2023-11-16 04:34:06

by Paul Moore

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 10/23] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook

On Nov 7, 2023 Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> the inode_post_setattr hook.
>
> At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
> inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
> file attributes and other file metadata.
>
> Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute
> change.
>
> The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> reverted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/attr.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
> security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

...

> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 7935d11d58b5..ce3bc7642e18 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2222,6 +2222,22 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
>
> +/**
> + * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> + * @dentry: file
> + * @ia_valid: file attributes set
> + *
> + * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
> + */
> +void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> + int ia_valid)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> + return;

I may be missing it, but I don't see the S_PRIVATE flag check in the
existing IMA or EVM hooks so I'm curious as to why it is added here?
Please don't misunderstand me, I think it makes sense to return early
on private dentrys/inodes, but why aren't we doing that now?

> + call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
> * @path: file
> --
> 2.34.1

--
paul-moore.com


2023-11-16 09:44:25

by Roberto Sassu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 10/23] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook

On Wed, 2023-11-15 at 23:33 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Nov 7, 2023 Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> > the inode_post_setattr hook.
> >
> > At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
> > inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
> > file attributes and other file metadata.
> >
> > Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute
> > change.
> >
> > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> > reverted.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > fs/attr.c | 1 +
> > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> > include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
> > security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
>
> ...
>
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index 7935d11d58b5..ce3bc7642e18 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -2222,6 +2222,22 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
> >
> > +/**
> > + * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
> > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> > + * @dentry: file
> > + * @ia_valid: file attributes set
> > + *
> > + * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
> > + */
> > +void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > + int ia_valid)
> > +{
> > + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > + return;
>
> I may be missing it, but I don't see the S_PRIVATE flag check in the
> existing IMA or EVM hooks so I'm curious as to why it is added here?
> Please don't misunderstand me, I think it makes sense to return early
> on private dentrys/inodes, but why aren't we doing that now?

My first motivation was that it is in the pre hooks, so it should be in
the post hook as well.

Thinking more about it, suppose that the post don't have the check,
private inodes would gain an HMAC without checking the validity of the
current HMAC first (done in the pre hooks), which would be even worse.

So, my idea about this is that at least we are consistent.

If IMA and EVM should look at private inodes is a different question,
which would require a discussion.

Thanks

Roberto

> > + call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
> > +}
> > +
> > /**
> > * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
> > * @path: file
> > --
> > 2.34.1
>
> --
> paul-moore.com

2023-11-16 18:46:27

by Paul Moore

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 10/23] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook

On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 4:44 AM Roberto Sassu
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-11-15 at 23:33 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Nov 7, 2023 Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >
> > > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> > > the inode_post_setattr hook.
> > >
> > > At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
> > > inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
> > > file attributes and other file metadata.
> > >
> > > Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute
> > > change.
> > >
> > > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> > > reverted.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> > > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> > > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> > > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > > fs/attr.c | 1 +
> > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> > > include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
> > > security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> > > 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > > index 7935d11d58b5..ce3bc7642e18 100644
> > > --- a/security/security.c
> > > +++ b/security/security.c
> > > @@ -2222,6 +2222,22 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > > }
> > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
> > >
> > > +/**
> > > + * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
> > > + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> > > + * @dentry: file
> > > + * @ia_valid: file attributes set
> > > + *
> > > + * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
> > > + */
> > > +void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> > > + int ia_valid)
> > > +{
> > > + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > > + return;
> >
> > I may be missing it, but I don't see the S_PRIVATE flag check in the
> > existing IMA or EVM hooks so I'm curious as to why it is added here?
> > Please don't misunderstand me, I think it makes sense to return early
> > on private dentrys/inodes, but why aren't we doing that now?
>
> My first motivation was that it is in the pre hooks, so it should be in
> the post hook as well.
>
> Thinking more about it, suppose that the post don't have the check,
> private inodes would gain an HMAC without checking the validity of the
> current HMAC first (done in the pre hooks), which would be even worse.
>
> So, my idea about this is that at least we are consistent.
>
> If IMA and EVM should look at private inodes is a different question,
> which would require a discussion.

As I said above, I can understand why having the IS_PRIVATE() macro
check might be a good idea, I am just concerned that the current
IMA/EVM hooks don't check for S_PRIVATE and thus moving to this new
LSM hook would potentially be a change in behavior (like I said, I
could be missing a subtle detail). I'd just like a quick confirmation
from Mimi that either there is no difference because of X, or she is
aware of the difference and is okay with it. It's very possible she
is fine with it, she did provide her 'Reviewed-by', but I worry this
is the sort of thing that might have gone unnoticed during review.

--
paul-moore.com