On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 09:34:43AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 3/5/19 4:17 PM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> >From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
> >
> >In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
> >fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
> >nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
> >
> >The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
> >security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
> >mounted the filesystem only once.
> >
> >("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
> >"fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
> >
> >Cc: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
> >Cc: [email protected]
> >Fixes: 0b4d3452b8b4 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
> >Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
>
> Do you have some tests you are using for the selinux nfs support?
No. I'll ask around. Trond or Anna, do either of you do any selinux
testing?
> I have an open issue on the selinux-testsuite with an example script
> for running the regular selinux tests on a NFS mount but it can't
> fully succeed as noted there,
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/32
So if I just clone
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite.git and filter out
those known failures, would that be a good starting point?
> I've also have another script to test context= mount handling for
> nfs since that should take precedence over native labels; it looks
> like that might be broken again:
Thanks for the report, I'll take a look. That's before or after
applying this patch? Assuming the former, do you have an idea how
recent a regression it is?
--b.
> #!/bin/sh
> cat > /etc/exports <<EOF
> /home localhost(rw,no_root_squash,security_label)
> EOF
> exportfs -a
> systemctl start nfs-server
> mkdir -p /mnt/home
> mount -t nfs -o vers=4.0,context=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0
> localhost:/home /mnt/home
> echo "Under NFSv4.0:"
> ls -Za /mnt/home
> touch /mnt/home/foo
> ls -Z /mnt/home/foo
> ls -Z /home/foo
> rm /mnt/home/foo
> umount /mnt/home
> mount -t nfs -o vers=4.2,context=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0
> localhost:/home /mnt/home
> echo "Under NFSv4.2:"
> ls -Za /mnt/home
> touch /mnt/home/foo
> ls -Z /mnt/home/foo
> ls -Z /home/foo
> rm /home/foo
> umount /mnt/home
> rmdir /mnt/home
> rm /etc/exports
> exportfs -ua
> systemctl stop nfs-server
>
> >---
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++++-
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> >diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> >index f0e36c3492ba..5e9304567233 100644
> >--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> >+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> >@@ -959,8 +959,11 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> > BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
> > /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
> >- if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
> >+ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
> >+ if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
> >+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
> > return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
> >+ }
> > mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
> >
On 3/6/19 10:34 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 09:34:43AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 3/5/19 4:17 PM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
>>> From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
>>>
>>> In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
>>> fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
>>> nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
>>>
>>> The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
>>> security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
>>> mounted the filesystem only once.
>>>
>>> ("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
>>> "fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
>>>
>>> Cc: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
>>> Cc: [email protected]
>>> Fixes: 0b4d3452b8b4 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
>>> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
>>
>> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
>>
>> Do you have some tests you are using for the selinux nfs support?
>
> No. I'll ask around. Trond or Anna, do either of you do any selinux
> testing?
>
>> I have an open issue on the selinux-testsuite with an example script
>> for running the regular selinux tests on a NFS mount but it can't
>> fully succeed as noted there,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/32
>
> So if I just clone
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite.git and filter out
> those known failures, would that be a good starting point?
Yes, although you might want to remove the inet_socket and sctp tests
from tests/Makefile before running it over NFS; it looks like there are
some interactions between NFS and labeled networking (netlabel and
ipsec/xfrm) that require further test policy changes to permit.
>
>> I've also have another script to test context= mount handling for
>> nfs since that should take precedence over native labels; it looks
>> like that might be broken again:
>
> Thanks for the report, I'll take a look. That's before or after
> applying this patch? Assuming the former, do you have an idea how
> recent a regression it is?
Now I'm having difficulty reproducing it entirely. I thought on stock
Fedora 29 (4.20.x) I was seeing the actual underlying security labels
leaking through on files within the NFS mount despite using a context=
mount, while correctly seeing the context mount values with your patch,
but now I can't seem to repro. It was this bug that originally
motivated Scott's commit that you are further fixing IIUC,
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
>
> --b.
>
>> #!/bin/sh
>> cat > /etc/exports <<EOF
>> /home localhost(rw,no_root_squash,security_label)
>> EOF
>> exportfs -a
>> systemctl start nfs-server
>> mkdir -p /mnt/home
>> mount -t nfs -o vers=4.0,context=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0
>> localhost:/home /mnt/home
>> echo "Under NFSv4.0:"
>> ls -Za /mnt/home
>> touch /mnt/home/foo
>> ls -Z /mnt/home/foo
>> ls -Z /home/foo
>> rm /mnt/home/foo
>> umount /mnt/home
>> mount -t nfs -o vers=4.2,context=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0
>> localhost:/home /mnt/home
>> echo "Under NFSv4.2:"
>> ls -Za /mnt/home
>> touch /mnt/home/foo
>> ls -Z /mnt/home/foo
>> ls -Z /home/foo
>> rm /home/foo
>> umount /mnt/home
>> rmdir /mnt/home
>> rm /etc/exports
>> exportfs -ua
>> systemctl stop nfs-server
>>
>>> ---
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++++-
>>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>> index f0e36c3492ba..5e9304567233 100644
>>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>> @@ -959,8 +959,11 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
>>> BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
>>> /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
>>> - if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
>>> + if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
>>> + if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
>>> + *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
>>> return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
>>> + }
>>> mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
>>>
On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 11:49:36AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 3/6/19 10:34 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> >On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 09:34:43AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >>I've also have another script to test context= mount handling for
> >>nfs since that should take precedence over native labels; it looks
> >> like that might be broken again:
> >
> >Thanks for the report, I'll take a look. That's before or after
> >applying this patch? Assuming the former, do you have an idea how
> >recent a regression it is?
>
> Now I'm having difficulty reproducing it entirely. I thought on
> stock Fedora 29 (4.20.x) I was seeing the actual underlying security
> labels leaking through on files within the NFS mount despite using a
> context= mount, while correctly seeing the context mount values with
> your patch, but now I can't seem to repro. It was this bug that
> originally motivated Scott's commit that you are further fixing
> IIUC,
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
For what it's worth, I can't reproduce. (If I mount with
-overs=4.2,context=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0 then ls -Z, I only see
system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0.)
--b.
On 3/6/19 12:25 PM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 11:49:36AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 3/6/19 10:34 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
>>> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 09:34:43AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>> I've also have another script to test context= mount handling for
>>>> nfs since that should take precedence over native labels; it looks
>>>> like that might be broken again:
>>>
>>> Thanks for the report, I'll take a look. That's before or after
>>> applying this patch? Assuming the former, do you have an idea how
>>> recent a regression it is?
>>
>> Now I'm having difficulty reproducing it entirely. I thought on
>> stock Fedora 29 (4.20.x) I was seeing the actual underlying security
>> labels leaking through on files within the NFS mount despite using a
>> context= mount, while correctly seeing the context mount values with
>> your patch, but now I can't seem to repro. It was this bug that
>> originally motivated Scott's commit that you are further fixing
>> IIUC,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
>
> For what it's worth, I can't reproduce. (If I mount with
> -overs=4.2,context=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0 then ls -Z, I only see
> system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0.)
Yes, sorry for the noise.