On Mon, 2015-06-01 at 16:05 +0200, Johannes Berg wrote:
> Ok - here the length is kinda passed a part of the AAD buffer, but this
> is really just some arcane code that should be fixed to use a proper
> struct. The value there, even though it is __be16 and looks like it came
> from the data, is actually created locally, see ccmp_special_blocks()
> and gcmp_special_blocks().
IOW, I think something like this would make sense:
(but I'll hold it until after Herbert's patches I guess)
>From 20bd0e92ab0d7ef545687da762228622bcdabeec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 16:33:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: move AAD length out of AAD buffer
The code currently passes the AAD buffer as a __be16 with the
length, followed by the actual data, but doesn't use a struct
or make this explicit in any other way, so it's confusing.
Change the code to pass the AAD length explicity outside of
the buffer.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
---
net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c | 18 +++++++-------
net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h | 14 ++++++-----
net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c | 10 ++++----
net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h | 6 +++--
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
index 208df7c0b6ea..b6e2f096127a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
- size_t mic_len)
+void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *mic, size_t mic_len)
{
struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
- sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_init_one(&assoc, aad, aad_len);
sg_init_table(ct, 2);
sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, mic_len);
@@ -45,9 +46,10 @@ void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
}
-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
- size_t mic_len)
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *mic, size_t mic_len)
{
struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
- sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_init_one(&assoc, aad, aad_len);
sg_init_table(ct, 2);
sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, mic_len);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
index 6a73d1e4d186..bfe355e4a680 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
@@ -15,12 +15,14 @@
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
size_t key_len,
size_t mic_len);
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
- size_t mic_len);
-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
- size_t mic_len);
+void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *mic, size_t mic_len);
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *mic, size_t mic_len);
void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
#endif /* AES_CCM_H */
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c
index fd278bbe1b0d..fb6823c5e381 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_gcm.h"
-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
- sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_init_one(&assoc, aad, aad_len);
sg_init_table(ct, 2);
sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN);
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
}
-int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
- sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_init_one(&assoc, aad, aad_len);
sg_init_table(ct, 2);
sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
index 1347fda6b76a..67ca10e3e7a4 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
@@ -11,9 +11,11 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
-int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0,
+ u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
size_t key_len);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 9d63d93c836e..b32c043b48b1 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
}
-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
+static u16 ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
@@ -352,22 +352,23 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
- put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
- put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
- memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+ put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)aad);
+ memcpy(&aad[2], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
- aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
- aad[23] = 0;
+ aad[20] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
+ aad[21] = 0;
if (a4_included) {
- memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
- aad[30] = qos_tid;
- aad[31] = 0;
+ memcpy(&aad[22], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
+ aad[28] = qos_tid;
+ aad[29] = 0;
} else {
- memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
- aad[24] = qos_tid;
+ memset(&aad[22], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
+ aad[22] = qos_tid;
}
+
+ return len_a;
}
@@ -407,6 +408,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
u64 pn64;
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t aad_len;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
@@ -460,8 +462,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+ aad_len = ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, aad_len, pos, len,
skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
return 0;
@@ -529,10 +531,10 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+ size_t aad_len = ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
- key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
+ key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, aad_len,
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - mic_len, mic_len))
@@ -550,7 +552,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
-static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
+static u16 gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
u8 qos_tid;
@@ -565,7 +567,6 @@ static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
*/
- put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
/* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
*/
@@ -576,12 +577,12 @@ static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
- put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
- memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+ put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)aad);
+ memcpy(&aad[2], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
- aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
- aad[23] = 0;
+ aad[20] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
+ aad[21] = 0;
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
@@ -590,13 +591,15 @@ static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
qos_tid = 0;
if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
- memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
- aad[30] = qos_tid;
- aad[31] = 0;
+ memcpy(&aad[22], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
+ aad[28] = qos_tid;
+ aad[29] = 0;
} else {
- memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
- aad[24] = qos_tid;
+ memset(&aad[22], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
+ aad[22] = qos_tid;
}
+
+ return ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2;
}
static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
@@ -632,6 +635,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
u64 pn64;
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t aad_len;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
@@ -686,8 +690,8 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
- gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
- ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
+ aad_len = gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
+ ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, aad_len, pos, len,
skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
return 0;
@@ -752,10 +756,10 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
- gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
+ size_t aad_len = gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
- key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
+ key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, aad_len,
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
--
2.1.4
On Mon, Jun 01, 2015 at 05:36:58PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Montag, 1. Juni 2015, 16:35:26 schrieb Johannes Berg:
> >IOW, I think something like this would make sense:
>
> That looks definitely cleaner :-)
Indeed.. That AAD length-in-the-buffer design came from the over ten
year old code that was optimized to cover the CCM construction with the
same buffer and that was not cleaned up when this was converted to use
cryptoapi couple of years ago.
> Though, my main concern was just to ensure that the aad length value is not
> zero.
It won't be in IEEE 802.11 use cases. The exact length depends on the
IEEE 802.11 frame type, but AAD is constructed in a way that it is
normally a bit over 20 octets while allowing CCM to fit the related
operations into two AES blocks.
--
Jouni Malinen PGP id EFC895FA
Am Montag, 1. Juni 2015, 16:35:26 schrieb Johannes Berg:
Hi Johannes,
>
>IOW, I think something like this would make sense:
>
That looks definitely cleaner :-)
Though, my main concern was just to ensure that the aad length value is not
zero.
Ciao
Stephan