2017-06-14 18:38:04

by Dave Watson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

Software implementation of transport layer security, implemented using ULP
infrastructure. tcp proto_ops are replaced with tls equivalents of sendmsg and
sendpage.

Only symmetric crypto is done in the kernel, keys are passed by setsockopt
after the handshake is complete. All control messages are supported via CMSG
data - the actual symmetric encryption is the same, just the message type needs
to be passed separately.

For user API, please see Documentation patch.

Pieces that can be shared between hw and sw implementation
are in tls_main.c

Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aviad Yehezkel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <[email protected]>
---
MAINTAINERS | 10 +
include/linux/socket.h | 1 +
include/net/tls.h | 237 +++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/tls.h | 79 +++++
net/Kconfig | 1 +
net/Makefile | 1 +
net/tls/Kconfig | 12 +
net/tls/Makefile | 7 +
net/tls/tls_main.c | 487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 772 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 1607 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/net/tls.h
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/tls.h
create mode 100644 net/tls/Kconfig
create mode 100644 net/tls/Makefile
create mode 100644 net/tls/tls_main.c
create mode 100644 net/tls/tls_sw.c

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f4e682c..710af53 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8979,6 +8979,16 @@ F: net/ipv6/
F: include/net/ip*
F: arch/x86/net/*

+NETWORKING [TLS]
+M: Ilya Lesokhin <[email protected]>
+M: Aviad Yehezkel <[email protected]>
+M: Dave Watson <[email protected]>
+L: [email protected]
+S: Maintained
+F: net/tls/*
+F: include/uapi/linux/tls.h
+F: include/net/tls.h
+
NETWORKING [IPSEC]
M: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
M: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
index 0820274..8b13db5 100644
--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ struct ucred {
#define SOL_ALG 279
#define SOL_NFC 280
#define SOL_KCM 281
+#define SOL_TLS 282

/* IPX options */
#define IPX_TYPE 1
diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b89d397
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <[email protected]>. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
+ * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
+ * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
+ * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
+ * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
+ * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
+ * conditions are met:
+ *
+ * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer.
+ *
+ * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+ * provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _TLS_OFFLOAD_H
+#define _TLS_OFFLOAD_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/tls.h>
+
+
+/* Maximum data size carried in a TLS record */
+#define TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE ((size_t)1 << 14)
+
+#define TLS_HEADER_SIZE 5
+#define TLS_NONCE_OFFSET TLS_HEADER_SIZE
+
+#define TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(info) ((info)->cipher_type)
+
+#define TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA 0x17
+
+#define TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE 13
+
+struct tls_sw_context {
+ struct crypto_aead *aead_send;
+
+ /* Sending context */
+ char aad_space[TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE];
+
+ unsigned int sg_plaintext_size;
+ int sg_plaintext_num_elem;
+ struct scatterlist sg_plaintext_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
+
+ unsigned int sg_encrypted_size;
+ int sg_encrypted_num_elem;
+ struct scatterlist sg_encrypted_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
+
+ /* AAD | sg_plaintext_data | sg_tag */
+ struct scatterlist sg_aead_in[2];
+ /* AAD | sg_encrypted_data (data contain overhead for hdr&iv&tag) */
+ struct scatterlist sg_aead_out[2];
+};
+
+enum {
+ TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD
+};
+
+struct tls_context {
+ union {
+ struct tls_crypto_info crypto_send;
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 crypto_send_aes_gcm_128;
+ };
+
+ void *priv_ctx;
+
+ u16 prepend_size;
+ u16 tag_size;
+ u16 overhead_size;
+ u16 iv_size;
+ char *iv;
+ u16 rec_seq_size;
+ char *rec_seq;
+
+ struct scatterlist *partially_sent_record;
+ u16 partially_sent_offset;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ u16 pending_open_record_frags;
+ int (*push_pending_record)(struct sock *sk, int flags);
+ void (*free_resources)(struct sock *sk);
+
+ void (*sk_write_space)(struct sock *sk);
+ void (*sk_proto_close)(struct sock *sk, long timeout);
+
+ int (*setsockopt)(struct sock *sk, int level,
+ int optname, char __user *optval,
+ unsigned int optlen);
+ int (*getsockopt)(struct sock *sk, int level,
+ int optname, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen);
+};
+
+int wait_on_pending_writer(struct sock *sk, long *timeo);
+int tls_sk_query(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen);
+int tls_sk_attach(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
+ unsigned int optlen);
+
+
+int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
+int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);
+int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
+ int offset, size_t size, int flags);
+void tls_sw_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout);
+
+void tls_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
+void tls_icsk_clean_acked(struct sock *sk);
+
+int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
+ struct scatterlist *sg, u16 first_offset,
+ int flags);
+int tls_push_pending_closed_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
+ int flags, long *timeo);
+
+static inline bool tls_is_pending_closed_record(struct tls_context *ctx)
+{
+ return test_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &ctx->flags);
+}
+
+static inline int tls_complete_pending_work(struct sock *sk,
+ struct tls_context *ctx,
+ int flags, long *timeo)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_write_pending))
+ rc = wait_on_pending_writer(sk, timeo);
+
+ if (!rc && tls_is_pending_closed_record(ctx))
+ rc = tls_push_pending_closed_record(sk, ctx, flags, timeo);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline bool tls_is_partially_sent_record(struct tls_context *ctx)
+{
+ return !!ctx->partially_sent_record;
+}
+
+static inline bool tls_is_pending_open_record(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ return tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags;
+}
+
+static inline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ sk->sk_err = -EBADMSG;
+ sk->sk_error_report(sk);
+}
+
+static inline bool tls_bigint_increment(unsigned char *seq, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return (i == -1);
+}
+
+static inline void tls_advance_record_sn(struct sock *sk,
+ struct tls_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (tls_bigint_increment(ctx->rec_seq, ctx->rec_seq_size))
+ tls_err_abort(sk);
+ tls_bigint_increment(ctx->iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
+ ctx->iv_size);
+}
+
+static inline void tls_fill_prepend(struct tls_context *ctx,
+ char *buf,
+ size_t plaintext_len,
+ unsigned char record_type)
+{
+ size_t pkt_len, iv_size = ctx->iv_size;
+
+ pkt_len = plaintext_len + iv_size + ctx->tag_size;
+
+ /* we cover nonce explicit here as well, so buf should be of
+ * size KTLS_DTLS_HEADER_SIZE + KTLS_DTLS_NONCE_EXPLICIT_SIZE
+ */
+ buf[0] = record_type;
+ buf[1] = TLS_VERSION_MINOR(ctx->crypto_send.version);
+ buf[2] = TLS_VERSION_MAJOR(ctx->crypto_send.version);
+ /* we can use IV for nonce explicit according to spec */
+ buf[3] = pkt_len >> 8;
+ buf[4] = pkt_len & 0xFF;
+ memcpy(buf + TLS_NONCE_OFFSET,
+ ctx->iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE, iv_size);
+}
+
+static inline struct tls_context *tls_get_ctx(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
+
+ return icsk->icsk_ulp_data;
+}
+
+static inline struct tls_sw_context *tls_sw_ctx(
+ const struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ return (struct tls_sw_context *)tls_ctx->priv_ctx;
+}
+
+static inline struct tls_offload_context *tls_offload_ctx(
+ const struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ return (struct tls_offload_context *)tls_ctx->priv_ctx;
+}
+
+int tls_proccess_cmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
+ unsigned char *record_type);
+
+#endif /* _TLS_OFFLOAD_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tls.h b/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc1d21d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
+ * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
+ * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
+ * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
+ * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
+ * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
+ * conditions are met:
+ *
+ * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer.
+ *
+ * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+ * provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_TLS_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_TLS_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
+
+/* TLS socket options */
+#define TLS_TX 1 /* Set transmit parameters */
+
+/* Supported versions */
+#define TLS_VERSION_MINOR(ver) ((ver) & 0xFF)
+#define TLS_VERSION_MAJOR(ver) (((ver) >> 8) & 0xFF)
+
+#define TLS_VERSION_NUMBER(id) ((((id##_VERSION_MAJOR) & 0xFF) << 8) | \
+ ((id##_VERSION_MINOR) & 0xFF))
+
+#define TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x3
+#define TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x3
+#define TLS_1_2_VERSION TLS_VERSION_NUMBER(TLS_1_2)
+
+/* Supported ciphers */
+#define TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128 51
+#define TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE 8
+#define TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE 16
+#define TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE 4
+#define TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE 16
+#define TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE 8
+
+#define TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE 1
+
+struct tls_crypto_info {
+ __u16 version;
+ __u16 cipher_type;
+};
+
+struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 {
+ struct tls_crypto_info info;
+ unsigned char iv[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE];
+ unsigned char key[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned char salt[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE];
+ unsigned char rec_seq[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE];
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_TLS_H */
diff --git a/net/Kconfig b/net/Kconfig
index 102f781..7d57ef3 100644
--- a/net/Kconfig
+++ b/net/Kconfig
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ menu "Networking options"

source "net/packet/Kconfig"
source "net/unix/Kconfig"
+source "net/tls/Kconfig"
source "net/xfrm/Kconfig"
source "net/iucv/Kconfig"
source "net/smc/Kconfig"
diff --git a/net/Makefile b/net/Makefile
index 9086ffb..bed80fa 100644
--- a/net/Makefile
+++ b/net/Makefile
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_LLC) += llc/
obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += ethernet/ 802/ sched/ netlink/ bpf/
obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER) += netfilter/
obj-$(CONFIG_INET) += ipv4/
+obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls/
obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm/
obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX) += unix/
obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += ipv6/
diff --git a/net/tls/Kconfig b/net/tls/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61e5329
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tls/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#
+# TLS configuration
+#
+config TLS
+ tristate "Transport Layer Security support"
+ depends on NET
+ default m
+ ---help---
+ Enable kernel support for TLS protocol. This allows symmetric
+ encryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.
+
+ If unsure, say M.
diff --git a/net/tls/Makefile b/net/tls/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a930fd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tls/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#
+# Makefile for the TLS subsystem.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o
+
+tls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ebc328
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <[email protected]>. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
+ * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
+ * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
+ * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
+ * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
+ * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
+ * conditions are met:
+ *
+ * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer.
+ *
+ * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+ * provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <net/tcp.h>
+#include <net/inet_common.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <net/tls.h>
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Mellanox Technologies");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Transport Layer Security Support");
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+
+static struct proto tls_base_prot;
+static struct proto tls_sw_prot;
+
+int wait_on_pending_writer(struct sock *sk, long *timeo)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
+
+ add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
+ while (1) {
+ if (!*timeo) {
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ rc = sock_intr_errno(*timeo);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_wait_event(sk, timeo, !sk->sk_write_pending, &wait))
+ break;
+ }
+ remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk,
+ struct tls_context *ctx,
+ struct scatterlist *sg,
+ u16 first_offset,
+ int flags)
+{
+ int sendpage_flags = flags | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct page *p;
+ size_t size;
+ int offset = first_offset;
+
+ size = sg->length - offset;
+ offset += sg->offset;
+
+ while (1) {
+ if (sg_is_last(sg))
+ sendpage_flags = flags;
+
+ /* is sending application-limited? */
+ tcp_rate_check_app_limited(sk);
+ p = sg_page(sg);
+retry:
+ ret = do_tcp_sendpages(sk, p, offset, size, sendpage_flags);
+
+ if (ret != size) {
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ offset += ret;
+ size -= ret;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+
+ offset -= sg->offset;
+ ctx->partially_sent_offset = offset;
+ ctx->partially_sent_record = (void *)sg;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ put_page(p);
+ sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg->length);
+ sg = sg_next(sg);
+ if (!sg)
+ break;
+
+ offset = sg->offset;
+ size = sg->length;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &ctx->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls_handle_open_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+
+ if (tls_is_pending_open_record(ctx))
+ return ctx->push_pending_record(sk, flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_proccess_cmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
+ unsigned char *record_type)
+{
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) {
+ if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_TLS)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
+ case TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE:
+ if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(*record_type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = tls_handle_open_record(sk, msg->msg_flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *record_type = *(unsigned char *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int tls_push_pending_closed_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
+ int flags, long *timeo)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ u16 offset;
+
+ if (!tls_is_partially_sent_record(ctx))
+ return ctx->push_pending_record(sk, flags);
+
+ sg = ctx->partially_sent_record;
+ offset = ctx->partially_sent_offset;
+
+ ctx->partially_sent_record = NULL;
+ return tls_push_sg(sk, ctx, sg, offset, flags);
+}
+
+static void tls_write_space(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+
+ if (!sk->sk_write_pending && tls_is_pending_closed_record(ctx)) {
+ gfp_t sk_allocation = sk->sk_allocation;
+ int rc;
+ long timeo = 0;
+
+ sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC;
+ rc = tls_push_pending_closed_record(sk, ctx,
+ MSG_DONTWAIT |
+ MSG_NOSIGNAL,
+ &timeo);
+ sk->sk_allocation = sk_allocation;
+
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx->sk_write_space(sk);
+}
+
+static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, 0);
+ void (*sk_proto_close)(struct sock *sk, long timeout);
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+
+ if (!tls_complete_pending_work(sk, ctx, 0, &timeo))
+ tls_handle_open_record(sk, 0);
+
+ if (ctx->partially_sent_record) {
+ struct scatterlist *sg = ctx->partially_sent_record;
+
+ while (1) {
+ put_page(sg_page(sg));
+ sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg->length);
+
+ if (sg_is_last(sg))
+ break;
+ sg++;
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->free_resources(sk);
+ kfree(ctx->rec_seq);
+ kfree(ctx->iv);
+
+ sk_proto_close = ctx->sk_proto_close;
+ kfree(ctx);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
+ sk_proto_close(sk, timeout);
+}
+
+static int do_tls_getsockopt_tx(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
+ int len;
+
+ if (get_user(len, optlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!optval || (len < sizeof(*crypto_info))) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* get user crypto info */
+ crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send;
+
+ if (!TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info)) {
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (len == sizeof(crypto_info)) {
+ rc = copy_to_user(optval, crypto_info, sizeof(*crypto_info));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *
+ crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 =
+ container_of(crypto_info,
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128,
+ info);
+
+ if (len != sizeof(*crypto_info_aes_gcm_128)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ memcpy(crypto_info_aes_gcm_128->iv, ctx->iv,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ rc = copy_to_user(optval,
+ crypto_info_aes_gcm_128,
+ sizeof(*crypto_info_aes_gcm_128));
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int do_tls_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+ char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (optname) {
+ case TLS_TX:
+ rc = do_tls_getsockopt_tx(sk, optval, optlen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int tls_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
+ char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+
+ if (level != SOL_TLS)
+ return ctx->getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+
+ return do_tls_getsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
+}
+
+static int do_tls_setsockopt_tx(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
+ unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, tmp_crypto_info;
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct proto *prot = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!optval || (optlen < sizeof(*crypto_info))) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = copy_from_user(&tmp_crypto_info, optval, sizeof(*crypto_info));
+ if (rc) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check version */
+ if (tmp_crypto_info.version != TLS_1_2_VERSION) {
+ rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* get user crypto info */
+ crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send;
+
+ /* Currently we don't support set crypto info more than one time */
+ if (TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info))
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (tmp_crypto_info.cipher_type) {
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
+ if (optlen != sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = copy_from_user(
+ crypto_info,
+ optval,
+ sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128));
+
+ if (rc) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto err_crypto_info;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx->sk_write_space = sk->sk_write_space;
+ sk->sk_write_space = tls_write_space;
+
+ ctx->sk_proto_close = sk->sk_prot->close;
+
+ /* currently SW is default, we will have ethtool in future */
+ rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, ctx);
+ prot = &tls_sw_prot;
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_crypto_info;
+
+ sk->sk_prot = prot;
+ goto out;
+
+err_crypto_info:
+ memset(crypto_info, 0, sizeof(*crypto_info));
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+ char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (optname) {
+ case TLS_TX:
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ rc = do_tls_setsockopt_tx(sk, optval, optlen);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
+ char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+
+ if (level != SOL_TLS)
+ return ctx->setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+
+ return do_tls_setsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
+}
+
+static int tls_init(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
+ struct tls_context *ctx;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* allocate tls context */
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ icsk->icsk_ulp_data = ctx;
+ ctx->setsockopt = sk->sk_prot->setsockopt;
+ ctx->getsockopt = sk->sk_prot->getsockopt;
+ sk->sk_prot = &tls_base_prot;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static struct tcp_ulp_ops tcp_tls_ulp_ops __read_mostly = {
+ .name = "tls",
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .init = tls_init,
+};
+
+static int __init tls_register(void)
+{
+ tls_base_prot = tcp_prot;
+ tls_base_prot.setsockopt = tls_setsockopt;
+ tls_base_prot.getsockopt = tls_getsockopt;
+
+ tls_sw_prot = tls_base_prot;
+ tls_sw_prot.sendmsg = tls_sw_sendmsg;
+ tls_sw_prot.sendpage = tls_sw_sendpage;
+ tls_sw_prot.close = tls_sk_proto_close;
+
+ tcp_register_ulp(&tcp_tls_ulp_ops);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit tls_unregister(void)
+{
+ tcp_unregister_ulp(&tcp_tls_ulp_ops);
+}
+
+module_init(tls_register);
+module_exit(tls_unregister);
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa596fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,772 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <[email protected]>. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <[email protected]>. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <[email protected]>. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[email protected]>. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
+ * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
+ * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
+ * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
+ * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
+ * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
+ * conditions are met:
+ *
+ * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer.
+ *
+ * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
+ * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
+ * provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+
+#include <net/tls.h>
+
+static inline void tls_make_aad(int recv,
+ char *buf,
+ size_t size,
+ char *record_sequence,
+ int record_sequence_size,
+ unsigned char record_type)
+{
+ memcpy(buf, record_sequence, record_sequence_size);
+
+ buf[8] = record_type;
+ buf[9] = TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ buf[10] = TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
+ buf[11] = size >> 8;
+ buf[12] = size & 0xFF;
+}
+
+static void trim_sg(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int *sg_num_elem, unsigned int *sg_size, int target_size)
+{
+ int i = *sg_num_elem - 1;
+ int trim = *sg_size - target_size;
+
+ if (trim <= 0) {
+ WARN_ON(trim < 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *sg_size = target_size;
+ while (trim >= sg[i].length) {
+ trim -= sg[i].length;
+ sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg[i].length);
+ put_page(sg_page(&sg[i]));
+ i--;
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sg[i].length -= trim;
+ sk_mem_uncharge(sk, trim);
+
+out:
+ *sg_num_elem = i + 1;
+}
+
+static void trim_both_sgl(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+
+ trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
+ target_size);
+
+ if (target_size > 0)
+ target_size += tls_ctx->overhead_size;
+
+ trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_encrypted_data,
+ &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_encrypted_size,
+ target_size);
+}
+
+static int alloc_sg(struct sock *sk, int len, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int *sg_num_elem, unsigned int *sg_size,
+ int first_coalesce)
+{
+ struct page_frag *pfrag;
+ unsigned int size = *sg_size;
+ int num_elem = *sg_num_elem, use = 0, rc = 0;
+ struct scatterlist *sge;
+ unsigned int orig_offset;
+
+ len -= size;
+ pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ use = min_t(int, len, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
+
+ if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, use)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sk_mem_charge(sk, use);
+ size += use;
+ orig_offset = pfrag->offset;
+ pfrag->offset += use;
+
+ sge = sg + num_elem - 1;
+ if (num_elem > first_coalesce && sg_page(sg) == pfrag->page &&
+ sg->offset + sg->length == orig_offset) {
+ sg->length += use;
+ } else {
+ sge++;
+ sg_unmark_end(sge);
+ sg_set_page(sge, pfrag->page, use, orig_offset);
+ get_page(pfrag->page);
+ ++num_elem;
+ if (num_elem == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
+ rc = -ENOSPC;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ len -= use;
+ }
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ *sg_size = size;
+ *sg_num_elem = num_elem;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int alloc_encrypted_sg(struct sock *sk, int len)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ rc = alloc_sg(sk, len, ctx->sg_encrypted_data,
+ &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem, &ctx->sg_encrypted_size, 0);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int alloc_plaintext_sg(struct sock *sk, int len)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ rc = alloc_sg(sk, len, ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem, &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void free_sg(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int *sg_num_elem, unsigned int *sg_size)
+{
+ int i, n = *sg_num_elem;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg[i].length);
+ put_page(sg_page(&sg[i]));
+ }
+ *sg_num_elem = 0;
+ *sg_size = 0;
+}
+
+static void tls_free_both_sg(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+
+ free_sg(sk, ctx->sg_encrypted_data, &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_encrypted_size);
+
+ free_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data, &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
+}
+
+static int tls_do_encryption(struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx, size_t data_len,
+ gfp_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned int req_size = sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int rc;
+
+ aead_req = kmalloc(req_size, flags);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset += tls_ctx->prepend_size;
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].length -= tls_ctx->prepend_size;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, ctx->sg_aead_in, ctx->sg_aead_out,
+ data_len, tls_ctx->iv);
+ rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset -= tls_ctx->prepend_size;
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].length += tls_ctx->prepend_size;
+
+ kfree(aead_req);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
+ unsigned char record_type)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ int rc;
+
+ sg_mark_end(ctx->sg_plaintext_data + ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem - 1);
+ sg_mark_end(ctx->sg_encrypted_data + ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem - 1);
+
+ tls_make_aad(0, ctx->aad_space, ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
+ tls_ctx->rec_seq, tls_ctx->rec_seq_size,
+ record_type);
+
+ tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
+ page_address(sg_page(&ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0])) +
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset,
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_size, record_type);
+
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = 0;
+ set_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &tls_ctx->flags);
+
+ rc = tls_do_encryption(tls_ctx, ctx, ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
+ sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ /* If we are called from write_space and
+ * we fail, we need to set this SOCK_NOSPACE
+ * to trigger another write_space in the future.
+ */
+ set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ free_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data, &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
+
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem = 0;
+ ctx->sg_encrypted_size = 0;
+
+ /* Only pass through MSG_DONTWAIT and MSG_NOSIGNAL flags */
+ rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx, ctx->sg_encrypted_data, 0, flags);
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
+ tls_err_abort(sk);
+
+ tls_advance_record_sn(sk, tls_ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
+{
+ return tls_push_record(sk, flags, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);
+}
+
+static int zerocopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
+ int length)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
+
+ size_t offset;
+ ssize_t copied, use;
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
+ int num_elem = ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int maxpages;
+
+ while (length > 0) {
+ i = 0;
+ maxpages = ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sg_plaintext_data) - num_elem;
+ if (maxpages == 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ copied = iov_iter_get_pages(from, pages,
+ length,
+ maxpages, &offset);
+ if (copied <= 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ iov_iter_advance(from, copied);
+
+ length -= copied;
+ size += copied;
+ while (copied) {
+ use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
+
+ sg_set_page(&ctx->sg_plaintext_data[num_elem],
+ pages[i], use, offset);
+ sg_unmark_end(&ctx->sg_plaintext_data[num_elem]);
+ sk_mem_charge(sk, use);
+
+ offset = 0;
+ copied -= use;
+
+ ++i;
+ ++num_elem;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_size = size;
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem = num_elem;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int memcopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
+ int bytes)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ struct scatterlist *sg = ctx->sg_plaintext_data;
+ int copy, i, rc = 0;
+
+ for (i = tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags;
+ i < ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem; ++i) {
+ copy = sg[i].length;
+ if (copy_from_iter(
+ page_address(sg_page(&sg[i])) + sg[i].offset,
+ copy, from) != copy) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ bytes -= copy;
+
+ ++tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags;
+
+ if (!bytes)
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ int ret = 0;
+ int required_size;
+ long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
+ size_t try_to_copy, copied = 0;
+ unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
+ int record_room;
+ bool full_record;
+ int orig_size;
+
+ if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+
+ if (tls_complete_pending_work(sk, tls_ctx, msg->msg_flags, &timeo))
+ goto send_end;
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
+ ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
+ if (ret)
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+
+ while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
+ if (sk->sk_err) {
+ ret = sk->sk_err;
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+
+ orig_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
+ full_record = false;
+ try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
+ record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
+ if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
+ try_to_copy = record_room;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ required_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size + try_to_copy +
+ tls_ctx->overhead_size;
+
+ if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
+ goto wait_for_sndbuf;
+alloc_encrypted:
+ ret = alloc_encrypted_sg(sk, required_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
+ * actually allocated. The difference is due
+ * to max sg elements limit
+ */
+ try_to_copy -= required_size - ctx->sg_encrypted_size;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ if (full_record || eor) {
+ ret = zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
+ try_to_copy);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fallback_to_reg_send;
+
+ copied += try_to_copy;
+ ret = tls_push_record(sk, msg->msg_flags, record_type);
+ if (!ret)
+ continue;
+ if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+ goto send_end;
+
+ copied -= try_to_copy;
+fallback_to_reg_send:
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_size - orig_size);
+ trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
+ orig_size);
+ }
+
+ required_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size + try_to_copy;
+alloc_plaintext:
+ ret = alloc_plaintext_sg(sk, required_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
+ * actually allocated. The difference is due
+ * to max sg elements limit
+ */
+ try_to_copy -= required_size - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
+ full_record = true;
+
+ trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_encrypted_data,
+ &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
+ &ctx->sg_encrypted_size,
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_size +
+ tls_ctx->overhead_size);
+ }
+
+ ret = memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter, try_to_copy);
+ if (ret)
+ goto trim_sgl;
+
+ copied += try_to_copy;
+ if (full_record || eor) {
+push_record:
+ ret = tls_push_record(sk, msg->msg_flags, record_type);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ continue;
+
+wait_for_sndbuf:
+ set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
+wait_for_memory:
+ ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
+ if (ret) {
+trim_sgl:
+ trim_both_sgl(sk, orig_size);
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+
+ if (tls_is_pending_closed_record(tls_ctx))
+ goto push_record;
+
+ if (ctx->sg_encrypted_size < required_size)
+ goto alloc_encrypted;
+
+ goto alloc_plaintext;
+ }
+
+send_end:
+ ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
+ return copied ? copied : ret;
+}
+
+int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
+ int offset, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+ int ret = 0;
+ long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ bool eor;
+ size_t orig_size = size;
+ unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ bool full_record;
+ int record_room;
+
+ if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
+ MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ /* No MSG_EOR from splice, only look at MSG_MORE */
+ eor = !(flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST));
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+
+ sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
+
+ if (tls_complete_pending_work(sk, tls_ctx, flags, &timeo))
+ goto sendpage_end;
+
+ /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
+ while (size > 0) {
+ size_t copy, required_size;
+
+ if (sk->sk_err) {
+ ret = sk->sk_err;
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+
+ full_record = false;
+ record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
+ copy = size;
+ if (copy >= record_room) {
+ copy = record_room;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+ required_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size + copy +
+ tls_ctx->overhead_size;
+
+ if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
+ goto wait_for_sndbuf;
+alloc_payload:
+ ret = alloc_encrypted_sg(sk, required_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
+ * actually allocated. The difference is due
+ * to max sg elements limit
+ */
+ copy -= required_size - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ get_page(page);
+ sg = ctx->sg_plaintext_data + ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem;
+ sg_set_page(sg, page, copy, offset);
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem++;
+
+ sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
+ offset += copy;
+ size -= copy;
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_size += copy;
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem;
+
+ if (full_record || eor ||
+ ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem ==
+ ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sg_plaintext_data)) {
+push_record:
+ ret = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+wait_for_sndbuf:
+ set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
+wait_for_memory:
+ ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
+ if (ret) {
+ trim_both_sgl(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+
+ if (tls_is_pending_closed_record(tls_ctx))
+ goto push_record;
+
+ goto alloc_payload;
+ }
+
+sendpage_end:
+ if (orig_size > size)
+ ret = orig_size - size;
+ else
+ ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void tls_sw_free_resources(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
+
+ if (ctx->aead_send)
+ crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
+
+ tls_free_both_sg(sk);
+
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
+{
+ char keyval[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE];
+ struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
+ struct tls_sw_context *sw_ctx;
+ u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size;
+ char *iv, *rec_seq;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->priv_ctx) {
+ rc = -EEXIST;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sw_ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sw_ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx->priv_ctx = (struct tls_offload_context *)sw_ctx;
+ ctx->free_resources = tls_sw_free_resources;
+
+ crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send;
+ switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
+ nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
+ tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
+ iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
+ iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
+ rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
+ rec_seq =
+ ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
+ gcm_128_info =
+ (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
+ ctx->tag_size = tag_size;
+ ctx->overhead_size = ctx->prepend_size + ctx->tag_size;
+ ctx->iv_size = iv_size;
+ ctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->iv) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, gcm_128_info->salt, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
+ memcpy(ctx->iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE, iv, iv_size);
+ ctx->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
+ ctx->rec_seq = kmalloc(rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->rec_seq) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_iv;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->rec_seq, rec_seq, rec_seq_size);
+
+ sg_init_table(sw_ctx->sg_encrypted_data,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(sw_ctx->sg_encrypted_data));
+ sg_init_table(sw_ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(sw_ctx->sg_plaintext_data));
+
+ sg_init_table(sw_ctx->sg_aead_in, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&sw_ctx->sg_aead_in[0], sw_ctx->aad_space,
+ sizeof(sw_ctx->aad_space));
+ sg_unmark_end(&sw_ctx->sg_aead_in[1]);
+ sg_chain(sw_ctx->sg_aead_in, 2, sw_ctx->sg_plaintext_data);
+ sg_init_table(sw_ctx->sg_aead_out, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&sw_ctx->sg_aead_out[0], sw_ctx->aad_space,
+ sizeof(sw_ctx->aad_space));
+ sg_unmark_end(&sw_ctx->sg_aead_out[1]);
+ sg_chain(sw_ctx->sg_aead_out, 2, sw_ctx->sg_encrypted_data);
+
+ if (!sw_ctx->aead_send) {
+ sw_ctx->aead_send = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send);
+ sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
+ goto free_rec_seq;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
+
+ memcpy(keyval, gcm_128_info->key, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ rc = crypto_aead_setkey(sw_ctx->aead_send, keyval,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (rc)
+ goto free_aead;
+
+ rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(sw_ctx->aead_send, ctx->tag_size);
+ if (!rc)
+ goto out;
+
+free_aead:
+ crypto_free_aead(sw_ctx->aead_send);
+ sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
+free_rec_seq:
+ kfree(ctx->rec_seq);
+ ctx->rec_seq = NULL;
+free_iv:
+ kfree(ctx->iv);
+ ctx->iv = NULL;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
--
2.9.3


2017-06-16 20:56:39

by Stephen Hemminger

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On Wed, 14 Jun 2017 11:37:39 -0700
Dave Watson <[email protected]> wrote:

> +
> +static inline struct tls_context *tls_get_ctx(const struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
> +
> + return icsk->icsk_ulp_data;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct tls_sw_context *tls_sw_ctx(
> + const struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
> +{
> + return (struct tls_sw_context *)tls_ctx->priv_ctx;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct tls_offload_context *tls_offload_ctx(
> + const struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
> +{
> + return (struct tls_offload_context *)tls_ctx->priv_ctx;
> +}
> +

Since priv_ctx is void *, casts here are unnecessary.

2017-06-16 20:58:53

by Stephen Hemminger

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On Wed, 14 Jun 2017 11:37:39 -0700
Dave Watson <[email protected]> wrote:

> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/net/tls/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
> +#
> +# TLS configuration
> +#
> +config TLS
> + tristate "Transport Layer Security support"
> + depends on NET
> + default m
> + ---help---
> + Enable kernel support for TLS protocol. This allows symmetric
> + encryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.
> +
> + If unsure, say M.

I understand that this will be useful to lots of people and most distributions
will enable it. But the defacto policy in kernel configuration has been that
new features in kernel default to being disabled.

2017-06-17 00:35:53

by Dave Watson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On 06/16/17 01:58 PM, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> On Wed, 14 Jun 2017 11:37:39 -0700
> Dave Watson <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/net/tls/Kconfig
> > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
> > +#
> > +# TLS configuration
> > +#
> > +config TLS
> > + tristate "Transport Layer Security support"
> > + depends on NET
> > + default m
> > + ---help---
> > + Enable kernel support for TLS protocol. This allows symmetric
> > + encryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.
> > +
> > + If unsure, say M.
>
> I understand that this will be useful to lots of people and most distributions
> will enable it. But the defacto policy in kernel configuration has been that
> new features in kernel default to being disabled.

Sure, will send a patch to switch to default n.

2017-07-11 06:29:56

by Steffen Klassert

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

Sorry for replying to old mail...

On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:37:39AM -0700, Dave Watson wrote:
> +static int tls_do_encryption(struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
> + struct tls_sw_context *ctx, size_t data_len,
> + gfp_t flags)
> +{
> + unsigned int req_size = sizeof(struct aead_request) +
> + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
> + struct aead_request *aead_req;
> + int rc;
> +
> + aead_req = kmalloc(req_size, flags);
> + if (!aead_req)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset += tls_ctx->prepend_size;
> + ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].length -= tls_ctx->prepend_size;
> +
> + aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
> + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
> + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, ctx->sg_aead_in, ctx->sg_aead_out,
> + data_len, tls_ctx->iv);
> + rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
> +
> + ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset -= tls_ctx->prepend_size;
> + ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].length += tls_ctx->prepend_size;
> +
> + kfree(aead_req);
> + return rc;
> +}

...

> +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> +{

...

> +
> + if (!sw_ctx->aead_send) {
> + sw_ctx->aead_send = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send)) {
> + rc = PTR_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send);
> + sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
> + goto free_rec_seq;
> + }
> + }
> +

When I look on how you allocate the aead transformation, it seems
that you should either register an asynchronous callback with
aead_request_set_callback(), or request for a synchronous algorithm.

Otherwise you will crash on an asynchronous crypto return, no?

Also, it seems that you have your scatterlists on a per crypto
transformation base istead of per crypto request. Is this intentional?

2017-07-11 18:53:11

by Dave Watson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On 07/11/17 08:29 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> Sorry for replying to old mail...
> > +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> > +{
>
> ...
>
> > +
> > + if (!sw_ctx->aead_send) {
> > + sw_ctx->aead_send = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> > + if (IS_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send)) {
> > + rc = PTR_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send);
> > + sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
> > + goto free_rec_seq;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
>
> When I look on how you allocate the aead transformation, it seems
> that you should either register an asynchronous callback with
> aead_request_set_callback(), or request for a synchronous algorithm.
>
> Otherwise you will crash on an asynchronous crypto return, no?

The intention is for it to be synchronous, and gather directly from
userspace buffers. It looks like calling
crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) is the correct way
to request synchronous algorithms only?

> Also, it seems that you have your scatterlists on a per crypto
> transformation base istead of per crypto request. Is this intentional?

We hold the socket lock and only one crypto op can happen at a time,
so we reuse the scatterlists.

2017-07-11 20:24:02

by Eric Biggers

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:53:11AM -0700, Dave Watson wrote:
> On 07/11/17 08:29 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> > Sorry for replying to old mail...
> > > +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> > > +{
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > +
> > > + if (!sw_ctx->aead_send) {
> > > + sw_ctx->aead_send = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send)) {
> > > + rc = PTR_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send);
> > > + sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
> > > + goto free_rec_seq;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > +
> >
> > When I look on how you allocate the aead transformation, it seems
> > that you should either register an asynchronous callback with
> > aead_request_set_callback(), or request for a synchronous algorithm.
> >
> > Otherwise you will crash on an asynchronous crypto return, no?
>
> The intention is for it to be synchronous, and gather directly from
> userspace buffers. It looks like calling
> crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) is the correct way
> to request synchronous algorithms only?
>

Yes, that means the CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC bit is required to be 0, i.e. the algorithm
must be synchronous. Currently it's requesting either a synchronous or
asynchronous algorithm, and it will crash if it gets an async one.

Also I think even with a synchronous algorithm, tls_do_encryption() still needs
to call aead_request_set_callback(), passing NULL for the callback and data, so
that the request flags are initialized.

Eric

2017-07-12 07:20:21

by Steffen Klassert

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:53:11AM -0700, Dave Watson wrote:
> On 07/11/17 08:29 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> > Sorry for replying to old mail...
> > > +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> > > +{
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > +
> > > + if (!sw_ctx->aead_send) {
> > > + sw_ctx->aead_send = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send)) {
> > > + rc = PTR_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send);
> > > + sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
> > > + goto free_rec_seq;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > +
> >
> > When I look on how you allocate the aead transformation, it seems
> > that you should either register an asynchronous callback with
> > aead_request_set_callback(), or request for a synchronous algorithm.
> >
> > Otherwise you will crash on an asynchronous crypto return, no?
>
> The intention is for it to be synchronous, and gather directly from
> userspace buffers. It looks like calling
> crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) is the correct way
> to request synchronous algorithms only?

Yes, but then you loose the aes-ni based algorithms because they are
asynchronous. If you want to have good crypto performance, it is
better to implement the asynchronous callbacks.

>
> > Also, it seems that you have your scatterlists on a per crypto
> > transformation base istead of per crypto request. Is this intentional?
>
> We hold the socket lock and only one crypto op can happen at a time,
> so we reuse the scatterlists.

This is OK as long as the crypto happens synchronous. But as said above,
I think this is not what you want.

2017-07-12 18:35:12

by Dave Watson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/4] tls: kernel TLS support

On 07/12/17 09:20 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:53:11AM -0700, Dave Watson wrote:
> > On 07/11/17 08:29 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> > > Sorry for replying to old mail...
> > > > +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> > > > +{
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > > +
> > > > + if (!sw_ctx->aead_send) {
> > > > + sw_ctx->aead_send = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> > > > + if (IS_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send)) {
> > > > + rc = PTR_ERR(sw_ctx->aead_send);
> > > > + sw_ctx->aead_send = NULL;
> > > > + goto free_rec_seq;
> > > > + }
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > >
> > > When I look on how you allocate the aead transformation, it seems
> > > that you should either register an asynchronous callback with
> > > aead_request_set_callback(), or request for a synchronous algorithm.
> > >
> > > Otherwise you will crash on an asynchronous crypto return, no?
> >
> > The intention is for it to be synchronous, and gather directly from
> > userspace buffers. It looks like calling
> > crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) is the correct way
> > to request synchronous algorithms only?
>
> Yes, but then you loose the aes-ni based algorithms because they are
> asynchronous. If you want to have good crypto performance, it is
> better to implement the asynchronous callbacks.

Right, the trick is we want both aesni, and to guarantee that we are
done using the input buffers before sendmsg() returns. For now I can
set a callback, and wait on a completion. The initial use case of
userspace openssl integration shouldn't hit the aesni async case
anyway (!irq_fpu_usable())