Alexandre Chartre ([email protected])

Number of posts: 408 (0.21 per day)
First post: 2019-01-11 14:18:50
Last post: 2024-05-24 07:05:42

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2024-05-24 07:05:42 linux-kernel [PATCH v2] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-05-23 18:32:57 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-05-23 18:29:53 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-05-23 17:06:48 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-05-23 14:53:30 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-05-23 13:03:07 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-05-23 12:34:19 linux-kernel [PATCH] x86/bhi: BHI mitigation can trigger warning in #DB handler
2024-04-16 08:42:53 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-15 15:15:12 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 15:16:58 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 14:43:08 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 13:33:45 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 13:21:20 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 09:45:02 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 08:24:16 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 07:50:43 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-11 07:25:48 linux-kernel [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
2024-04-10 08:47:16 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Fix return type of spectre_bhi_state()
2024-03-29 15:34:49 linux-kernel [PATCH V2] objtool/x86: objtool can confuse memory and stack access
2024-03-29 15:08:07 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH] objtool/x86: objtool can confuse memory and stack access
2024-03-28 13:46:54 linux-kernel [PATCH] objtool/x86: objtool can confuse memory and stack access
2022-07-18 15:22:37 linux-kernel Re: Retbleed, Zen2 and STIBP
2022-07-13 21:04:02 linux-kernel [PATCH] x86/entry: Remove UNTRAIN_RET from native_irq_return_ldt
2022-07-12 18:37:18 linux-kernel UNTRAIN_RET in native_irq_return_ldt
2022-04-08 12:28:03 linux-kernel Re: [RFC PATCH 00/47] Address Space Isolation for KVM
2022-03-22 11:07:56 linux-kernel Re: [RFC PATCH 00/47] Address Space Isolation for KVM
2022-03-17 01:28:12 linux-kernel Re: [RFC PATCH 00/47] Address Space Isolation for KVM
2021-04-09 09:10:18 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH 2/2] arch/x86: arch/sparc: tools/perf: fix typos in comments
2021-04-09 09:08:56 linux-kernel Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/traps: call cond_local_irq_disable before returning from exc_general_protection and math_error
2021-03-19 11:25:08 linux-kernel Re: [for-stable-4.19 PATCH 1/2] vmlinux.lds.h: Create section for protection against instrumentation
2020-11-19 19:59:18 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-19 17:05:02 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-19 12:10:36 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-19 08:09:07 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-18 19:40:36 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-18 17:23:19 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-18 10:29:54 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-18 07:43:02 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-18 07:09:32 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-17 19:05:13 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-17 18:28:03 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-17 18:14:33 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-17 17:03:56 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-17 15:10:35 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-17 08:45:58 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 11/21] x86/pti: Extend PTI user mappings
2020-11-17 08:30:35 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack
2020-11-17 08:21:22 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-17 07:59:22 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
2020-11-17 03:23:44 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 11/21] x86/pti: Extend PTI user mappings
2020-11-17 01:54:10 linux-kernel [RFC][PATCH v2 16/21] x86/pti: Execute system vector handlers on the kernel stack
2020-11-16 21:33:49 linux-kernel Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack