Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS. This patch
preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use
the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints
are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".
Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
---
policy/mcs | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
index af90ef2..5aedab8 100644
--- a/policy/mcs
+++ b/policy/mcs
@@ -102,6 +102,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
#
+# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
+# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
+# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+ (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetread ));
+
+#
# MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
#
On Wed, 2009-10-07 at 17:25 +0000, Paul Moore wrote:
> Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS. This patch
> preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use
> the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints
> are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".
It still needs the attribute declarations, along with interfaces for
each of them.
> Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
> ---
>
> policy/mcs | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> index af90ef2..5aedab8 100644
> --- a/policy/mcs
> +++ b/policy/mcs
> @@ -102,6 +102,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
> (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
>
> #
> +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> +#
> +
> +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
> +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
> +# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
> +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ));
> +
> +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
> +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
> +# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
> +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ));
> +
> +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
> +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
> +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
> +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +
> +#
> +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> +#
> +
> +# the peer/packet recv op
> +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetread ));
> +
> +#
> # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
> #
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> refpolicy mailing list
> refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
> http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
--
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
On Wednesday 07 October 2009 06:20:17 pm Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Wed, 2009-10-07 at 17:25 +0000, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS. This
> > patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts
> > them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby
> > h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".
>
> It still needs the attribute declarations, along with interfaces for
> each of them.
Ah yes, of course it does ...
> > Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
> > ---
> >
> > policy/mcs | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> > index af90ef2..5aedab8 100644
> > --- a/policy/mcs
> > +++ b/policy/mcs
> > @@ -102,6 +102,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
> > (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
> >
> > #
> > +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network interface which is acting
> > as the object +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as
> > the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation
> > because the +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which
> > is writing data +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in
> > this case
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +
> > +#
> > +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the peer/packet recv op
> > +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> > + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetread ));
> > +
> > +#
> > # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
> > #
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > refpolicy mailing list
> > refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
> > http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
>
--
paul moore
linux @ hp