[ ... adding NFS and CIFS ... ]
> On Feb 2, 2022, at 9:12 AM, Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> nvme-over-tcp has the option to utilize TLS for encrypted traffic, but due to the internal design of the nvme-over-fabrics stack we cannot initiate the TLS connection from userspace (as the current in-kernel TLS implementation is designed).
>
> This leaves us with two options:
> 1) Put TLS handshake into the kernel (which will be quite some
> discussion as it's arguably a userspace configuration)
> 2) Pass an in-kernel socket to userspace and have a userspace
> application to run the TLS handshake.
>
> None of these options are quiet clear cut, as we will be have to put
> quite some complexity into the kernel to do full TLS handshake (if we
> were to go with option 1) or will have to design a mechanism to pass
> an in-kernel socket to userspace as we don't do that currently (if we were going with option 2).
>
> We have been discussing some ideas on how to implement option 2 (together with Chuck Lever and the NFS crowd), but so far haven't been able to come up with a decent design.
>
> So I would like to discuss with interested parties on how TLS handshake could be facilitated, and what would be the best design options here.
IMO we are a bit farther along than Hannes suggests, and I had
the impression that we have already agreed on a "decent design"
(see Ben Coddington's earlier post).
We currently have several prototypes we can discuss, and there
are some important issues on the table.
First, from the start we have recognized that we have a range
of potential in-kernel TLS consumers. To name a few: NVMe/TLS,
RPC-with-TLS (for in-transit NFS encryption), CIFS/SMB, and,
when it arrives, the QUICv1 transport. We don't intend to
build something that works for only one of these, thus it
will not be based on existing security infrastructure like
rpc.gssd.
Second, we believe in-kernel consumers will hitch onto the
existing kTLS infrastructure to handle payload encryption and
decryption. This transparently enables both software-based
and offload, and in the latter case, we hope for quite
reasonable performance.
As Hannes said, the missing piece is support for the TLS
handshake protocol to boot strap each TLS session.
The security community has demanded that we stick with user
space handshake implementations because they view the TLS
handshake as complex and a broad attack surface. I question
those assumptions, but even so...
We will need to have in-kernel handshake to support NFSROOT
and NVMe/TLS with a root filesystem, which are requirements
for the storage community.
We have an in-kernel prototype based on Tempesta's TLSv1.2
offload in the works. See the "topic-rpc-with-tls" branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux.git
We also have three promising user space upcall implementations
that are helping us with architectural choices. The main issue
here is how to set the correct peer authentication parameters
for each handshake. As Ben said, key rings can play a critical
part (as might netlink, but perhaps that can be avoided). We
are sensitive to containerization requirements as well.
One (not-yet-working) user space prototype is published in
the "topic-rpc-with-tls-upcall" branch in the repo above.
> The proposed configd would be an option, but then we don't have that, either :-)
>
> Required attendees:
>
> Chuck Lever
> James Bottomley
> Sagi Grimberg
> Keith Busch
> Christoph Hellwig
> David Howells
Anyone from the CIFS team? Enzo? How about Dave Miller?
Actually I think we need to have security and network folks
at the table. LSF/MM might not be the right venue for a
full-scale discussion of alternatives. We have been waiting
for an opportunity to bring this to a broad community event
such as Plumbers but the pandemic has interfered.
However, I am happy to discuss alternative upcall mechanisms,
new requirements, and anything related to securing an
in-kernel handshake against remote attack.
--
Chuck Lever
This is an interesting question - and got me thinking about whether
also could be helpful to the critical question we have been asked
about multiple times for SMB, about how to get QUIC in the kernel (see
the various Storage Developer Conference presentations etc), while
putting as much as possible of the session establishment in userspace
accessed via upcalls.
I don't mind discussing this in detail at LSF (or at SambaXP a few
weeks after LSF), and since there are some SMB servers that support
QUIC already we could probably do at least some prototyping if there
is overlap between these two efforts.
On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 10:04 AM Chuck Lever III <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> [ ... adding NFS and CIFS ... ]
>
> > On Feb 2, 2022, at 9:12 AM, Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > Hi all,
> >
> > nvme-over-tcp has the option to utilize TLS for encrypted traffic, but due to the internal design of the nvme-over-fabrics stack we cannot initiate the TLS connection from userspace (as the current in-kernel TLS implementation is designed).
> >
> > This leaves us with two options:
> > 1) Put TLS handshake into the kernel (which will be quite some
> > discussion as it's arguably a userspace configuration)
> > 2) Pass an in-kernel socket to userspace and have a userspace
> > application to run the TLS handshake.
> >
> > None of these options are quiet clear cut, as we will be have to put
> > quite some complexity into the kernel to do full TLS handshake (if we
> > were to go with option 1) or will have to design a mechanism to pass
> > an in-kernel socket to userspace as we don't do that currently (if we were going with option 2).
> >
> > We have been discussing some ideas on how to implement option 2 (together with Chuck Lever and the NFS crowd), but so far haven't been able to come up with a decent design.
> >
> > So I would like to discuss with interested parties on how TLS handshake could be facilitated, and what would be the best design options here.
>
> IMO we are a bit farther along than Hannes suggests, and I had
> the impression that we have already agreed on a "decent design"
> (see Ben Coddington's earlier post).
>
> We currently have several prototypes we can discuss, and there
> are some important issues on the table.
>
> First, from the start we have recognized that we have a range
> of potential in-kernel TLS consumers. To name a few: NVMe/TLS,
> RPC-with-TLS (for in-transit NFS encryption), CIFS/SMB, and,
> when it arrives, the QUICv1 transport. We don't intend to
> build something that works for only one of these, thus it
> will not be based on existing security infrastructure like
> rpc.gssd.
>
> Second, we believe in-kernel consumers will hitch onto the
> existing kTLS infrastructure to handle payload encryption and
> decryption. This transparently enables both software-based
> and offload, and in the latter case, we hope for quite
> reasonable performance.
>
> As Hannes said, the missing piece is support for the TLS
> handshake protocol to boot strap each TLS session.
>
> The security community has demanded that we stick with user
> space handshake implementations because they view the TLS
> handshake as complex and a broad attack surface. I question
> those assumptions, but even so...
>
> We will need to have in-kernel handshake to support NFSROOT
> and NVMe/TLS with a root filesystem, which are requirements
> for the storage community.
>
> We have an in-kernel prototype based on Tempesta's TLSv1.2
> offload in the works. See the "topic-rpc-with-tls" branch:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux.git
>
> We also have three promising user space upcall implementations
> that are helping us with architectural choices. The main issue
> here is how to set the correct peer authentication parameters
> for each handshake. As Ben said, key rings can play a critical
> part (as might netlink, but perhaps that can be avoided). We
> are sensitive to containerization requirements as well.
>
> One (not-yet-working) user space prototype is published in
> the "topic-rpc-with-tls-upcall" branch in the repo above.
>
>
> > The proposed configd would be an option, but then we don't have that, either :-)
> >
> > Required attendees:
> >
> > Chuck Lever
> > James Bottomley
> > Sagi Grimberg
> > Keith Busch
> > Christoph Hellwig
> > David Howells
>
> Anyone from the CIFS team? Enzo? How about Dave Miller?
>
> Actually I think we need to have security and network folks
> at the table. LSF/MM might not be the right venue for a
> full-scale discussion of alternatives. We have been waiting
> for an opportunity to bring this to a broad community event
> such as Plumbers but the pandemic has interfered.
>
> However, I am happy to discuss alternative upcall mechanisms,
> new requirements, and anything related to securing an
> in-kernel handshake against remote attack.
>
> --
> Chuck Lever
>
>
>
--
Thanks,
Steve