +fs_search_cgroup_dirs(udevadm_t)
> +
> files_read_etc_files(udevadm_t)
> files_read_usr_files(udevadm_t)
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
> @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ interface(`unconfined_domain_noaudit',`
>
> # Use most Linux capabilities
> allow $1 self:{ capability cap_userns } { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write audit_control setfcap };
> - allow $1 self:{ capability2 cap2_userns } { syslog wake_alarm };
> + allow $1 self:{ capability2 cap2_userns } { syslog wake_alarm bpf perfmon };
> allow $1 self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
>
> # Transition to myself, to make get_ordered_context_list happy.
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
> @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + certbot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
unconfined should be unconfined.
> +')
> +
> +optional_policy(`
> cron_unconfined_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t)
> ')
>
> @@ -121,6 +125,7 @@ optional_policy(`
>
> optional_policy(`
> lvm_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
> + lvm_use_sem(unconfined_t)
that lvm_use_sem should probably just be part of lvm_run()
ie "allow $1 lvm_t:semd rw_sem_perms;"
But in my personal view unconfined_t shouldnt run lvm with a domain
transition in the first place (defeats the purpose of the unconfined domain)
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> @@ -2167,6 +2167,8 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_conten
> ')
>
> read_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
> + allow $1 user_home_t:file map;
read != map
and file != lnk_file
by generalizing interfaces you shut doors for fine grained access control
> + allow $1 user_home_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
> files_search_home($1)
> ')
>
>
--
gpg --locate-keys [email protected]
Key fingerprint = FCD2 3660 5D6B 9D27 7FC6 E0FF DA7E 521F 10F6 4098
https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xDA7E521F10F64098
Dominick Grift
On Thursday, 21 January 2021 1:36:46 AM AEDT Dominick Grift wrote:
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
> > @@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_all_executables'
> >
> > corecmd_search_bin($1)
> > read_files_pattern($1, exec_type, exec_type)
> >
> > + allow $1 exec_type:file map;
>
> create a corecmd_map_read_all_executables() instead. This macro name is
> "read_all_executables" if you extend it with this rule then you
> effectively do several things:
OK, I'll do that in another patch.
> > +interface(`files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table',`
> > + gen_require(`
> > + type boot_t, system_map_t;
> > + ')
> > +
> > + allow $1 boot_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> > + allow $1 system_map_t:file mounton;
>
> mount != listing boot_t dirs (i know its semi-related but you might want
> to mount on symbox table and not list boot_t and this will shut the door
> on that)
>
> instead you should probably imply getattr here:
>
> allow $1 system_map_t:file { getattr mounton };
>
> Would be even better to declare "mounton_file_perms" on a lower level
> and use that
>
> define(`mounton_file_perms',`{ getattr mounton }')
OK, that will be in the next version.
> > +## Mount on the selinuxfs filesystem.
> > +## </summary>
> > +## <param name="domain">
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Domain allowed access.
> > +## </summary>
> > +## </param>
> > +#
> > +interface(`selinux_mounton_fs',`
> > + gen_require(`
> > + type security_t;
> > + ')
> > +
> > + allow $1 security_t:dir mounton;
>
> getattr should probably be implied here
>
> a mounton_dir_perms would be even better:
>
> define(`mounton_dir_perms',`{ getattr mounton }')
OK.
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
> > @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ fs_associate_tmpfs(devpts_t)
> >
> > fs_xattr_type(devpts_t)
> > fs_use_trans devpts gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0);
> >
> > +# for systemd-nspawn
> > +allow console_device_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
>
> I am a fairly big user of systemd_nspawn and i have never ever
> encountered this. only pty devices should ever associate with devpts_t
> filesystems AFAIK
OK, I'll remove that and investigate other solutions.
> > +## Allow a domain to be transitioned to from init_t with nnp_transition
> > +## </summary>
> > +## <param name="domain">
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Domain to transition
> > +## </summary>
> > +## </param>
> > +#
> > +interface(`init_nnp_domain',`
> > + gen_require(`
> > + type init_t;
> > + ')
> > +
> > + allow init_t $1:process2 nnp_transition;
> > +')
>
> This is redundant. In systems with systemd (ifdef init_systemd) this access
> is already allowed.
OK, I'll remove it.
> > +######################################
> > +## <summary>
> > +## restart systemd units, for /run/systemd/transient/*
> > +## </summary>
> > +## <param name="domain">
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Domain allowed access.
> > +## </summary>
> > +## </param>
> > +#
> > +interface(`init_restart_units',`
> > + gen_require(`
> > + type init_var_run_t;
> > + ')
> > +
> > + allow $1 init_var_run_t:service { start status stop };
> > +')
>
> i would probably create a private type for "runtime units"
> but also in another patch you create another "restart_units" interface
> and that has different permissions (probably best to associate
> consistent permissions with interface names)
>
> not where "restart_units" means something different somewhere else
I'll move this to another patch.
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/init.te
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
> > @@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> >
> > allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms
> > connectto }; allow init_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay
> > create_socket_perms }; allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket
> > create_socket_perms;
> >
> > - allow init_t self:system { status reboot halt reload };
> > + # why does kernel 4.9 make it need start and stop while 4.19 does not?
> > + allow init_t self:system { start stop status reboot halt reload
> >
> > };
>
> I would remove the above change. might have been a bug in 4.9, no need
> to support bugs besides kernel 4.9 is old.
OK, I've removed that.
> > @@ -1002,6 +1003,7 @@ ifdef(`enabled_mls',`
> >
> > ifdef(`init_systemd',`
> >
> > allow initrc_t init_t:system { start status reboot halt reload };
> >
> > + allow init_t initrc_t:process2 nnp_transition;
>
> this is dedundant. Should already be allowed
OK.
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
> > @@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ auth_manage_pam_runtime_files(local_logi
> >
> > auth_manage_pam_console_data(local_login_t)
> > auth_domtrans_pam_console(local_login_t)
> >
> > -init_dontaudit_use_fds(local_login_t)
> > +# if local_login_t can not inherit fd from init it takes ages to login
> > +init_use_fds(local_login_t)
>
> Yes i think youre right but i think this applies to all processes forked
> by systemd. I believe that addressing rules associated with systemd
> forked processes should probably be addressed on a lower level instead
>
> for example:
>
> init_domain is obviously systemd forked in a systemd system (init_domain
> is allowed to use init fd via domtrans_pattern(init_t, $1, $2) in
> init_domain().
>
> Howver local_login is not a direct fork of systemd (its not an
> init_daemon) and instead its a indirect forked process of systemd (it
> gets executed by a init domain but not by init itself)
>
> I would create a type attribute "systemd_forked_type" and then associate
> the forked related rules to that and then use that
>
> i think these (or somthing like it):
>
> allow $1 systemd_forked_type:fd use;
> allow $1 systemd_forked_type:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
>
> These these can be removed:
I'll move this to another patch and another discussion.
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/ea6002ddf9c09a307dccc4bf662
> ff7efa2395572/policy/modules/system/init.if#L186
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/master/policy/modules/syst
> em/init.if#L149 etc
>
> otherwise you end up with very decentralized policy which is hard to
> maintain.
> > +######################################
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Allow lvm_t to use a semaphore
> > +## </summary>
> > +## <param name="domain">
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Domain that created the semaphore
> > +## </summary>
> > +## </param>
> > +#
> > +interface(`lvm_use_sem',`
> > + gen_require(`
> > + type lvm_t;
> > + ')
> > +
> > + allow lvm_t $1:sem all_sem_perms;
>
> Thats not allowed like this generally
OK, I'll do it differently.
> > @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(kmod_t)
> >
> > fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(kmod_t)
> > fs_search_tracefs(kmod_t)
> >
> > +init_nnp_domain(kmod_t)
>
> shouldnt be needed : kmod is a init_system_domain which is a
> init_domain, and systemd can already nnp transition to all init_domain
> if ifdef init_systemd is set
OK, I'll test that out.
> > +term_use_unallocated_ttys(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> >
> > auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
> >
> > @@ -1100,6 +1133,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_pstore_t
> >
> > allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create
> > getattr read setopt };>
> > +allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
> > client_stream_socket_perms;
> thats not a stream socket, do this instead:
>
> - allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create
> getattr read setopt }; + allow systemd_rfkill_t
> self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
OK.
> > @@ -1264,6 +1299,8 @@ allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_journal
> >
> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_type:file read_file_perms;
> >
> > +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file unlink;
>
> questionable
Why?
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
> > @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> >
> > ')
> >
> > optional_policy(`
> >
> > + certbot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
>
> unconfined should be unconfined.
certbot needs execmem, we generally don't want to give that to unconfined, so
running certbot in a different domain seems better.
> > optional_policy(`
> >
> > lvm_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
> >
> > + lvm_use_sem(unconfined_t)
>
> that lvm_use_sem should probably just be part of lvm_run()
>
> ie "allow $1 lvm_t:semd rw_sem_perms;"
OK, I'll do that.
> But in my personal view unconfined_t shouldnt run lvm with a domain
> transition in the first place (defeats the purpose of the unconfined domain)
I think the problem is the type transition rules. Run lvm etc as unconfined_t
and then lvm run from init etc won't be able to access it's temporary files
etc.
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> > @@ -2167,6 +2167,8 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_conten
> >
> > ')
> >
> > read_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
> >
> > + allow $1 user_home_t:file map;
>
> read != map
> and file != lnk_file
>
> by generalizing interfaces you shut doors for fine grained access control
OK, I'll remove that.
--
My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/
My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
Russell Coker <[email protected]> writes:
> On Thursday, 21 January 2021 1:36:46 AM AEDT Dominick Grift wrote:
>> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
>> > ===================================================================
>> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
>> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if
>> > @@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_all_executables'
>> >
>> > corecmd_search_bin($1)
>> > read_files_pattern($1, exec_type, exec_type)
>> >
>> > + allow $1 exec_type:file map;
>>
>> create a corecmd_map_read_all_executables() instead. This macro name is
>> "read_all_executables" if you extend it with this rule then you
>> effectively do several things:
>
> OK, I'll do that in another patch.
>
>> > +interface(`files_mounton_kernel_symbol_table',`
>> > + gen_require(`
>> > + type boot_t, system_map_t;
>> > + ')
>> > +
>> > + allow $1 boot_t:dir list_dir_perms;
>> > + allow $1 system_map_t:file mounton;
>>
>> mount != listing boot_t dirs (i know its semi-related but you might want
>> to mount on symbox table and not list boot_t and this will shut the door
>> on that)
>>
>> instead you should probably imply getattr here:
>>
>> allow $1 system_map_t:file { getattr mounton };
>>
>> Would be even better to declare "mounton_file_perms" on a lower level
>> and use that
>>
>> define(`mounton_file_perms',`{ getattr mounton }')
>
> OK, that will be in the next version.
>
>> > +## Mount on the selinuxfs filesystem.
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## <param name="domain">
>> > +## <summary>
>> > +## Domain allowed access.
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## </param>
>> > +#
>> > +interface(`selinux_mounton_fs',`
>> > + gen_require(`
>> > + type security_t;
>> > + ')
>> > +
>> > + allow $1 security_t:dir mounton;
>>
>> getattr should probably be implied here
>>
>> a mounton_dir_perms would be even better:
>>
>> define(`mounton_dir_perms',`{ getattr mounton }')
>
> OK.
>
>> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
>> > ===================================================================
>> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
>> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te
>> > @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ fs_associate_tmpfs(devpts_t)
>> >
>> > fs_xattr_type(devpts_t)
>> > fs_use_trans devpts gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0);
>> >
>> > +# for systemd-nspawn
>> > +allow console_device_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
>>
>> I am a fairly big user of systemd_nspawn and i have never ever
>> encountered this. only pty devices should ever associate with devpts_t
>> filesystems AFAIK
>
> OK, I'll remove that and investigate other solutions.
>
>> > +## Allow a domain to be transitioned to from init_t with nnp_transition
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## <param name="domain">
>> > +## <summary>
>> > +## Domain to transition
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## </param>
>> > +#
>> > +interface(`init_nnp_domain',`
>> > + gen_require(`
>> > + type init_t;
>> > + ')
>> > +
>> > + allow init_t $1:process2 nnp_transition;
>> > +')
>>
>> This is redundant. In systems with systemd (ifdef init_systemd) this access
>> is already allowed.
>
> OK, I'll remove it.
>
>> > +######################################
>> > +## <summary>
>> > +## restart systemd units, for /run/systemd/transient/*
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## <param name="domain">
>> > +## <summary>
>> > +## Domain allowed access.
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## </param>
>> > +#
>> > +interface(`init_restart_units',`
>> > + gen_require(`
>> > + type init_var_run_t;
>> > + ')
>> > +
>> > + allow $1 init_var_run_t:service { start status stop };
>> > +')
>>
>> i would probably create a private type for "runtime units"
>> but also in another patch you create another "restart_units" interface
>> and that has different permissions (probably best to associate
>> consistent permissions with interface names)
>>
>> not where "restart_units" means something different somewhere else
>
> I'll move this to another patch.
>
>> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
>> > ===================================================================
>> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/init.te
>> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/init.te
>> > @@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>> >
>> > allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms
>> > connectto }; allow init_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay
>> > create_socket_perms }; allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket
>> > create_socket_perms;
>> >
>> > - allow init_t self:system { status reboot halt reload };
>> > + # why does kernel 4.9 make it need start and stop while 4.19 does not?
>> > + allow init_t self:system { start stop status reboot halt reload
>> >
>> > };
>>
>> I would remove the above change. might have been a bug in 4.9, no need
>> to support bugs besides kernel 4.9 is old.
>
> OK, I've removed that.
>
>> > @@ -1002,6 +1003,7 @@ ifdef(`enabled_mls',`
>> >
>> > ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>> >
>> > allow initrc_t init_t:system { start status reboot halt reload };
>> >
>> > + allow init_t initrc_t:process2 nnp_transition;
>>
>> this is dedundant. Should already be allowed
>
> OK.
>
>> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
>> > ===================================================================
>> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
>> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
>> > @@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ auth_manage_pam_runtime_files(local_logi
>> >
>> > auth_manage_pam_console_data(local_login_t)
>> > auth_domtrans_pam_console(local_login_t)
>> >
>> > -init_dontaudit_use_fds(local_login_t)
>> > +# if local_login_t can not inherit fd from init it takes ages to login
>> > +init_use_fds(local_login_t)
>>
>> Yes i think youre right but i think this applies to all processes forked
>> by systemd. I believe that addressing rules associated with systemd
>> forked processes should probably be addressed on a lower level instead
>>
>> for example:
>>
>> init_domain is obviously systemd forked in a systemd system (init_domain
>> is allowed to use init fd via domtrans_pattern(init_t, $1, $2) in
>> init_domain().
>>
>> Howver local_login is not a direct fork of systemd (its not an
>> init_daemon) and instead its a indirect forked process of systemd (it
>> gets executed by a init domain but not by init itself)
>>
>> I would create a type attribute "systemd_forked_type" and then associate
>> the forked related rules to that and then use that
>>
>> i think these (or somthing like it):
>>
>> allow $1 systemd_forked_type:fd use;
>> allow $1 systemd_forked_type:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
>>
>> These these can be removed:
>
> I'll move this to another patch and another discussion.
>
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/ea6002ddf9c09a307dccc4bf662
>> ff7efa2395572/policy/modules/system/init.if#L186
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/master/policy/modules/syst
>> em/init.if#L149 etc
>>
>> otherwise you end up with very decentralized policy which is hard to
>> maintain.
>
>> > +######################################
>> > +## <summary>
>> > +## Allow lvm_t to use a semaphore
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## <param name="domain">
>> > +## <summary>
>> > +## Domain that created the semaphore
>> > +## </summary>
>> > +## </param>
>> > +#
>> > +interface(`lvm_use_sem',`
>> > + gen_require(`
>> > + type lvm_t;
>> > + ')
>> > +
>> > + allow lvm_t $1:sem all_sem_perms;
>>
>> Thats not allowed like this generally
>
> OK, I'll do it differently.
>
>> > @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(kmod_t)
>> >
>> > fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(kmod_t)
>> > fs_search_tracefs(kmod_t)
>> >
>> > +init_nnp_domain(kmod_t)
>>
>> shouldnt be needed : kmod is a init_system_domain which is a
>> init_domain, and systemd can already nnp transition to all init_domain
>> if ifdef init_systemd is set
>
> OK, I'll test that out.
>
>> > +term_use_unallocated_ttys(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>> >
>> > auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_passwd_agent_t)
>> >
>> > @@ -1100,6 +1133,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_pstore_t
>> >
>> > allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create
>> > getattr read setopt };>
>> > +allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
>> > client_stream_socket_perms;
>> thats not a stream socket, do this instead:
>>
>> - allow systemd_rfkill_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { bind create
>> getattr read setopt }; + allow systemd_rfkill_t
>> self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
>
> OK.
>
>> > @@ -1264,6 +1299,8 @@ allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_journal
>> >
>> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
>> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_type:file read_file_perms;
>> >
>> > +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file unlink;
>>
>> questionable
>
> Why?
>
Not sure yet. other than that is looks incomplete and that i am
wondering why one would be bothering with this.
Can you tell me a bit more about this event?
>> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
>> > ===================================================================
>> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
>> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
>> > @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ optional_policy(`
>> >
>> > ')
>> >
>> > optional_policy(`
>> >
>> > + certbot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
>>
>> unconfined should be unconfined.
>
> certbot needs execmem, we generally don't want to give that to unconfined, so
> running certbot in a different domain seems better.
Those day's are long gone. Nowaday's even `grep` does execmem.
>
>> > optional_policy(`
>> >
>> > lvm_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r)
>> >
>> > + lvm_use_sem(unconfined_t)
>>
>> that lvm_use_sem should probably just be part of lvm_run()
>>
>> ie "allow $1 lvm_t:semd rw_sem_perms;"
>
> OK, I'll do that.
>
>> But in my personal view unconfined_t shouldnt run lvm with a domain
>> transition in the first place (defeats the purpose of the unconfined domain)
>
> I think the problem is the type transition rules. Run lvm etc as unconfined_t
> and then lvm run from init etc won't be able to access it's temporary files
> etc.
>
why would lvm run for init have any busyness with temporary files? Seems
unlikely to me and nowaday's we have a lot more flexibility with
type-trans rules. But yes, its a bit late in the game now to change
this. It breaks the model though IMHO.
>> > Index: refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
>> > ===================================================================
>> > --- refpolicy-2.20210120.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
>> > +++ refpolicy-2.20210120/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
>> > @@ -2167,6 +2167,8 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_conten
>> >
>> > ')
>> >
>> > read_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t)
>> >
>> > + allow $1 user_home_t:file map;
>>
>> read != map
>> and file != lnk_file
>>
>> by generalizing interfaces you shut doors for fine grained access control
>
> OK, I'll remove that.
--
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Dominick Grift
On Wednesday, 27 January 2021 5:03:06 PM AEDT Dominick Grift wrote:
> >> > @@ -1264,6 +1299,8 @@ allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_journal
> >> >
> >> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> >> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_type:file
> >> > read_file_perms;
> >> >
> >> > +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file unlink;
> >>
> >> questionable
> >
> > Why?
>
> Not sure yet. other than that is looks incomplete and that i am
> wondering why one would be bothering with this.
>
> Can you tell me a bit more about this event?
It's just a fifo that systemd-nspawn left lying around and tmpfiles cleaned
up. My way of not bothering is to just allow it. It doesn't seem to do any
harm.
> >> unconfined should be unconfined.
> >
> > certbot needs execmem, we generally don't want to give that to unconfined,
> > so running certbot in a different domain seems better.
>
> Those day's are long gone. Nowaday's even `grep` does execmem.
grep asks for execmem but seems to work fine without it. certbot won't
function without it.
> >> But in my personal view unconfined_t shouldnt run lvm with a domain
> >> transition in the first place (defeats the purpose of the unconfined
> >> domain)>
> > I think the problem is the type transition rules. Run lvm etc as
> > unconfined_t and then lvm run from init etc won't be able to access it's
> > temporary files etc.
>
> why would lvm run for init have any busyness with temporary files? Seems
> unlikely to me and nowaday's we have a lot more flexibility with
> type-trans rules. But yes, its a bit late in the game now to change
> this. It breaks the model though IMHO.
type_transition lvm_t device_t:blk_file fixed_disk_device_t;
type_transition lvm_t etc_t:file lvm_metadata_t;
Here's a couple of the type_transition rules in the current policy that
indicate problems if you removed the transition to lvm_t.
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Russell Coker <[email protected]> writes:
> On Wednesday, 27 January 2021 5:03:06 PM AEDT Dominick Grift wrote:
>> >> > @@ -1264,6 +1299,8 @@ allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_journal
>> >> >
>> >> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms;
>> >> > allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_tmpfiles_conf_type:file
>> >> > read_file_perms;
>> >> >
>> >> > +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t systemd_nspawn_runtime_t:fifo_file unlink;
>> >>
>> >> questionable
>> >
>> > Why?
>>
>> Not sure yet. other than that is looks incomplete and that i am
>> wondering why one would be bothering with this.
>>
>> Can you tell me a bit more about this event?
>
> It's just a fifo that systemd-nspawn left lying around and tmpfiles cleaned
> up. My way of not bothering is to just allow it. It doesn't seem to do any
> harm.
>
>> >> unconfined should be unconfined.
>> >
>> > certbot needs execmem, we generally don't want to give that to unconfined,
>> > so running certbot in a different domain seems better.
>>
>> Those day's are long gone. Nowaday's even `grep` does execmem.
>
> grep asks for execmem but seems to work fine without it. certbot won't
> function without it.
>
git also wants execmem and without it some functionality does not work
(although dont ask me what exactly as i dont fully recall, i just know
that the search box in my gitweb didnt work correctly without it and
that is using git under the hood.
But aside , modern wayland compositors also need execmem (gnome,sway
etc). Execmem is just way too common these day's
>> >> But in my personal view unconfined_t shouldnt run lvm with a domain
>> >> transition in the first place (defeats the purpose of the unconfined
>> >> domain)>
>> > I think the problem is the type transition rules. Run lvm etc as
>> > unconfined_t and then lvm run from init etc won't be able to access it's
>> > temporary files etc.
>>
>> why would lvm run for init have any busyness with temporary files? Seems
>> unlikely to me and nowaday's we have a lot more flexibility with
>> type-trans rules. But yes, its a bit late in the game now to change
>> this. It breaks the model though IMHO.
>
> type_transition lvm_t device_t:blk_file fixed_disk_device_t;
> type_transition lvm_t etc_t:file lvm_metadata_t;
>
> Here's a couple of the type_transition rules in the current policy that
> indicate problems if you removed the transition to lvm_t.
k, well those could be addressed with name-based type transitions
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