Hi!
We are trying to implement Secure TSC feature for AMD SNP guests [1]. During the boot-up of the
secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from Security processor (PSP).
This communication channel is encrypted between the security processor and the guest,
hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the security processor.
Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM).
As the TSC info is needed during the smpboot phase, few crypto modules need to be loaded early
to use the crypto api for encryption/decryption of SNP Guest messages.
I was able to get the SNP Guest messages working with initializing few crypto modules using
early_initcall() instead of subsys_initcall().
Require suggestion/inputs if this is acceptable. List of modules that was changed
to early_initcall:
early_initcall(aes_init);
early_initcall(cryptomgr_init);
early_initcall(crypto_ctr_module_init);
early_initcall(crypto_gcm_module_init);
early_initcall(ghash_mod_init);
Thanks,
Nikunj
1. AMD APM Vol-2 (15.36.18 Secure TSC): https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
2. SNP ABI Spec (7.9 TSC Info): https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 06:41, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi!
>
> We are trying to implement Secure TSC feature for AMD SNP guests [1]. During the boot-up of the
> secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from Security processor (PSP).
> This communication channel is encrypted between the security processor and the guest,
> hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the security processor.
> Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM).
>
> As the TSC info is needed during the smpboot phase, few crypto modules need to be loaded early
> to use the crypto api for encryption/decryption of SNP Guest messages.
>
> I was able to get the SNP Guest messages working with initializing few crypto modules using
> early_initcall() instead of subsys_initcall().
>
> Require suggestion/inputs if this is acceptable. List of modules that was changed
> to early_initcall:
>
> early_initcall(aes_init);
> early_initcall(cryptomgr_init);
> early_initcall(crypto_ctr_module_init);
> early_initcall(crypto_gcm_module_init);
> early_initcall(ghash_mod_init);
>
I understand the need for this, but I think it is a bad idea. These
will run even before SMP bringup, and before pure initcalls, which are
documented as
On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 10:24, Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 06:41, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > Hi!
> >
> > We are trying to implement Secure TSC feature for AMD SNP guests [1]. During the boot-up of the
> > secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from Security processor (PSP).
> > This communication channel is encrypted between the security processor and the guest,
> > hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the security processor.
> > Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM).
> >
> > As the TSC info is needed during the smpboot phase, few crypto modules need to be loaded early
> > to use the crypto api for encryption/decryption of SNP Guest messages.
> >
> > I was able to get the SNP Guest messages working with initializing few crypto modules using
> > early_initcall() instead of subsys_initcall().
> >
> > Require suggestion/inputs if this is acceptable. List of modules that was changed
> > to early_initcall:
> >
> > early_initcall(aes_init);
> > early_initcall(cryptomgr_init);
> > early_initcall(crypto_ctr_module_init);
> > early_initcall(crypto_gcm_module_init);
> > early_initcall(ghash_mod_init);
> >
>
> I understand the need for this, but I think it is a bad idea. These
> will run even before SMP bringup, and before pure initcalls, which are
> documented as
/*
* A "pure" initcall has no dependencies on anything else, and purely
* initializes variables that couldn't be statically initialized.
*/
So basically, you should not be relying on any global infrastructure
to have been initialized. This is also something that may cause
different problems on different architectures, and doing this only for
x86 seems like a problem as well.
Can you elaborate a bit on the use case? AES in GCM mode seems like a
thing that we might be able to add to the crypto library API without
much hassle (which already has a minimal implementation of AES)
On 04/10/22 13:58, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 10:24, Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 06:41, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi!
>>>
>>> We are trying to implement Secure TSC feature for AMD SNP guests [1]. During the boot-up of the
>>> secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from Security processor (PSP).
>>> This communication channel is encrypted between the security processor and the guest,
>>> hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the security processor.
>>> Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM).
>>>
>>> As the TSC info is needed during the smpboot phase, few crypto modules need to be loaded early
>>> to use the crypto api for encryption/decryption of SNP Guest messages.
>>>
>>> I was able to get the SNP Guest messages working with initializing few crypto modules using
>>> early_initcall() instead of subsys_initcall().
>>>
>>> Require suggestion/inputs if this is acceptable. List of modules that was changed
>>> to early_initcall:
>>>
>>> early_initcall(aes_init);
>>> early_initcall(cryptomgr_init);
>>> early_initcall(crypto_ctr_module_init);
>>> early_initcall(crypto_gcm_module_init);
>>> early_initcall(ghash_mod_init);
>>>
>>
>> I understand the need for this, but I think it is a bad idea. These
>> will run even before SMP bringup, and before pure initcalls, which are
>> documented as
>
> /*
> * A "pure" initcall has no dependencies on anything else, and purely
> * initializes variables that couldn't be statically initialized.
> */>
> So basically, you should not be relying on any global infrastructure
> to have been initialized. This is also something that may cause
> different problems on different architectures, and doing this only for
> x86 seems like a problem as well.
>
> Can you elaborate a bit on the use case?
Parameters used in TSC value calculation is controlled by
the hypervisor and a malicious hypervisor can prevent guest from
moving forward. Secure TSC allows guest to securely use rdtsc/rdtscp
as the parameters being used now cannot be changed by hypervisor once
the guest is launched.
For the boot-cpu, TSC_SCALE/OFFSET is initialized as part of the guest
launch process. During the secure guest boot, boot cpu will start bringing
up the secondary CPUs. While creation of secondary CPU, TSC_SCALE/OFFSET
field needs to be initialized appropriately. SNP Guest messages are the
mechanism to communicate with the PSP to prevent risks from a malicious
hypervisor snooping.
The PSP firmware provides each guests with four Virtual Machine Platform
Communication key(VMPCK) and is passed to the guest using a special secrets page
as part of the guest launch process. The key is either with the guest or the
PSP firmware.
The messages exchanged between the guest and the PSP firmware is
encrypted/decrypted using this key.
> AES in GCM mode seems like a
> thing that we might be able to add to the crypto library API without
> much hassle (which already has a minimal implementation of AES)
That will be great !
Regards,
Nikunj
On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 11:51, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 04/10/22 13:58, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 10:24, Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 06:41, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Hi!
> >>>
> >>> We are trying to implement Secure TSC feature for AMD SNP guests [1]. During the boot-up of the
> >>> secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from Security processor (PSP).
> >>> This communication channel is encrypted between the security processor and the guest,
> >>> hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the security processor.
> >>> Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM).
> >>>
> >>> As the TSC info is needed during the smpboot phase, few crypto modules need to be loaded early
> >>> to use the crypto api for encryption/decryption of SNP Guest messages.
> >>>
> >>> I was able to get the SNP Guest messages working with initializing few crypto modules using
> >>> early_initcall() instead of subsys_initcall().
> >>>
> >>> Require suggestion/inputs if this is acceptable. List of modules that was changed
> >>> to early_initcall:
> >>>
> >>> early_initcall(aes_init);
> >>> early_initcall(cryptomgr_init);
> >>> early_initcall(crypto_ctr_module_init);
> >>> early_initcall(crypto_gcm_module_init);
> >>> early_initcall(ghash_mod_init);
> >>>
> >>
> >> I understand the need for this, but I think it is a bad idea. These
> >> will run even before SMP bringup, and before pure initcalls, which are
> >> documented as
> >
> > /*
> > * A "pure" initcall has no dependencies on anything else, and purely
> > * initializes variables that couldn't be statically initialized.
> > */>
> > So basically, you should not be relying on any global infrastructure
> > to have been initialized. This is also something that may cause
> > different problems on different architectures, and doing this only for
> > x86 seems like a problem as well.
> >
> > Can you elaborate a bit on the use case?
>
> Parameters used in TSC value calculation is controlled by
> the hypervisor and a malicious hypervisor can prevent guest from
> moving forward. Secure TSC allows guest to securely use rdtsc/rdtscp
> as the parameters being used now cannot be changed by hypervisor once
> the guest is launched.
>
> For the boot-cpu, TSC_SCALE/OFFSET is initialized as part of the guest
> launch process. During the secure guest boot, boot cpu will start bringing
> up the secondary CPUs. While creation of secondary CPU, TSC_SCALE/OFFSET
> field needs to be initialized appropriately. SNP Guest messages are the
> mechanism to communicate with the PSP to prevent risks from a malicious
> hypervisor snooping.
>
> The PSP firmware provides each guests with four Virtual Machine Platform
> Communication key(VMPCK) and is passed to the guest using a special secrets page
> as part of the guest launch process. The key is either with the guest or the
> PSP firmware.
>
> The messages exchanged between the guest and the PSP firmware is
> encrypted/decrypted using this key.
>
> > AES in GCM mode seems like a
> > thing that we might be able to add to the crypto library API without
> > much hassle (which already has a minimal implementation of AES)
>
> That will be great !
>
Try this branch and see if it works for you
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=libgcm
On 04/10/22 22:47, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 11:51, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> AES in GCM mode seems like a
>>> thing that we might be able to add to the crypto library API without
>>> much hassle (which already has a minimal implementation of AES)
>>
>> That will be great !
>>
>
> Try this branch and see if it works for you
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=libgcm
Thanks Ard, I had to make few changes to the api to get it working for my usecase.
The ghash is store/retrieved from the AUTHTAG field of message header as per
"Table 97. Message Header Format" in the SNP ABI document:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
Below are the changes I had made in my tree.
---
diff --git a/include/crypto/gcm.h b/include/crypto/gcm.h
index bab85df6df7a..838d1b4e25c3 100644
--- a/include/crypto/gcm.h
+++ b/include/crypto/gcm.h
@@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ int gcm_setkey(struct gcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize);
void gcm_encrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv);
+ int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv,
+ u8 *authtag);
int gcm_decrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv);
+ int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv,
+ u8 *authtag);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto/gcm.c b/lib/crypto/gcm.c
index d80e430505ee..34c86b2ea2aa 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int gcm_setkey(struct gcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key,
static int gcm_crypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len,
- const u8 *iv, bool encrypt)
+ const u8 *iv, bool encrypt, u8 *authtag)
{
be128 tail = { cpu_to_be64(assoc_len * 8), cpu_to_be64(crypt_len * 8) };
u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ static int gcm_crypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
put_unaligned_be32(1, ctr + GCM_AES_IV_SIZE);
aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr);
- crypto_xor_cpy(encrypt ? dst : buf, buf, (u8 *)&ghash, ctx->authsize);
- if (!encrypt && crypto_memneq(src, buf, ctx->authsize))
+ crypto_xor_cpy(encrypt ? authtag : buf, buf, (u8 *)&ghash, ctx->authsize);
+ if (!encrypt && crypto_memneq(authtag, buf, ctx->authsize))
ret = -EBADMSG;
memzero_explicit(&ghash, sizeof(ghash));
@@ -87,16 +87,18 @@ static int gcm_crypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
}
void gcm_encrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv)
+ int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv,
+ u8 *authtag)
{
- gcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, src_len, assoc, assoc_len, iv, true);
+ gcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, src_len, assoc, assoc_len, iv, true, authtag);
}
int gcm_decrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv)
+ int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv,
+ u8 *authtag)
{
return gcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, src_len - ctx->authsize, assoc,
- assoc_len, iv, false);
+ assoc_len, iv, false, authtag);
}
On Thu, 6 Oct 2022 at 13:50, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 04/10/22 22:47, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Tue, 4 Oct 2022 at 11:51, Nikunj A. Dadhania <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>
> >>> AES in GCM mode seems like a
> >>> thing that we might be able to add to the crypto library API without
> >>> much hassle (which already has a minimal implementation of AES)
> >>
> >> That will be great !
> >>
> >
> > Try this branch and see if it works for you
> >
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=libgcm
>
> Thanks Ard, I had to make few changes to the api to get it working for my usecase.
Excellent
> The ghash is store/retrieved from the AUTHTAG field of message header as per
> "Table 97. Message Header Format" in the SNP ABI document:
> https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
>
> Below are the changes I had made in my tree.
>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/gcm.h b/include/crypto/gcm.h
> index bab85df6df7a..838d1b4e25c3 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/gcm.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/gcm.h
> @@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ int gcm_setkey(struct gcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key,
> unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize);
>
> void gcm_encrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
> - int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv);
> + int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv,
> + u8 *authtag);
>
> int gcm_decrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
> - int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv);
> + int src_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, const u8 *iv,
> + u8 *authtag);
This should really be 'const u8 *authtag'. Which means that the
encrypt/decrypt path should be split somewhat differently, i.e.,
something like
void gcm_encrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len,
const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], u8 *authtag)
{
gcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, crypt_len, assoc, assoc_len, iv, authtag,
true);
}
int gcm_decrypt(const struct gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len,
const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], const u8 *authtag)
{
u8 tagbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
gcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, crypt_len - ctx->authsize, assoc, assoc_len,
iv, tagbuf, false);
if (crypto_memneq(authtag, tagbuf, ctx->authsize)) {
memzero_explicit(tagbuf, sizeof(tagbuf));
return -EBADMSG;
}
return 0;
}
I've updated my branch with these (and some other changes). Now we
just need to add some comment blocks to describe the API.