2022-03-22 19:19:56

by Tyler Hicks

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()

On 2022-03-22 12:13:23, Micka?l Sala?n wrote:
> From: Micka?l Sala?n <[email protected]>
>
> The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
> errors. This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.
>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> [1]
> Requested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> [1]
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [1]
> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Micka?l Sala?n <[email protected]>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>

Tyler

> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> * Fix commit subject spelling spotted by David Woodhouse.
> * Reword one sentence as suggested by Paul Moore.
> * Add Reviewed-by Paul Moore.
> * Add Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen.
> ---
> certs/blacklist.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
> index 486ce0dd8e9c..25094ea73600 100644
> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
> @@ -307,6 +307,15 @@ static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
>
> /*
> * Initialise the blacklist
> + *
> + * The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via
> + * device_initcall(). As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for
> + * any reason the kernel continues to execute. While cleanly returning -ENODEV
> + * could be acceptable for some non-critical kernel parts, if the blacklist
> + * keyring fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for
> + * signed modules. If a critical piece of security functionality that users
> + * expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right
> + * thing to do.
> */
> static int __init blacklist_init(void)
> {
> --
> 2.35.1
>