2011-02-06 14:36:23

by sven.vermeulen

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] LVM uses systemwide semaphores for activities such as vgchange -ay

The LVM subsystem uses system-wide semaphores for various activities.

Although the system boots properly without these (apart from the AVC denials
of course), I would assume that they are here to ensure no corruption of any
kind happens in case of concurrent execution / race conditions.

As such, I rather enable it explicitly in the security policy.

Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <[email protected]>
---
policy/modules/system/lvm.te | 2 ++
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
index 74e38b4..5e8e5aa 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ allow lvm_t self:file rw_file_perms;
allow lvm_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
allow lvm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow lvm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow lvm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;

allow lvm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
allow lvm_t clvmd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ filetrans_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
files_etc_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
files_search_mnt(lvm_t)

+kernel_get_sysvipc_info(lvm_t)
kernel_read_system_state(lvm_t)
# Read system variables in /proc/sys
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(lvm_t)
--
1.7.3.4


2011-02-09 14:43:02

by cpebenito

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] LVM uses systemwide semaphores for activities such as vgchange -ay

On 2/6/2011 9:36 AM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> The LVM subsystem uses system-wide semaphores for various activities.
>
> Although the system boots properly without these (apart from the AVC denials
> of course), I would assume that they are here to ensure no corruption of any
> kind happens in case of concurrent execution / race conditions.
>
> As such, I rather enable it explicitly in the security policy.

Merged.

> Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen<[email protected]>
> ---
> policy/modules/system/lvm.te | 2 ++
> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> index 74e38b4..5e8e5aa 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ allow lvm_t self:file rw_file_perms;
> allow lvm_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
> allow lvm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
> allow lvm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
> +allow lvm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
>
> allow lvm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
> allow lvm_t clvmd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
> @@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ filetrans_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
> files_etc_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
> files_search_mnt(lvm_t)
>
> +kernel_get_sysvipc_info(lvm_t)
> kernel_read_system_state(lvm_t)
> # Read system variables in /proc/sys
> kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(lvm_t)


--
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
http://www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com