Hello,
This series adds xfstests which verify that encrypted contents and
filenames on ext4 and f2fs are actually correct, i.e. that the
encryption uses the correct algorithms, keys, IVs, and padding amounts.
The new tests work by creating encrypted files, unmounting the
filesystem, reading the ciphertext from disk using dd and debugfs or
dump.f2fs, and then comparing it against ciphertext computed
independently by a new test program that implements the same algorithms.
These tests are important because:
- The whole point of file encryption is that the files are actually
encrypted correctly on-disk. Except for generic/399, current xfstests
only tests the filesystem semantics, not the actual encryption.
generic/399 only tests for incompressibility of encrypted file
contents using one particular encryption setting, which isn't much.
- fscrypt now supports 4 main combinations of encryption settings,
rather than 1 as it did originally. This may be doubled to 8 soon
(https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10908153/). We should test all
settings. And without tests, even if the initial implementation is
correct, breakage in one specific setting could go undetected.
- Though Linux's crypto API has self-tests, these only test the
algorithms themselves, not how they are used, e.g. by fscrypt.
Patch 1 is a cleanup patch. Patches 2-4 add the common helpers for
ciphertext verification tests. Patches 5-7 add the actual tests.
These tests require e2fsprogs and f2fs-tools patches I recently sent out
to fix printing encrypted filenames. So, this series might not be
suitable for merging into mainline xfstests until those patches are
applied. Regardless, comments are appreciated. The needed patches are:
debugfs: avoid ambiguity when printing filenames (https://marc.info/?l=linux-ext4&m=155596495624232&w=2)
f2fs-tools: improve filename printing (https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-f2fs/mailman/message/36648641/)
This series can also be retrieved from git at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git
branch "ciphertext-verification".
I also have patches on top of this series which verify the ciphertext
produced from v2 encryption policies, which are proposed by my kernel
patch series "fscrypt: key management improvements"
(https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/10908107/). v2 encryption policies
will use a different key derivation function, and thus their ciphertext
will be different. These additional patches can be found at branch
"fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements" of my git repo above. But I've arranged
things such that this shorter series can potentially be applied earlier,
to test what's in the kernel now.
Eric Biggers (7):
common/encrypt: introduce helpers for set_encpolicy and get_encpolicy
fscrypt-crypt-util: add utility for reproducing fscrypt encrypted data
common/encrypt: support requiring other encryption settings
common/encrypt: add helper for ciphertext verification tests
generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with AES-256
generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with AES-128
generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with Adiantum
.gitignore | 1 +
common/encrypt | 482 ++++++++++-
src/Makefile | 3 +-
src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c | 1645 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/ext4/024 | 3 +-
tests/generic/395 | 28 +-
tests/generic/395.out | 2 +-
tests/generic/396 | 15 +-
tests/generic/397 | 3 +-
tests/generic/398 | 5 +-
tests/generic/399 | 3 +-
tests/generic/419 | 3 +-
tests/generic/421 | 3 +-
tests/generic/429 | 3 +-
tests/generic/435 | 3 +-
tests/generic/440 | 5 +-
tests/generic/700 | 41 +
tests/generic/700.out | 5 +
tests/generic/701 | 41 +
tests/generic/701.out | 5 +
tests/generic/702 | 43 +
tests/generic/702.out | 10 +
tests/generic/group | 3 +
23 files changed, 2308 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c
create mode 100755 tests/generic/700
create mode 100644 tests/generic/700.out
create mode 100755 tests/generic/701
create mode 100644 tests/generic/701.out
create mode 100755 tests/generic/702
create mode 100644 tests/generic/702.out
--
2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Verify ciphertext for v1 encryption policies that use Adiantum to
encrypt file contents and file names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
tests/generic/702 | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/generic/702.out | 10 ++++++++++
tests/generic/group | 1 +
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 tests/generic/702
create mode 100644 tests/generic/702.out
diff --git a/tests/generic/702 b/tests/generic/702
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..c7ac7be4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generic/702
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#! /bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+#
+# FS QA Test generic/702
+#
+# Verify ciphertext for v1 encryption policies that use Adiantum to encrypt file
+# contents and file names.
+#
+seq=`basename $0`
+seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
+echo "QA output created by $seq"
+
+here=`pwd`
+tmp=/tmp/$$
+status=1 # failure is the default!
+trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
+
+_cleanup()
+{
+ cd /
+ rm -f $tmp.*
+}
+
+# get standard environment, filters and checks
+. ./common/rc
+. ./common/filter
+. ./common/encrypt
+
+# remove previous $seqres.full before test
+rm -f $seqres.full
+
+# real QA test starts here
+_supported_fs generic
+_supported_os Linux
+
+# Test both with and without the DIRECT_KEY flag.
+_verify_ciphertext_for_encryption_policy Adiantum Adiantum
+_verify_ciphertext_for_encryption_policy Adiantum Adiantum direct
+
+# success, all done
+status=0
+exit
diff --git a/tests/generic/702.out b/tests/generic/702.out
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0dd80dae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generic/702.out
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+QA output created by 702
+
+Verifying ciphertext with parameters:
+ contents_encryption_mode: Adiantum
+ filenames_encryption_mode: Adiantum
+
+Verifying ciphertext with parameters:
+ contents_encryption_mode: Adiantum
+ filenames_encryption_mode: Adiantum
+ options: direct
diff --git a/tests/generic/group b/tests/generic/group
index 6bb793cb..f6672b93 100644
--- a/tests/generic/group
+++ b/tests/generic/group
@@ -549,3 +549,4 @@
544 auto quick clone
700 auto quick encrypt
701 auto quick encrypt
+702 auto quick encrypt
--
2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Verify ciphertext for v1 encryption policies that use AES-128-CBC-ESSIV
to encrypt file contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC to encrypt file names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
tests/generic/701 | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/generic/701.out | 5 +++++
tests/generic/group | 1 +
3 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 tests/generic/701
create mode 100644 tests/generic/701.out
diff --git a/tests/generic/701 b/tests/generic/701
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..d477f5bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generic/701
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#! /bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+#
+# FS QA Test generic/701
+#
+# Verify ciphertext for v1 encryption policies that use AES-128-CBC-ESSIV to
+# encrypt file contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC to encrypt file names.
+#
+seq=`basename $0`
+seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
+echo "QA output created by $seq"
+
+here=`pwd`
+tmp=/tmp/$$
+status=1 # failure is the default!
+trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
+
+_cleanup()
+{
+ cd /
+ rm -f $tmp.*
+}
+
+# get standard environment, filters and checks
+. ./common/rc
+. ./common/filter
+. ./common/encrypt
+
+# remove previous $seqres.full before test
+rm -f $seqres.full
+
+# real QA test starts here
+_supported_fs generic
+_supported_os Linux
+
+_verify_ciphertext_for_encryption_policy AES-128-CBC-ESSIV AES-128-CTS-CBC
+
+# success, all done
+status=0
+exit
diff --git a/tests/generic/701.out b/tests/generic/701.out
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cfb6c924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/generic/701.out
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+QA output created by 701
+
+Verifying ciphertext with parameters:
+ contents_encryption_mode: AES-128-CBC-ESSIV
+ filenames_encryption_mode: AES-128-CTS-CBC
diff --git a/tests/generic/group b/tests/generic/group
index 22e5c028..6bb793cb 100644
--- a/tests/generic/group
+++ b/tests/generic/group
@@ -548,3 +548,4 @@
543 auto quick clone
544 auto quick clone
700 auto quick encrypt
+701 auto quick encrypt
--
2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
For conciseness in tests, add helper functions that wrap the xfs_io
commands 'set_encpolicy' and 'get_encpolicy'. Then update all
encryption tests to use them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
common/encrypt | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
tests/ext4/024 | 3 +--
tests/generic/395 | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
tests/generic/395.out | 2 +-
tests/generic/396 | 15 +++++++--------
tests/generic/397 | 3 +--
tests/generic/398 | 5 ++---
tests/generic/399 | 3 +--
tests/generic/419 | 3 +--
tests/generic/421 | 3 +--
tests/generic/429 | 3 +--
tests/generic/435 | 3 +--
tests/generic/440 | 5 ++---
13 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/common/encrypt b/common/encrypt
index 1b10aa71..54d873fa 100644
--- a/common/encrypt
+++ b/common/encrypt
@@ -38,8 +38,7 @@ _require_scratch_encryption()
# presence of /sys/fs/ext4/features/encryption, but this is broken on
# some older kernels and is ext4-specific anyway.)
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir
- if $XFS_IO_PROG -c set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir \
- 2>&1 >>$seqres.full | \
+ if _set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir 2>&1 >>$seqres.full | \
egrep -q 'Inappropriate ioctl for device|Operation not supported'
then
_notrun "kernel does not support $FSTYP encryption"
@@ -175,3 +174,34 @@ _revoke_encryption_key()
local keyid=$($KEYCTL_PROG search @s logon $FSTYP:$keydesc)
$KEYCTL_PROG revoke $keyid >>$seqres.full
}
+
+# Set an encryption policy on the specified directory.
+_set_encpolicy()
+{
+ local dir=$1
+ shift
+
+ $XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $*" "$dir"
+}
+
+_user_do_set_encpolicy()
+{
+ local dir=$1
+ shift
+
+ _user_do "$XFS_IO_PROG -c \"set_encpolicy $*\" \"$dir\""
+}
+
+_require_get_encpolicy()
+{
+ _require_xfs_io_command "get_encpolicy"
+}
+
+# Display the specified file or directory's encryption policy.
+_get_encpolicy()
+{
+ local file=$1
+ shift
+
+ $XFS_IO_PROG -c "get_encpolicy $*" "$file"
+}
diff --git a/tests/ext4/024 b/tests/ext4/024
index c54d2519..a86cc417 100755
--- a/tests/ext4/024
+++ b/tests/ext4/024
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs ext4
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
_new_session_keyring
@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ _scratch_mkfs_encrypted &>>$seqres.full
_scratch_mount
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $keydesc
echo foo > $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/file
inum=$(stat -c '%i' $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/file)
_scratch_unmount
diff --git a/tests/generic/395 b/tests/generic/395
index cae97cef..cdb348c1 100755
--- a/tests/generic/395
+++ b/tests/generic/395
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "get_encpolicy"
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
+_require_get_encpolicy
_require_user
_scratch_mkfs_encrypted &>> $seqres.full
@@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ check_no_policy()
# When a file is unencrypted, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY currently
# fails with ENOENT on ext4 but with ENODATA on f2fs. TODO: it's
# planned to consistently use ENODATA. For now this test accepts both.
- $XFS_IO_PROG -c "get_encpolicy" $1 |&
+ _get_encpolicy $1 |&
sed -e 's/No such file or directory/No data available/'
}
@@ -54,25 +53,25 @@ empty_dir=$SCRATCH_MNT/empty_dir
echo -e "\n*** Setting encryption policy on empty directory ***"
mkdir $empty_dir
check_no_policy $empty_dir |& _filter_scratch
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy 0000111122223333" $empty_dir
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "get_encpolicy" $empty_dir | _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $empty_dir 0000111122223333
+_get_encpolicy $empty_dir | _filter_scratch
# Should be able to set the same policy again, but not a different one.
# TODO: the error code for "already has a different policy" is planned to switch
# from EINVAL to EEXIST. For now this test accepts both.
echo -e "\n*** Setting encryption policy again ***"
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy 0000111122223333" $empty_dir
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "get_encpolicy" $empty_dir | _filter_scratch
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy 4444555566667777" $empty_dir |& \
+_set_encpolicy $empty_dir 0000111122223333
+_get_encpolicy $empty_dir | _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $empty_dir 4444555566667777 |& \
_filter_scratch | sed -e 's/Invalid argument/File exists/'
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "get_encpolicy" $empty_dir | _filter_scratch
+_get_encpolicy $empty_dir | _filter_scratch
# Should *not* be able to set an encryption policy on a nonempty directory
nonempty_dir=$SCRATCH_MNT/nonempty_dir
echo -e "\n*** Setting encryption policy on nonempty directory ***"
mkdir $nonempty_dir
touch $nonempty_dir/file
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy" $nonempty_dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $nonempty_dir |& _filter_scratch
check_no_policy $nonempty_dir |& _filter_scratch
# Should *not* be able to set an encryption policy on a nondirectory file, even
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ check_no_policy $nonempty_dir |& _filter_scratch
nondirectory=$SCRATCH_MNT/nondirectory
echo -e "\n*** Setting encryption policy on nondirectory ***"
touch $nondirectory
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy" $nondirectory |& \
+_set_encpolicy $nondirectory |& \
_filter_scratch | sed -e 's/Invalid argument/Not a directory/'
check_no_policy $nondirectory |& _filter_scratch
@@ -93,8 +92,7 @@ check_no_policy $nondirectory |& _filter_scratch
unauthorized_dir=$SCRATCH_MNT/unauthorized_dir
echo -e "\n*** Setting encryption policy on another user's directory ***"
mkdir $unauthorized_dir
-su $qa_user -c "$XFS_IO_PROG -c \"set_encpolicy\" $unauthorized_dir" |& \
- _filter_scratch
+_user_do_set_encpolicy $unauthorized_dir |& _filter_scratch
check_no_policy $unauthorized_dir |& _filter_scratch
# Should *not* be able to set an encryption policy on a directory on a
@@ -104,12 +102,12 @@ check_no_policy $unauthorized_dir |& _filter_scratch
echo -e "\n*** Setting encryption policy on readonly filesystem ***"
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_dir $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt
_scratch_remount ro
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy" $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_dir |& _filter_scratch
check_no_policy $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_dir |& _filter_scratch
_scratch_remount rw
mount --bind $SCRATCH_MNT $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt
mount -o remount,ro,bind $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy" $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt/ro_dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt/ro_dir |& _filter_scratch
check_no_policy $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt/ro_dir |& _filter_scratch
umount $SCRATCH_MNT/ro_bind_mnt
diff --git a/tests/generic/395.out b/tests/generic/395.out
index 90c450f2..2c55d7a9 100644
--- a/tests/generic/395.out
+++ b/tests/generic/395.out
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ SCRATCH_MNT/nondirectory: failed to set encryption policy: Not a directory
SCRATCH_MNT/nondirectory: failed to get encryption policy: No data available
*** Setting encryption policy on another user's directory ***
-SCRATCH_MNT/unauthorized_dir: failed to set encryption policy: Permission denied
+Permission denied
SCRATCH_MNT/unauthorized_dir: failed to get encryption policy: No data available
*** Setting encryption policy on readonly filesystem ***
diff --git a/tests/generic/396 b/tests/generic/396
index 50c2c2e0..7027c339 100755
--- a/tests/generic/396
+++ b/tests/generic/396
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_scratch_mkfs_encrypted &>> $seqres.full
_scratch_mount
@@ -42,23 +41,23 @@ dir=$SCRATCH_MNT/dir
mkdir $dir
echo -e "\n*** Invalid contents encryption mode ***"
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -c 0xFF" $dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -c 0xFF |& _filter_scratch
echo -e "\n*** Invalid filenames encryption mode ***"
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -n 0xFF" $dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -n 0xFF |& _filter_scratch
echo -e "\n*** Invalid flags ***"
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -f 0xFF" $dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -f 0xFF |& _filter_scratch
echo -e "\n*** Invalid policy version ***"
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -v 0xFF" $dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -v 0xFF |& _filter_scratch
# Currently, the only supported combination of modes is AES-256-XTS for contents
# and AES-256-CTS for filenames. Nothing else should be accepted.
echo -e "\n*** Invalid combinations of modes ***"
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -c AES-256-CTS -n AES-256-CTS" $dir |& _filter_scratch
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -c AES-256-CTS -n AES-256-XTS" $dir |& _filter_scratch
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -c AES-256-XTS -n AES-256-XTS" $dir |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -c AES-256-CTS -n AES-256-CTS |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -c AES-256-CTS -n AES-256-XTS |& _filter_scratch
+_set_encpolicy $dir -c AES-256-XTS -n AES-256-XTS |& _filter_scratch
# success, all done
status=0
diff --git a/tests/generic/397 b/tests/generic/397
index c2f779a4..a97e866b 100755
--- a/tests/generic/397
+++ b/tests/generic/397
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
_new_session_keyring
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ _scratch_mount
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $SCRATCH_MNT/ref_dir
keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $keydesc
for dir in $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $SCRATCH_MNT/ref_dir; do
touch $dir/empty > /dev/null
$XFS_IO_PROG -t -f -c "pwrite 0 4k" $dir/a > /dev/null
diff --git a/tests/generic/398 b/tests/generic/398
index ecf82690..b1af65e5 100755
--- a/tests/generic/398
+++ b/tests/generic/398
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_requires_renameat2
_new_session_keyring
@@ -71,8 +70,8 @@ udir=$SCRATCH_MNT/udir
mkdir $edir1 $edir2 $udir
keydesc1=$(_generate_encryption_key)
keydesc2=$(_generate_encryption_key)
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc1" $edir1
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc2" $edir2
+_set_encpolicy $edir1 $keydesc1
+_set_encpolicy $edir2 $keydesc2
touch $edir1/efile1
touch $edir2/efile2
touch $udir/ufile
diff --git a/tests/generic/399 b/tests/generic/399
index 5e55096f..5625503b 100755
--- a/tests/generic/399
+++ b/tests/generic/399
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$XZ_PROG" xz
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ _scratch_mount
keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/encrypted_dir
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/encrypted_dir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/encrypted_dir $keydesc
# Create the "same" symlink in two different directories.
# Later we'll check both the name and target of the symlink.
diff --git a/tests/generic/419 b/tests/generic/419
index 1014764c..2f1d34c6 100755
--- a/tests/generic/419
+++ b/tests/generic/419
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
_requires_renameat2
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ _scratch_mount
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $keydesc
echo a > $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/a
echo b > $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/b
_unlink_encryption_key $keydesc
diff --git a/tests/generic/421 b/tests/generic/421
index 415e14b5..c8cc2dcc 100755
--- a/tests/generic/421
+++ b/tests/generic/421
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
_new_session_keyring
@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ slice=2
rm -rf $dir
mkdir $dir
keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $dir
+_set_encpolicy $dir $keydesc
$XFS_IO_PROG -f $file -c "pwrite 0 $((nproc*slice))M" -c "fsync" > /dev/null
# Create processes to read from the encrypted file. Use fadvise to wipe the
diff --git a/tests/generic/429 b/tests/generic/429
index 5f5b056a..472fdbd9 100755
--- a/tests/generic/429
+++ b/tests/generic/429
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
_require_test_program "t_encrypted_d_revalidate"
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ keydesc=$(_generate_key_descriptor)
raw_key=$(_generate_raw_encryption_key)
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
_add_encryption_key $keydesc $raw_key
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $keydesc
# Create two files in the directory: one whose name is valid in the base64
# format used for encoding ciphertext filenames, and one whose name is not. The
diff --git a/tests/generic/435 b/tests/generic/435
index baed1bdc..073596f3 100755
--- a/tests/generic/435
+++ b/tests/generic/435
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
# set up an encrypted directory
@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ _scratch_mount
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
# -f 0x2: zero-pad to 16-byte boundary (i.e. encryption block boundary)
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -f 0x2 $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $keydesc -f 0x2
# Create files with long names (> 32 bytes, long enough to trigger the use of
# "digested" names) in the encrypted directory.
diff --git a/tests/generic/440 b/tests/generic/440
index 5013f276..434286f4 100755
--- a/tests/generic/440
+++ b/tests/generic/440
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ rm -f $seqres.full
_supported_fs generic
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch_encryption
-_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
# Set up an encryption-capable filesystem and an encryption key.
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ _add_encryption_key $keydesc $raw_key
# Set up an encrypted directory containing a regular file, a subdirectory, and a
# symlink.
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir $keydesc
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/subdir
ln -s target $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/symlink
echo contents > $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/file
@@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ echo
echo "***** Child has key, but parent doesn't *****"
_add_encryption_key $keydesc $raw_key
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir2
-$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir2
+_set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/edir2 $keydesc
ln $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/file $SCRATCH_MNT/edir2/link
_scratch_cycle_mount
cat $SCRATCH_MNT/edir2/link
--
2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a utility program that can reproduce encrypted contents and
filenames. It implements all encryption algorithms currently supported
by fscrypt (a.k.a. ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption), and it generates
IVs in the same way. The program takes the algorithm and master key on
the command line, and encrypts stdin to stdout.
A file nonce may also be passed on the command line, and the program
will "tweak" the encryption using this nonce in the same way the kernel
does -- either by deriving a subkey, or by including the nonce in the
IVs. The block size and padding amount may also be specified.
No dependencies are added, as all algorithms implemented from scratch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
src/Makefile | 3 +-
src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c | 1645 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 1648 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index c13fb713..11232be7 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
/src/fill
/src/fill2
/src/fs_perms
+/src/fscrypt-crypt-util
/src/fssum
/src/fstest
/src/fsync-err
diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile
index 4057d7b3..9d3d2529 100644
--- a/src/Makefile
+++ b/src/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ LINUX_TARGETS = xfsctl bstat t_mtab getdevicesize preallo_rw_pattern_reader \
renameat2 t_getcwd e4compact test-nextquota punch-alternating \
attr-list-by-handle-cursor-test listxattr dio-interleaved t_dir_type \
dio-invalidate-cache stat_test t_encrypted_d_revalidate \
- attr_replace_test swapon mkswap t_attr_corruption t_open_tmpfiles
+ attr_replace_test swapon mkswap t_attr_corruption t_open_tmpfiles \
+ fscrypt-crypt-util
SUBDIRS = log-writes perf
diff --git a/src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c b/src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..715e2bf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1645 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * fscrypt-crypt-util.c - utility for verifying fscrypt-encrypted data
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This program implements all crypto algorithms supported by fscrypt (a.k.a.
+ * ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption), for the purpose of verifying the
+ * correctness of the ciphertext stored on-disk. See usage() below.
+ *
+ * All algorithms are implemented in portable C code to avoid depending on
+ * libcrypto (OpenSSL), and because some fscrypt-supported algorithms aren't
+ * available in libcrypto anyway (e.g. Adiantum). For simplicity, all crypto
+ * code here tries to follow the mathematical definitions directly, without
+ * optimizing for performance or worrying about following security best
+ * practices such as mitigating side-channel attacks. So, only use this program
+ * for testing!
+ */
+
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define PROGRAM_NAME "fscrypt-crypt-util"
+
+/*
+ * Define to enable the tests of the crypto code in this file. If enabled, you
+ * must link this program with OpenSSL (-lcrypto) v1.1.0 or later, and your
+ * kernel needs CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM=y.
+ */
+#undef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+
+#define NUM_ALG_TEST_ITERATIONS 10000
+
+static void usage(FILE *fp)
+{
+ fputs(
+"Usage: " PROGRAM_NAME " [OPTION]... CIPHER MASTER_KEY\n"
+"\n"
+"Utility for verifying fscrypt-encrypted data. This program encrypts\n"
+"(or decrypts) the data on stdin using the given CIPHER with the given\n"
+"MASTER_KEY (or a key derived from it, if a KDF is specified), and writes the\n"
+"resulting ciphertext (or plaintext) to stdout.\n"
+"\n"
+"CIPHER can be AES-256-XTS, AES-256-CTS-CBC, AES-128-CBC-ESSIV, AES-128-CTS-CBC,\n"
+"or Adiantum. MASTER_KEY must be a hex string long enough for the cipher.\n"
+"\n"
+"WARNING: this program is only meant for testing, not for \"real\" use!\n"
+"\n"
+"Options:\n"
+" --block-size=BLOCK_SIZE Encrypt each BLOCK_SIZE bytes independently.\n"
+" Default: 4096 bytes\n"
+" --decrypt Decrypt instead of encrypt\n"
+" --file-nonce=NONCE File's nonce as a 32-character hex string\n"
+" --kdf=KDF Key derivation function to use: AES-128-ECB\n"
+" or none. Default: none\n"
+" --help Show this help\n"
+" --padding=PADDING If last block is partial, zero-pad it to next\n"
+" PADDING-byte boundary. Default: BLOCK_SIZE\n"
+ , fp);
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * Utilities *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(A) (sizeof(A) / sizeof((A)[0]))
+#define MIN(x, y) ((x) < (y) ? (x) : (y))
+#define MAX(x, y) ((x) > (y) ? (x) : (y))
+#define ROUND_DOWN(x, y) ((x) & ~((y) - 1))
+#define ROUND_UP(x, y) (((x) + (y) - 1) & ~((y) - 1))
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP(n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d))
+#define STATIC_ASSERT(e) ((void)sizeof(char[1 - 2*!(e)]))
+
+typedef __u8 u8;
+typedef __u16 u16;
+typedef __u32 u32;
+typedef __u64 u64;
+
+#define cpu_to_le32 __cpu_to_le32
+#define cpu_to_be32 __cpu_to_be32
+#define cpu_to_le64 __cpu_to_le64
+#define cpu_to_be64 __cpu_to_be64
+#define le32_to_cpu __le32_to_cpu
+#define be32_to_cpu __be32_to_cpu
+#define le64_to_cpu __le64_to_cpu
+#define be64_to_cpu __be64_to_cpu
+
+#define DEFINE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS_HELPERS(type, native_type) \
+static inline native_type __attribute__((unused)) \
+get_unaligned_##type(const void *p) \
+{ \
+ __##type x; \
+ \
+ memcpy(&x, p, sizeof(x)); \
+ return type##_to_cpu(x); \
+} \
+ \
+static inline void __attribute__((unused)) \
+put_unaligned_##type(native_type v, void *p) \
+{ \
+ __##type x = cpu_to_##type(v); \
+ \
+ memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); \
+}
+
+DEFINE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS_HELPERS(le32, u32)
+DEFINE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS_HELPERS(be32, u32)
+DEFINE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS_HELPERS(le64, u64)
+DEFINE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS_HELPERS(be64, u64)
+
+static inline bool is_power_of_2(unsigned long v)
+{
+ return v != 0 && (v & (v - 1)) == 0;
+}
+
+static inline u32 rol32(u32 v, int n)
+{
+ return (v << n) | (v >> (32 - n));
+}
+
+static inline u32 ror32(u32 v, int n)
+{
+ return (v >> n) | (v << (32 - n));
+}
+
+static inline u64 ror64(u64 v, int n)
+{
+ return (v >> n) | (v << (64 - n));
+}
+
+static inline void xor(u8 *res, const u8 *a, const u8 *b, size_t count)
+{
+ while (count--)
+ *res++ = *a++ ^ *b++;
+}
+
+static void __attribute__((noreturn, format(printf, 2, 3)))
+do_die(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list va;
+
+ va_start(va, format);
+ fputs("[" PROGRAM_NAME "] ERROR: ", stderr);
+ vfprintf(stderr, format, va);
+ if (err)
+ fprintf(stderr, ": %s", strerror(errno));
+ putc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(va);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+#define die(format, ...) do_die(0, (format), ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define die_errno(format, ...) do_die(errno, (format), ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn)) void
+assertion_failed(const char *expr, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ die("Assertion failed: %s at %s:%d", expr, file, line);
+}
+
+#define ASSERT(e) ({ if (!(e)) assertion_failed(#e, __FILE__, __LINE__); })
+
+static void *xmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ void *p = malloc(size);
+
+ ASSERT(p != NULL);
+ return p;
+}
+
+static int hexchar2bin(char c)
+{
+ if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
+ return 10 + c - 'a';
+ if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
+ return 10 + c - 'A';
+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
+ return c - '0';
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int hex2bin(const char *hex, u8 *bin, int max_bin_size)
+{
+ size_t len = strlen(hex);
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (len & 1)
+ return -1;
+ len /= 2;
+ if (len > max_bin_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ int high = hexchar2bin(hex[2 * i]);
+ int low = hexchar2bin(hex[2 * i + 1]);
+
+ if (high < 0 || low < 0)
+ return -1;
+ bin[i] = (high << 4) | low;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
+
+static size_t xread(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ const size_t orig_count = count;
+
+ while (count) {
+ ssize_t res = read(fd, buf, count);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ die_errno("read error");
+ if (res == 0)
+ break;
+ buf += res;
+ count -= res;
+ }
+ return orig_count - count;
+}
+
+static void full_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ while (count) {
+ ssize_t res = write(fd, buf, count);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ die_errno("write error");
+ buf += res;
+ count -= res;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+static void rand_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ while (count--)
+ *buf++ = rand();
+}
+#endif
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * Finite field arithmetic *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/* Multiply a GF(2^8) element by the polynomial 'x' */
+static inline u8 gf2_8_mul_x(u8 b)
+{
+ return (b << 1) ^ ((b & 0x80) ? 0x1B : 0);
+}
+
+/* Multiply four packed GF(2^8) elements by the polynomial 'x' */
+static inline u32 gf2_8_mul_x_4way(u32 w)
+{
+ return ((w & 0x7F7F7F7F) << 1) ^ (((w & 0x80808080) >> 7) * 0x1B);
+}
+
+/* Element of GF(2^128) */
+typedef struct {
+ __le64 lo;
+ __le64 hi;
+} ble128;
+
+/* Multiply a GF(2^128) element by the polynomial 'x' */
+static inline void gf2_128_mul_x(ble128 *t)
+{
+ u64 lo = le64_to_cpu(t->lo);
+ u64 hi = le64_to_cpu(t->hi);
+
+ t->hi = cpu_to_le64((hi << 1) | (lo >> 63));
+ t->lo = cpu_to_le64((lo << 1) ^ ((hi & (1ULL << 63)) ? 0x87 : 0));
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * Group arithmetic *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/* Element of Z/(2^{128}Z) (a.k.a. the integers modulo 2^128) */
+typedef struct {
+ __le64 lo;
+ __le64 hi;
+} le128;
+
+static inline void le128_add(le128 *res, const le128 *a, const le128 *b)
+{
+ u64 a_lo = le64_to_cpu(a->lo);
+ u64 b_lo = le64_to_cpu(b->lo);
+
+ res->lo = cpu_to_le64(a_lo + b_lo);
+ res->hi = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(a->hi) + le64_to_cpu(b->hi) +
+ (a_lo + b_lo < a_lo));
+}
+
+static inline void le128_sub(le128 *res, const le128 *a, const le128 *b)
+{
+ u64 a_lo = le64_to_cpu(a->lo);
+ u64 b_lo = le64_to_cpu(b->lo);
+
+ res->lo = cpu_to_le64(a_lo - b_lo);
+ res->hi = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(a->hi) - le64_to_cpu(b->hi) -
+ (a_lo - b_lo > a_lo));
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * AES block cipher *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/*
+ * Reference: "FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard"
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.197.pdf
+ */
+
+#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+#define AES_128_KEY_SIZE 16
+#define AES_192_KEY_SIZE 24
+#define AES_256_KEY_SIZE 32
+
+static inline void AddRoundKey(u32 state[4], const u32 *rk)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] ^= rk[i];
+}
+
+static const u8 aes_sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b,
+ 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
+ 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26,
+ 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
+ 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2,
+ 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
+ 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed,
+ 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
+ 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f,
+ 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
+ 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec,
+ 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
+ 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
+ 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d,
+ 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
+ 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f,
+ 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11,
+ 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
+ 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f,
+ 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16,
+};
+
+static u8 aes_inverse_sbox[256];
+
+static void aes_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ aes_inverse_sbox[aes_sbox[i]] = i;
+}
+
+static inline u32 DoSubWord(u32 w, const u8 sbox[256])
+{
+ return ((u32)sbox[(u8)(w >> 24)] << 24) |
+ ((u32)sbox[(u8)(w >> 16)] << 16) |
+ ((u32)sbox[(u8)(w >> 8)] << 8) |
+ ((u32)sbox[(u8)(w >> 0)] << 0);
+}
+
+static inline u32 SubWord(u32 w)
+{
+ return DoSubWord(w, aes_sbox);
+}
+
+static inline u32 InvSubWord(u32 w)
+{
+ return DoSubWord(w, aes_inverse_sbox);
+}
+
+static inline void SubBytes(u32 state[4])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = SubWord(state[i]);
+}
+
+static inline void InvSubBytes(u32 state[4])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = InvSubWord(state[i]);
+}
+
+static inline void DoShiftRows(u32 state[4], int direction)
+{
+ u32 newstate[4];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ newstate[i] = (state[(i + direction*0) & 3] & 0xff) |
+ (state[(i + direction*1) & 3] & 0xff00) |
+ (state[(i + direction*2) & 3] & 0xff0000) |
+ (state[(i + direction*3) & 3] & 0xff000000);
+ memcpy(state, newstate, 16);
+}
+
+static inline void ShiftRows(u32 state[4])
+{
+ DoShiftRows(state, 1);
+}
+
+static inline void InvShiftRows(u32 state[4])
+{
+ DoShiftRows(state, -1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mix one column by doing the following matrix multiplication in GF(2^8):
+ *
+ * | 2 3 1 1 | | w[0] |
+ * | 1 2 3 1 | | w[1] |
+ * | 1 1 2 3 | x | w[2] |
+ * | 3 1 1 2 | | w[3] |
+ *
+ * a.k.a. w[i] = 2*w[i] + 3*w[(i+1)%4] + w[(i+2)%4] + w[(i+3)%4]
+ */
+static inline u32 MixColumn(u32 w)
+{
+ u32 _2w0_w2 = gf2_8_mul_x_4way(w) ^ ror32(w, 16);
+ u32 _3w1_w3 = ror32(_2w0_w2 ^ w, 8);
+
+ return _2w0_w2 ^ _3w1_w3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ( | 5 0 4 0 | | w[0] | )
+ * ( | 0 5 0 4 | | w[1] | )
+ * MixColumn( | 4 0 5 0 | x | w[2] | )
+ * ( | 0 4 0 5 | | w[3] | )
+ */
+static inline u32 InvMixColumn(u32 w)
+{
+ u32 _4w = gf2_8_mul_x_4way(gf2_8_mul_x_4way(w));
+
+ return MixColumn(_4w ^ w ^ ror32(_4w, 16));
+}
+
+static inline void MixColumns(u32 state[4])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = MixColumn(state[i]);
+}
+
+static inline void InvMixColumns(u32 state[4])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = InvMixColumn(state[i]);
+}
+
+struct aes_key {
+ u32 round_keys[15 * 4];
+ int nrounds;
+};
+
+/* Expand an AES key */
+static void aes_setkey(struct aes_key *k, const u8 *key, int keysize)
+{
+ const int N = keysize / 4;
+ u32 * const rk = k->round_keys;
+ u8 rcon = 1;
+ int i;
+
+ ASSERT(keysize == 16 || keysize == 24 || keysize == 32);
+ k->nrounds = 6 + N;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 * (k->nrounds + 1); i++) {
+ if (i < N) {
+ rk[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&key[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+ } else if (i % N == 0) {
+ rk[i] = rk[i - N] ^ SubWord(ror32(rk[i - 1], 8)) ^ rcon;
+ rcon = gf2_8_mul_x(rcon);
+ } else if (N > 6 && i % N == 4) {
+ rk[i] = rk[i - N] ^ SubWord(rk[i - 1]);
+ } else {
+ rk[i] = rk[i - N] ^ rk[i - 1];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Encrypt one 16-byte block with AES */
+static void aes_encrypt(const struct aes_key *k, const u8 src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ u8 dst[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+ u32 state[4];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&src[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+
+ AddRoundKey(state, k->round_keys);
+ for (i = 1; i < k->nrounds; i++) {
+ SubBytes(state);
+ ShiftRows(state);
+ MixColumns(state);
+ AddRoundKey(state, &k->round_keys[4 * i]);
+ }
+ SubBytes(state);
+ ShiftRows(state);
+ AddRoundKey(state, &k->round_keys[4 * i]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ put_unaligned_le32(state[i], &dst[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+}
+
+/* Decrypt one 16-byte block with AES */
+static void aes_decrypt(const struct aes_key *k, const u8 src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ u8 dst[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+ u32 state[4];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&src[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+
+ AddRoundKey(state, &k->round_keys[4 * k->nrounds]);
+ InvShiftRows(state);
+ InvSubBytes(state);
+ for (i = k->nrounds - 1; i >= 1; i--) {
+ AddRoundKey(state, &k->round_keys[4 * i]);
+ InvMixColumns(state);
+ InvShiftRows(state);
+ InvSubBytes(state);
+ }
+ AddRoundKey(state, k->round_keys);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ put_unaligned_le32(state[i], &dst[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+static void test_aes_keysize(int keysize)
+{
+ unsigned long num_tests = NUM_ALG_TEST_ITERATIONS;
+
+ while (num_tests--) {
+ struct aes_key k;
+ AES_KEY ref_k;
+ u8 key[AES_256_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 ptext[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 ctext[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 ref_ctext[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 decrypted[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ rand_bytes(key, keysize);
+ rand_bytes(ptext, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ aes_setkey(&k, key, keysize);
+ aes_encrypt(&k, ptext, ctext);
+
+ ASSERT(AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keysize*8, &ref_k) == 0);
+ AES_encrypt(ptext, ref_ctext, &ref_k);
+
+ ASSERT(memcmp(ctext, ref_ctext, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
+
+ aes_decrypt(&k, ctext, decrypted);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(ptext, decrypted, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_aes(void)
+{
+ test_aes_keysize(AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ test_aes_keysize(AES_192_KEY_SIZE);
+ test_aes_keysize(AES_256_KEY_SIZE);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_ALG_TESTS */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * SHA-256 *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/*
+ * Reference: "FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Standard"
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/180/2/archive/2002-08-01/documents/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf
+ */
+
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64
+
+#define Ch(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) ^ (~(x) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+#define Sigma256_0(x) (ror32((x), 2) ^ ror32((x), 13) ^ ror32((x), 22))
+#define Sigma256_1(x) (ror32((x), 6) ^ ror32((x), 11) ^ ror32((x), 25))
+#define sigma256_0(x) (ror32((x), 7) ^ ror32((x), 18) ^ ((x) >> 3))
+#define sigma256_1(x) (ror32((x), 17) ^ ror32((x), 19) ^ ((x) >> 10))
+
+static const u32 sha256_iv[8] = {
+ 0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c,
+ 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19,
+};
+
+static const u32 sha256_round_constants[64] = {
+ 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1,
+ 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5, 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3,
+ 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174, 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786,
+ 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,
+ 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147,
+ 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967, 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13,
+ 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85, 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b,
+ 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,
+ 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a,
+ 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3, 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208,
+ 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,
+};
+
+/* Compute the SHA-256 digest of the given buffer */
+static void sha256(const u8 *in, size_t inlen, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+ const size_t msglen = ROUND_UP(inlen + 9, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ u8 * const msg = xmalloc(msglen);
+ u32 H[8];
+ int i;
+
+ /* super naive way of handling the padding */
+ memcpy(msg, in, inlen);
+ memset(&msg[inlen], 0, msglen - inlen);
+ msg[inlen] = 0x80;
+ put_unaligned_be64((u64)inlen * 8, &msg[msglen - sizeof(__be64)]);
+ in = msg;
+
+ memcpy(H, sha256_iv, sizeof(H));
+ do {
+ u32 a = H[0], b = H[1], c = H[2], d = H[3],
+ e = H[4], f = H[5], g = H[6], h = H[7];
+ u32 W[64];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ W[i] = get_unaligned_be32(&in[i * sizeof(__be32)]);
+ for (; i < ARRAY_SIZE(W); i++)
+ W[i] = sigma256_1(W[i - 2]) + W[i - 7] +
+ sigma256_0(W[i - 15]) + W[i - 16];
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(W); i++) {
+ u32 T1 = h + Sigma256_1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) +
+ sha256_round_constants[i] + W[i];
+ u32 T2 = Sigma256_0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+
+ h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1;
+ d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2;
+ }
+ H[0] += a; H[1] += b; H[2] += c; H[3] += d;
+ H[4] += e; H[5] += f; H[6] += g; H[7] += h;
+ } while ((in += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) != &msg[msglen]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(H); i++)
+ put_unaligned_be32(H[i], &out[i * sizeof(__be32)]);
+ free(msg);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+static void test_sha2(void)
+{
+ unsigned long num_tests = NUM_ALG_TEST_ITERATIONS;
+
+ while (num_tests--) {
+ u8 in[4096];
+ u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ u8 ref_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ const size_t inlen = rand() % (1 + sizeof(in));
+
+ rand_bytes(in, inlen);
+
+ sha256(in, inlen, digest);
+ SHA256(in, inlen, ref_digest);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(digest, ref_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) == 0);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_ALG_TESTS */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * AES encryption modes *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+static void aes_256_xts_crypt(const u8 key[2 * AES_256_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const u8 *src,
+ u8 *dst, size_t nbytes, bool decrypting)
+{
+ struct aes_key tweak_key, cipher_key;
+ ble128 t;
+ size_t i;
+
+ ASSERT(nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+ aes_setkey(&cipher_key, key, AES_256_KEY_SIZE);
+ aes_setkey(&tweak_key, &key[AES_256_KEY_SIZE], AES_256_KEY_SIZE);
+ aes_encrypt(&tweak_key, iv, (u8 *)&t);
+ for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ xor(&dst[i], &src[i], (const u8 *)&t, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (decrypting)
+ aes_decrypt(&cipher_key, &dst[i], &dst[i]);
+ else
+ aes_encrypt(&cipher_key, &dst[i], &dst[i]);
+ xor(&dst[i], &dst[i], (const u8 *)&t, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ gf2_128_mul_x(&t);
+ }
+}
+
+static void aes_256_xts_encrypt(const u8 key[2 * AES_256_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const u8 *src,
+ u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ aes_256_xts_crypt(key, iv, src, dst, nbytes, false);
+}
+
+static void aes_256_xts_decrypt(const u8 key[2 * AES_256_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const u8 *src,
+ u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ aes_256_xts_crypt(key, iv, src, dst, nbytes, true);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+static void test_aes_256_xts(void)
+{
+ unsigned long num_tests = NUM_ALG_TEST_ITERATIONS;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+
+ ASSERT(ctx != NULL);
+ while (num_tests--) {
+ u8 key[2 * AES_256_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 ptext[512];
+ u8 actual_ctext[sizeof(ptext)];
+ u8 expected_ctext[sizeof(ptext)];
+ u8 decrypted[sizeof(ptext)];
+ const size_t datalen = ROUND_DOWN(rand() % (1 + sizeof(ptext)),
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ int outl;
+
+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
+ rand_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ rand_bytes(ptext, datalen);
+
+ aes_256_xts_encrypt(key, iv, ptext, actual_ctext, datalen);
+ ASSERT(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_xts(),
+ NULL, key, iv) > 0);
+ ASSERT(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, expected_ctext, &outl,
+ ptext, datalen) > 0);
+ ASSERT(outl == datalen);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(actual_ctext, expected_ctext, datalen) == 0);
+
+ aes_256_xts_decrypt(key, iv, actual_ctext, decrypted, datalen);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(ptext, decrypted, datalen) == 0);
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_ALG_TESTS */
+
+static void aes_cbc_encrypt(const struct aes_key *k,
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ ASSERT(nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ xor(&dst[i], &src[i], (i == 0 ? iv : &dst[i - AES_BLOCK_SIZE]),
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ aes_encrypt(k, &dst[i], &dst[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+static void aes_cbc_decrypt(const struct aes_key *k,
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ size_t i = nbytes;
+
+ ASSERT(i % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+ while (i) {
+ i -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ aes_decrypt(k, &src[i], &dst[i]);
+ xor(&dst[i], &dst[i], (i == 0 ? iv : &src[i - AES_BLOCK_SIZE]),
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+}
+
+static void aes_cts_cbc_encrypt(const u8 *key, int keysize,
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ const size_t offset = ROUND_DOWN(nbytes - 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ const size_t final_bsize = nbytes - offset;
+ struct aes_key k;
+ u8 *pad;
+ u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ ASSERT(nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ aes_setkey(&k, key, keysize);
+
+ if (nbytes == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ return aes_cbc_encrypt(&k, iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+
+ aes_cbc_encrypt(&k, iv, src, dst, offset);
+ pad = &dst[offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ memcpy(buf, pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ xor(buf, buf, &src[offset], final_bsize);
+ memcpy(&dst[offset], pad, final_bsize);
+ aes_encrypt(&k, buf, pad);
+}
+
+static void aes_cts_cbc_decrypt(const u8 *key, int keysize,
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ const size_t offset = ROUND_DOWN(nbytes - 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ const size_t final_bsize = nbytes - offset;
+ struct aes_key k;
+ u8 *pad;
+
+ ASSERT(nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ aes_setkey(&k, key, keysize);
+
+ if (nbytes == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ return aes_cbc_decrypt(&k, iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+
+ pad = &dst[offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ aes_decrypt(&k, &src[offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE], pad);
+ xor(&dst[offset], &src[offset], pad, final_bsize);
+ xor(pad, pad, &dst[offset], final_bsize);
+
+ aes_cbc_decrypt(&k, (offset == AES_BLOCK_SIZE ?
+ iv : &src[offset - 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]),
+ pad, pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ aes_cbc_decrypt(&k, iv, src, dst, offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void aes_256_cts_cbc_encrypt(const u8 key[AES_256_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ aes_cts_cbc_encrypt(key, AES_256_KEY_SIZE, iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+}
+
+static void aes_256_cts_cbc_decrypt(const u8 key[AES_256_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ aes_cts_cbc_decrypt(key, AES_256_KEY_SIZE, iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+#include <openssl/modes.h>
+static void aes_block128_f(const unsigned char in[16],
+ unsigned char out[16], const void *key)
+{
+ aes_encrypt(key, in, out);
+}
+
+static void test_aes_256_cts_cbc(void)
+{
+ unsigned long num_tests = NUM_ALG_TEST_ITERATIONS;
+
+ while (num_tests--) {
+ u8 key[AES_256_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 iv_copy[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 ptext[512];
+ u8 actual_ctext[sizeof(ptext)];
+ u8 expected_ctext[sizeof(ptext)];
+ u8 decrypted[sizeof(ptext)];
+ const size_t datalen = 16 + (rand() % (sizeof(ptext) - 15));
+ struct aes_key k;
+
+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
+ rand_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ rand_bytes(ptext, datalen);
+
+ aes_256_cts_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, ptext, actual_ctext, datalen);
+
+ /* OpenSSL doesn't allow datalen=AES_BLOCK_SIZE; Linux does */
+ if (datalen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ aes_setkey(&k, key, sizeof(key));
+ memcpy(iv_copy, iv, sizeof(iv));
+ ASSERT(CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(ptext,
+ expected_ctext,
+ datalen, &k, iv_copy,
+ aes_block128_f)
+ == datalen);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(actual_ctext, expected_ctext,
+ datalen) == 0);
+ }
+ aes_256_cts_cbc_decrypt(key, iv, actual_ctext, decrypted,
+ datalen);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(ptext, decrypted, datalen) == 0);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_ALG_TESTS */
+
+static void essiv_generate_iv(const u8 orig_key[AES_128_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 orig_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ u8 real_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+ u8 essiv_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct aes_key essiv;
+
+ /* AES encrypt the original IV using a hash of the original key */
+ STATIC_ASSERT(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE == AES_256_KEY_SIZE);
+ sha256(orig_key, AES_128_KEY_SIZE, essiv_key);
+ aes_setkey(&essiv, essiv_key, AES_256_KEY_SIZE);
+ aes_encrypt(&essiv, orig_iv, real_iv);
+}
+
+static void aes_128_cbc_essiv_encrypt(const u8 key[AES_128_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ struct aes_key k;
+ u8 real_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ aes_setkey(&k, key, AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ essiv_generate_iv(key, iv, real_iv);
+ aes_cbc_encrypt(&k, real_iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+}
+
+static void aes_128_cbc_essiv_decrypt(const u8 key[AES_128_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ struct aes_key k;
+ u8 real_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ aes_setkey(&k, key, AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ essiv_generate_iv(key, iv, real_iv);
+ aes_cbc_decrypt(&k, real_iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+}
+
+static void aes_128_cts_cbc_encrypt(const u8 key[AES_128_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ aes_cts_cbc_encrypt(key, AES_128_KEY_SIZE, iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+}
+
+static void aes_128_cts_cbc_decrypt(const u8 key[AES_128_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ aes_cts_cbc_decrypt(key, AES_128_KEY_SIZE, iv, src, dst, nbytes);
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * XChaCha12 stream cipher *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ * - "XChaCha: eXtended-nonce ChaCha and AEAD_XChaCha20_Poly1305"
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-arciszewski-xchacha-03
+ *
+ * - "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"
+ * https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
+ *
+ * - "Extending the Salsa20 nonce"
+ * https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf
+ */
+
+#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define XCHACHA_KEY_SIZE CHACHA_KEY_SIZE
+#define XCHACHA_NONCE_SIZE 24
+
+static void chacha_init_state(u32 state[16], const u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[16])
+{
+ static const u8 consts[16] = "expand 32-byte k";
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&consts[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ state[4 + i] = get_unaligned_le32(&key[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ state[12 + i] = get_unaligned_le32(&iv[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+}
+
+#define CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(a, b, c, d) \
+ do { \
+ a += b; d = rol32(d ^ a, 16); \
+ c += d; b = rol32(b ^ c, 12); \
+ a += b; d = rol32(d ^ a, 8); \
+ c += d; b = rol32(b ^ c, 7); \
+ } while (0)
+
+static void chacha_permute(u32 x[16], int nrounds)
+{
+ do {
+ /* column round */
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[0], x[4], x[8], x[12]);
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[1], x[5], x[9], x[13]);
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[2], x[6], x[10], x[14]);
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[3], x[7], x[11], x[15]);
+
+ /* diagonal round */
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[0], x[5], x[10], x[15]);
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[1], x[6], x[11], x[12]);
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[2], x[7], x[8], x[13]);
+ CHACHA_QUARTERROUND(x[3], x[4], x[9], x[14]);
+ } while ((nrounds -= 2) != 0);
+}
+
+static void xchacha(const u8 key[XCHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 nonce[XCHACHA_NONCE_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes, int nrounds)
+{
+ u32 state[16];
+ u8 real_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 real_iv[16] = { 0 };
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ /* Compute real key using original key and first 128 nonce bits */
+ chacha_init_state(state, key, nonce);
+ chacha_permute(state, nrounds);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) /* state words 0..3, 12..15 */
+ put_unaligned_le32(state[(i < 4 ? 0 : 8) + i],
+ &real_key[i * sizeof(__le32)]);
+
+ /* Now do regular ChaCha, using real key and remaining nonce bits */
+ memcpy(&real_iv[8], nonce + 16, 8);
+ chacha_init_state(state, real_key, real_iv);
+ for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i += 64) {
+ u32 x[16];
+ __le32 keystream[16];
+
+ memcpy(x, state, 64);
+ chacha_permute(x, nrounds);
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+ keystream[j] = cpu_to_le32(x[j] + state[j]);
+ xor(&dst[i], &src[i], (u8 *)keystream, MIN(nbytes - i, 64));
+ if (++state[12] == 0)
+ state[13]++;
+ }
+}
+
+static void xchacha12(const u8 key[XCHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 nonce[XCHACHA_NONCE_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ xchacha(key, nonce, src, dst, nbytes, 12);
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * Poly1305 *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/*
+ * Note: this is only the Poly1305 ε-almost-∆-universal hash function, not the
+ * full Poly1305 MAC. I.e., it doesn't add anything at the end.
+ */
+
+#define POLY1305_KEY_SIZE 16
+#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+static void poly1305(const u8 key[POLY1305_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 *msg, size_t msglen, le128 *out)
+{
+ const u32 limb_mask = 0x3ffffff; /* limbs are base 2^26 */
+ const u64 r0 = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff;
+ const u64 r1 = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03;
+ const u64 r2 = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff;
+ const u64 r3 = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff;
+ const u64 r4 = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff;
+ u32 h0 = 0, h1 = 0, h2 = 0, h3 = 0, h4 = 0;
+ u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, ge_p_mask;
+
+ /* Partial block support is not necessary for Adiantum */
+ ASSERT(msglen % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+
+ while (msglen) {
+ u64 d0, d1, d2, d3, d4;
+
+ /* h += *msg */
+ h0 += (get_unaligned_le32(msg + 0) >> 0) & limb_mask;
+ h1 += (get_unaligned_le32(msg + 3) >> 2) & limb_mask;
+ h2 += (get_unaligned_le32(msg + 6) >> 4) & limb_mask;
+ h3 += (get_unaligned_le32(msg + 9) >> 6) & limb_mask;
+ h4 += (get_unaligned_le32(msg + 12) >> 8) | (1 << 24);
+
+ /* h *= r */
+ d0 = h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1;
+ d1 = h0*r1 + h1*r0 + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2;
+ d2 = h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h2*r0 + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3;
+ d3 = h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h2*r1 + h3*r0 + h4*5*r4;
+ d4 = h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h2*r2 + h3*r1 + h4*r0;
+
+ /* (partial) h %= 2^130 - 5 */
+ d1 += d0 >> 26; h0 = d0 & limb_mask;
+ d2 += d1 >> 26; h1 = d1 & limb_mask;
+ d3 += d2 >> 26; h2 = d2 & limb_mask;
+ d4 += d3 >> 26; h3 = d3 & limb_mask;
+ h0 += (d4 >> 26) * 5; h4 = d4 & limb_mask;
+ h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 &= limb_mask;
+
+ msg += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ msglen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* fully carry h */
+ h2 += (h1 >> 26); h1 &= limb_mask;
+ h3 += (h2 >> 26); h2 &= limb_mask;
+ h4 += (h3 >> 26); h3 &= limb_mask;
+ h0 += (h4 >> 26) * 5; h4 &= limb_mask;
+ h1 += (h0 >> 26); h0 &= limb_mask;
+
+ /* if (h >= 2^130 - 5) h -= 2^130 - 5; */
+ g0 = h0 + 5;
+ g1 = h1 + (g0 >> 26); g0 &= limb_mask;
+ g2 = h2 + (g1 >> 26); g1 &= limb_mask;
+ g3 = h3 + (g2 >> 26); g2 &= limb_mask;
+ g4 = h4 + (g3 >> 26); g3 &= limb_mask;
+ ge_p_mask = ~((g4 >> 26) - 1); /* all 1's if h >= 2^130 - 5, else 0 */
+ h0 = (h0 & ~ge_p_mask) | (g0 & ge_p_mask);
+ h1 = (h1 & ~ge_p_mask) | (g1 & ge_p_mask);
+ h2 = (h2 & ~ge_p_mask) | (g2 & ge_p_mask);
+ h3 = (h3 & ~ge_p_mask) | (g3 & ge_p_mask);
+ h4 = (h4 & ~ge_p_mask) | (g4 & ge_p_mask & limb_mask);
+
+ /* h %= 2^128 */
+ out->lo = cpu_to_le64(((u64)h2 << 52) | ((u64)h1 << 26) | h0);
+ out->hi = cpu_to_le64(((u64)h4 << 40) | ((u64)h3 << 14) | (h2 >> 12));
+}
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * Adiantum encryption mode *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/*
+ * Reference: "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
+ * https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/7360
+ */
+
+#define ADIANTUM_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE 32
+#define ADIANTUM_HASH_KEY_SIZE ((2 * POLY1305_KEY_SIZE) + NH_KEY_SIZE)
+
+#define NH_KEY_SIZE 1072
+#define NH_KEY_WORDS (NH_KEY_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
+#define NH_BLOCK_SIZE 1024
+#define NH_HASH_SIZE 32
+#define NH_MESSAGE_UNIT 16
+
+static u64 nh_pass(const u32 *key, const u8 *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+ u64 sum = 0;
+
+ ASSERT(msglen % NH_MESSAGE_UNIT == 0);
+ while (msglen) {
+ sum += (u64)(u32)(get_unaligned_le32(msg + 0) + key[0]) *
+ (u32)(get_unaligned_le32(msg + 8) + key[2]);
+ sum += (u64)(u32)(get_unaligned_le32(msg + 4) + key[1]) *
+ (u32)(get_unaligned_le32(msg + 12) + key[3]);
+ key += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT / sizeof(key[0]);
+ msg += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT;
+ msglen -= NH_MESSAGE_UNIT;
+ }
+ return sum;
+}
+
+/* NH ε-almost-universal hash function */
+static void nh(const u32 *key, const u8 *msg, size_t msglen,
+ u8 result[NH_HASH_SIZE])
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NH_HASH_SIZE; i += sizeof(__le64)) {
+ put_unaligned_le64(nh_pass(key, msg, msglen), &result[i]);
+ key += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT / sizeof(key[0]);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Adiantum's ε-almost-∆-universal hash function */
+static void adiantum_hash(const u8 key[ADIANTUM_HASH_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE],
+ const u8 *msg, size_t msglen, le128 *result)
+{
+ const u8 *header_poly_key = key;
+ const u8 *msg_poly_key = header_poly_key + POLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
+ const u8 *nh_key = msg_poly_key + POLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
+ u32 nh_key_words[NH_KEY_WORDS];
+ u8 header[ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ const size_t num_nh_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(msglen, NH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ u8 *nh_hashes = xmalloc(num_nh_blocks * NH_HASH_SIZE);
+ const size_t padded_msglen = ROUND_UP(msglen, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT);
+ u8 *padded_msg = xmalloc(padded_msglen);
+ le128 hash1, hash2;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NH_KEY_WORDS; i++)
+ nh_key_words[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&nh_key[i * sizeof(u32)]);
+
+ /* Hash tweak and message length with first Poly1305 key */
+ put_unaligned_le64((u64)msglen * 8, header);
+ put_unaligned_le64(0, &header[sizeof(__le64)]);
+ memcpy(&header[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE], iv, ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE);
+ poly1305(header_poly_key, header, sizeof(header), &hash1);
+
+ /* Hash NH hashes of message blocks using second Poly1305 key */
+ /* (using a super naive way of handling the padding) */
+ memcpy(padded_msg, msg, msglen);
+ memset(&padded_msg[msglen], 0, padded_msglen - msglen);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_nh_blocks; i++) {
+ nh(nh_key_words, &padded_msg[i * NH_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ MIN(NH_BLOCK_SIZE, padded_msglen - (i * NH_BLOCK_SIZE)),
+ &nh_hashes[i * NH_HASH_SIZE]);
+ }
+ poly1305(msg_poly_key, nh_hashes, num_nh_blocks * NH_HASH_SIZE, &hash2);
+
+ /* Add the two hashes together to get the final hash */
+ le128_add(result, &hash1, &hash2);
+
+ free(nh_hashes);
+ free(padded_msg);
+}
+
+static void adiantum_crypt(const u8 key[ADIANTUM_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE], const u8 *src,
+ u8 *dst, size_t nbytes, bool decrypting)
+{
+ u8 subkeys[AES_256_KEY_SIZE + ADIANTUM_HASH_KEY_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ struct aes_key aes_key;
+ union {
+ u8 nonce[XCHACHA_NONCE_SIZE];
+ le128 block;
+ } u = { .nonce = { 1 } };
+ const size_t bulk_len = nbytes - sizeof(u.block);
+ le128 hash;
+
+ ASSERT(nbytes >= sizeof(u.block));
+
+ /* Derive subkeys */
+ xchacha12(key, u.nonce, subkeys, subkeys, sizeof(subkeys));
+ aes_setkey(&aes_key, subkeys, AES_256_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ /* Hash left part and add to right part */
+ adiantum_hash(&subkeys[AES_256_KEY_SIZE], iv, src, bulk_len, &hash);
+ memcpy(&u.block, &src[bulk_len], sizeof(u.block));
+ le128_add(&u.block, &u.block, &hash);
+
+ if (!decrypting) /* Encrypt right part with block cipher */
+ aes_encrypt(&aes_key, u.nonce, u.nonce);
+
+ /* Encrypt left part with stream cipher, using the computed nonce */
+ u.nonce[sizeof(u.block)] = 1;
+ xchacha12(key, u.nonce, src, dst, bulk_len);
+
+ if (decrypting) /* Decrypt right part with block cipher */
+ aes_decrypt(&aes_key, u.nonce, u.nonce);
+
+ /* Finalize right part by subtracting hash of left part */
+ adiantum_hash(&subkeys[AES_256_KEY_SIZE], iv, dst, bulk_len, &hash);
+ le128_sub(&u.block, &u.block, &hash);
+ memcpy(&dst[bulk_len], &u.block, sizeof(u.block));
+}
+
+static void adiantum_encrypt(const u8 key[ADIANTUM_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ adiantum_crypt(key, iv, src, dst, nbytes, false);
+}
+
+static void adiantum_decrypt(const u8 key[ADIANTUM_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 iv[ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE],
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ adiantum_crypt(key, iv, src, dst, nbytes, true);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+#include <linux/if_alg.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#define SOL_ALG 279
+static void af_alg_crypt(int algfd, int op, const u8 *key, size_t keylen,
+ const u8 *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t datalen)
+{
+ size_t controllen = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int)) +
+ CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct af_alg_iv) + ivlen);
+ u8 *control = xmalloc(controllen);
+ struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = (u8 *)src, .iov_len = datalen };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_iov = &iov,
+ .msg_iovlen = 1,
+ .msg_control = control,
+ .msg_controllen = controllen,
+ };
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ struct af_alg_iv *algiv;
+ int reqfd;
+
+ memset(control, 0, controllen);
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
+ *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = op;
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct af_alg_iv) + ivlen);
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_IV;
+ algiv = (struct af_alg_iv *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+ algiv->ivlen = ivlen;
+ memcpy(algiv->iv, iv, ivlen);
+
+ if (setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, keylen) != 0)
+ die_errno("can't set key on AF_ALG socket");
+
+ reqfd = accept(algfd, NULL, NULL);
+ if (reqfd < 0)
+ die_errno("can't accept() AF_ALG socket");
+ if (sendmsg(reqfd, &msg, 0) != datalen)
+ die_errno("can't sendmsg() AF_ALG request socket");
+ if (xread(reqfd, dst, datalen) != datalen)
+ die("short read from AF_ALG request socket");
+ close(reqfd);
+
+ free(control);
+}
+
+static void test_adiantum(void)
+{
+ int algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+ struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
+ .salg_type = "skcipher",
+ .salg_name = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
+ };
+ unsigned long num_tests = NUM_ALG_TEST_ITERATIONS;
+
+ if (algfd < 0)
+ die_errno("can't create AF_ALG socket");
+ if (bind(algfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
+ die_errno("can't bind AF_ALG socket to Adiantum algorithm");
+
+ while (num_tests--) {
+ u8 key[ADIANTUM_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 iv[ADIANTUM_IV_SIZE];
+ u8 ptext[4096];
+ u8 actual_ctext[sizeof(ptext)];
+ u8 expected_ctext[sizeof(ptext)];
+ u8 decrypted[sizeof(ptext)];
+ const size_t datalen = 16 + (rand() % (sizeof(ptext) - 15));
+
+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
+ rand_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ rand_bytes(ptext, datalen);
+
+ adiantum_encrypt(key, iv, ptext, actual_ctext, datalen);
+ af_alg_crypt(algfd, ALG_OP_ENCRYPT, key, sizeof(key),
+ iv, sizeof(iv), ptext, expected_ctext, datalen);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(actual_ctext, expected_ctext, datalen) == 0);
+
+ adiantum_decrypt(key, iv, actual_ctext, decrypted, datalen);
+ ASSERT(memcmp(ptext, decrypted, datalen) == 0);
+ }
+ close(algfd);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_ALG_TESTS */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*
+ * Main program *
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+#define FILE_NONCE_SIZE 16
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
+
+static const struct fscrypt_cipher {
+ const char *name;
+ void (*encrypt)(const u8 *key, const u8 *iv, const u8 *src,
+ u8 *dst, size_t nbytes);
+ void (*decrypt)(const u8 *key, const u8 *iv, const u8 *src,
+ u8 *dst, size_t nbytes);
+ int keysize;
+ int min_input_size;
+} fscrypt_ciphers[] = {
+ {
+ .name = "AES-256-XTS",
+ .encrypt = aes_256_xts_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = aes_256_xts_decrypt,
+ .keysize = 2 * AES_256_KEY_SIZE,
+ .min_input_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ }, {
+ .name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
+ .encrypt = aes_256_cts_cbc_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = aes_256_cts_cbc_decrypt,
+ .keysize = AES_256_KEY_SIZE,
+ .min_input_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ }, {
+ .name = "AES-128-CBC-ESSIV",
+ .encrypt = aes_128_cbc_essiv_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = aes_128_cbc_essiv_decrypt,
+ .keysize = AES_128_KEY_SIZE,
+ .min_input_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ }, {
+ .name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
+ .encrypt = aes_128_cts_cbc_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = aes_128_cts_cbc_decrypt,
+ .keysize = AES_128_KEY_SIZE,
+ .min_input_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ }, {
+ .name = "Adiantum",
+ .encrypt = adiantum_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = adiantum_decrypt,
+ .keysize = ADIANTUM_KEY_SIZE,
+ .min_input_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ }
+};
+
+static const struct fscrypt_cipher *find_fscrypt_cipher(const char *name)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fscrypt_ciphers); i++) {
+ if (strcmp(fscrypt_ciphers[i].name, name) == 0)
+ return &fscrypt_ciphers[i];
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct fscrypt_iv {
+ union {
+ __le64 block_num;
+ u8 bytes[32];
+ };
+};
+
+static void crypt_loop(const struct fscrypt_cipher *cipher, const u8 *key,
+ struct fscrypt_iv *iv, bool decrypting,
+ size_t block_size, size_t padding)
+{
+ u8 *buf = xmalloc(block_size);
+ size_t res;
+
+ while ((res = xread(STDIN_FILENO, buf, block_size)) > 0) {
+ size_t crypt_len = block_size;
+
+ if (padding > 0)
+ crypt_len = MIN(ROUND_UP(res, padding), crypt_len);
+
+ crypt_len = MAX(crypt_len, cipher->min_input_size);
+
+ memset(&buf[res], 0, crypt_len - res);
+
+ if (decrypting)
+ cipher->decrypt(key, iv->bytes, buf, buf, crypt_len);
+ else
+ cipher->encrypt(key, iv->bytes, buf, buf, crypt_len);
+
+ full_write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, crypt_len);
+
+ iv->block_num = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(iv->block_num) + 1);
+ }
+ free(buf);
+}
+
+/* The supported key derivation functions */
+enum kdf_algorithm {
+ KDF_NONE,
+ KDF_AES_128_ECB,
+};
+
+static enum kdf_algorithm parse_kdf_algorithm(const char *arg)
+{
+ if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+ return KDF_NONE;
+ if (strcmp(arg, "AES-128-ECB") == 0)
+ return KDF_AES_128_ECB;
+ die("Unknown KDF: %s", arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the key and starting IV with which the encryption will actually be done.
+ * If a KDF was specified, a subkey is derived from the master key and file
+ * nonce. Otherwise, the master key is used directly.
+ */
+static void get_key_and_iv(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_key_size,
+ enum kdf_algorithm kdf,
+ const u8 nonce[FILE_NONCE_SIZE],
+ u8 *real_key, size_t real_key_size,
+ struct fscrypt_iv *iv)
+{
+ bool nonce_in_iv = false;
+ struct aes_key aes_key;
+ size_t i;
+
+ ASSERT(real_key_size <= master_key_size);
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof(*iv));
+
+ switch (kdf) {
+ case KDF_NONE:
+ memcpy(real_key, master_key, real_key_size);
+ nonce_in_iv = true;
+ break;
+ case KDF_AES_128_ECB:
+ if (nonce == NULL)
+ die("--file-nonce is required with --kdf=AES-128-ECB");
+ STATIC_ASSERT(FILE_NONCE_SIZE == AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ ASSERT(real_key_size % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
+ aes_setkey(&aes_key, nonce, AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ for (i = 0; i < real_key_size; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ aes_encrypt(&aes_key, &master_key[i], &real_key[i]);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ASSERT(0);
+ }
+
+ if (nonce_in_iv && nonce != NULL)
+ memcpy(&iv->bytes[8], nonce, FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
+}
+
+enum {
+ OPT_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ OPT_DECRYPT,
+ OPT_FILE_NONCE,
+ OPT_HELP,
+ OPT_KDF,
+ OPT_PADDING,
+};
+
+static const struct option longopts[] = {
+ { "block-size", required_argument, NULL, OPT_BLOCK_SIZE },
+ { "decrypt", no_argument, NULL, OPT_DECRYPT },
+ { "file-nonce", required_argument, NULL, OPT_FILE_NONCE },
+ { "help", no_argument, NULL, OPT_HELP },
+ { "kdf", required_argument, NULL, OPT_KDF },
+ { "padding", required_argument, NULL, OPT_PADDING },
+ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 },
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ size_t block_size = 4096;
+ bool decrypting = false;
+ u8 _file_nonce[FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
+ u8 *file_nonce = NULL;
+ enum kdf_algorithm kdf = KDF_NONE;
+ size_t padding = 0;
+ const struct fscrypt_cipher *cipher;
+ u8 master_key[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ int master_key_size;
+ u8 real_key[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ struct fscrypt_iv iv;
+ char *tmp;
+ int c;
+
+ aes_init();
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_ALG_TESTS
+ test_aes();
+ test_sha2();
+ test_aes_256_xts();
+ test_aes_256_cts_cbc();
+ test_adiantum();
+#endif
+
+ while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "", longopts, NULL)) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case OPT_BLOCK_SIZE:
+ block_size = strtoul(optarg, &tmp, 10);
+ if (block_size <= 0 || *tmp)
+ die("Invalid block size: %s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case OPT_DECRYPT:
+ decrypting = true;
+ break;
+ case OPT_FILE_NONCE:
+ if (hex2bin(optarg, _file_nonce, FILE_NONCE_SIZE) !=
+ FILE_NONCE_SIZE)
+ die("Invalid file nonce: %s", optarg);
+ file_nonce = _file_nonce;
+ break;
+ case OPT_HELP:
+ usage(stdout);
+ return 0;
+ case OPT_KDF:
+ kdf = parse_kdf_algorithm(optarg);
+ break;
+ case OPT_PADDING:
+ padding = strtoul(optarg, &tmp, 10);
+ if (padding <= 0 || *tmp || !is_power_of_2(padding) ||
+ padding > INT_MAX)
+ die("Invalid padding amount: %s", optarg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage(stderr);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if (argc != 2) {
+ usage(stderr);
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ cipher = find_fscrypt_cipher(argv[0]);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ die("Unknown cipher: %s", argv[0]);
+
+ if (block_size < cipher->min_input_size)
+ die("Block size of %zu bytes is too small for cipher %s",
+ block_size, cipher->name);
+
+ master_key_size = hex2bin(argv[1], master_key, MAX_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (master_key_size < 0)
+ die("Invalid master_key: %s", argv[1]);
+ if (master_key_size < cipher->keysize)
+ die("Master key is too short for cipher %s", cipher->name);
+
+ get_key_and_iv(master_key, master_key_size, kdf, file_nonce,
+ real_key, cipher->keysize, &iv);
+
+ crypt_loop(cipher, real_key, &iv, decrypting, block_size, padding);
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 01:41:46PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Hello,
>
> This series adds xfstests which verify that encrypted contents and
> filenames on ext4 and f2fs are actually correct, i.e. that the
> encryption uses the correct algorithms, keys, IVs, and padding amounts.
> The new tests work by creating encrypted files, unmounting the
> filesystem, reading the ciphertext from disk using dd and debugfs or
> dump.f2fs, and then comparing it against ciphertext computed
> independently by a new test program that implements the same algorithms.
>
> These tests are important because:
>
> - The whole point of file encryption is that the files are actually
> encrypted correctly on-disk. Except for generic/399, current xfstests
> only tests the filesystem semantics, not the actual encryption.
> generic/399 only tests for incompressibility of encrypted file
> contents using one particular encryption setting, which isn't much.
>
> - fscrypt now supports 4 main combinations of encryption settings,
> rather than 1 as it did originally. This may be doubled to 8 soon
> (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10908153/). We should test all
> settings. And without tests, even if the initial implementation is
> correct, breakage in one specific setting could go undetected.
>
> - Though Linux's crypto API has self-tests, these only test the
> algorithms themselves, not how they are used, e.g. by fscrypt.
>
> Patch 1 is a cleanup patch. Patches 2-4 add the common helpers for
> ciphertext verification tests. Patches 5-7 add the actual tests.
>
> These tests require e2fsprogs and f2fs-tools patches I recently sent out
> to fix printing encrypted filenames. So, this series might not be
> suitable for merging into mainline xfstests until those patches are
> applied. Regardless, comments are appreciated. The needed patches are:
>
> debugfs: avoid ambiguity when printing filenames (https://marc.info/?l=linux-ext4&m=155596495624232&w=2)
> f2fs-tools: improve filename printing (https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-f2fs/mailman/message/36648641/)
>
> This series can also be retrieved from git at
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git
> branch "ciphertext-verification".
>
> I also have patches on top of this series which verify the ciphertext
> produced from v2 encryption policies, which are proposed by my kernel
> patch series "fscrypt: key management improvements"
> (https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/10908107/). v2 encryption policies
> will use a different key derivation function, and thus their ciphertext
> will be different. These additional patches can be found at branch
> "fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements" of my git repo above. But I've arranged
> things such that this shorter series can potentially be applied earlier,
> to test what's in the kernel now.
>
> Eric Biggers (7):
> common/encrypt: introduce helpers for set_encpolicy and get_encpolicy
> fscrypt-crypt-util: add utility for reproducing fscrypt encrypted data
> common/encrypt: support requiring other encryption settings
> common/encrypt: add helper for ciphertext verification tests
> generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with AES-256
> generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with AES-128
> generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with Adiantum
>
> .gitignore | 1 +
> common/encrypt | 482 ++++++++++-
> src/Makefile | 3 +-
> src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c | 1645 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tests/ext4/024 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/395 | 28 +-
> tests/generic/395.out | 2 +-
> tests/generic/396 | 15 +-
> tests/generic/397 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/398 | 5 +-
> tests/generic/399 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/419 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/421 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/429 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/435 | 3 +-
> tests/generic/440 | 5 +-
> tests/generic/700 | 41 +
> tests/generic/700.out | 5 +
> tests/generic/701 | 41 +
> tests/generic/701.out | 5 +
> tests/generic/702 | 43 +
> tests/generic/702.out | 10 +
> tests/generic/group | 3 +
> 23 files changed, 2308 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c
> create mode 100755 tests/generic/700
> create mode 100644 tests/generic/700.out
> create mode 100755 tests/generic/701
> create mode 100644 tests/generic/701.out
> create mode 100755 tests/generic/702
> create mode 100644 tests/generic/702.out
>
> --
> 2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
>
Any comments on this?
FYI, the e2fsprogs patch that these tests need was applied.
I'm still waiting for the f2fs-tools patch.
- Eric
On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 01:41:47PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
>
> For conciseness in tests, add helper functions that wrap the xfs_io
> commands 'set_encpolicy' and 'get_encpolicy'. Then update all
> encryption tests to use them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
> ---
> common/encrypt | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> tests/ext4/024 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/395 | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
> tests/generic/395.out | 2 +-
> tests/generic/396 | 15 +++++++--------
> tests/generic/397 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/398 | 5 ++---
> tests/generic/399 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/419 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/421 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/429 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/435 | 3 +--
> tests/generic/440 | 5 ++---
> 13 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/common/encrypt b/common/encrypt
> index 1b10aa71..54d873fa 100644
> --- a/common/encrypt
> +++ b/common/encrypt
> @@ -38,8 +38,7 @@ _require_scratch_encryption()
> # presence of /sys/fs/ext4/features/encryption, but this is broken on
> # some older kernels and is ext4-specific anyway.)
> mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir
> - if $XFS_IO_PROG -c set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir \
> - 2>&1 >>$seqres.full | \
> + if _set_encpolicy $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir 2>&1 >>$seqres.full | \
> egrep -q 'Inappropriate ioctl for device|Operation not supported'
> then
> _notrun "kernel does not support $FSTYP encryption"
> @@ -175,3 +174,34 @@ _revoke_encryption_key()
> local keyid=$($KEYCTL_PROG search @s logon $FSTYP:$keydesc)
> $KEYCTL_PROG revoke $keyid >>$seqres.full
> }
> +
> +# Set an encryption policy on the specified directory.
> +_set_encpolicy()
> +{
> + local dir=$1
> + shift
> +
> + $XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy $*" "$dir"
> +}
> +
> +_user_do_set_encpolicy()
> +{
> + local dir=$1
> + shift
> +
> + _user_do "$XFS_IO_PROG -c \"set_encpolicy $*\" \"$dir\""
> +}
> +
> +_require_get_encpolicy()
> +{
> + _require_xfs_io_command "get_encpolicy"
> +}
This doesn't seem necessary to me, just calling
_require_xfs_io_command "get_encpolicy"
explicitly is fine to me.
Thanks,
Eryu
On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 08:57:22AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 01:41:46PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > This series adds xfstests which verify that encrypted contents and
> > filenames on ext4 and f2fs are actually correct, i.e. that the
> > encryption uses the correct algorithms, keys, IVs, and padding amounts.
> > The new tests work by creating encrypted files, unmounting the
> > filesystem, reading the ciphertext from disk using dd and debugfs or
> > dump.f2fs, and then comparing it against ciphertext computed
> > independently by a new test program that implements the same algorithms.
> >
> > These tests are important because:
> >
> > - The whole point of file encryption is that the files are actually
> > encrypted correctly on-disk. Except for generic/399, current xfstests
> > only tests the filesystem semantics, not the actual encryption.
> > generic/399 only tests for incompressibility of encrypted file
> > contents using one particular encryption setting, which isn't much.
> >
> > - fscrypt now supports 4 main combinations of encryption settings,
> > rather than 1 as it did originally. This may be doubled to 8 soon
> > (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10908153/). We should test all
> > settings. And without tests, even if the initial implementation is
> > correct, breakage in one specific setting could go undetected.
> >
> > - Though Linux's crypto API has self-tests, these only test the
> > algorithms themselves, not how they are used, e.g. by fscrypt.
> >
> > Patch 1 is a cleanup patch. Patches 2-4 add the common helpers for
> > ciphertext verification tests. Patches 5-7 add the actual tests.
> >
> > These tests require e2fsprogs and f2fs-tools patches I recently sent out
> > to fix printing encrypted filenames. So, this series might not be
> > suitable for merging into mainline xfstests until those patches are
> > applied. Regardless, comments are appreciated. The needed patches are:
> >
> > debugfs: avoid ambiguity when printing filenames (https://marc.info/?l=linux-ext4&m=155596495624232&w=2)
> > f2fs-tools: improve filename printing (https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-f2fs/mailman/message/36648641/)
> >
> > This series can also be retrieved from git at
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git
> > branch "ciphertext-verification".
> >
> > I also have patches on top of this series which verify the ciphertext
> > produced from v2 encryption policies, which are proposed by my kernel
> > patch series "fscrypt: key management improvements"
> > (https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/10908107/). v2 encryption policies
> > will use a different key derivation function, and thus their ciphertext
> > will be different. These additional patches can be found at branch
> > "fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements" of my git repo above. But I've arranged
> > things such that this shorter series can potentially be applied earlier,
> > to test what's in the kernel now.
> >
> > Eric Biggers (7):
> > common/encrypt: introduce helpers for set_encpolicy and get_encpolicy
> > fscrypt-crypt-util: add utility for reproducing fscrypt encrypted data
> > common/encrypt: support requiring other encryption settings
> > common/encrypt: add helper for ciphertext verification tests
> > generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with AES-256
> > generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with AES-128
> > generic: verify ciphertext of v1 encryption policies with Adiantum
> >
> > .gitignore | 1 +
> > common/encrypt | 482 ++++++++++-
> > src/Makefile | 3 +-
> > src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c | 1645 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > tests/ext4/024 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/395 | 28 +-
> > tests/generic/395.out | 2 +-
> > tests/generic/396 | 15 +-
> > tests/generic/397 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/398 | 5 +-
> > tests/generic/399 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/419 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/421 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/429 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/435 | 3 +-
> > tests/generic/440 | 5 +-
> > tests/generic/700 | 41 +
> > tests/generic/700.out | 5 +
> > tests/generic/701 | 41 +
> > tests/generic/701.out | 5 +
> > tests/generic/702 | 43 +
> > tests/generic/702.out | 10 +
> > tests/generic/group | 3 +
> > 23 files changed, 2308 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 src/fscrypt-crypt-util.c
> > create mode 100755 tests/generic/700
> > create mode 100644 tests/generic/700.out
> > create mode 100755 tests/generic/701
> > create mode 100644 tests/generic/701.out
> > create mode 100755 tests/generic/702
> > create mode 100644 tests/generic/702.out
> >
> > --
> > 2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog
> >
>
> Any comments on this?
Sorry for the late review, I went through the patches and they look fine
to me over all from fstests perspective, I replied a few minor issues to
individual patches.
It'd be great if ext4 and/or f2fs folks could help review the tests as
well.
Thanks,
Eryu
>
> FYI, the e2fsprogs patch that these tests need was applied.
>
> I'm still waiting for the f2fs-tools patch.
>
> - Eric