On Tue Apr 9, 2024 at 12:48 PM EEST, Kshitiz Varshney wrote:
> Hi Jarkko,
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 9:18 PM
> > To: David Gstir <[email protected]>; Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>;
> > James Bottomley <[email protected]>; Herbert Xu
> > <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Shawn Guo <[email protected]>; Jonathan Corbet
> > <[email protected]>; Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>; Pengutronix
> > Kernel Team <[email protected]>; Fabio Estevam
> > <[email protected]>; dl-linux-imx <[email protected]>; Ahmad Fatoum
> > <[email protected]>; sigma star Kernel Team
> > <[email protected]>; David Howells <[email protected]>; Li
> > Yang <[email protected]>; Paul Moore <[email protected]>; James
> > Morris <[email protected]>; Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>; Paul E.
> > McKenney <[email protected]>; Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>;
> > Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>; Rafael J. Wysocki
> > <[email protected]>; Tejun Heo <[email protected]>; Steven Rostedt
> > (Google) <[email protected]>; [email protected]; linux-
> > [email protected]; [email protected];
> > [email protected]; [email protected]; linux-arm-
> > [email protected]; [email protected]; linux-security-
> > [email protected]; Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>; David
> > Oberhollenzer <[email protected]>
> > Subject: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v8 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new
> > trust source
> >
> > Caution: This is an external email. Please take care when clicking links or
> > opening attachments. When in doubt, report the message using the 'Report
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> >
> >
> > On Wed Apr 3, 2024 at 10:21 AM EEST, David Gstir wrote:
> > > Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as
> > > new trust source:
> > >
> > > - Describe security properties of DCP trust source
> > > - Describe key usage
> > > - Document blob format
> > >
> > > Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
> > > Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer
> > > <[email protected]>
> > > Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <[email protected]>
> > > Signed-off-by: David Gstir <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > > .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
> > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 19 +++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > > b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > > index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644
> > > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > > @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe.
> > > randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
> > > Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
> > >
> > > + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX
> > > + SoCs)
> > > +
> > > + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally
> > burnt
> > > + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine
> > only.
> > > + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP
> > key
> > > + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
> > > + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter
> > (dcp_use_otp_key).
> > > +
> > > * Execution isolation
> > >
> > > (1) TPM
> > > @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe.
> > >
> > > Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
> > >
> > > + (4) DCP
> > > +
> > > + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
> > > + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
> > > + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel
> > space.
> > > +
> > > * Optional binding to platform integrity state
> > >
> > > (1) TPM
> > > @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe.
> > > Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
> > > for platform integrity.
> > >
> > > + (4) DCP
> > > +
> > > + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
> > > + platform integrity.
> > > +
> > > * Interfaces and APIs
> > >
> > > (1) TPM
> > > @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe.
> > >
> > > Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
> > >
> > > + (4) DCP
> > > +
> > > + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto
> > driver in
> > > + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.
> > > +
> > > * Threat model
> > >
> > > The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source
> > > for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source:
> > > CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure
> > the device
> > > is probed.
> > >
> > > + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)
> > > +
> > > + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG
> > interface,
> > > + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do
> > have
> > > + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be
> > enabled
> > > + to back the kernel RNG.
> > > +
> > > Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the
> > > kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random
> > number pool.
> > >
> > > @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage::
> > > CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
> > > Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
> > >
> > > +Trusted Keys usage: DCP
> > > +-----------------------
> > > +
> > > +Usage::
> > > +
> > > + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
> > > + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
> > > + keyctl print keyid
> > > +
> > > +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is
> > > +in format specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key
> > > +length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes
> > (256 - 1024 bits).
> > > +
> > > Encrypted Keys usage
> > > --------------------
> > >
> > > @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length.
> > > privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
> > > initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
> > > string length.
> > > +
> > > +DCP Blob Format
> > > +---------------
> > > +
> > > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> > > + :doc: dcp blob format
> > > +
> > > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> > > + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt
> > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> > > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> > > index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644
> > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> > > @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@
> > > #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
> > > #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
> > >
> > > +/**
> > > + * DOC: dcp blob format
> > > + *
> > > + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using
> > > +its
> > > + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key
> > sealing/unsealing.
> > > + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we
> > > +define
> > > + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the
> > > +sealing
> > > + * key stored in the key blob.
> > > + *
> > > + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a
> > > +random 128-bit
> > > + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are
> > > +used to
> > > + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM.
> > > + *
> > > + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the
> > > +DCP's AES
> > > + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated
> > > +nonce,
> > > + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob
> > > +format together
> > > + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag.
> > > + */
> > > +
> > > /**
> > > * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
> > > *
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
> >
> > I can only test that this does not break a machine without the hardware
> > feature.
> >
> > Is there anyone who could possibly peer test these patches?
> I am already working on testing this patchset on i.MX6 platform.
> Regards,
> Kshitiz
OK great.
BR, Jarkko