2013-09-21 08:56:35

by [email protected]

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v4] crypto: caam - map src buffer before access

KMap the buffers before copying trailing bytes during hmac into a session
temporary buffer. This is required if pinned buffer from user-space is send
during hmac and is safe even if hmac request is generated from within kernel.

Cc:[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yashpal Dutta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vakul Garg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta <[email protected]>
---
Patch covers review comments on first version of patch.
./scripts/checkpatch.pl --strict 0001-crypto-caam-map-src-buffer-before-access.patch

total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 62 lines checked

The patch fixes driver crashes when a pinned buffer from user-space is sent to CAAM driver
for HMAC processing.

Added Cc:[email protected]

drivers/crypto/caam/sg_sw_sec4.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/sg_sw_sec4.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/sg_sw_sec4.h
index e0037c8..6d21a12 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/sg_sw_sec4.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/sg_sw_sec4.h
@@ -117,6 +117,21 @@ static int dma_unmap_sg_chained(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
return nents;
}

+/* Map SG page in kernel virtual address space and copy */
+static inline void sg_map_copy(u8 *dest, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int len, int offset)
+{
+ u8 *mapped_addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Page here can be user-space pinned using get_user_pages
+ * Same must be kmapped before use and kunmapped subsequently
+ */
+ mapped_addr = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg));
+ memcpy(dest, mapped_addr + offset, len);
+ kunmap_atomic(mapped_addr);
+}
+
/* Copy from len bytes of sg to dest, starting from beginning */
static inline void sg_copy(u8 *dest, struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned int len)
{
@@ -124,15 +139,15 @@ static inline void sg_copy(u8 *dest, struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned int len)
int cpy_index = 0, next_cpy_index = current_sg->length;

while (next_cpy_index < len) {
- memcpy(dest + cpy_index, (u8 *) sg_virt(current_sg),
- current_sg->length);
+ sg_map_copy(dest + cpy_index, current_sg, current_sg->length,
+ current_sg->offset);
current_sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(current_sg);
cpy_index = next_cpy_index;
next_cpy_index += current_sg->length;
}
if (cpy_index < len)
- memcpy(dest + cpy_index, (u8 *) sg_virt(current_sg),
- len - cpy_index);
+ sg_map_copy(dest + cpy_index, current_sg, len-cpy_index,
+ current_sg->offset);
}

/* Copy sg data, from to_skip to end, to dest */
@@ -140,7 +155,7 @@ static inline void sg_copy_part(u8 *dest, struct scatterlist *sg,
int to_skip, unsigned int end)
{
struct scatterlist *current_sg = sg;
- int sg_index, cpy_index;
+ int sg_index, cpy_index, offset;

sg_index = current_sg->length;
while (sg_index <= to_skip) {
@@ -148,9 +163,10 @@ static inline void sg_copy_part(u8 *dest, struct scatterlist *sg,
sg_index += current_sg->length;
}
cpy_index = sg_index - to_skip;
- memcpy(dest, (u8 *) sg_virt(current_sg) +
- current_sg->length - cpy_index, cpy_index);
- current_sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(current_sg);
- if (end - sg_index)
+ offset = current_sg->offset + current_sg->length - cpy_index;
+ sg_map_copy(dest, current_sg, cpy_index, offset);
+ if (end - sg_index) {
+ current_sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(current_sg);
sg_copy(dest + cpy_index, current_sg, end - sg_index);
+ }
}
--
1.7.10.4


2013-09-23 18:51:36

by Kim Phillips

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] crypto: caam - map src buffer before access

On Sat, 21 Sep 2013 14:26:35 +0530
Yashpal Dutta <[email protected]> wrote:

> KMap the buffers before copying trailing bytes during hmac into a session
> temporary buffer. This is required if pinned buffer from user-space is send
> during hmac and is safe even if hmac request is generated from within kernel.

it may be "safe" but it adversely affects performance for AF_ALG users,
no?

why does ocf-linux need this, and not AF_ALG? Is a patch to ocf-linux
more appropriate here?

> Cc:[email protected]

fyi, this violates the following rule in
Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt:

- It or an equivalent fix must already exist in Linus' tree (upstream).

Kim

2013-09-24 09:08:39

by Horia Geantă

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] crypto: caam - map src buffer before access

On 9/23/2013 9:51 PM, Kim Phillips wrote:
> On Sat, 21 Sep 2013 14:26:35 +0530
> Yashpal Dutta <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> KMap the buffers before copying trailing bytes during hmac into a session
>> temporary buffer. This is required if pinned buffer from user-space is send
>> during hmac and is safe even if hmac request is generated from within kernel.
> it may be "safe" but it adversely affects performance for AF_ALG users,
> no?
>
> why does ocf-linux need this, and not AF_ALG? Is a patch to ocf-linux
> more appropriate here?

SW hashing (crypto/ahash.c, crypto/shash.c) do the kmap/kunmap.
Crypto engine drivers should do this too. Either by themselves or
(probably better) try to use existing support in crypto/scatterwalk.c

At the interface level, AF_ALG issues get_user_pages via
af_alg_make_sg(), similar to what ocf-linux does.

>
>> Cc:[email protected]
> fyi, this violates the following rule in
> Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt:
>
> - It or an equivalent fix must already exist in Linus' tree (upstream).

AFAICT, rules are more flexible, at least that's my understanding.
Adding a Cc:stable in the signed-off area is more convenient, since it
provides for automatic inclusion in -stable tree (once patch reaches
Linus' tree):
- To have the patch automatically included in the stable tree, add the tag
Cc: [email protected]
in the sign-off area. Once the patch is merged it will be applied to
the stable tree without anything else needing to be done by the author
or subsystem maintainer.

Horia