2021-08-10 08:33:17

by zhenwei pi

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
bytes datafile by keyctl command.

WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540 pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
...
Call Trace:
public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

'.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value,
so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit machine.

Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <[email protected]>
---
include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 47accec68cb0..f603325c0c30 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
struct public_key_signature {
struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
u8 *s; /* Signature */
- u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
u8 *digest;
- u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
+ u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
+ u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
const char *pkey_algo;
const char *hash_algo;
const char *encoding;
--
2.25.1


2021-08-18 08:35:12

by zhenwei pi

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion


PING

On 8/10/21 2:39 PM, zhenwei pi wrote:
> Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
> bytes datafile by keyctl command.
>
> WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540 pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
> ...
> Call Trace:
> public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
> ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
> ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
> asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
> keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
> do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value,
> so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
> public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit machine.
>
> Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 47accec68cb0..f603325c0c30 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
> struct public_key_signature {
> struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
> u8 *s; /* Signature */
> - u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> u8 *digest;
> - u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> + u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> + u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> const char *pkey_algo;
> const char *hash_algo;
> const char *encoding;
>

--
zhenwei pi

2021-08-18 12:34:24

by Jarkko Sakkinen

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:33 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> PING

Please, do not top-post.

You are lacking Herbert Xu:

$ scripts/get_maintainer.pl crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
David Howells <[email protected]> (maintainer:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
Herbert Xu <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
"David S. Miller" <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
[email protected] (open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
[email protected] (open list:CRYPTO API)
[email protected] (open list)

> On 8/10/21 2:39 PM, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
> > bytes datafile by keyctl command.
> >
> > WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
> > pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
> > ...
> > Call Trace:
> > public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
> > ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
> > ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
> > asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
> > keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
> > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> >
> > '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8

Where is this statement?

> > value,
> > so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
> > public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit machine.
~~~~~
64-bit

What do you mean by "could"? Does it, or does it
not?





> >
> > Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <[email protected]>

Nit: "Firstname Lastname" (first letters capitalized)

> > ---
> > include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > index 47accec68cb0..f603325c0c30 100644
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key
> > *key);
> > struct public_key_signature {
> > struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
> > u8 *s; /* Signature */
> > - u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> > u8 *digest;
> > - u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > + u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> > + u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > const char *pkey_algo;
> > const char *hash_algo;
> > const char *encoding;
> >

/Jarkko

2021-08-18 23:35:41

by Herbert Xu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 03:33:32PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:33 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > PING
>
> Please, do not top-post.
>
> You are lacking Herbert Xu:

I think he already cc'ed me but this patch really belongs to David
Howells' tree.

Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

2021-08-19 02:05:08

by zhenwei pi

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: Re: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

On 8/18/21 8:33 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:33 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
>> PING
>
> Please, do not top-post.
>
> You are lacking Herbert Xu:
>
> $ scripts/get_maintainer.pl crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> David Howells <[email protected]> (maintainer:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
> Herbert Xu <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
> "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
> [email protected] (open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
> [email protected] (open list:CRYPTO API)
> [email protected] (open list)
>
>> On 8/10/21 2:39 PM, zhenwei pi wrote:
>>> Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
>>> bytes datafile by keyctl command.
>>>
>>> WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
>>> pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
>>> ...
>>> Call Trace:
>>> public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
>>> ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
>>> ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
>>> asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
>>> keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
>>> do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>>>
>>> '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8
>
> Where is this statement?
>

In function "static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct
kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2)"

>>> value,
>>> so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
>>> public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit machine.
> ~~~~~
> 64-bit
>
> What do you mean by "could"? Does it, or does it
> not?
>
>
After reordering struct public_key_signature, sizeof(struct
public_key_signature) gets smaller than the original version.

>
>
>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <[email protected]>
>
> Nit: "Firstname Lastname" (first letters capitalized)
>
>>> ---
>>> include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> index 47accec68cb0..f603325c0c30 100644
>>> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key
>>> *key);
>>> struct public_key_signature {
>>> struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
>>> u8 *s; /* Signature */
>>> - u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
>>> u8 *digest;
>>> - u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
>>> + u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
>>> + u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
>>> const char *pkey_algo;
>>> const char *hash_algo;
>>> const char *encoding;
>>>
>
> /Jarkko
>

--
zhenwei pi

2021-08-19 10:36:34

by Jarkko Sakkinen

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: Re: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 10:03 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> On 8/18/21 8:33 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:33 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > > PING
> >
> > Please, do not top-post.
> >
> > You are lacking Herbert Xu:
> >
> > $ scripts/get_maintainer.pl crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> > David Howells <[email protected]> (maintainer:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
> > Herbert Xu <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
> > "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
> > [email protected] (open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
> > [email protected] (open list:CRYPTO API)
> > [email protected] (open list)
> >
> > > On 8/10/21 2:39 PM, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > > > Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying
> > > > 256
> > > > bytes datafile by keyctl command.
> > > >
> > > > WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
> > > > pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
> > > > ...
> > > > Call Trace:
> > > > public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
> > > > ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
> > > > ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
> > > > asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
> > > > keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
> > > > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
> > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> > > >
> > > > '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an
> > > > u8
> >
> > Where is this statement?
> >
>
> In function "static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct
> kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2)"
>
> > > > value,
> > > > so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
> > > > public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit
> > > > machine.
> > ~~~~~
> > 64-bit
> >
> > What do you mean by "could"? Does it, or does it
> > not?
> >
> >
> >
> After reordering struct public_key_signature, sizeof(struct
> public_key_signature) gets smaller than the original version.

OK, then just state is as "it saves" instead of "it could save".

Not a requirement but have you been able to trigger this for a
kernel that does not have this fix?

/Jarkko

2021-08-19 10:53:39

by zhenwei pi

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: Re: Re: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

On 8/19/21 6:35 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 10:03 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
>> On 8/18/21 8:33 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:33 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
>>>> PING
>>>
>>> Please, do not top-post.
>>>
>>> You are lacking Herbert Xu:
>>>
>>> $ scripts/get_maintainer.pl crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>>> David Howells <[email protected]> (maintainer:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
>>> Herbert Xu <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
>>> "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
>>> [email protected] (open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
>>> [email protected] (open list:CRYPTO API)
>>> [email protected] (open list)
>>>
>>>> On 8/10/21 2:39 PM, zhenwei pi wrote:
>>>>> Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying
>>>>> 256
>>>>> bytes datafile by keyctl command.
>>>>>
>>>>> WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
>>>>> pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
>>>>> ...
>>>>> Call Trace:
>>>>> public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
>>>>> ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
>>>>> ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
>>>>> asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
>>>>> keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
>>>>> do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
>>>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>>>>>
>>>>> '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an
>>>>> u8
>>>
>>> Where is this statement?
>>>
>>
>> In function "static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct
>> kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2)"
>>
>>>>> value,
>>>>> so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
>>>>> public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit
>>>>> machine.
>>> ~~~~~
>>> 64-bit
>>>
>>> What do you mean by "could"? Does it, or does it
>>> not?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> After reordering struct public_key_signature, sizeof(struct
>> public_key_signature) gets smaller than the original version.
>
> OK, then just state is as "it saves" instead of "it could save".
>
> Not a requirement but have you been able to trigger this for a
> kernel that does not have this fix?
>
This kernel warning can be reproduced on debian11(Linux-5.10.0-8-amd64)
by the following script:

RAWDATA=rawdata
SIGDATA=sigdata

modprobe pkcs8_key_parser

rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx
rm -rf $RAWDATA
dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1

openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem
-subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/[email protected]"

KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl
padd asymmetric 123 @s`

keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA
keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1


> /Jarkko
>

--
zhenwei pi

2021-08-19 11:45:57

by Jarkko Sakkinen

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: Re: Re: PING: [PATCH] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 18:52 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> On 8/19/21 6:35 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 10:03 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > > On 8/18/21 8:33 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:33 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > > > > PING
> > > >
> > > > Please, do not top-post.
> > > >
> > > > You are lacking Herbert Xu:
> > > >
> > > > $ scripts/get_maintainer.pl crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> > > > David Howells <[email protected]> (maintainer:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
> > > > Herbert Xu <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
> > > > "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
> > > > [email protected] (open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
> > > > [email protected] (open list:CRYPTO API)
> > > > [email protected] (open list)
> > > >
> > > > > On 8/10/21 2:39 PM, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > > > > > Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying
> > > > > > 256
> > > > > > bytes datafile by keyctl command.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
> > > > > > pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > > Call Trace:
> > > > > > public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
> > > > > > ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
> > > > > > ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
> > > > > > asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
> > > > > > keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
> > > > > > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
> > > > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> > > > > >
> > > > > > '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an
> > > > > > u8
> > > >
> > > > Where is this statement?
> > > >
> > >
> > > In function "static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct
> > > kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2)"
> > >
> > > > > > value,
> > > > > > so use u32 instead of u8 of digest. And reorder struct
> > > > > > public_key_signature, it could save 8 bytes on a 64 bit
> > > > > > machine.
> > > > ~~~~~
> > > > 64-bit
> > > >
> > > > What do you mean by "could"? Does it, or does it
> > > > not?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > After reordering struct public_key_signature, sizeof(struct
> > > public_key_signature) gets smaller than the original version.
> >
> > OK, then just state is as "it saves" instead of "it could save".
> >
> > Not a requirement but have you been able to trigger this for a
> > kernel that does not have this fix?
> >
> This kernel warning can be reproduced on debian11(Linux-5.10.0-8-amd64)
> by the following script:
>
> RAWDATA=rawdata
> SIGDATA=sigdata
>
> modprobe pkcs8_key_parser
>
> rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx
> rm -rf $RAWDATA
> dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1
>
> openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem
> -subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/[email protected]"
>
> KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl
> padd asymmetric 123 @s`
>
> keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA
> keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1


Thank you. I'll see if I can reproduce this when you send a new version
(if not, it is not constraint for accepting to patch, but I'll still
try).

PS. Ignore the firstname lastname comment. I was not aware that in some
cultures it is written like that (James Bottomley pointed this out).

/Jarkko