Document the overview of the feature along with relevant consideration
when provisioning dm-crypt volumes with AES-KL instead of AES-NI.
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
---
Changes from v8:
* Change wording of documentation slightly. (Randy Dunlap and Bagas
Sanjaya)
Changes from v6:
* Rebase on the upstream -- commit ff61f0791ce9 ("docs: move x86
documentation into Documentation/arch/"). (Nathan Huckleberry)
* Remove a duplicated sentence -- 'But there is no AES-KL instruction
to process a 192-bit key.'
* Update the text for clarity and readability:
- Clarify the error code and exemplify the backup failure
- Use 'wrapping key' instead of less readable 'IWKey'
Changes from v5:
* Fix a typo: 'feature feature' -> 'feature'
Changes from RFC v2:
* Add as a new patch.
The preview is available here:
https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/intel-staging/keylocker/kdoc/arch/x86/keylocker.html
---
Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 97 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst
index 8ac64d7de4dc..669c239c009f 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst
@@ -43,3 +43,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation
features
elf_auxvec
xstate
+ keylocker
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b28addb8eaf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==============
+x86 Key Locker
+==============
+
+Introduction
+============
+
+Key Locker is a CPU feature to reduce key exfiltration opportunities
+while maintaining a programming interface similar to AES-NI. It
+converts the AES key into an encoded form, called the 'key handle'.
+The key handle is a wrapped version of the clear-text key where the
+wrapping key has limited exposure. Once converted, all subsequent data
+encryption using new AES instructions (AES-KL) uses this key handle,
+reducing the exposure of private key material in memory.
+
+CPU-internal Wrapping Key
+=========================
+
+The CPU-internal wrapping key is an entity in a software-invisible CPU
+state. On every system boot, a new key is loaded. So the key handle that
+was encoded by the old wrapping key is no longer usable on system shutdown
+or reboot.
+
+And the key may be lost on the following exceptional situation upon wakeup:
+
+Wrapping Key Restore Failure
+----------------------------
+
+The CPU state is volatile with the ACPI S3/4 sleep states. When the system
+supports those states, the key has to be backed up so that it is restored
+on wake up. The kernel saves the key in non-volatile media.
+
+Upon the event of a wrapping key restore failure upon resume from suspend,
+all established key handles become invalid. In flight dm-crypt operations
+receive error results from pending operations. In the likely scenario that
+dm-crypt is hosting the root filesystem the recovery is identical to if a
+storage controller failed to resume from suspend or reboot. If the volume
+impacted by a wrapping key restore failure is a data volume then it is
+possible that I/O errors on that volume do not bring down the rest of the
+system. However, a reboot is still required because the kernel will have
+soft-disabled Key Locker. Upon the failure, the crypto library code will
+return -ENODEV on every AES-KL function call. The Key Locker implementation
+only loads a new wrapping key at initial boot, not any time after like
+resume from suspend.
+
+Use Case and Non-use Cases
+==========================
+
+Bare metal disk encryption is the only intended use case.
+
+Userspace usage is not supported because there is no ABI provided to
+communicate and coordinate wrapping-key restore failure to userspace. For
+now, key restore failures are only coordinated with kernel users. But the
+kernel can not prevent userspace from using the feature's AES instructions
+('AES-KL') when the feature has been enabled. So, the lack of userspace
+support is only documented, not actively enforced.
+
+Key Locker is not expected to be advertised to guest VMs and the kernel
+implementation ignores it even if the VMM enumerates the capability. The
+expectation is that a guest VM wants private wrapping key state, but the
+architecture does not provide that. An emulation of that capability, by
+caching per-VM wrapping keys in memory, defeats the purpose of Key Locker.
+The backup / restore facility is also not performant enough to be suitable
+for guest VM context switches.
+
+AES Instruction Set
+===================
+
+The feature accompanies a new AES instruction set. This instruction set is
+analogous to AES-NI. A set of AES-NI instructions can be mapped to an
+AES-KL instruction. For example, AESENC128KL is responsible for ten rounds
+of transformation, which is equivalent to nine times AESENC and one
+AESENCLAST in AES-NI.
+
+But they have some notable differences:
+
+* AES-KL provides a secure data transformation using an encrypted key.
+
+* If an invalid key handle is provided, e.g. a corrupted one or a handle
+ restriction failure, the instruction fails with setting RFLAGS.ZF. The
+ crypto library implementation includes the flag check to return -EINVAL.
+ Note that this flag is also set if the wrapping key is changed, e.g.,
+ because of the backup error.
+
+* AES-KL implements support for 128-bit and 256-bit keys, but there is no
+ AES-KL instruction to process an 192-bit key. The AES-KL cipher
+ implementation logs a warning message with a 192-bit key and then falls
+ back to AES-NI. So, this 192-bit key-size limitation is only documented,
+ not enforced. It means the key will remain in clear-text in memory. This
+ is to meet Linux crypto-cipher expectation that each implementation must
+ support all the AES-compliant key sizes.
+
+* Some AES-KL hardware implementation may have noticeable performance
+ overhead when compared with AES-NI instructions.
--
2.34.1
Hi,
On 3/28/24 18:53, Chang S. Bae wrote:
> Document the overview of the feature along with relevant consideration
> when provisioning dm-crypt volumes with AES-KL instead of AES-NI.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>
> Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
> ---
> Changes from v8:
> * Change wording of documentation slightly. (Randy Dunlap and Bagas
> Sanjaya)
>
> Changes from v6:
> * Rebase on the upstream -- commit ff61f0791ce9 ("docs: move x86
> documentation into Documentation/arch/"). (Nathan Huckleberry)
> * Remove a duplicated sentence -- 'But there is no AES-KL instruction
> to process a 192-bit key.'
> * Update the text for clarity and readability:
> - Clarify the error code and exemplify the backup failure
> - Use 'wrapping key' instead of less readable 'IWKey'
>
> Changes from v5:
> * Fix a typo: 'feature feature' -> 'feature'
>
> Changes from RFC v2:
> * Add as a new patch.
>
> The preview is available here:
> https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/intel-staging/keylocker/kdoc/arch/x86/keylocker.html
> ---
> Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst | 1 +
> Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst
> index 8ac64d7de4dc..669c239c009f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/index.rst
> @@ -43,3 +43,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation
> features
> elf_auxvec
> xstate
> + keylocker
> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b28addb8eaf4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/keylocker.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +==============
> +x86 Key Locker
> +==============
> +
> +Introduction
> +============
> +
> +Key Locker is a CPU feature to reduce key exfiltration opportunities
> +while maintaining a programming interface similar to AES-NI. It
> +converts the AES key into an encoded form, called the 'key handle'.
> +The key handle is a wrapped version of the clear-text key where the
> +wrapping key has limited exposure. Once converted, all subsequent data
> +encryption using new AES instructions (AES-KL) uses this key handle,
> +reducing the exposure of private key material in memory.
> +
> +CPU-internal Wrapping Key
> +=========================
> +
> +The CPU-internal wrapping key is an entity in a software-invisible CPU
> +state. On every system boot, a new key is loaded. So the key handle that
> +was encoded by the old wrapping key is no longer usable on system shutdown
> +or reboot.
> +
> +And the key may be lost on the following exceptional situation upon wakeup:
> +
> +Wrapping Key Restore Failure
> +----------------------------
> +
> +The CPU state is volatile with the ACPI S3/4 sleep states. When the system
> +supports those states, the key has to be backed up so that it is restored
> +on wake up. The kernel saves the key in non-volatile media.
> +
> +Upon the event of a wrapping key restore failure upon resume from suspend,
> +all established key handles become invalid. In flight dm-crypt operations
In-flight
> +receive error results from pending operations. In the likely scenario that
> +dm-crypt is hosting the root filesystem the recovery is identical to if a
> +storage controller failed to resume from suspend or reboot. If the volume
> +impacted by a wrapping key restore failure is a data volume then it is
> +possible that I/O errors on that volume do not bring down the rest of the
> +system. However, a reboot is still required because the kernel will have
> +soft-disabled Key Locker. Upon the failure, the crypto library code will
> +return -ENODEV on every AES-KL function call. The Key Locker implementation
> +only loads a new wrapping key at initial boot, not any time after like
> +resume from suspend.
> +
> +Use Case and Non-use Cases
> +==========================
> +
> +Bare metal disk encryption is the only intended use case.
> +
> +Userspace usage is not supported because there is no ABI provided to
> +communicate and coordinate wrapping-key restore failure to userspace. For
> +now, key restore failures are only coordinated with kernel users. But the
> +kernel can not prevent userspace from using the feature's AES instructions
> +('AES-KL') when the feature has been enabled. So, the lack of userspace
> +support is only documented, not actively enforced.
> +
> +Key Locker is not expected to be advertised to guest VMs and the kernel
> +implementation ignores it even if the VMM enumerates the capability. The
> +expectation is that a guest VM wants private wrapping key state, but the
> +architecture does not provide that. An emulation of that capability, by
> +caching per-VM wrapping keys in memory, defeats the purpose of Key Locker.
> +The backup / restore facility is also not performant enough to be suitable
> +for guest VM context switches.
> +
> +AES Instruction Set
> +===================
> +
> +The feature accompanies a new AES instruction set. This instruction set is
> +analogous to AES-NI. A set of AES-NI instructions can be mapped to an
> +AES-KL instruction. For example, AESENC128KL is responsible for ten rounds
> +of transformation, which is equivalent to nine times AESENC and one
> +AESENCLAST in AES-NI.
> +
> +But they have some notable differences:
> +
> +* AES-KL provides a secure data transformation using an encrypted key.
> +
> +* If an invalid key handle is provided, e.g. a corrupted one or a handle
> + restriction failure, the instruction fails with setting RFLAGS.ZF. The
> + crypto library implementation includes the flag check to return -EINVAL.
> + Note that this flag is also set if the wrapping key is changed, e.g.,
> + because of the backup error.
> +
> +* AES-KL implements support for 128-bit and 256-bit keys, but there is no
> + AES-KL instruction to process an 192-bit key. The AES-KL cipher
> + implementation logs a warning message with a 192-bit key and then falls
> + back to AES-NI. So, this 192-bit key-size limitation is only documented,
> + not enforced. It means the key will remain in clear-text in memory. This
> + is to meet Linux crypto-cipher expectation that each implementation must
> + support all the AES-compliant key sizes.
> +
> +* Some AES-KL hardware implementation may have noticeable performance
> + overhead when compared with AES-NI instructions.
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
thanks.
--
#Randy