This is the start of the review cycle for the Linux 3.13.11-ckt36 stable
kernel.
This version contains 138 new patches, summarized below. The new patches
are posted as replies to this message and also available in this git branch:
http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git/ubuntu/linux.git/log/?h=linux-3.13.y-review
git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/linux.git linux-3.13.y-review
The review period for version 3.13.11-ckt36 will be open for the next three
days. To report a problem, please reply to the relevant follow-up patch
message.
For more information about the Linux 3.13.y-ckt extended stable kernel
series, see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable .
-Kamal
--
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 +
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 23 ++
arch/arm/common/icst.c | 9 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +-
crypto/algif_hash.c | 4 +-
crypto/crypto_user.c | 6 +-
crypto/shash.c | 7 +-
drivers/ata/ahci.c | 20 ++
drivers/ata/libahci.c | 4 +-
drivers/ata/libata-sff.c | 32 +--
drivers/dma/dw/core.c | 15 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c | 20 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_i2c.c | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_ioctl.c | 3 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c | 5 +
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c | 2 +-
drivers/hwmon/ads1015.c | 2 +-
drivers/iio/dac/mcp4725.c | 1 +
drivers/iio/inkern.c | 2 +
drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c | 4 +-
drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 19 ++
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 9 +
drivers/iommu/dmar.c | 2 +-
drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c | 2 +-
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 8 +-
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda1004x.c | 9 +
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-alsa.c | 5 +-
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 39 +++-
drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c | 14 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c | 25 ++-
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c | 4 +-
drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 17 ++
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 2 +
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 34 ++-
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c | 4 +-
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.h | 1 -
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c | 2 -
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c | 10 +-
drivers/phy/phy-twl4030-usb.c | 1 +
drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipcutil.c | 2 +-
drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c | 23 +-
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c | 4 +-
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/tcm_qla2xxx.c | 16 ++
drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c | 1 +
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/android/binder.c | 2 +-
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 13 ++
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c | 8 +
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.c | 4 +-
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.h | 1 +
drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c | 6 +
drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c | 6 +
drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c | 4 +
drivers/target/target_core_device.c | 43 ++++
drivers/target/target_core_file.c | 29 +--
drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c | 56 ++---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 150 +++++++++----
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 289 ++++++++++++++++++--------
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tcm_fc.h | 1 +
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_cmd.c | 5 +
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_conf.c | 1 +
drivers/tty/pty.c | 21 +-
drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c | 8 +-
drivers/usb/gadget/tcm_usb_gadget.c | 6 +
drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 +-
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 10 -
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 4 +-
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 2 +
drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 9 +
drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 6 +
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 9 +-
fs/bio.c | 12 +-
fs/btrfs/backref.c | 10 +-
fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c | 3 +-
fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.h | 2 +-
fs/btrfs/inode.c | 14 +-
fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +-
fs/devpts/inode.c | 20 ++
fs/ext4/inode.c | 72 +++++--
fs/ext4/move_extent.c | 15 +-
fs/ext4/resize.c | 2 +-
fs/hpfs/namei.c | 31 +--
fs/namei.c | 4 +
fs/namespace.c | 1 +
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 4 +-
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c | 2 +
fs/pipe.c | 47 ++++-
include/asm-generic/cputime_nsecs.h | 5 +-
include/drm/drm_fixed.h | 53 ++++-
include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +-
include/linux/devpts_fs.h | 4 +
include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 +
include/linux/nfs_fs.h | 4 +-
include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h | 4 +
include/linux/radix-tree.h | 22 +-
include/linux/rmap.h | 14 --
include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 +
include/linux/tracepoint.h | 6 +
include/net/af_unix.h | 4 +-
include/net/scm.h | 1 +
include/sound/rawmidi.h | 4 +
include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h | 1 +
include/target/target_core_backend.h | 3 +
include/target/target_core_base.h | 4 +-
include/target/target_core_fabric.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h | 1 +
kernel/module.c | 26 ++-
kernel/resource.c | 5 +-
kernel/sysctl.c | 14 ++
kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 3 +-
kernel/workqueue.c | 18 +-
lib/dump_stack.c | 7 +-
lib/klist.c | 6 +-
lib/radix-tree.c | 12 +-
mm/backing-dev.c | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 56 +++--
mm/vmstat.c | 3 +-
net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 +-
net/core/scm.c | 7 +
net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 10 +
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +
net/ipv4/ping.c | 4 +-
net/ipv4/raw.c | 4 +-
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 13 +-
net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 +-
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 12 +-
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 3 +
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 5 +-
net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 16 +-
net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 3 +
net/mac80211/ibss.c | 1 -
net/mac80211/mesh.c | 11 -
net/mac80211/mesh.h | 4 -
net/mac80211/mlme.c | 2 -
net/mac80211/scan.c | 16 +-
net/rfkill/core.c | 16 +-
net/sctp/protocol.c | 47 ++++-
net/sctp/socket.c | 10 +-
net/sunrpc/cache.c | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 28 ++-
net/unix/diag.c | 2 +-
net/unix/garbage.c | 8 +-
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 +-
sound/core/hwdep.c | 3 +-
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 21 +-
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 169 ++++++++++-----
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 3 +
sound/core/seq/seq_fifo.c | 4 +-
sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c | 19 +-
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c | 240 +++++++++++----------
sound/core/seq/seq_prioq.c | 4 +-
sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 4 +-
sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c | 91 ++++++--
sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c | 23 +-
sound/core/timer.c | 72 +++++--
sound/drivers/dummy.c | 37 ++--
sound/pci/hda/patch_cirrus.c | 27 +++
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 3 +-
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 +
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c | 3 +-
sound/usb/midi.c | 1 -
virt/kvm/async_pf.c | 2 +-
169 files changed, 1815 insertions(+), 813 deletions(-)
Al Viro (1):
do_last(): don't let a bogus return value from ->open() et.al. to confuse us
Alex Leung (1):
target: Fix Task Aborted Status (TAS) handling
Alexandra Yates (1):
ahci: Intel DNV device IDs SATA
Amir Vadai (1):
net/mlx4_en: Count HW buffer overrun only once
Andreas Schwab (1):
powerpc: Fix dedotify for binutils >= 2.26
Andrey Konovalov (1):
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
Andrey Skvortsov (1):
USB: option: add support for SIM7100E
Andy Lutomirski (1):
x86/entry/compat: Add missing CLAC to entry_INT80_32
Andy Shevchenko (1):
dmaengine: dw: disable BLOCK IRQs for non-cyclic xfer
Anton Protopopov (2):
cifs: fix erroneous return value
rtnl: RTM_GETNETCONF: fix wrong return value
Arnd Bergmann (1):
tracing: Fix freak link error caused by branch tracer
Benjamin Coddington (1):
NFSv4: Fix a dentry leak on alias use
Bjørn Mork (2):
USB: option: add "4G LTE usb-modem U901"
qmi_wwan: add "4G LTE usb-modem U901"
CQ Tang (1):
iommu/vt-d: Fix 64-bit accesses to 32-bit DMAR_GSTS_REG
Christian Borntraeger (1):
KVM: async_pf: do not warn on page allocation failures
Christoph Hellwig (1):
nfs: fix nfs_size_to_loff_t
Dan Carpenter (2):
iio: inkern: fix a NULL dereference on error
intel_scu_ipcutil: underflow in scu_reg_access()
David Henningsson (1):
ALSA: hda - Fix static checker warning in patch_hdmi.c
David Sterba (1):
btrfs: properly set the termination value of ctx->pos in readdir
Dmitry V. Levin (1):
unix_diag: fix incorrect sign extension in unix_lookup_by_ino
Eliad Peller (1):
mac80211: start_next_roc only if scan was actually running
Eric Dumazet (5):
dump_stack: avoid potential deadlocks
tcp: fix NULL deref in tcp_v4_send_ack()
af_unix: fix struct pid memory leak
ipv6: fix a lockdep splat
ipv4: fix memory leaks in ip_cmsg_send() callers
Eric W. Biederman (1):
umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
Eryu Guan (1):
ext4: don't read blocks from disk after extents being swapped
Eugenia Emantayev (1):
net/mlx4_en: Choose time-stamping shift value according to HW frequency
Filipe Manana (1):
Btrfs: fix hang on extent buffer lock caused by the inode_paths ioctl
Gerd Hoffmann (1):
drm/qxl: use kmalloc_array to alloc reloc_info in qxl_process_single_command
Gerhard Uttenthaler (1):
can: ems_usb: Fix possible tx overflow
Guillaume Nault (1):
pppoe: fix reference counting in PPPoE proxy
Hangbin Liu (1):
net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit
Hannes Frederic Sowa (2):
pptp: fix illegal memory access caused by multiple bind()s
unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
Hannes Reinecke (2):
scsi_dh_rdac: always retry MODE SELECT on command lock violation
bio: return EINTR if copying to user space got interrupted
Hans Westgaard Ry (1):
net:Add sysctl_max_skb_frags
Hariprasad S (1):
iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
Harry Wentland (1):
drm: Add drm_fixp_from_fraction and drm_fixp2int_ceil
Herbert Xu (1):
crypto: shash - Fix has_key setting
Herton R. Krzesinski (2):
pty: fix possible use after free of tty->driver_data
pty: make sure super_block is still valid in final /dev/tty close
Ilya Dryomov (1):
libceph: don't bail early from try_read() when skipping a message
Insu Yun (1):
ext4: fix potential integer overflow
James Bottomley (1):
klist: fix starting point removed bug in klist iterators
Jan Kara (2):
ext4: fix bh->b_state corruption
ext4: fix crashes in dioread_nolock mode
Jani Nikula (1):
drm/i915/dp: fall back to 18 bpp when sink capability is unknown
Jay Vosburgh (1):
bonding: Fix ARP monitor validation
Johannes Berg (1):
rfkill: fix rfkill_fop_read wait_event usage
Ken Lin (1):
USB: cp210x: add IDs for GE B650V3 and B850V3 boards
Kent Overstreet (1):
bcache: Fix a lockdep splat in an error path
Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
drivers/scsi/sg.c: mark VMA as VM_IO to prevent migration
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk (3):
xen/pciback: Check PF instead of VF for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
xen/pciback: Save the number of MSI-X entries to be copied later.
xen/pcifront: Fix mysterious crashes when NUMA locality information was extracted.
Konstantin Khlebnikov (2):
mm: replace vma_lock_anon_vma with anon_vma_lock_read/write
radix-tree: fix oops after radix_tree_iter_retry
Linus Torvalds (1):
vmstat: explicitly schedule per-cpu work on the CPU we need it to run on
Linus Walleij (2):
ARM: 8517/1: ICST: avoid arithmetic overflow in icst_hz()
ARM: 8519/1: ICST: try other dividends than 1
Lisa Du (1):
drivers: android: correct the size of struct binder_uintptr_t for BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE
Lu Baolu (1):
usb: xhci: apply XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK to Intel Broxton-M platforms
Manfred Rudigier (1):
net: dp83640: Fix tx timestamp overflow handling.
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner (1):
sctp: allow setting SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY by the application
Mathias Krause (1):
crypto: user - lock crypto_alg_list on alg dump
Mathias Nyman (2):
Revert "xhci: don't finish a TD if we get a short-transfer event mid TD"
xhci: Fix list corruption in urb dequeue at host removal
Matthew Wilcox (1):
radix-tree: fix race in gang lookup
Mauro Carvalho Chehab (2):
[media] tda1004x: only update the frontend properties if locked
[media] saa7134-alsa: Only frees registered sound cards
Mika Westerberg (1):
SCSI: Add Marvell Console to VPD blacklist
Mike Christie (1):
target: Fix WRITE_SAME/DISCARD conversion to linux 512b sectors
Mike Krinkin (1):
KVM: x86: MMU: fix ubsan index-out-of-range warning
Mikulas Patocka (1):
hpfs: don't truncate the file when delete fails
Neil Horman (1):
sctp: Fix port hash table size computation
Nicholas Bellinger (6):
target: Add TFO->abort_task for aborted task resources release
target: Fix LUN_RESET active TMR descriptor handling
target: Fix LUN_RESET active I/O handling for ACK_KREF
target: Fix TAS handling for multi-session se_node_acls
target: Fix remote-port TMR ABORT + se_cmd fabric stop
target: Fix race with SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS handling
Nicolai Hähnle (1):
drm/radeon: hold reference to fences in radeon_sa_bo_new
Paolo Abeni (1):
ipv6/udp: use sticky pktinfo egress ifindex on connect()
Peter Hurley (1):
serial: omap: Prevent DoS using unprivileged ioctl(TIOCSRS485)
Peter Rosin (1):
hwmon: (ads1015) Handle negative conversion values correctly
Rainer Weikusat (2):
af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
af_unix: Don't set err in unix_stream_read_generic unless there was an error
Rasmus Villemoes (2):
drm/i915: fix error path in intel_setup_gmbus()
drm/radeon: use post-decrement in error handling
Rusty Russell (1):
module: wrapper for symbol name.
Ryan Ware (1):
EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
Sachin Kulkarni (1):
mac80211: Requeue work after scan complete for all VIF types.
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior (1):
PCI/AER: Flush workqueue on device remove to avoid use-after-free
Simon Guinot (1):
kernel/resource.c: fix muxed resource handling in __request_region()
Stefan Haberland (2):
s390/dasd: prevent incorrect length error under z/VM after PAV changes
s390/dasd: fix refcount for PAV reassignment
Stefan Hajnoczi (1):
sunrpc/cache: fix off-by-one in qword_get()
Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) (2):
tracepoints: Do not trace when cpu is offline
tracing: Fix showing function event in available_events
Takashi Iwai (19):
ALSA: seq: Fix race at closing in virmidi driver
ALSA: rawmidi: Remove kernel WARNING for NULL user-space buffer check
ALSA: pcm: Fix potential deadlock in OSS emulation
ALSA: seq: Fix yet another races among ALSA timer accesses
ALSA: timer: Fix link corruption due to double start or stop
ALSA: hda - Add fixup for Mac Mini 7,1 model
ALSA: Move EXPORT_SYMBOL() in appropriate places
ALSA: rawmidi: Make snd_rawmidi_transmit() race-free
ALSA: rawmidi: Fix race at copying & updating the position
ALSA: seq: Fix lockdep warnings due to double mutex locks
ALSA: timer: Fix leftover link at closing
ALSA: hda - Fix speaker output from VAIO AiO machines
ALSA: dummy: Implement timer backend switching more safely
ALSA: timer: Fix wrong instance passed to slave callbacks
ALSA: timer: Fix race between stop and interrupt
ALSA: timer: Fix race at concurrent reads
ALSA: seq: Drop superfluous error/debug messages after malloc failures
ALSA: seq: Fix leak of pool buffer at concurrent writes
ALSA: seq: Fix double port list deletion
Tejun Heo (4):
Revert "workqueue: make sure delayed work run in local cpu"
libata: disable forced PORTS_IMPL for >= AHCI 1.3
libata: fix sff host state machine locking while polling
workqueue: handle NUMA_NO_NODE for unbound pool_workqueue lookup
Tetsuo Handa (1):
mm, vmstat: fix wrong WQ sleep when memory reclaim doesn't make any progress
Tony Lindgren (1):
phy: twl4030-usb: Relase usb phy on unload
Ursula Braun (1):
af_iucv: Validate socket address length in iucv_sock_bind()
Vinod Koul (1):
ASoC: dpcm: fix the BE state on hw_free
Wang, Rui Y (1):
crypto: algif_hash - wait for crypto_ahash_init() to complete
Willy Tarreau (1):
pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
Xin Long (1):
sctp: translate network order to host order when users get a hmacid
Yong Li (1):
iio: dac: mcp4725: set iio name property in sysfs
xuejiufei (1):
ocfs2/dlm: clear refmap bit of recovery lock while doing local recovery cleanup
zengtao (1):
cputime: Prevent 32bit overflow in time[val|spec]_to_cputime()
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 176bed1de5bf977938cad26551969eca8f0883b1 upstream.
The vmstat code uses "schedule_delayed_work_on()" to do the initial
startup of the delayed work on the right CPU, but then once it was
started it would use the non-cpu-specific "schedule_delayed_work()" to
re-schedule it on that CPU.
That just happened to schedule it on the same CPU historically (well, in
almost all situations), but the code _requires_ this work to be per-cpu,
and should say so explicitly rather than depend on the non-cpu-specific
scheduling to schedule on the current CPU.
The timer code is being changed to not be as single-minded in always
running things on the calling CPU.
See also commit 874bbfe600a6 ("workqueue: make sure delayed work run in
local cpu") that for now maintains the local CPU guarantees just in case
there are other broken users that depended on the accidental behavior.
js: 3.12 backport
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: use queue_delayed_work_on() ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
mm/vmstat.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/vmstat.c b/mm/vmstat.c
index f143e1d..eb4bc96 100644
--- a/mm/vmstat.c
+++ b/mm/vmstat.c
@@ -1219,7 +1219,8 @@ int sysctl_stat_interval __read_mostly = HZ;
static void vmstat_update(struct work_struct *w)
{
refresh_cpu_vm_stats();
- queue_delayed_work(vmstat_wq, &__get_cpu_var(vmstat_work),
+ queue_delayed_work_on(smp_processor_id(), vmstat_wq,
+ &__get_cpu_var(vmstat_work),
round_jiffies_relative(sysctl_stat_interval));
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 041bd12e272c53a35c54c13875839bcb98c999ce upstream.
This reverts commit 874bbfe600a660cba9c776b3957b1ce393151b76.
Workqueue used to implicity guarantee that work items queued without
explicit CPU specified are put on the local CPU. Recent changes in
timer broke the guarantee and led to vmstat breakage which was fixed
by 176bed1de5bf ("vmstat: explicitly schedule per-cpu work on the CPU
we need it to run on").
vmstat is the most likely to expose the issue and it's quite possible
that there are other similar problems which are a lot more difficult
to trigger. As a preventive measure, 874bbfe600a6 ("workqueue: make
sure delayed work run in local cpu") was applied to restore the local
CPU guarnatee. Unfortunately, the change exposed a bug in timer code
which got fixed by 22b886dd1018 ("timers: Use proper base migration in
add_timer_on()"). Due to code restructuring, the commit couldn't be
backported beyond certain point and stable kernels which only had
874bbfe600a6 started crashing.
The local CPU guarantee was accidental more than anything else and we
want to get rid of it anyway. As, with the vmstat case fixed,
874bbfe600a6 is causing more problems than it's fixing, it has been
decided to take the chance and officially break the guarantee by
reverting the commit. A debug feature will be added to force foreign
CPU assignment to expose cases relying on the guarantee and fixes for
the individual cases will be backported to stable as necessary.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Fixes: 874bbfe600a6 ("workqueue: make sure delayed work run in local cpu")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/[email protected]
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Bilik <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Bilik <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
kernel/workqueue.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
index dcae810..eb1cc22 100644
--- a/kernel/workqueue.c
+++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
@@ -1475,13 +1475,13 @@ static void __queue_delayed_work(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq,
timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(&dwork->timer);
dwork->wq = wq;
- /* timer isn't guaranteed to run in this cpu, record earlier */
- if (cpu == WORK_CPU_UNBOUND)
- cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
dwork->cpu = cpu;
timer->expires = jiffies + delay;
- add_timer_on(timer, cpu);
+ if (unlikely(cpu != WORK_CPU_UNBOUND))
+ add_timer_on(timer, cpu);
+ else
+ add_timer(timer);
}
/**
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
commit da362b09e42ee0bcaf0356afee6078b4f324baff upstream.
Andrew Vagin <[email protected]> writes:
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <sched.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <sys/mount.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv)
> {
> int fd;
>
> fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY);
> if (fd < 0)
> return 1;
> while (1) {
> if (umount2("/", MNT_DETACH) ||
> setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS))
> break;
> }
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# gcc -Wall nsenter.c -o nsenter
> root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# strace ./nsenter
> execve("./nsenter", ["./nsenter"], [/* 22 vars */]) = 0
> ...
> open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY) = 3
> umount("/", MNT_DETACH) = 0
> setns(3, 131072) = 0
> umount("/", MNT_DETACH
>
causes:
> [ 260.548301] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 260.550941] kernel BUG at /build/buildd/linux-3.13.0/fs/pnode.c:372!
> [ 260.552068] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 260.552068] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_tcpudp xt_addrtype xt_conntrack ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack bridge stp llc dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_bio_prison iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel binfmt_misc nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl aesni_intel nfs lockd aes_x86_64 sunrpc fscache lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw ppdev parport_pc lp parport btrfs xor raid6_pq libcrc32c psmouse floppy
> [ 260.552068] CPU: 0 PID: 1723 Comm: nsenter Not tainted 3.13.0-30-generic #55-Ubuntu
> [ 260.552068] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> [ 260.552068] task: ffff8800376097f0 ti: ffff880074824000 task.ti: ffff880074824000
> [ 260.552068] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811e9483>] [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> [ 260.552068] RSP: 0018:ffff880074825e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 260.552068] RAX: ffff88007c741140 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff88007c741190
> [ 260.552068] RDX: ffff88007c741190 RSI: ffff880074825ec0 RDI: ffff880074825ec0
> [ 260.552068] RBP: ffff880074825eb0 R08: 00000000000172e0 R09: ffff88007fc172e0
> [ 260.552068] R10: ffffffff811cc642 R11: ffffea0001d59000 R12: ffff88007c741140
> [ 260.552068] R13: ffff88007c741140 R14: ffff88007c741140 R15: 0000000000000000
> [ 260.552068] FS: 00007fd5c7e41740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 260.552068] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 260.552068] CR2: 00007fd5c7968050 CR3: 0000000070124000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
> [ 260.552068] Stack:
> [ 260.552068] 0000000000000002 0000000000000002 ffff88007c631000 ffff880074825ed8
> [ 260.552068] ffffffff811dcfac ffff88007c741140 0000000000000002 ffff88007c741160
> [ 260.552068] ffff880074825f38 ffffffff811dd12b ffffffff811cc642 0000000075640000
> [ 260.552068] Call Trace:
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dcfac>] umount_tree+0x20c/0x260
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd12b>] do_umount+0x12b/0x300
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc642>] ? final_putname+0x22/0x50
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811cc849>] ? putname+0x29/0x40
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff811dd88c>] SyS_umount+0xdc/0x100
> [ 260.552068] [<ffffffff8172aeff>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
> [ 260.552068] Code: 89 50 08 48 8b 50 08 48 89 02 49 89 45 08 e9 72 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 e7 e8 f5 f6 ff ff 48 89 c3 e9 39 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 b8 01
> [ 260.552068] RIP [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> [ 260.552068] RSP <ffff880074825e98>
> [ 260.611451] ---[ end trace 11c33d85f1d4c652 ]--
Which in practice is totally uninteresting. Only the global root user can
do it, and it is just a stupid thing to do.
However that is no excuse to allow a silly way to oops the kernel.
We can avoid this silly problem by setting MNT_LOCKED on the rootfs
mount point and thus avoid needing any special cases in the unmount
code.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/namespace.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index df7bf37..a1ba2b4 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2890,6 +2890,7 @@ static void __init init_mount_tree(void)
root.mnt = mnt;
root.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
+ mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &root);
set_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Yong Li <[email protected]>
commit 97a249e98a72d6b79fb7350a8dd56b147e9d5bdb upstream.
Without this change, the name entity for mcp4725 is missing in
/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio\:device*/name
With this change, name is reported correctly
Signed-off-by: Yong Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/iio/dac/mcp4725.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/dac/mcp4725.c b/drivers/iio/dac/mcp4725.c
index 9f57ae8..247e54c 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/dac/mcp4725.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/dac/mcp4725.c
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ static int mcp4725_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
data->client = client;
indio_dev->dev.parent = &client->dev;
+ indio_dev->name = id->name;
indio_dev->info = &mcp4725_info;
indio_dev->channels = &mcp4725_channel;
indio_dev->num_channels = 1;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit 00420a65fa2beb3206090ead86942484df2275f3 upstream.
The has_key logic is wrong for shash algorithms as they always
have a setkey function. So we should instead be testing against
shash_no_setkey.
Fixes: a5596d633278 ("crypto: hash - Add crypto_ahash_has_setkey")
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
crypto/shash.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c
index 8e4256a..ac4d763 100644
--- a/crypto/shash.c
+++ b/crypto/shash.c
@@ -353,11 +353,10 @@ int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crt->final = shash_async_final;
crt->finup = shash_async_finup;
crt->digest = shash_async_digest;
+ crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey;
+
+ crt->has_setkey = alg->setkey != shash_no_setkey;
- if (alg->setkey) {
- crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey;
- crt->has_setkey = true;
- }
if (alg->export)
crt->export = shash_async_export;
if (alg->import)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
commit 5efd407674068dede403551bea3b0b134c32513a upstream.
Per DP spec, the source device should fall back to 18 bpp, VESA range
RGB when the sink capability is unknown. Fix the color depth
clamping. 18 bpp color depth should ensure full color range in automatic
mode.
The clamping has been HDMI specific since its introduction in
commit 996a2239f93b03c5972923f04b097f65565c5bed
Author: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Date: Fri Apr 19 11:24:34 2013 +0200
drm/i915: Disable high-bpc on pre-1.4 EDID screens
Reported-and-tested-by: Dihan Wickremasuriya <[email protected]>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105331
Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 013dd9e038723bbd2aa67be51847384b75be8253)
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
index cb8515b..4d9933a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
@@ -8590,11 +8590,21 @@ connected_sink_compute_bpp(struct intel_connector * connector,
pipe_config->pipe_bpp = connector->base.display_info.bpc*3;
}
- /* Clamp bpp to 8 on screens without EDID 1.4 */
- if (connector->base.display_info.bpc == 0 && bpp > 24) {
- DRM_DEBUG_KMS("clamping display bpp (was %d) to default limit of 24\n",
- bpp);
- pipe_config->pipe_bpp = 24;
+ /* Clamp bpp to default limit on screens without EDID 1.4 */
+ if (connector->base.display_info.bpc == 0) {
+ int type = connector->base.connector_type;
+ int clamp_bpp = 24;
+
+ /* Fall back to 18 bpp when DP sink capability is unknown. */
+ if (type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DisplayPort ||
+ type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_eDP)
+ clamp_bpp = 18;
+
+ if (bpp > clamp_bpp) {
+ DRM_DEBUG_KMS("clamping display bpp (was %d) to default limit of %d\n",
+ bpp, clamp_bpp);
+ pipe_config->pipe_bpp = clamp_bpp;
+ }
}
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
commit 4ae2182b1e3407de369f8c5d799543b7db74221b upstream.
A Root Port's AER structure (rpc) contains a queue of events. aer_irq()
enqueues AER status information and schedules aer_isr() to dequeue and
process it. When we remove a device, aer_remove() waits for the queue to
be empty, then frees the rpc struct.
But aer_isr() references the rpc struct after dequeueing and possibly
emptying the queue, which can cause a use-after-free error as in the
following scenario with two threads, aer_isr() on the left and a
concurrent aer_remove() on the right:
Thread A Thread B
-------- --------
aer_irq():
rpc->prod_idx++
aer_remove():
wait_event(rpc->prod_idx == rpc->cons_idx)
# now blocked until queue becomes empty
aer_isr(): # ...
rpc->cons_idx++ # unblocked because queue is now empty
... kfree(rpc)
mutex_unlock(&rpc->rpc_mutex)
To prevent this problem, use flush_work() to wait until the last scheduled
instance of aer_isr() has completed before freeing the rpc struct in
aer_remove().
I reproduced this use-after-free by flashing a device FPGA and
re-enumerating the bus to find the new device. With SLUB debug, this
crashes with 0x6b bytes (POISON_FREE, the use-after-free magic number) in
GPR25:
pcieport 0000:00:00.0: AER: Multiple Corrected error received: id=0000
Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x27ef9e3e
Workqueue: events aer_isr
GPR24: dd6aa000 6b6b6b6b 605f8378 605f8360 d99b12c0 604fc674 606b1704 d99b12c0
NIP [602f5328] pci_walk_bus+0xd4/0x104
[bhelgaas: changelog, stable tag]
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c | 4 +---
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.h | 1 -
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c | 2 --
3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c
index 0bf82a2..48d21e0 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c
@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ static struct aer_rpc *aer_alloc_rpc(struct pcie_device *dev)
rpc->rpd = dev;
INIT_WORK(&rpc->dpc_handler, aer_isr);
mutex_init(&rpc->rpc_mutex);
- init_waitqueue_head(&rpc->wait_release);
/* Use PCIe bus function to store rpc into PCIe device */
set_service_data(dev, rpc);
@@ -285,8 +284,7 @@ static void aer_remove(struct pcie_device *dev)
if (rpc->isr)
free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
- wait_event(rpc->wait_release, rpc->prod_idx == rpc->cons_idx);
-
+ flush_work(&rpc->dpc_handler);
aer_disable_rootport(rpc);
kfree(rpc);
set_service_data(dev, NULL);
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.h b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.h
index 84420b7..945c939 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.h
+++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.h
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ struct aer_rpc {
* recovery on the same
* root port hierarchy
*/
- wait_queue_head_t wait_release;
};
struct aer_broadcast_data {
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c
index b2c8881..777edcc 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c
@@ -785,8 +785,6 @@ void aer_isr(struct work_struct *work)
while (get_e_source(rpc, &e_src))
aer_isr_one_error(p_device, &e_src);
mutex_unlock(&rpc->rpc_mutex);
-
- wake_up(&rpc->wait_release);
}
/**
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit f784beb75ce82f4136f8a0960d3ee872f7109e09 upstream.
Although ALSA timer code got hardening for races, it still causes
use-after-free error. This is however rather a corrupted linked list,
not actually the concurrent accesses. Namely, when timer start is
triggered twice, list_add_tail() is called twice, too. This ends
up with the link corruption and triggers KASAN error.
The simplest fix would be replacing list_add_tail() with
list_move_tail(), but fundamentally it's the problem that we don't
check the double start/stop correctly. So, the right fix here is to
add the proper checks to snd_timer_start() and snd_timer_stop() (and
their variants).
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+ZyPRoMQjmawbvmCEDrkBD2BQuH7R09=eOkf5ESK8kJAw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context in _snd_timer_stop ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 4e436fe..2c2d3d1 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -444,6 +444,10 @@ static int snd_timer_start_slave(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
+ if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
if (timeri->master && timeri->timer) {
spin_lock(&timeri->timer->lock);
@@ -468,18 +472,26 @@ int snd_timer_start(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri, unsigned int ticks)
return -EINVAL;
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
result = snd_timer_start_slave(timeri);
- snd_timer_notify1(timeri, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START);
+ if (result >= 0)
+ snd_timer_notify1(timeri, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START);
return result;
}
timer = timeri->timer;
if (timer == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
+ if (timeri->flags & (SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING |
+ SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START)) {
+ result = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
timeri->ticks = timeri->cticks = ticks;
timeri->pticks = 0;
result = snd_timer_start1(timer, timeri, ticks);
+ unlock:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
- snd_timer_notify1(timeri, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START);
+ if (result >= 0)
+ snd_timer_notify1(timeri, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START);
return result;
}
@@ -495,6 +507,10 @@ static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
if (!keep_flag) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
+ if (!(timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING)) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
@@ -506,6 +522,11 @@ static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
+ if (!(timeri->flags & (SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING |
+ SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START))) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) &&
@@ -571,10 +592,15 @@ int snd_timer_continue(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
if (! timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
+ if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) {
+ result = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
if (!timeri->cticks)
timeri->cticks = 1;
timeri->pticks = 0;
result = snd_timer_start1(timer, timeri, timer->sticks);
+ unlock:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE);
return result;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
commit 6736fde9672ff6717ac576e9bba2fd5f3dfec822 upstream.
The code within wait_event_interruptible() is called with
!TASK_RUNNING, so mustn't call any functions that can sleep,
like mutex_lock().
Since we re-check the list_empty() in a loop after the wait,
it's safe to simply use list_empty() without locking.
This bug has existed forever, but was only discovered now
because all userspace implementations, including the default
'rfkill' tool, use poll() or select() to get a readable fd
before attempting to read.
Fixes: c64fb01627e24 ("rfkill: create useful userspace interface")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/rfkill/core.c | 16 ++++------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rfkill/core.c b/net/rfkill/core.c
index 5a14f55..918c5eb 100644
--- a/net/rfkill/core.c
+++ b/net/rfkill/core.c
@@ -1080,17 +1080,6 @@ static unsigned int rfkill_fop_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
return res;
}
-static bool rfkill_readable(struct rfkill_data *data)
-{
- bool r;
-
- mutex_lock(&data->mtx);
- r = !list_empty(&data->events);
- mutex_unlock(&data->mtx);
-
- return r;
-}
-
static ssize_t rfkill_fop_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
@@ -1107,8 +1096,11 @@ static ssize_t rfkill_fop_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
mutex_unlock(&data->mtx);
+ /* since we re-check and it just compares pointers,
+ * using !list_empty() without locking isn't a problem
+ */
ret = wait_event_interruptible(data->read_wait,
- rfkill_readable(data));
+ !list_empty(&data->events));
mutex_lock(&data->mtx);
if (ret)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 2cdc7b636d55cbcf42e1e6c8accd85e62d3e9ae8 upstream.
ALSA sequencer may open/close and control ALSA timer instance
dynamically either via sequencer events or direct ioctls. These are
done mostly asynchronously, and it may call still some timer action
like snd_timer_start() while another is calling snd_timer_close().
Since the instance gets removed by snd_timer_close(), it may lead to
a use-after-free.
This patch tries to address such a race by protecting each
snd_timer_*() call via the existing spinlock and also by avoiding the
access to timer during close call.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Z6RzW5MBr-HUdV-8zwg71WQfKTdPpYGvOeS7v4cyurNQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
index 24d44b2..6ec30a9 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ void snd_seq_timer_delete(struct snd_seq_timer **tmr)
void snd_seq_timer_defaults(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
/* setup defaults */
tmr->ppq = 96; /* 96 PPQ */
tmr->tempo = 500000; /* 120 BPM */
@@ -107,21 +110,25 @@ void snd_seq_timer_defaults(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
tmr->preferred_resolution = seq_default_timer_resolution;
tmr->skew = tmr->skew_base = SKEW_BASE;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
}
-void snd_seq_timer_reset(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
+static void seq_timer_reset(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
- unsigned long flags;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
-
/* reset time & songposition */
tmr->cur_time.tv_sec = 0;
tmr->cur_time.tv_nsec = 0;
tmr->tick.cur_tick = 0;
tmr->tick.fraction = 0;
+}
+
+void snd_seq_timer_reset(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ seq_timer_reset(tmr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
}
@@ -140,8 +147,11 @@ static void snd_seq_timer_interrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
tmr = q->timer;
if (tmr == NULL)
return;
- if (!tmr->running)
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ if (!tmr->running) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
return;
+ }
resolution *= ticks;
if (tmr->skew != tmr->skew_base) {
@@ -150,8 +160,6 @@ static void snd_seq_timer_interrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
(((resolution & 0xffff) * tmr->skew) >> 16);
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
-
/* update timer */
snd_seq_inc_time_nsec(&tmr->cur_time, resolution);
@@ -298,26 +306,30 @@ int snd_seq_timer_open(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
t->callback = snd_seq_timer_interrupt;
t->callback_data = q;
t->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO;
+ spin_lock_irq(&tmr->lock);
tmr->timeri = t;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tmr->lock);
return 0;
}
int snd_seq_timer_close(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
struct snd_seq_timer *tmr;
+ struct snd_timer_instance *t;
tmr = q->timer;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!tmr))
return -EINVAL;
- if (tmr->timeri) {
- snd_timer_stop(tmr->timeri);
- snd_timer_close(tmr->timeri);
- tmr->timeri = NULL;
- }
+ spin_lock_irq(&tmr->lock);
+ t = tmr->timeri;
+ tmr->timeri = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tmr->lock);
+ if (t)
+ snd_timer_close(t);
return 0;
}
-int snd_seq_timer_stop(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
+static int seq_timer_stop(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
if (! tmr->timeri)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -328,6 +340,17 @@ int snd_seq_timer_stop(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
return 0;
}
+int snd_seq_timer_stop(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ err = seq_timer_stop(tmr);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ return err;
+}
+
static int initialize_timer(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
struct snd_timer *t;
@@ -360,13 +383,13 @@ static int initialize_timer(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
return 0;
}
-int snd_seq_timer_start(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
+static int seq_timer_start(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
if (! tmr->timeri)
return -EINVAL;
if (tmr->running)
- snd_seq_timer_stop(tmr);
- snd_seq_timer_reset(tmr);
+ seq_timer_stop(tmr);
+ seq_timer_reset(tmr);
if (initialize_timer(tmr) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
snd_timer_start(tmr->timeri, tmr->ticks);
@@ -375,14 +398,25 @@ int snd_seq_timer_start(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
return 0;
}
-int snd_seq_timer_continue(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
+int snd_seq_timer_start(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ err = seq_timer_start(tmr);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int seq_timer_continue(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
if (! tmr->timeri)
return -EINVAL;
if (tmr->running)
return -EBUSY;
if (! tmr->initialized) {
- snd_seq_timer_reset(tmr);
+ seq_timer_reset(tmr);
if (initialize_timer(tmr) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -392,11 +426,24 @@ int snd_seq_timer_continue(struct snd_seq_timer * tmr)
return 0;
}
+int snd_seq_timer_continue(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ err = seq_timer_continue(tmr);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ return err;
+}
+
/* return current 'real' time. use timeofday() to get better granularity. */
snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
snd_seq_real_time_t cur_time;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
cur_time = tmr->cur_time;
if (tmr->running) {
struct timeval tm;
@@ -412,7 +459,7 @@ snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
}
snd_seq_sanity_real_time(&cur_time);
}
-
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
return cur_time;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: zengtao <[email protected]>
commit 0f26922fe5dc5724b1adbbd54b21bad03590b4f3 upstream.
The datatype __kernel_time_t is u32 on 32bit platform, so its subject to
overflows in the timeval/timespec to cputime conversion.
Currently the following functions are affected:
1. setitimer()
2. timer_create/timer_settime()
3. sys_clock_nanosleep
This can happen on MIPS32 and ARM32 with "Full dynticks CPU time accounting"
enabled, which is required for CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL.
Enforce u64 conversion to prevent the overflow.
Fixes: 31c1fc818715 ("ARM: Kconfig: allow full nohz CPU accounting")
Signed-off-by: zengtao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/asm-generic/cputime_nsecs.h | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cputime_nsecs.h b/include/asm-generic/cputime_nsecs.h
index 2c9e62c..f55fb04 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/cputime_nsecs.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/cputime_nsecs.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ typedef u64 __nocast cputime64_t;
*/
static inline cputime_t timespec_to_cputime(const struct timespec *val)
{
- u64 ret = val->tv_sec * NSEC_PER_SEC + val->tv_nsec;
+ u64 ret = (u64)val->tv_sec * NSEC_PER_SEC + val->tv_nsec;
return (__force cputime_t) ret;
}
static inline void cputime_to_timespec(const cputime_t ct, struct timespec *val)
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ static inline void cputime_to_timespec(const cputime_t ct, struct timespec *val)
*/
static inline cputime_t timeval_to_cputime(const struct timeval *val)
{
- u64 ret = val->tv_sec * NSEC_PER_SEC + val->tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC;
+ u64 ret = (u64)val->tv_sec * NSEC_PER_SEC +
+ val->tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC;
return (__force cputime_t) ret;
}
static inline void cputime_to_timeval(const cputime_t ct, struct timeval *val)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
commit 5e82d2be6ee53275c72e964507518d7964c82753 upstream.
While performing hw_free, DPCM checks the BE state but leaves out
the suspend state. The suspend state needs to be checked as well,
as we might be suspended and then usermode closes rather than
resuming the audio stream.
This was found by a stress testing of system with playback in
loop and killed after few seconds running in background and second
script running suspend-resume test in loop
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c b/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c
index d1c0b5e..fa68980 100644
--- a/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c
+++ b/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c
@@ -1301,7 +1301,8 @@ static int dpcm_be_dai_hw_free(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream)
(be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_PREPARE) &&
(be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_HW_FREE) &&
(be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_PAUSED) &&
- (be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_STOP))
+ (be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_STOP) &&
+ (be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_SUSPEND))
continue;
dev_dbg(be->dev, "ASoC: hw_free BE %s\n",
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 6776a5d712a1e670e9cf31c6693480d4d9b30e33 upstream.
Just a cleanup to follow the standard coding style.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/hwdep.c | 3 +--
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++------------------
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/hwdep.c b/sound/core/hwdep.c
index d105073..f7fc855 100644
--- a/sound/core/hwdep.c
+++ b/sound/core/hwdep.c
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ int snd_hwdep_new(struct snd_card *card, char *id, int device,
*rhwdep = hwdep;
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_hwdep_new);
static int snd_hwdep_free(struct snd_hwdep *hwdep)
{
@@ -543,5 +544,3 @@ static void __exit alsa_hwdep_exit(void)
module_init(alsa_hwdep_init)
module_exit(alsa_hwdep_exit)
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_hwdep_new);
diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
index b600dc2..c43a240 100644
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_drop_output(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_drop_output);
int snd_rawmidi_drain_output(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
{
@@ -194,6 +195,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_drain_output(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
}
return err;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_drain_output);
int snd_rawmidi_drain_input(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
{
@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_drain_input(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_drain_input);
/* look for an available substream for the given stream direction;
* if a specific subdevice is given, try to assign it
@@ -345,6 +348,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_kernel_open(struct snd_card *card, int device, int subdevice,
module_put(rmidi->card->module);
return err;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_open);
static int snd_rawmidi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
@@ -523,6 +527,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_kernel_release(struct snd_rawmidi_file *rfile)
module_put(rmidi->card->module);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_release);
static int snd_rawmidi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
@@ -599,6 +604,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_info_select(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_rawmidi_info *info
}
return -ENXIO;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_info_select);
static int snd_rawmidi_info_select_user(struct snd_card *card,
struct snd_rawmidi_info __user *_info)
@@ -646,6 +652,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_output_params(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
substream->active_sensing = !params->no_active_sensing;
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_output_params);
int snd_rawmidi_input_params(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
struct snd_rawmidi_params * params)
@@ -671,6 +678,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_input_params(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
runtime->avail_min = params->avail_min;
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_input_params);
static int snd_rawmidi_output_status(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
struct snd_rawmidi_status * status)
@@ -926,6 +934,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_receive(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return result;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_receive);
static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_read1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
unsigned char __user *userbuf,
@@ -968,6 +977,7 @@ long snd_rawmidi_kernel_read(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
snd_rawmidi_input_trigger(substream, 1);
return snd_rawmidi_kernel_read1(substream, NULL/*userbuf*/, buf, count);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_read);
static ssize_t snd_rawmidi_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
@@ -1042,6 +1052,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_empty(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return result;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_empty);
/**
* snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek - copy data from the internal buffer
@@ -1097,6 +1108,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return result;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek);
/**
* snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack - acknowledge the transmission
@@ -1131,6 +1143,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int count)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return count;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack);
/**
* snd_rawmidi_transmit - copy from the buffer to the device
@@ -1152,6 +1165,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
return count;
return snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, count);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit);
static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
const unsigned char __user *userbuf,
@@ -1213,6 +1227,7 @@ long snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
{
return snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(substream, NULL, buf, count);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_write);
static ssize_t snd_rawmidi_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
@@ -1492,6 +1507,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_new(struct snd_card *card, char *id, int device,
*rrawmidi = rmidi;
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_new);
static void snd_rawmidi_free_substreams(struct snd_rawmidi_str *stream)
{
@@ -1670,6 +1686,7 @@ void snd_rawmidi_set_ops(struct snd_rawmidi *rmidi, int stream,
list_for_each_entry(substream, &rmidi->streams[stream].substreams, list)
substream->ops = ops;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_set_ops);
/*
* ENTRY functions
@@ -1706,21 +1723,3 @@ static void __exit alsa_rawmidi_exit(void)
module_init(alsa_rawmidi_init)
module_exit(alsa_rawmidi_exit)
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_output_params);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_input_params);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_drop_output);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_drain_output);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_drain_input);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_receive);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_empty);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_new);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_set_ops);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_info_select);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_open);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_release);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_read);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_kernel_write);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 06ab30034ed9c200a570ab13c017bde248ddb2a6 upstream.
A kernel WARNING in snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() is triggered by
syzkaller fuzzer:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20739 at sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82999e2d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81352089>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
[<ffffffff813522b9>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
[<ffffffff84f80bd5>] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x275/0x400 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
[<ffffffff84fdb3c1>] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x4b1/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:163
[< inline >] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
[<ffffffff84f87ed9>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x549/0x780 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1223
[<ffffffff84f89fd3>] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1273
[<ffffffff817b0323>] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
[<ffffffff817b1db7>] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
[<ffffffff817b50a1>] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
[<ffffffff86336c36>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Also a similar warning is found but in another path:
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82be2c0d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81355139>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
[<ffffffff81355369>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
[<ffffffff8527e69a>] rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x24a/0x3b0 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1133
[<ffffffff8527e851>] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x51/0x80 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1163
[<ffffffff852d9046>] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x2b6/0x570 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:185
[< inline >] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
[<ffffffff85285a0b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x4bb/0x760 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1252
[<ffffffff85287b73>] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1302
[<ffffffff817ba5f3>] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
[<ffffffff817bc087>] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
[<ffffffff817bf371>] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
[<ffffffff86660276>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
In the former case, the reason is that virmidi has an open code
calling snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() with the value calculated outside
the spinlock. We may use snd_rawmidi_transmit() in a loop just for
consuming the input data, but even there, there is a race between
snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack().
Similarly in the latter case, it calls snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack() separately without protection, so they are
racy as well.
The patch tries to address these issues by the following ways:
- Introduce the unlocked versions of snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() to be called inside the explicit lock.
- Rewrite snd_rawmidi_transmit() to be race-free (the former case).
- Make the split calls (the latter case) protected in the rawmidi spin
lock.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YPq1+cYLkadwjWa5XjzF1_Vki1eHnVn-Lm0hzhSpu5PA@mail.gmail.com
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+acG4iyphdOZx47Nyq_VHGbpJQK-6xNpiqUjaZYqsXOGw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/sound/rawmidi.h | 4 ++
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c | 17 +++++---
3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/sound/rawmidi.h b/include/sound/rawmidi.h
index adf0885..f9d0133 100644
--- a/include/sound/rawmidi.h
+++ b/include/sound/rawmidi.h
@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
int snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int count);
int snd_rawmidi_transmit(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
unsigned char *buffer, int count);
+int __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
+ unsigned char *buffer, int count);
+int __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
+ int count);
/* main midi functions */
diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
index c43a240..786277f 100644
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -1055,23 +1055,16 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_empty(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_empty);
/**
- * snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek - copy data from the internal buffer
+ * __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek - copy data from the internal buffer
* @substream: the rawmidi substream
* @buffer: the buffer pointer
* @count: data size to transfer
*
- * Copies data from the internal output buffer to the given buffer.
- *
- * Call this in the interrupt handler when the midi output is ready,
- * and call snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() after the transmission is
- * finished.
- *
- * Return: The size of copied data, or a negative error code on failure.
+ * This is a variant of snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() without spinlock.
*/
-int snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
+int __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
unsigned char *buffer, int count)
{
- unsigned long flags;
int result, count1;
struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
@@ -1080,7 +1073,6 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
return -EINVAL;
}
result = 0;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
if (runtime->avail >= runtime->buffer_size) {
/* warning: lowlevel layer MUST trigger down the hardware */
goto __skip;
@@ -1105,32 +1097,53 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
}
}
__skip:
+ return result;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek);
+
+/**
+ * snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek - copy data from the internal buffer
+ * @substream: the rawmidi substream
+ * @buffer: the buffer pointer
+ * @count: data size to transfer
+ *
+ * Copies data from the internal output buffer to the given buffer.
+ *
+ * Call this in the interrupt handler when the midi output is ready,
+ * and call snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() after the transmission is
+ * finished.
+ *
+ * Return: The size of copied data, or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
+ unsigned char *buffer, int count)
+{
+ struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ int result;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
+ result = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buffer, count);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek);
/**
- * snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack - acknowledge the transmission
+ * __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack - acknowledge the transmission
* @substream: the rawmidi substream
* @count: the tranferred count
*
- * Advances the hardware pointer for the internal output buffer with
- * the given size and updates the condition.
- * Call after the transmission is finished.
- *
- * Return: The advanced size if successful, or a negative error code on failure.
+ * This is a variant of __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() without spinlock.
*/
-int snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int count)
+int __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int count)
{
- unsigned long flags;
struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
if (runtime->buffer == NULL) {
snd_printd("snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack: output is not active!!!\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
snd_BUG_ON(runtime->avail + count > runtime->buffer_size);
runtime->hw_ptr += count;
runtime->hw_ptr %= runtime->buffer_size;
@@ -1140,9 +1153,32 @@ int snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int count)
if (runtime->drain || snd_rawmidi_ready(substream))
wake_up(&runtime->sleep);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return count;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack);
+
+/**
+ * snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack - acknowledge the transmission
+ * @substream: the rawmidi substream
+ * @count: the transferred count
+ *
+ * Advances the hardware pointer for the internal output buffer with
+ * the given size and updates the condition.
+ * Call after the transmission is finished.
+ *
+ * Return: The advanced size if successful, or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int count)
+{
+ struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ int result;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
+ result = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, count);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
+ return result;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack);
/**
@@ -1158,12 +1194,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack);
int snd_rawmidi_transmit(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
unsigned char *buffer, int count)
{
+ struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ int result;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
if (!substream->opened)
- return -EBADFD;
- count = snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buffer, count);
- if (count < 0)
- return count;
- return snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, count);
+ result = -EBADFD;
+ else {
+ count = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buffer, count);
+ if (count <= 0)
+ result = count;
+ else
+ result = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, count);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
+ return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_rawmidi_transmit);
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c
index 0fa691e..6b38e7c 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c
@@ -155,21 +155,26 @@ static void snd_virmidi_output_trigger(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
struct snd_virmidi *vmidi = substream->runtime->private_data;
int count, res;
unsigned char buf[32], *pbuf;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (up) {
vmidi->trigger = 1;
if (vmidi->seq_mode == SNDRV_VIRMIDI_SEQ_DISPATCH &&
!(vmidi->rdev->flags & SNDRV_VIRMIDI_SUBSCRIBE)) {
- snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, substream->runtime->buffer_size - substream->runtime->avail);
- return; /* ignored */
+ while (snd_rawmidi_transmit(substream, buf,
+ sizeof(buf)) > 0) {
+ /* ignored */
+ }
+ return;
}
if (vmidi->event.type != SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE) {
if (snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch(vmidi->client, &vmidi->event, in_atomic(), 0) < 0)
return;
vmidi->event.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE;
}
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags);
while (1) {
- count = snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ count = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (count <= 0)
break;
pbuf = buf;
@@ -179,16 +184,18 @@ static void snd_virmidi_output_trigger(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
snd_midi_event_reset_encode(vmidi->parser);
continue;
}
- snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, res);
+ __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(substream, res);
pbuf += res;
count -= res;
if (vmidi->event.type != SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE) {
if (snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch(vmidi->client, &vmidi->event, in_atomic(), 0) < 0)
- return;
+ goto out;
vmidi->event.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE;
}
}
}
+ out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&substream->runtime->lock, flags);
} else {
vmidi->trigger = 0;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 81f577542af15640cbcb6ef68baa4caa610cbbfc upstream.
The rawmidi read and write functions manage runtime stream status
such as runtime->appl_ptr and runtime->avail. These point where to
copy the new data and how many bytes have been copied (or to be
read). The problem is that rawmidi read/write call copy_from_user()
or copy_to_user(), and the runtime spinlock is temporarily unlocked
and relocked while copying user-space. Since the current code
advances and updates the runtime status after the spin unlock/relock,
the copy and the update may be asynchronous, and eventually
runtime->avail might go to a negative value when many concurrent
accesses are done. This may lead to memory corruption in the end.
For fixing this race, in this patch, the status update code is
performed in the same lock before the temporary unlock. Also, the
spinlock is now taken more widely in snd_rawmidi_kernel_read1() for
protecting more properly during the whole operation.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+b-dCmNf1GpgPKfDO0ih+uZCL2JV4__j-r1kdhPLSgQCQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
index 786277f..a15f63f 100644
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -943,31 +943,36 @@ static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_read1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
unsigned long flags;
long result = 0, count1;
struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ unsigned long appl_ptr;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
while (count > 0 && runtime->avail) {
count1 = runtime->buffer_size - runtime->appl_ptr;
if (count1 > count)
count1 = count;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
if (count1 > (int)runtime->avail)
count1 = runtime->avail;
+
+ /* update runtime->appl_ptr before unlocking for userbuf */
+ appl_ptr = runtime->appl_ptr;
+ runtime->appl_ptr += count1;
+ runtime->appl_ptr %= runtime->buffer_size;
+ runtime->avail -= count1;
+
if (kernelbuf)
- memcpy(kernelbuf + result, runtime->buffer + runtime->appl_ptr, count1);
+ memcpy(kernelbuf + result, runtime->buffer + appl_ptr, count1);
if (userbuf) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(userbuf + result,
- runtime->buffer + runtime->appl_ptr, count1)) {
+ runtime->buffer + appl_ptr, count1)) {
return result > 0 ? result : -EFAULT;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
}
- runtime->appl_ptr += count1;
- runtime->appl_ptr %= runtime->buffer_size;
- runtime->avail -= count1;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
result += count1;
count -= count1;
}
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
return result;
}
@@ -1221,6 +1226,7 @@ static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
unsigned long flags;
long count1, result;
struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ unsigned long appl_ptr;
if (!kernelbuf && !userbuf)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1241,12 +1247,19 @@ static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
count1 = count;
if (count1 > (long)runtime->avail)
count1 = runtime->avail;
+
+ /* update runtime->appl_ptr before unlocking for userbuf */
+ appl_ptr = runtime->appl_ptr;
+ runtime->appl_ptr += count1;
+ runtime->appl_ptr %= runtime->buffer_size;
+ runtime->avail -= count1;
+
if (kernelbuf)
- memcpy(runtime->buffer + runtime->appl_ptr,
+ memcpy(runtime->buffer + appl_ptr,
kernelbuf + result, count1);
else if (userbuf) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags);
- if (copy_from_user(runtime->buffer + runtime->appl_ptr,
+ if (copy_from_user(runtime->buffer + appl_ptr,
userbuf + result, count1)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
result = result > 0 ? result : -EFAULT;
@@ -1254,9 +1267,6 @@ static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags);
}
- runtime->appl_ptr += count1;
- runtime->appl_ptr %= runtime->buffer_size;
- runtime->avail -= count1;
result += count1;
count -= count1;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
commit ccc04afb72cddbdf7c0e1c17e92886405a71b754 upstream.
Intel Broxton M was verifed to require XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK quirk as well.
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
index 6cdfe03..0e097ee 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CHERRYVIEW_XHCI 0x22b5
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_SUNRISEPOINT_H_XHCI 0xa12f
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_SUNRISEPOINT_LP_XHCI 0x9d2f
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BROXTON_M_XHCI 0x0aa8
static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd";
@@ -136,7 +137,8 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct device *dev, struct xhci_hcd *xhci)
if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL &&
(pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_SUNRISEPOINT_LP_XHCI ||
pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_SUNRISEPOINT_H_XHCI ||
- pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CHERRYVIEW_XHCI)) {
+ pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CHERRYVIEW_XHCI ||
+ pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BROXTON_M_XHCI)) {
xhci->quirks |= XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK;
}
if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ETRON &&
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a6d9bb1c9605cd4f44e2d8290dc4d0e88f20292d ]
This patch fixes a NULL pointer se_cmd->cmd_kref < 0
refcount bug during TMR LUN_RESET with active TMRs,
triggered during se_cmd + se_tmr_req descriptor
shutdown + release via core_tmr_drain_tmr_list().
To address this bug, go ahead and obtain a local
kref_get_unless_zero(&se_cmd->cmd_kref) for active I/O
to set CMD_T_ABORTED, and transport_wait_for_tasks()
followed by the final target_put_sess_cmd() to drop
the local ->cmd_kref.
Also add two new checks within target_tmr_work() to
avoid CMD_T_ABORTED -> TFO->queue_tm_rsp() callbacks
ahead of invoking the backend -> fabric put in
transport_cmd_check_stop_to_fabric().
For good measure, also change core_tmr_release_req()
to use list_del_init() ahead of se_tmr_req memory
free.
Reviewed-by: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Cc: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Grover <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
index 3f0338f..b681709 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void core_tmr_release_req(
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->se_tmr_lock, flags);
- list_del(&tmr->tmr_list);
+ list_del_init(&tmr->tmr_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->se_tmr_lock, flags);
kfree(tmr);
@@ -176,9 +176,11 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(
struct list_head *preempt_and_abort_list)
{
LIST_HEAD(drain_tmr_list);
+ struct se_session *sess;
struct se_tmr_req *tmr_p, *tmr_pp;
struct se_cmd *cmd;
unsigned long flags;
+ bool rc;
/*
* Release all pending and outgoing TMRs aside from the received
* LUN_RESET tmr..
@@ -204,17 +206,31 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(
if (target_check_cdb_and_preempt(preempt_and_abort_list, cmd))
continue;
+ sess = cmd->se_sess;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sess))
+ continue;
+
+ spin_lock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
spin_lock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ACTIVE)) {
spin_unlock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
continue;
}
if (cmd->t_state == TRANSPORT_ISTATE_PROCESSING) {
spin_unlock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
continue;
}
+ cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
spin_unlock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ rc = kref_get_unless_zero(&cmd->cmd_kref);
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ if (!rc) {
+ printk("LUN_RESET TMR: non-zero kref_get_unless_zero\n");
+ continue;
+ }
list_move_tail(&tmr_p->tmr_list, &drain_tmr_list);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->se_tmr_lock, flags);
@@ -228,7 +244,11 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(
(preempt_and_abort_list) ? "Preempt" : "", tmr_p,
tmr_p->function, tmr_p->response, cmd->t_state);
+ cancel_work_sync(&cmd->work);
+ transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
+
transport_cmd_finish_abort(cmd, 1);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(cmd->se_sess, cmd);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index 9477737..b28df51 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -2811,8 +2811,17 @@ static void target_tmr_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct se_cmd *cmd = container_of(work, struct se_cmd, work);
struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
struct se_tmr_req *tmr = cmd->se_tmr_req;
+ unsigned long flags;
int ret;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED) {
+ tmr->response = TMR_FUNCTION_REJECTED;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ goto check_stop;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+
switch (tmr->function) {
case TMR_ABORT_TASK:
core_tmr_abort_task(dev, tmr, cmd->se_sess);
@@ -2840,9 +2849,17 @@ static void target_tmr_work(struct work_struct *work)
break;
}
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ goto check_stop;
+ }
cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_ISTATE_PROCESSING;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+
cmd->se_tfo->queue_tm_rsp(cmd);
+check_stop:
transport_cmd_check_stop_to_fabric(cmd);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit febe562c20dfa8f33bee7d419c6b517986a5aa33 ]
This patch fixes a NULL pointer se_cmd->cmd_kref < 0
refcount bug during TMR LUN_RESET with active se_cmd
I/O, that can be triggered during se_cmd descriptor
shutdown + release via core_tmr_drain_state_list() code.
To address this bug, add common __target_check_io_state()
helper for ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET w/ CMD_T_COMPLETE
checking, and set CMD_T_ABORTED + obtain ->cmd_kref for
both cases ahead of last target_put_sess_cmd() after
TFO->aborted_task() -> transport_cmd_finish_abort()
callback has completed.
It also introduces SCF_ACK_KREF to determine when
transport_cmd_finish_abort() needs to drop the second
extra reference, ahead of calling target_put_sess_cmd()
for the final kref_put(&se_cmd->cmd_kref).
It also updates transport_cmd_check_stop() to avoid
holding se_cmd->t_state_lock while dropping se_cmd
device state via target_remove_from_state_list(), now
that core_tmr_drain_state_list() is holding the
se_device lock while checking se_cmd state from
within TMR logic.
Finally, move transport_put_cmd() release of SGL +
TMR + extended CDB memory into target_free_cmd_mem()
in order to avoid potential resource leaks in TMR
ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET code-paths. Also update
target_release_cmd_kref() accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Cc: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Grover <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 67 +++++++++++++++-------------------
2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
index b681709..7adc5f5 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -115,6 +115,34 @@ static int target_check_cdb_and_preempt(struct list_head *list,
return 1;
}
+static bool __target_check_io_state(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ struct se_session *sess = se_cmd->se_sess;
+
+ assert_spin_locked(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
+ /*
+ * If command already reached CMD_T_COMPLETE state within
+ * target_complete_cmd(), this se_cmd has been passed to
+ * fabric driver and will not be aborted.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, obtain a local se_cmd->cmd_kref now for TMR
+ * ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET for CMD_T_ABORTED processing as
+ * long as se_cmd->cmd_kref is still active unless zero.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_COMPLETE) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u already complete,"
+ " skipping\n", se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd));
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+
+ return kref_get_unless_zero(&se_cmd->cmd_kref);
+}
+
void core_tmr_abort_task(
struct se_device *dev,
struct se_tmr_req *tmr,
@@ -137,25 +165,20 @@ void core_tmr_abort_task(
printk("ABORT_TASK: Found referenced %s task_tag: %u\n",
se_cmd->se_tfo->get_fabric_name(), ref_tag);
- spin_lock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
- if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_COMPLETE) {
- printk("ABORT_TASK: ref_tag: %u already complete, skipping\n", ref_tag);
- spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ if (!__target_check_io_state(se_cmd)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
goto out;
}
- se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
- spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
list_del_init(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
- kref_get(&se_cmd->cmd_kref);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
cancel_work_sync(&se_cmd->work);
transport_wait_for_tasks(se_cmd);
- target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
transport_cmd_finish_abort(se_cmd, true);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
printk("ABORT_TASK: Sending TMR_FUNCTION_COMPLETE for"
" ref_tag: %d\n", ref_tag);
@@ -260,8 +283,10 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
struct list_head *preempt_and_abort_list)
{
LIST_HEAD(drain_task_list);
+ struct se_session *sess;
struct se_cmd *cmd, *next;
unsigned long flags;
+ int rc;
/*
* Complete outstanding commands with TASK_ABORTED SAM status.
@@ -300,6 +325,16 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
if (prout_cmd == cmd)
continue;
+ sess = cmd->se_sess;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sess))
+ continue;
+
+ spin_lock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ rc = __target_check_io_state(cmd);
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ if (!rc)
+ continue;
+
list_move_tail(&cmd->state_list, &drain_task_list);
cmd->state_active = false;
}
@@ -307,7 +342,7 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
while (!list_empty(&drain_task_list)) {
cmd = list_entry(drain_task_list.next, struct se_cmd, state_list);
- list_del(&cmd->state_list);
+ list_del_init(&cmd->state_list);
pr_debug("LUN_RESET: %s cmd: %p"
" ITT/CmdSN: 0x%08x/0x%08x, i_state: %d, t_state: %d"
@@ -331,16 +366,11 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
* loop above, but we do it down here given that
* cancel_work_sync may block.
*/
- if (cmd->t_state == TRANSPORT_COMPLETE)
- cancel_work_sync(&cmd->work);
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
- target_stop_cmd(cmd, &flags);
-
- cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ cancel_work_sync(&cmd->work);
+ transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(tmr_nacl, cmd, tas);
+ target_put_sess_cmd(cmd->se_sess, cmd);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index b28df51..7d7f981 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -483,9 +483,6 @@ void transport_deregister_session(struct se_session *se_sess)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(transport_deregister_session);
-/*
- * Called with cmd->t_state_lock held.
- */
static void target_remove_from_state_list(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
@@ -510,10 +507,6 @@ static int transport_cmd_check_stop(struct se_cmd *cmd, bool remove_from_lists,
{
unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
- if (write_pending)
- cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_WRITE_PENDING;
-
if (remove_from_lists) {
target_remove_from_state_list(cmd);
@@ -523,6 +516,10 @@ static int transport_cmd_check_stop(struct se_cmd *cmd, bool remove_from_lists,
cmd->se_lun = NULL;
}
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ if (write_pending)
+ cmd->t_state = TRANSPORT_WRITE_PENDING;
+
/*
* Determine if frontend context caller is requesting the stopping of
* this command for frontend exceptions.
@@ -577,6 +574,8 @@ static void transport_lun_remove_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
void transport_cmd_finish_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd, int remove)
{
+ bool ack_kref = (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_ACK_KREF);
+
if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SE_LUN_CMD)
transport_lun_remove_cmd(cmd);
/*
@@ -588,7 +587,7 @@ void transport_cmd_finish_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd, int remove)
if (transport_cmd_check_stop_to_fabric(cmd))
return;
- if (remove)
+ if (remove && ack_kref)
transport_put_cmd(cmd);
}
@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ void target_complete_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd, u8 scsi_status)
* Check for case where an explicit ABORT_TASK has been received
* and transport_wait_for_tasks() will be waiting for completion..
*/
- if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED &&
+ if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED ||
cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_STOP) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
complete_all(&cmd->t_transport_stop_comp);
@@ -2047,20 +2046,14 @@ static inline void transport_free_pages(struct se_cmd *cmd)
}
/**
- * transport_release_cmd - free a command
- * @cmd: command to free
+ * transport_put_cmd - release a reference to a command
+ * @cmd: command to release
*
- * This routine unconditionally frees a command, and reference counting
- * or list removal must be done in the caller.
+ * This routine releases our reference to the command and frees it if possible.
*/
-static int transport_release_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
+static int transport_put_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
BUG_ON(!cmd->se_tfo);
-
- if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB)
- core_tmr_release_req(cmd->se_tmr_req);
- if (cmd->t_task_cdb != cmd->__t_task_cdb)
- kfree(cmd->t_task_cdb);
/*
* If this cmd has been setup with target_get_sess_cmd(), drop
* the kref and call ->release_cmd() in kref callback.
@@ -2068,18 +2061,6 @@ static int transport_release_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
return target_put_sess_cmd(cmd->se_sess, cmd);
}
-/**
- * transport_put_cmd - release a reference to a command
- * @cmd: command to release
- *
- * This routine releases our reference to the command and frees it if possible.
- */
-static int transport_put_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
-{
- transport_free_pages(cmd);
- return transport_release_cmd(cmd);
-}
-
void *transport_kmap_data_sg(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
struct scatterlist *sg = cmd->t_data_sg;
@@ -2269,14 +2250,13 @@ static void transport_write_pending_qf(struct se_cmd *cmd)
int transport_generic_free_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd, int wait_for_tasks)
{
- unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (!(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SE_LUN_CMD)) {
if (wait_for_tasks && (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB))
- transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
+ transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
- ret = transport_release_cmd(cmd);
+ ret = transport_put_cmd(cmd);
} else {
if (wait_for_tasks)
transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
@@ -2285,11 +2265,8 @@ int transport_generic_free_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd, int wait_for_tasks)
* has already added se_cmd to state_list, but fabric has
* failed command before I/O submission.
*/
- if (cmd->state_active) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ if (cmd->state_active)
target_remove_from_state_list(cmd);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
- }
if (cmd->se_lun)
transport_lun_remove_cmd(cmd);
@@ -2337,6 +2314,16 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(target_get_sess_cmd);
+static void target_free_cmd_mem(struct se_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ transport_free_pages(cmd);
+
+ if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB)
+ core_tmr_release_req(cmd->se_tmr_req);
+ if (cmd->t_task_cdb != cmd->__t_task_cdb)
+ kfree(cmd->t_task_cdb);
+}
+
static void target_release_cmd_kref(struct kref *kref)
{
struct se_cmd *se_cmd = container_of(kref, struct se_cmd, cmd_kref);
@@ -2344,17 +2331,20 @@ static void target_release_cmd_kref(struct kref *kref)
if (list_empty(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list)) {
spin_unlock(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ target_free_cmd_mem(se_cmd);
se_cmd->se_tfo->release_cmd(se_cmd);
return;
}
if (se_sess->sess_tearing_down && se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
spin_unlock(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ target_free_cmd_mem(se_cmd);
complete(&se_cmd->cmd_wait_comp);
return;
}
list_del(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
spin_unlock(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ target_free_cmd_mem(se_cmd);
se_cmd->se_tfo->release_cmd(se_cmd);
}
@@ -2365,6 +2355,7 @@ static void target_release_cmd_kref(struct kref *kref)
int target_put_sess_cmd(struct se_session *se_sess, struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
if (!se_sess) {
+ target_free_cmd_mem(se_cmd);
se_cmd->se_tfo->release_cmd(se_cmd);
return 1;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Henningsson <[email protected]>
commit 360a8245680053619205a3ae10e6bfe624a5da1d upstream.
The static checker warning is:
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c:460 hdmi_eld_ctl_get()
error: __memcpy() 'eld->eld_buffer' too small (256 vs 512)
I have a hard time figuring out if this can ever cause an information leak
(I don't think so), but nonetheless it does not hurt to increase the
robustness of the code.
Fixes: 68e03de98507 ('ALSA: hda - hdmi: Do not expose eld data when eld is invalid')
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Henningsson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
index 09a4c80..83556a5 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
@@ -427,7 +427,8 @@ static int hdmi_eld_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
eld = &per_pin->sink_eld;
mutex_lock(&per_pin->lock);
- if (eld->eld_size > ARRAY_SIZE(ucontrol->value.bytes.data)) {
+ if (eld->eld_size > ARRAY_SIZE(ucontrol->value.bytes.data) ||
+ eld->eld_size > ELD_MAX_SIZE) {
mutex_unlock(&per_pin->lock);
snd_BUG();
return -EINVAL;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
commit 12352d3cae2cebe18805a91fab34b534d7444231 upstream.
Sequence vma_lock_anon_vma() - vma_unlock_anon_vma() isn't safe if
anon_vma appeared between lock and unlock. We have to check anon_vma
first or call anon_vma_prepare() to be sure that it's here. There are
only few users of these legacy helpers. Let's get rid of them.
This patch fixes anon_vma lock imbalance in validate_mm(). Write lock
isn't required here, read lock is enough.
And reorders expand_downwards/expand_upwards: security_mmap_addr() and
wrapping-around check don't have to be under anon vma lock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y908EjM2z=706dv4rV6dWtxTLK9nFg9_7DhRMLppBo2g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/rmap.h | 14 -------------
mm/mmap.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/rmap.h b/include/linux/rmap.h
index fc7c6cb..8a3ded5 100644
--- a/include/linux/rmap.h
+++ b/include/linux/rmap.h
@@ -114,20 +114,6 @@ static inline struct anon_vma *page_anon_vma(struct page *page)
return page_rmapping(page);
}
-static inline void vma_lock_anon_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- struct anon_vma *anon_vma = vma->anon_vma;
- if (anon_vma)
- down_write(&anon_vma->root->rwsem);
-}
-
-static inline void vma_unlock_anon_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- struct anon_vma *anon_vma = vma->anon_vma;
- if (anon_vma)
- up_write(&anon_vma->root->rwsem);
-}
-
static inline void anon_vma_lock_write(struct anon_vma *anon_vma)
{
down_write(&anon_vma->root->rwsem);
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index e3bd471..daab5f9 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -411,11 +411,16 @@ void validate_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
unsigned long highest_address = 0;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = mm->mmap;
while (vma) {
+ struct anon_vma *anon_vma = vma->anon_vma;
struct anon_vma_chain *avc;
- vma_lock_anon_vma(vma);
- list_for_each_entry(avc, &vma->anon_vma_chain, same_vma)
- anon_vma_interval_tree_verify(avc);
- vma_unlock_anon_vma(vma);
+
+ if (anon_vma) {
+ anon_vma_lock_read(anon_vma);
+ list_for_each_entry(avc, &vma->anon_vma_chain, same_vma)
+ anon_vma_interval_tree_verify(avc);
+ anon_vma_unlock_read(anon_vma);
+ }
+
highest_address = vma->vm_end;
vma = vma->vm_next;
i++;
@@ -2097,32 +2102,27 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long size, uns
*/
int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
- int error;
+ int error = 0;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
return -EFAULT;
- /*
- * We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated
- * so that the anon_vma locking is not a noop.
- */
+ /* Guard against wrapping around to address 0. */
+ if (address < PAGE_ALIGN(address+4))
+ address = PAGE_ALIGN(address+4);
+ else
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
- vma_lock_anon_vma(vma);
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
- * Also guard against wrapping around to address 0.
*/
- if (address < PAGE_ALIGN(address+4))
- address = PAGE_ALIGN(address+4);
- else {
- vma_unlock_anon_vma(vma);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
- error = 0;
+ anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address > vma->vm_end) {
@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
- * vma_lock_anon_vma() doesn't help here, as
+ * anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
}
}
}
- vma_unlock_anon_vma(vma);
+ anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(vma->vm_mm);
return error;
@@ -2175,25 +2175,21 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
int error;
- /*
- * We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated
- * so that the anon_vma locking is not a noop.
- */
- if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
- return -ENOMEM;
-
address &= PAGE_MASK;
error = security_mmap_addr(address);
if (error)
return error;
- vma_lock_anon_vma(vma);
+ /* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
+ if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
+ anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
@@ -2211,7 +2207,7 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
- * vma_lock_anon_vma() doesn't help here, as
+ * anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
@@ -2229,7 +2225,7 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
}
}
}
- vma_unlock_anon_vma(vma);
+ anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(vma->vm_mm);
return error;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
commit 308bbc9ab838d0ace0298268c7970ba9513e2c65 upstream.
The omap-serial driver emulates RS485 delays using software timers,
but neglects to clamp the input values from the unprivileged
ioctl(TIOCSRS485). Because the software implementation busy-waits,
malicious userspace could stall the cpu for ~49 days.
Clamp the input values to < 100ms.
Fixes: 4a0ac0f55b18 ("OMAP: add RS485 support")
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c
index 270d084..dabf668 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c
@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ static inline void serial_omap_add_console_port(struct uart_omap_port *up)
/* Enable or disable the rs485 support */
static void
-serial_omap_config_rs485(struct uart_port *port, struct serial_rs485 *rs485conf)
+serial_omap_config_rs485(struct uart_port *port, struct serial_rs485 *rs485)
{
struct uart_omap_port *up = to_uart_omap_port(port);
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1380,8 +1380,12 @@ serial_omap_config_rs485(struct uart_port *port, struct serial_rs485 *rs485conf)
up->ier = 0;
serial_out(up, UART_IER, 0);
+ /* Clamp the delays to [0, 100ms] */
+ rs485->delay_rts_before_send = min(rs485->delay_rts_before_send, 100U);
+ rs485->delay_rts_after_send = min(rs485->delay_rts_after_send, 100U);
+
/* store new config */
- up->rs485 = *rs485conf;
+ up->rs485 = *rs485;
/*
* Just as a precaution, only allow rs485
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 117159f0b9d392fb433a7871426fad50317f06f7 upstream.
In snd_timer_notify1(), the wrong timer instance was passed for slave
ccallback function. This leads to the access to the wrong data when
an incompatible master is handled (e.g. the master is the sequencer
timer and the slave is a user timer), as spotted by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch fixes that wrong assignment.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y_Bm+7epAb=8Wi=AaWd+DYS7qawX52qxdCfOfY49vozQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 79e57a7..44cbdde 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static void snd_timer_notify1(struct snd_timer_instance *ti, int event)
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(ts, &ti->slave_active_head, active_list)
if (ts->ccallback)
- ts->ccallback(ti, event + 100, &tstamp, resolution);
+ ts->ccallback(ts, event + 100, &tstamp, resolution);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
commit 5070fb14a0154f075c8b418e5bc58a620ae85a45 upstream.
When trying to set the ICST 307 clock to 25174000 Hz I ran into
this arithmetic error: the icst_hz_to_vco() correctly figure out
DIVIDE=2, RDW=100 and VDW=99 yielding a frequency of
25174000 Hz out of the VCO. (I replicated the icst_hz() function
in a spreadsheet to verify this.)
However, when I called icst_hz() on these VCO settings it would
instead return 4122709 Hz. This causes an error in the common
clock driver for ICST as the common clock framework will call
.round_rate() on the clock which will utilize icst_hz_to_vco()
followed by icst_hz() suggesting the erroneous frequency, and
then the clock gets set to this.
The error did not manifest in the old clock framework since
this high frequency was only used by the CLCD, which calls
clk_set_rate() without first calling clk_round_rate() and since
the old clock framework would not call clk_round_rate() before
setting the frequency, the correct values propagated into
the VCO.
After some experimenting I figured out that it was due to a simple
arithmetic overflow: the divisor for 24Mhz reference frequency
as reference becomes 24000000*2*(99+8)=0x132212400 and the "1"
in bit 32 overflows and is lost.
But introducing an explicit 64-by-32 bit do_div() and casting
the divisor into (u64) we get the right frequency back, and the
right frequency gets set.
Tested on the ARM Versatile.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Pawel Moll <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/common/icst.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/common/icst.c b/arch/arm/common/icst.c
index 2dc6da70..d3c0e69 100644
--- a/arch/arm/common/icst.c
+++ b/arch/arm/common/icst.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-
+#include <asm/div64.h>
#include <asm/hardware/icst.h>
/*
@@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(icst525_s2div);
unsigned long icst_hz(const struct icst_params *p, struct icst_vco vco)
{
- return p->ref * 2 * (vco.v + 8) / ((vco.r + 2) * p->s2div[vco.s]);
+ u64 dividend = p->ref * 2 * (u64)(vco.v + 8);
+ u32 divisor = (vco.r + 2) * p->s2div[vco.s];
+
+ do_div(dividend, divisor);
+ return (unsigned long)dividend;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(icst_hz);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Andreas Schwab <[email protected]>
commit f15838e9cac8f78f0cc506529bb9d3b9fa589c1f upstream.
Since binutils 2.26 BFD is doing suffix merging on STRTAB sections. But
dedotify modifies the symbol names in place, which can also modify
unrelated symbols with a name that matches a suffix of a dotted name. To
remove the leading dot of a symbol name we can just increment the pointer
into the STRTAB section instead.
Backport to all stables to avoid breakage when people update their
binutils - mpe.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c
index 860c412..6ccf96d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static void dedotify(Elf64_Sym *syms, unsigned int numsyms, char *strtab)
if (syms[i].st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) {
char *name = strtab + syms[i].st_name;
if (name[0] == '.')
- memmove(name, name+1, strlen(name));
+ syms[i].st_name++;
}
}
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 4dff5c7b7093b19c19d3a100f8a3ad87cb7cd9e7 upstream.
snd_timer_user_read() has a potential race among parallel reads, as
qhead and qused are updated outside the critical section due to
copy_to_user() calls. Move them into the critical section, and also
sanitize the relevant code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: no tu->disconnected clause ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 32 ++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index cbb127b..917c4c3 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1891,6 +1891,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
+ int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
@@ -1902,7 +1903,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
- break;
+ goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
@@ -1917,38 +1918,33 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
+ goto _error;
}
}
+ qhead = tu->qhead++;
+ tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
- if (err < 0)
- goto _error;
if (tu->tread) {
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[tu->qhead++],
- sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread))) {
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
+ sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
- goto _error;
- }
} else {
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[tu->qhead++],
- sizeof(struct snd_timer_read))) {
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
+ sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
- goto _error;
- }
}
- tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
-
- result += unit;
- buffer += unit;
-
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
tu->qused--;
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto _error;
+ result += unit;
+ buffer += unit;
}
- spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
_error:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
commit ed3f9fd1e865975ceefdb2a43b453e090b1fd787 upstream.
This fails to undo the setup for pin==0; moreover, something
interesting happens if the setup failed already at pin==0.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
Fixes: f899fc64cda8 ("drm/i915: use GMBUS to manage i2c links")
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 2417c8c03f508841b85bf61acc91836b7b0e2560)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- use 'i' instead of 'pin'
- adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_i2c.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_i2c.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_i2c.c
index d5fa4fc..7186be6 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_i2c.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_i2c.c
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ int intel_setup_gmbus(struct drm_device *dev)
return 0;
err:
- while (--i) {
+ while (i--) {
struct intel_gmbus *bus = &dev_priv->gmbus[i];
i2c_del_adapter(&bus->adapter);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
commit 50ab8ec74a153eb30db26529088bc57dd700b24c upstream.
See http: //http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html
X-Evolution-Source: [email protected]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Mime-Version: 1.0
We support OFFSET_MAX just fine, so don't round down below it. Also
switch to using min_t to make the helper more readable.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Fixes: 433c92379d9c ("NFS: Clean up nfs_size_to_loff_t()")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/nfs_fs.h | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
index 4899737..d3c0bbe 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
@@ -589,9 +589,7 @@ static inline void nfs3_forget_cached_acls(struct inode *inode)
static inline loff_t nfs_size_to_loff_t(__u64 size)
{
- if (size > (__u64) OFFSET_MAX - 1)
- return OFFSET_MAX - 1;
- return (loff_t) size;
+ return min_t(u64, size, OFFSET_MAX);
}
static inline ino_t
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Alexandra Yates <[email protected]>
commit 342decff2b846b46fa61eb5ee40986fab79a9a32 upstream.
Adding Intel codename DNV platform device IDs for SATA.
Signed-off-by: Alexandra Yates <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/ata/ahci.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/ata/ahci.c b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
index 9de149d..01e5cfd 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/ahci.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
@@ -247,6 +247,26 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_pci_tbl[] = {
{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x3b2b), board_ahci }, /* PCH RAID */
{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x3b2c), board_ahci }, /* PCH RAID */
{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x3b2f), board_ahci }, /* PCH AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b0), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b1), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b2), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b3), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b4), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b5), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b6), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19b7), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19bE), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19bF), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c0), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c1), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c2), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c3), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c4), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c5), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c6), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19c7), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19cE), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x19cF), board_ahci }, /* DNV AHCI */
{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1c02), board_ahci }, /* CPT AHCI */
{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1c03), board_ahci }, /* CPT AHCI */
{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1c04), board_ahci }, /* CPT RAID */
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolai=20H=C3=A4hnle?= <[email protected]>
commit f6ff4f67cdf8455d0a4226eeeaf5af17c37d05eb upstream.
An arbitrary amount of time can pass between spin_unlock and
radeon_fence_wait_any, so we need to ensure that nobody frees the
fences from under us.
Based on the analogous fix for amdgpu.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Hähnle <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
index f0bac68..bb16684 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
@@ -349,8 +349,13 @@ int radeon_sa_bo_new(struct radeon_device *rdev,
/* see if we can skip over some allocations */
} while (radeon_sa_bo_next_hole(sa_manager, fences, tries));
+ for (i = 0; i < RADEON_NUM_RINGS; ++i)
+ radeon_fence_ref(fences[i]);
+
spin_unlock(&sa_manager->wq.lock);
r = radeon_fence_wait_any(rdev, fences, false);
+ for (i = 0; i < RADEON_NUM_RINGS; ++i)
+ radeon_fence_unref(&fences[i]);
spin_lock(&sa_manager->wq.lock);
/* if we have nothing to wait for block */
if (r == -ENOENT && block) {
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]>
commit 020bf042e5b397479c1174081b935d0ff15d1a64 upstream.
The channel checks the specified length and the provided amount of
data for CCWs and provides an incorrect length error if the size does
not match. Under z/VM with simulation activated the length may get
changed. Having the suppress length indication bit set is stated as
good CCW coding practice and avoids errors under z/VM.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
index a2597e6..d52d7a2 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ static int reset_summary_unit_check(struct alias_lcu *lcu,
ASCEBC((char *) &cqr->magic, 4);
ccw = cqr->cpaddr;
ccw->cmd_code = DASD_ECKD_CCW_RSCK;
- ccw->flags = 0 ;
+ ccw->flags = CCW_FLAG_SLI;
ccw->count = 16;
ccw->cda = (__u32)(addr_t) cqr->data;
((char *)cqr->data)[0] = reason;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit d6e022f1d207a161cd88e08ef0371554680ffc46 upstream.
When looking up the pool_workqueue to use for an unbound workqueue,
workqueue assumes that the target CPU is always bound to a valid NUMA
node. However, currently, when a CPU goes offline, the mapping is
destroyed and cpu_to_node() returns NUMA_NO_NODE.
This has always been broken but hasn't triggered often enough before
874bbfe600a6 ("workqueue: make sure delayed work run in local cpu").
After the commit, workqueue forcifully assigns the local CPU for
delayed work items without explicit target CPU to fix a different
issue. This widens the window where CPU can go offline while a
delayed work item is pending causing delayed work items dispatched
with target CPU set to an already offlined CPU. The resulting
NUMA_NO_NODE mapping makes workqueue try to queue the work item on a
NULL pool_workqueue and thus crash.
While 874bbfe600a6 has been reverted for a different reason making the
bug less visible again, it can still happen. Fix it by mapping
NUMA_NO_NODE to the default pool_workqueue from unbound_pwq_by_node().
This is a temporary workaround. The long term solution is keeping CPU
-> NODE mapping stable across CPU off/online cycles which is being
worked on.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Tang Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Cc: Len Brown <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/[email protected]
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
kernel/workqueue.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
index eb1cc22..de5ad5c 100644
--- a/kernel/workqueue.c
+++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
@@ -558,6 +558,16 @@ static struct pool_workqueue *unbound_pwq_by_node(struct workqueue_struct *wq,
int node)
{
assert_rcu_or_wq_mutex(wq);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: @node can be NUMA_NO_NODE if CPU goes offline while a
+ * delayed item is pending. The plan is to keep CPU -> NODE
+ * mapping valid and stable across CPU on/offlines. Once that
+ * happens, this workaround can be removed.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(node == NUMA_NO_NODE))
+ return wq->dfl_pwq;
+
return rcu_dereference_raw(wq->numa_pwq_tbl[node]);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 24db8bbaa3fcfaf0c2faccbff5864b58088ac1f6 upstream.
The kernel memory allocators already report the errors when the
requested allocation fails, thus we don't need to warn it again in
each caller side.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_fifo.c | 4 +---
sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c | 8 ++------
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c | 4 +---
sound/core/seq/seq_prioq.c | 4 +---
sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 4 +---
sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c | 4 +---
6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_fifo.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_fifo.c
index 0d75afa..42c9bd8 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_fifo.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_fifo.c
@@ -33,10 +33,8 @@ struct snd_seq_fifo *snd_seq_fifo_new(int poolsize)
struct snd_seq_fifo *f;
f = kzalloc(sizeof(*f), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (f == NULL) {
- snd_printd("malloc failed for snd_seq_fifo_new() \n");
+ if (!f)
return NULL;
- }
f->pool = snd_seq_pool_new(poolsize);
if (f->pool == NULL) {
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c
index f478f77..99eaf4a 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c
@@ -387,10 +387,8 @@ int snd_seq_pool_init(struct snd_seq_pool *pool)
return 0;
pool->ptr = vmalloc(sizeof(struct snd_seq_event_cell) * pool->size);
- if (pool->ptr == NULL) {
- snd_printd("seq: malloc for sequencer events failed\n");
+ if (!pool->ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
/* add new cells to the free cell list */
spin_lock_irqsave(&pool->lock, flags);
@@ -463,10 +461,8 @@ struct snd_seq_pool *snd_seq_pool_new(int poolsize)
/* create pool block */
pool = kzalloc(sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (pool == NULL) {
- snd_printd("seq: malloc failed for pool\n");
+ if (!pool)
return NULL;
- }
spin_lock_init(&pool->lock);
pool->ptr = NULL;
pool->free = NULL;
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
index 67c91d2..3bf67ec 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
@@ -141,10 +141,8 @@ struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
/* create a new port */
new_port = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_port), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (! new_port) {
- snd_printd("malloc failed for registering client port\n");
+ if (!new_port)
return NULL; /* failure, out of memory */
- }
/* init port data */
new_port->addr.client = client->number;
new_port->addr.port = -1;
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_prioq.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_prioq.c
index 29896ab..9d73507 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_prioq.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_prioq.c
@@ -59,10 +59,8 @@ struct snd_seq_prioq *snd_seq_prioq_new(void)
struct snd_seq_prioq *f;
f = kzalloc(sizeof(*f), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (f == NULL) {
- snd_printd("oops: malloc failed for snd_seq_prioq_new()\n");
+ if (!f)
return NULL;
- }
spin_lock_init(&f->lock);
f->head = NULL;
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
index 4c9aa46..77ec214 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
@@ -111,10 +111,8 @@ static struct snd_seq_queue *queue_new(int owner, int locked)
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
q = kzalloc(sizeof(*q), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (q == NULL) {
- snd_printd("malloc failed for snd_seq_queue_new()\n");
+ if (!q)
return NULL;
- }
spin_lock_init(&q->owner_lock);
spin_lock_init(&q->check_lock);
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
index 6ec30a9..e16b197 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
@@ -56,10 +56,8 @@ struct snd_seq_timer *snd_seq_timer_new(void)
struct snd_seq_timer *tmr;
tmr = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmr), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (tmr == NULL) {
- snd_printd("malloc failed for snd_seq_timer_new() \n");
+ if (!tmr)
return NULL;
- }
spin_lock_init(&tmr->lock);
/* reset setup to defaults */
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <[email protected]>
commit d061c1caa31d4d9792cfe48a2c6b309a0e01ef46 upstream.
Thomas reports:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=05c6 ProdID=6001 Rev=00.00
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=1234567890ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 21bf218..ed8a4c0 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1142,6 +1142,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(KYOCERA_VENDOR_ID, KYOCERA_PRODUCT_KPC650) },
{ USB_DEVICE(KYOCERA_VENDOR_ID, KYOCERA_PRODUCT_KPC680) },
{ USB_DEVICE(QUALCOMM_VENDOR_ID, 0x6000)}, /* ZTE AC8700 */
+ { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(QUALCOMM_VENDOR_ID, 0x6001, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff), /* 4G LTE usb-modem U901 */
+ .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&net_intf3_blacklist },
{ USB_DEVICE(QUALCOMM_VENDOR_ID, 0x6613)}, /* Onda H600/ZTE MF330 */
{ USB_DEVICE(QUALCOMM_VENDOR_ID, 0x0023)}, /* ONYX 3G device */
{ USB_DEVICE(QUALCOMM_VENDOR_ID, 0x9000)}, /* SIMCom SIM5218 */
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
commit e7a88e82fe380459b864e05b372638aeacb0f52d upstream.
The contract between try_read() and try_write() is that when called
each processes as much data as possible. When instructed by osd_client
to skip a message, try_read() is violating this contract by returning
after receiving and discarding a single message instead of checking for
more. try_write() then gets a chance to write out more requests,
generating more replies/skips for try_read() to handle, forcing the
messenger into a starvation loop.
Reported-by: Varada Kari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Varada Kari <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c
index 057017b..469f313 100644
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -2280,7 +2280,7 @@ static int read_partial_message(struct ceph_connection *con)
con->in_base_pos = -front_len - middle_len - data_len -
sizeof(m->footer);
con->in_tag = CEPH_MSGR_TAG_READY;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
} else if ((s64)seq - (s64)con->in_seq > 1) {
pr_err("read_partial_message bad seq %lld expected %lld\n",
seq, con->in_seq + 1);
@@ -2313,7 +2313,7 @@ static int read_partial_message(struct ceph_connection *con)
sizeof(m->footer);
con->in_tag = CEPH_MSGR_TAG_READY;
con->in_seq++;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
BUG_ON(!con->in_msg);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
commit 52a82e23b9f2a9e1d429c5207f8575784290d008 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Evgeny Cherkashin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
index 1465363..bb3969a 100644
--- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
+++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
@@ -697,6 +697,9 @@ static int iucv_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_IUCV)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_iucv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit fa0dc04df259ba2df3ce1920e9690c7842f8fa4b upstream.
Dmitry reported a struct pid leak detected by a syzkaller program.
Bug happens in unix_stream_recvmsg() when we break the loop when a
signal is pending, without properly releasing scm.
Fixes: b3ca9b02b007 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- use siocb->scm instead of &scm ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index e6b0213..496ce9c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2147,6 +2147,7 @@ again:
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
goto out;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Manfred Rudigier <[email protected]>
commit 81e8f2e930fe76b9814c71b9d87c30760b5eb705 upstream.
PHY status frames are not reliable, the PHY may not be able to send them
during heavy receive traffic. This overflow condition is signaled by the
PHY in the next status frame, but the driver did not make use of it.
Instead it always reported wrong tx timestamps to user space after an
overflow happened because it assigned newly received tx timestamps to old
packets in the queue.
This commit fixes this issue by clearing the tx timestamp queue every time
an overflow happens, so that no timestamps are delivered for overflow
packets. This way time stamping will continue correctly after an overflow.
Signed-off-by: Manfred Rudigier <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
index d2907a6..be37c04 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
@@ -698,6 +698,11 @@ static void decode_rxts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
{
struct rxts *rxts;
unsigned long flags;
+ u8 overflow;
+
+ overflow = (phy_rxts->ns_hi >> 14) & 0x3;
+ if (overflow)
+ pr_debug("rx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dp83640->rx_lock, flags);
@@ -721,6 +726,7 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps shhwtstamps;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u64 ns;
+ u8 overflow;
/* We must already have the skb that triggered this. */
@@ -730,6 +736,17 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
pr_debug("have timestamp but tx_queue empty\n");
return;
}
+
+ overflow = (phy_txts->ns_hi >> 14) & 0x3;
+ if (overflow) {
+ pr_debug("tx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
+ while (skb) {
+ skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, NULL);
+ skb = skb_dequeue(&dp83640->tx_queue);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
ns = phy2txts(phy_txts);
memset(&shhwtstamps, 0, sizeof(shhwtstamps));
shhwtstamps.hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime(ns);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit 1cdda91871470f15e79375991bd2eddc6e86ddb1 upstream.
Currently, the egress interface index specified via IPV6_PKTINFO
is ignored by __ip6_datagram_connect(), so that RFC 3542 section 6.7
can be subverted when the user space application calls connect()
before sendmsg().
Fix it by initializing properly flowi6_oif in connect() before
performing the route lookup.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 6e85cb9..28be769 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ ipv4_connected:
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
+ if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
+ fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
+
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
commit 9a368aff9cb370298fa02feeffa861f2db497c18 upstream.
Several times already this has been reported as kasan reports caused by
syzkaller and trinity and people always looked at RCU races, but it is
much more simple. :)
In case we bind a pptp socket multiple times, we simply add it to
the callid_sock list but don't remove the old binding. Thus the old
socket stays in the bucket with unused call_id indexes and doesn't get
cleaned up. This causes various forms of kasan reports which were hard
to pinpoint.
Simply don't allow multiple binds and correct error handling in
pptp_bind. Also keep sk_state bits in place in pptp_connect.
Fixes: 00959ade36acad ("PPTP: PPP over IPv4 (Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol)")
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
index 0710214..bb1ab1f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
@@ -131,24 +131,27 @@ static int lookup_chan_dst(u16 call_id, __be32 d_addr)
return i < MAX_CALLID;
}
-static int add_chan(struct pppox_sock *sock)
+static int add_chan(struct pppox_sock *sock,
+ struct pptp_addr *sa)
{
static int call_id;
spin_lock(&chan_lock);
- if (!sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id) {
+ if (!sa->call_id) {
call_id = find_next_zero_bit(callid_bitmap, MAX_CALLID, call_id + 1);
if (call_id == MAX_CALLID) {
call_id = find_next_zero_bit(callid_bitmap, MAX_CALLID, 1);
if (call_id == MAX_CALLID)
goto out_err;
}
- sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id = call_id;
- } else if (test_bit(sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id, callid_bitmap))
+ sa->call_id = call_id;
+ } else if (test_bit(sa->call_id, callid_bitmap)) {
goto out_err;
+ }
- set_bit(sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id, callid_bitmap);
- rcu_assign_pointer(callid_sock[sock->proto.pptp.src_addr.call_id], sock);
+ sock->proto.pptp.src_addr = *sa;
+ set_bit(sa->call_id, callid_bitmap);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(callid_sock[sa->call_id], sock);
spin_unlock(&chan_lock);
return 0;
@@ -417,7 +420,6 @@ static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
- struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
int error = 0;
if (sockaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppox))
@@ -425,10 +427,22 @@ static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
lock_sock(sk);
- opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
- if (add_chan(po))
+ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
+ error = -EALREADY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
error = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (add_chan(po, &sp->sa_addr.pptp))
+ error = -EBUSY;
+ else
+ sk->sk_state |= PPPOX_BOUND;
+out:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
@@ -499,7 +513,7 @@ static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
- sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
+ sk->sk_state |= PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream.
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 4 ++--
include/net/scm.h | 1 +
net/core/scm.c | 7 +++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
net/unix/garbage.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index e830c3d..7bb69c9 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
void unix_gc(void);
void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 262532d..59fa93c 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct scm_creds {
struct scm_fp_list {
short count;
short max;
+ struct user_struct *user;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index b442e7e..47a5515 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fplp = fpl;
fpl->count = 0;
fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+ fpl->user = NULL;
}
fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
@@ -107,6 +108,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fpp++ = file;
fpl->count++;
}
+
+ if (!fpl->user)
+ fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
return num;
}
@@ -119,6 +124,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
scm->fp = NULL;
for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+ free_uid(fpl->user);
kfree(fpl);
}
}
@@ -335,6 +341,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+ new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
}
return new_fpl;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 496ce9c..e00b572 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1532,7 +1532,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 06730fe..a72182d 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
* descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
*/
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -139,11 +139,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ user->unix_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hans Westgaard Ry <[email protected]>
commit 5f74f82ea34c0da80ea0b49192bb5ea06e063593 upstream.
Devices may have limits on the number of fragments in an skb they support.
Current codebase uses a constant as maximum for number of fragments one
skb can hold and use.
When enabling scatter/gather and running traffic with many small messages
the codebase uses the maximum number of fragments and may thereby violate
the max for certain devices.
The patch introduces a global variable as max number of fragments.
Signed-off-by: Hans Westgaard Ry <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 +
net/core/skbuff.c | 2 ++
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 090a81d..ab38ef2 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct sk_buff;
#else
#define MAX_SKB_FRAGS (65536/PAGE_SIZE + 1)
#endif
+extern int sysctl_max_skb_frags;
typedef struct skb_frag_struct skb_frag_t;
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index a6c16df..eb118c7 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache __read_mostly;
static struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_max_skb_frags __read_mostly = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_max_skb_frags);
/**
* skb_panic - private function for out-of-line support
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index f3413ae..d796239 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static int one = 1;
static int ushort_max = USHRT_MAX;
static int min_sndbuf = SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF;
static int min_rcvbuf = SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF;
+static int max_skb_frags = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
@@ -362,6 +363,15 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
+ {
+ .procname = "max_skb_frags",
+ .data = &sysctl_max_skb_frags,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &one,
+ .extra2 = &max_skb_frags,
+ },
{ }
};
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index fda904e..43f384d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ new_segment:
i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
can_coalesce = skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, page, offset);
- if (!can_coalesce && i >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
+ if (!can_coalesce && i >= sysctl_max_skb_frags) {
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ new_segment:
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
- if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS || !sg) {
+ if (i == sysctl_max_skb_frags || !sg) {
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
commit a5527dda344fff0514b7989ef7a755729769daa1 upstream.
The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either
established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an
unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the
specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or
because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of
the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In
both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which
might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock
the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk
check to guard against this.
Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index e00b572..3974413 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1716,7 +1716,12 @@ restart_locked:
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ /* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
+ */
+ if (other != sk &&
+ unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
if (timeo) {
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= <[email protected]>
commit aac8d3c282e024c344c5b86dc1eab7af88bb9716 upstream.
Thomas reports:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=05c6 ProdID=6001 Rev=00.00
S: Manufacturer=USB Modem
S: Product=USB Modem
S: SerialNumber=1234567890ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 7bd1716..67073e9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -535,6 +535,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
/* 3. Combined interface devices matching on interface number */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0408, 0xea42, 4)}, /* Yota / Megafon M100-1 */
+ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x6001, 3)}, /* 4G LTE usb-modem U901 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7000, 0)},
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7001, 1)},
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x05c6, 0x7002, 1)},
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 919483096bfe75dda338e98d56da91a263746a0a upstream.
Dmitry reported memory leaks of IP options allocated in
ip_cmsg_send() when/if this function returns an error.
Callers are responsible for the freeing.
Many thanks to Dmitry for the report and diagnostic.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 ++
net/ipv4/ping.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/raw.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 304cd16..73e8497 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ int ip_cmsg_send(struct net *net, struct msghdr *msg, struct ipcm_cookie *ipc)
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case IP_RETOPTS:
err = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr));
+
+ /* Our caller is responsible for freeing ipc->opt */
err = ip_options_get(net, &ipc->opt, CMSG_DATA(cmsg),
err < 40 ? err : 40);
if (err)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index 64735ad..fc15435 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -743,8 +743,10 @@ int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 3022aed..4bd8d30 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -525,8 +525,10 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
goto out;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index ccb5fbf..3dc61c4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -933,8 +933,10 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
+ }
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
connected = 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
commit 21a75f0915dde8674708b39abfcda113911c49b1 upstream.
The current logic in bond_arp_rcv will accept an incoming ARP for
validation if (a) the receiving slave is either "active" (which includes
the currently active slave, or the current ARP slave) or, (b) there is a
currently active slave, and it has received an ARP since it became active.
For case (b), the receiving slave isn't the currently active slave, and is
receiving the original broadcast ARP request, not an ARP reply from the
target.
This logic can fail if there is no currently active slave. In
this situation, the ARP probe logic cycles through all slaves, assigning
each in turn as the "current_arp_slave" for one arp_interval, then setting
that one as "active," and sending an ARP probe from that slave. The
current logic expects the ARP reply to arrive on the sending
current_arp_slave, however, due to switch FDB updating delays, the reply
may be directed to another slave.
This can arise if the bonding slaves and switch are working, but
the ARP target is not responding. When the ARP target recovers, a
condition may result wherein the ARP target host replies faster than the
switch can update its forwarding table, causing each ARP reply to be sent
to the previous current_arp_slave. This will never pass the logic in
bond_arp_rcv, as neither of the above conditions (a) or (b) are met.
Some experimentation on a LAN shows ARP reply round trips in the
200 usec range, but my available switches never update their FDB in less
than 4000 usec.
This patch changes the logic in bond_arp_rcv to additionally
accept an ARP reply for validation on any slave if there is a current ARP
slave and it sent an ARP probe during the previous arp_interval.
Fixes: aeea64ac717a ("bonding: don't trust arp requests unless active slave really works")
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backported to 3.13: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index 54d2dc4..f7788a1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ struct bond_parm_tbl ad_select_tbl[] = {
static int bond_init(struct net_device *bond_dev);
static void bond_uninit(struct net_device *bond_dev);
+static bool bond_time_in_interval(struct bonding *bond, unsigned long last_act,
+ int mod);
/*---------------------------- General routines -----------------------------*/
@@ -2334,6 +2336,7 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
struct slave *slave)
{
struct arphdr *arp = (struct arphdr *)skb->data;
+ struct slave *curr_arp_slave;
unsigned char *arp_ptr;
__be32 sip, tip;
int alen;
@@ -2378,17 +2381,29 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
bond->params.arp_validate, slave_do_arp_validate(bond, slave),
&sip, &tip);
- /*
- * Backup slaves won't see the ARP reply, but do come through
- * here for each ARP probe (so we swap the sip/tip to validate
- * the probe). In a "redundant switch, common router" type of
- * configuration, the ARP probe will (hopefully) travel from
- * the active, through one switch, the router, then the other
- * switch before reaching the backup.
+ curr_arp_slave = rcu_dereference(bond->current_arp_slave);
+
+ /* We 'trust' the received ARP enough to validate it if:
+ *
+ * (a) the slave receiving the ARP is active (which includes the
+ * current ARP slave, if any), or
*
- * We 'trust' the arp requests if there is an active slave and
- * it received valid arp reply(s) after it became active. This
- * is done to avoid endless looping when we can't reach the
+ * (b) the receiving slave isn't active, but there is a currently
+ * active slave and it received valid arp reply(s) after it became
+ * the currently active slave, or
+ *
+ * (c) there is an ARP slave that sent an ARP during the prior ARP
+ * interval, and we receive an ARP reply on any slave. We accept
+ * these because switch FDB update delays may deliver the ARP
+ * reply to a slave other than the sender of the ARP request.
+ *
+ * Note: for (b), backup slaves are receiving the broadcast ARP
+ * request, not a reply. This request passes from the sending
+ * slave through the L2 switch(es) to the receiving slave. Since
+ * this is checking the request, sip/tip are swapped for
+ * validation.
+ *
+ * This is done to avoid endless looping when we can't reach the
* arp_ip_target and fool ourselves with our own arp requests.
*/
if (bond_is_active_slave(slave))
@@ -2397,6 +2412,10 @@ int bond_arp_rcv(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond,
time_after(slave_last_rx(bond, bond->curr_active_slave),
bond->curr_active_slave->jiffies))
bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, tip, sip);
+ else if (curr_arp_slave && (arp->ar_op == htons(ARPOP_REPLY)) &&
+ bond_time_in_interval(bond,
+ dev_trans_start(curr_arp_slave->dev), 1))
+ bond_validate_arp(bond, slave, sip, tip);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
commit 1b92ee3d03af6643df395300ba7748f19ecdb0c5 upstream.
The present unix_stream_read_generic contains various code sequences of
the form
err = -EDISASTER;
if (<test>)
goto out;
This has the unfortunate side effect of possibly causing the error code
to bleed through to the final
out:
return copied ? : err;
and then to be wrongly returned if no data was copied because the caller
didn't supply a data buffer, as demonstrated by the program available at
http://pad.lv/1540731
Change it such that err is only set if an error condition was detected.
Fixes: 3822b5c2fc62 ("af_unix: Revert 'lock_interruptible' in stream receive code")
Reported-by: Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- modify unix_stream_recvmsg() instead of unix_stream_read_generic()
- adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3974413..17a824b 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2089,13 +2089,15 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
long timeo;
int skip;
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
+ }
- err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (flags&MSG_OOB)
+ if (unlikely(flags & MSG_OOB)) {
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
+ }
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock);
@@ -2143,9 +2145,11 @@ again:
goto unlock;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
- err = -EAGAIN;
- if (!timeo)
+ if (!timeo) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo, last);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
commit 34855706c30d52b0a744da44348b5d1cc39fbe51 upstream.
This avoids integer overflows on 32bit machines when calculating
reloc_info size, as reported by Alan Cox.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_ioctl.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_ioctl.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_ioctl.c
index 729debf..9400858 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_ioctl.c
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static int qxl_process_single_command(struct qxl_device *qdev,
cmd->command_size))
return -EFAULT;
- reloc_info = kmalloc(sizeof(struct qxl_reloc_info) * cmd->relocs_num, GFP_KERNEL);
+ reloc_info = kmalloc_array(cmd->relocs_num,
+ sizeof(struct qxl_reloc_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!reloc_info)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
commit 759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52 upstream.
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/pipe.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h | 4 ++++
include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
kernel/sysctl.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index 88152f2..302b5ed 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
- nr_open
- overflowuid
- overflowgid
+- pipe-user-pages-hard
+- pipe-user-pages-soft
- protected_hardlinks
- protected_symlinks
- suid_dumpable
@@ -159,6 +161,27 @@ The default is 65534.
==============================================================
+pipe-user-pages-hard:
+
+Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes.
+Once this limit is reached, no new pipes may be allocated until usage goes
+below the limit again. When set to 0, no limit is applied, which is the default
+setting.
+
+==============================================================
+
+pipe-user-pages-soft:
+
+Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes
+before the pipe size gets limited to a single page. Once this limit is reached,
+new pipes will be limited to a single page in size for this user in order to
+limit total memory usage, and trying to increase them using fcntl() will be
+denied until usage goes below the limit again. The default value allows to
+allocate up to 1024 pipes at their default size. When set to 0, no limit is
+applied.
+
+==============================================================
+
protected_hardlinks:
A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 3e7ab27..47f79ac 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576;
*/
unsigned int pipe_min_size = PAGE_SIZE;
+/* Maximum allocatable pages per user. Hard limit is unset by default, soft
+ * matches default values.
+ */
+unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard;
+unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS * INR_OPEN_CUR;
+
/*
* We use a start+len construction, which provides full use of the
* allocated memory.
@@ -791,20 +797,49 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
return retval;
}
+static void account_pipe_buffers(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
+ unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+ atomic_long_add(new - old, &pipe->user->pipe_bufs);
+}
+
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user)
+{
+ return pipe_user_pages_soft &&
+ atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_soft;
+}
+
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
+{
+ return pipe_user_pages_hard &&
+ atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
+}
+
struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe) {
- pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
+ unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
+ struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
+
+ if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
+ if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
+ pipe_bufs = 1;
+ pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * pipe_bufs, GFP_KERNEL);
+ }
+
if (pipe->bufs) {
init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
- pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
+ pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
+ pipe->user = user;
+ account_pipe_buffers(pipe, 0, pipe_bufs);
mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
return pipe;
}
+ free_uid(user);
kfree(pipe);
}
@@ -815,6 +850,8 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
+ account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, 0);
+ free_uid(pipe->user);
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
@@ -1205,6 +1242,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long nr_pages)
memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
}
+ account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
pipe->curbuf = 0;
kfree(pipe->bufs);
pipe->bufs = bufs;
@@ -1276,6 +1314,11 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
+ } else if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
+ too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
}
ret = pipe_set_size(pipe, nr_pages);
break;
diff --git a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
index ab57526..b3374f6 100644
--- a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
+++ b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct pipe_buffer {
* @fasync_readers: reader side fasync
* @fasync_writers: writer side fasync
* @bufs: the circular array of pipe buffers
+ * @user: the user who created this pipe
**/
struct pipe_inode_info {
struct mutex mutex;
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info {
struct fasync_struct *fasync_readers;
struct fasync_struct *fasync_writers;
struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
+ struct user_struct *user;
};
/*
@@ -140,6 +142,8 @@ void pipe_unlock(struct pipe_inode_info *);
void pipe_double_lock(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_inode_info *);
extern unsigned int pipe_max_size, pipe_min_size;
+extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard;
+extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft;
int pipe_proc_fn(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 3f3128b..7069678e 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ struct user_struct {
#endif
unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
+ atomic_long_t pipe_bufs; /* how many pages are allocated in pipe buffers */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index bbf0a95..3ac328e 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1654,6 +1654,20 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.proc_handler = &pipe_proc_fn,
.extra1 = &pipe_min_size,
},
+ {
+ .procname = "pipe-user-pages-hard",
+ .data = &pipe_user_pages_hard,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(pipe_user_pages_hard),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "pipe-user-pages-soft",
+ .data = &pipe_user_pages_soft,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(pipe_user_pages_soft),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+ },
{ }
};
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eugenia Emantayev <[email protected]>
commit 31c128b66e5b28f468076e4f3ca3025c35342041 upstream.
Previously, the shift value used for time-stamping was constant and didn't
depend on the HW chip frequency. Change that to take the frequency into account
and calculate the maximal value in cycles per wraparound of ten seconds. This
time slot was chosen since it gives a good accuracy in time synchronization.
Algorithm for shift value calculation:
* Round up the maximal value in cycles to nearest power of two
* Calculate maximal multiplier by division of all 64 bits set
to above result
* Then, invert the function clocksource_khz2mult() to get the shift from
maximal mult value
Fixes: ec693d47010e ('net/mlx4_en: Add HW timestamping (TS) support')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matan Barak <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
index fd64410..9180c7e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_clock.c
@@ -111,6 +111,24 @@ void mlx4_en_fill_hwtstamps(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev,
hwts->hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime(nsec);
}
+#define MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC 10ULL
+
+/* This function calculates the max shift that enables the user range
+ * of MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC values in the cycles register.
+ */
+static u32 freq_to_shift(u16 freq)
+{
+ u32 freq_khz = freq * 1000;
+ u64 max_val_cycles = freq_khz * 1000 * MLX4_EN_WRAP_AROUND_SEC;
+ u64 max_val_cycles_rounded = is_power_of_2(max_val_cycles + 1) ?
+ max_val_cycles : roundup_pow_of_two(max_val_cycles) - 1;
+ /* calculate max possible multiplier in order to fit in 64bit */
+ u64 max_mul = div_u64(0xffffffffffffffffULL, max_val_cycles_rounded);
+
+ /* This comes from the reverse of clocksource_khz2mult */
+ return ilog2(div_u64(max_mul * freq_khz, 1000000));
+}
+
void mlx4_en_init_timestamp(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev)
{
struct mlx4_dev *dev = mdev->dev;
@@ -119,12 +137,7 @@ void mlx4_en_init_timestamp(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev)
memset(&mdev->cycles, 0, sizeof(mdev->cycles));
mdev->cycles.read = mlx4_en_read_clock;
mdev->cycles.mask = CLOCKSOURCE_MASK(48);
- /* Using shift to make calculation more accurate. Since current HW
- * clock frequency is 427 MHz, and cycles are given using a 48 bits
- * register, the biggest shift when calculating using u64, is 14
- * (max_cycles * multiplier < 2^64)
- */
- mdev->cycles.shift = 14;
+ mdev->cycles.shift = freq_to_shift(dev->caps.hca_core_clock);
mdev->cycles.mult =
clocksource_khz2mult(1000 * dev->caps.hca_core_clock, mdev->cycles.shift);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
commit d9749fb5942f51555dc9ce1ac0dbb1806960a975 upstream.
Dmitry Vyukov noted recently that the sctp_port_hashtable had an error in
its size computation, observing that the current method never guaranteed
that the hashsize (measured in number of entries) would be a power of two,
which the input hash function for that table requires. The root cause of
the problem is that two values need to be computed (one, the allocation
order of the storage requries, as passed to __get_free_pages, and two the
number of entries for the hash table). Both need to be ^2, but for
different reasons, and the existing code is simply computing one order
value, and using it as the basis for both, which is wrong (i.e. it assumes
that ((1<<order)*PAGE_SIZE)/sizeof(bucket) is still ^2 when its not).
To fix this, we change the logic slightly. We start by computing a goal
allocation order (which is limited by the maximum size hash table we want
to support. Then we attempt to allocate that size table, decreasing the
order until a successful allocation is made. Then, with the resultant
successful order we compute the number of buckets that hash table supports,
which we then round down to the nearest power of two, giving us the number
of entries the table actually supports.
I've tested this locally here, using non-debug and spinlock-debug kernels,
and the number of entries in the hashtable consistently work out to be
powers of two in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
CC: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
CC: Vladislav Yasevich <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/protocol.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index 599757e..d8689fc 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
+#define MAX_SCTP_PORT_HASH_ENTRIES (64 * 1024)
+
/* Global data structures. */
struct sctp_globals sctp_globals __read_mostly;
@@ -1333,6 +1335,8 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
unsigned long limit;
int max_share;
int order;
+ int num_entries;
+ int max_entry_order;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct sctp_ulpevent) >
sizeof(((struct sk_buff *) 0)->cb));
@@ -1386,14 +1390,24 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
/* Size and allocate the association hash table.
* The methodology is similar to that of the tcp hash tables.
+ * Though not identical. Start by getting a goal size
*/
if (totalram_pages >= (128 * 1024))
goal = totalram_pages >> (22 - PAGE_SHIFT);
else
goal = totalram_pages >> (24 - PAGE_SHIFT);
- for (order = 0; (1UL << order) < goal; order++)
- ;
+ /* Then compute the page order for said goal */
+ order = get_order(goal);
+
+ /* Now compute the required page order for the maximum sized table we
+ * want to create
+ */
+ max_entry_order = get_order(MAX_SCTP_PORT_HASH_ENTRIES *
+ sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket));
+
+ /* Limit the page order by that maximum hash table size */
+ order = min(order, max_entry_order);
do {
sctp_assoc_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
@@ -1427,27 +1441,42 @@ static __init int sctp_init(void)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain);
}
- /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table. */
+ /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table.
+ * Note that order is initalized to start at the max sized
+ * table we want to support. If we can't get that many pages
+ * reduce the order and try again
+ */
do {
- sctp_port_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
- sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
- if ((sctp_port_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
- continue;
sctp_port_hashtable = (struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_port_hashtable && --order > 0);
+
if (!sctp_port_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed bind hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_bhash_alloc;
}
+
+ /* Now compute the number of entries that will fit in the
+ * port hash space we allocated
+ */
+ num_entries = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
+ sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
+
+ /* And finish by rounding it down to the nearest power of two
+ * this wastes some memory of course, but its needed because
+ * the hash function operates based on the assumption that
+ * that the number of entries is a power of two
+ */
+ sctp_port_hashsize = rounddown_pow_of_two(num_entries);
+
for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain);
}
- pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d)\n",
- sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize);
+ pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d/%d)\n",
+ sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize, num_entries);
sctp_sysctl_register();
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Anton Protopopov <[email protected]>
commit a97eb33ff225f34a8124774b3373fd244f0e83ce upstream.
An error response from a RTM_GETNETCONF request can return the positive
error value EINVAL in the struct nlmsgerr that can mislead userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index f4b34d8..6844710 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -1785,7 +1785,7 @@ static int inet_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index dd8b55b..c476142 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int inet6_netconf_get_devconf(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!tb[NETCONFA_IFINDEX])
goto errout;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
commit 29e73269aa4d36f92b35610c25f8b01c789b0dc8 upstream.
Drop reference on the relay_po socket when __pppoe_xmit() succeeds.
This is already handled correctly in the error path.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
index 1cfd4e8..ec98278 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ static int pppoe_rcv_core(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!__pppoe_xmit(sk_pppox(relay_po), skb))
goto abort_put;
+
+ sock_put(sk_pppox(relay_po));
} else {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
goto abort_kfree;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Amir Vadai <[email protected]>
commit 281e8b2fdf8e4ef366b899453cae50e09b577ada upstream.
RdropOvflw counts overrun of HW buffer, therefore should
be used for rx_fifo_errors only.
Currently RdropOvflw counter is mistakenly also set into
rx_missed_errors and rx_over_errors too, which makes the
device total dropped packets accounting to show wrong results.
Fix that. Use it for rx_fifo_errors only.
Fixes: c27a02cd94d6 ('mlx4_en: Add driver for Mellanox ConnectX 10GbE NIC')
Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
index dae1a1f..136eb5b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_port.c
@@ -171,11 +171,11 @@ int mlx4_en_DUMP_ETH_STATS(struct mlx4_en_dev *mdev, u8 port, u8 reset)
be64_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->MCAST_novlan);
stats->collisions = 0;
stats->rx_length_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropLength);
- stats->rx_over_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
+ stats->rx_over_errors = 0;
stats->rx_crc_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RCRC);
stats->rx_frame_errors = 0;
stats->rx_fifo_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
- stats->rx_missed_errors = be32_to_cpu(mlx4_en_stats->RdropOvflw);
+ stats->rx_missed_errors = 0;
stats->tx_aborted_errors = 0;
stats->tx_carrier_errors = 0;
stats->tx_fifo_errors = 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <[email protected]>
commit b5f0549231ffb025337be5a625b0ff9f52b016f0 upstream.
The value passed by unix_diag_get_exact to unix_lookup_by_ino has type
__u32, but unix_lookup_by_ino's argument ino has type int, which is not
a problem yet.
However, when ino is compared with sock_i_ino return value of type
unsigned long, ino is sign extended to signed long, and this results
to incorrect comparison on 64-bit architectures for inode numbers
greater than INT_MAX.
This bug was found by strace test suite.
Fixes: 5d3cae8bc39d ("unix_diag: Dumping exact socket core")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/unix/diag.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/diag.c b/net/unix/diag.c
index 86fa0f3..27dd3dc 100644
--- a/net/unix/diag.c
+++ b/net/unix/diag.c
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ done:
return skb->len;
}
-static struct sock *unix_lookup_by_ino(int ino)
+static struct sock *unix_lookup_by_ino(unsigned int ino)
{
int i;
struct sock *sk;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 44c3d0c1c0a880354e9de5d94175742e2c7c9683 upstream.
Silence lockdep false positive about rcu_dereference() being
used in the wrong context.
First one should use rcu_dereference_protected() as we own the spinlock.
Second one should be a normal assignation, as no barrier is needed.
Fixes: 18367681a10bd ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np->ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
index e7fb710..0d8b127 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
@@ -529,12 +529,13 @@ int ipv6_flowlabel_opt(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int optlen)
case IPV6_FL_A_PUT:
spin_lock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
for (sflp = &np->ipv6_fl_list;
- (sfl = rcu_dereference(*sflp))!=NULL;
+ (sfl = rcu_dereference_protected(*sflp,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ip6_sk_fl_lock))) != NULL;
sflp = &sfl->next) {
if (sfl->fl->label == freq.flr_label) {
if (freq.flr_label == (np->flow_label&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK))
np->flow_label &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
- *sflp = rcu_dereference(sfl->next);
+ *sflp = sfl->next;
spin_unlock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
fl_release(sfl->fl);
kfree_rcu(sfl, rcu);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
commit 27f7ed2b11d42ab6d796e96533c2076ec220affc upstream.
This patch extends commit b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side
for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension") as it didn't white list
SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY on sctp_msghdr_parse(), causing it to be
understood as an invalid flag and returning -EINVAL to the application.
Note that the actual handling of the flag is already there in
sctp_datamsg_from_user().
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7053#section-7
Fixes: b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- dropped changes to SCTP_SNDINFO case ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index d486356..fdd6a8305 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -6436,6 +6436,7 @@ static int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
/* Minimally, validate the sinfo_flags. */
if (cmsgs->info->sinfo_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
+ SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4 upstream.
Commit 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface")
disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop
limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition.
RFC 4861, 6.3.4. Processing Received Router Advertisements
A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time,
and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is
unspecified. In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the
host should continue using whatever value it is already using.
If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set
its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.
So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum
hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC
standards.
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 16 +++++++---------
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index b4be7fd..9a11e8d 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
@@ -1143,6 +1143,14 @@ accept_ra_defrtr - BOOLEAN
Functional default: enabled if accept_ra is enabled.
disabled if accept_ra is disabled.
+accept_ra_min_hop_limit - INTEGER
+ Minimum hop limit Information in Router Advertisement.
+
+ Hop limit Information in Router Advertisement less than this
+ variable shall be ignored.
+
+ Default: 1
+
accept_ra_pinfo - BOOLEAN
Learn Prefix Information in Router Advertisement.
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index c56c350..dc80edd 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct ipv6_devconf {
__s32 max_desync_factor;
__s32 max_addresses;
__s32 accept_ra_defrtr;
+ __s32 accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
__s32 accept_ra_pinfo;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
__s32 accept_ra_rtr_pref;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
index 593b0e3..f1d3214 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ enum {
DEVCONF_MLDV1_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL,
DEVCONF_MLDV2_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL,
DEVCONF_SUPPRESS_FRAG_NDISC,
+ DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT,
DEVCONF_MAX
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 2be400d..dd8b55b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf __read_mostly = {
.max_desync_factor = MAX_DESYNC_FACTOR,
.max_addresses = IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
.accept_ra_defrtr = 1,
+ .accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
.accept_ra_pinfo = 1,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 1,
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf_dflt __read_mostly = {
.max_desync_factor = MAX_DESYNC_FACTOR,
.max_addresses = IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
.accept_ra_defrtr = 1,
+ .accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
.accept_ra_pinfo = 1,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 1,
@@ -4125,6 +4127,7 @@ static inline void ipv6_store_devconf(struct ipv6_devconf *cnf,
array[DEVCONF_MAX_DESYNC_FACTOR] = cnf->max_desync_factor;
array[DEVCONF_MAX_ADDRESSES] = cnf->max_addresses;
array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_DEFRTR] = cnf->accept_ra_defrtr;
+ array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT] = cnf->accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_PINFO] = cnf->accept_ra_pinfo;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_RTR_PREF] = cnf->accept_ra_rtr_pref;
@@ -4864,6 +4867,13 @@ static struct addrconf_sysctl_table
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
+ .procname = "accept_ra_min_hop_limit",
+ .data = &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ {
.procname = "accept_ra_pinfo",
.data = &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_pinfo,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
index ac0bbe8..4e62e51 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
@@ -1190,18 +1190,16 @@ static void ndisc_router_discovery(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (rt)
rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + (HZ * lifetime));
- if (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
- /* Only set hop_limit on the interface if it is higher than
- * the current hop_limit.
- */
- if (in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit < ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+ if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 &&
+ ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+ if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit <= ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit;
+ if (rt)
+ dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
+ ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
} else {
- ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than current\n");
+ ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than minimum\n");
}
- if (rt)
- dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
- ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
}
skip_defrtr:
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit e62a123b8ef7c5dc4db2c16383d506860ad21b47 upstream.
Neal reported crashes with this stack trace :
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8c57231b>] tcp_v4_send_ack+0x41/0x20f
...
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000044005c000 CR4: 00000000001427e0
...
[<ffffffff8c57258e>] tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack+0xa5/0xb4
[<ffffffff8c1a7caa>] tcp_check_req+0x2ea/0x3e0
[<ffffffff8c19e420>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x850/0x2500
[<ffffffff8c1a6d21>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x141/0x330
[<ffffffff8c56cdb2>] sk_backlog_rcv+0x21/0x30
[<ffffffff8c098bbd>] tcp_recvmsg+0x75d/0xf90
[<ffffffff8c0a8700>] inet_recvmsg+0x80/0xa0
[<ffffffff8c17623e>] sock_aio_read+0xee/0x110
[<ffffffff8c066fcf>] do_sync_read+0x6f/0xa0
[<ffffffff8c0673a1>] SyS_read+0x1e1/0x290
[<ffffffff8c5ca262>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The problem here is the skb we provide to tcp_v4_send_ack() had to
be parked in the backlog of a new TCP fastopen child because this child
was owned by the user at the time an out of window packet arrived.
Before queuing a packet, TCP has to set skb->dev to NULL as the device
could disappear before packet is removed from the queue.
Fix this issue by using the net pointer provided by the socket (being a
timewait or a request socket).
IPv6 is immune to the bug : tcp_v6_send_response() already gets the net
pointer from the socket if provided.
Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path")
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Chu <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index fcb88df..98f3eb8 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -710,7 +710,8 @@ release_sk1:
outside socket context is ugly, certainly. What can I do?
*/
-static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
+static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct net *net,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
u32 win, u32 tsval, u32 tsecr, int oif,
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
int reply_flags, u8 tos)
@@ -725,7 +726,6 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack,
];
} rep;
struct ip_reply_arg arg;
- struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
memset(&rep.th, 0, sizeof(struct tcphdr));
memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
@@ -786,7 +786,8 @@ static void tcp_v4_timewait_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk);
struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk(sk);
- tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, tcptw->tw_snd_nxt, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
+ tcp_v4_send_ack(sock_net(sk), skb,
+ tcptw->tw_snd_nxt, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd >> tw->tw_rcv_wscale,
tcp_time_stamp + tcptw->tw_ts_offset,
tcptw->tw_ts_recent,
@@ -805,8 +806,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN -> for regular TCP_SYN_RECV
* sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV -> for Fast Open.
*/
- tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ?
- tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 : tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt,
+ u32 seq = (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ? tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 :
+ tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt;
+
+ tcp_v4_send_ack(sock_net(sk), skb, seq,
tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, req->rcv_wnd,
tcp_time_stamp,
req->ts_recent,
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit 7a84bd46647ff181eb2659fdc99590e6f16e501d upstream.
Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid") corrected the hmacid byte-order when setting a hmacid.
but the same issue also exists on getting a hmacid.
We fix it by changing hmacids to host order when users get them with
getsockopt.
Fixes: Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index fdd6a8305..2aac2d8 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5385,6 +5385,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
__u16 data_len = 0;
u32 num_idents;
+ int i;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
@@ -5402,8 +5403,12 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
return -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_user(p->shmac_idents, hmacs->hmac_ids, data_len))
- return -EFAULT;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_idents; i++) {
+ __u16 hmacid = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(&p->shmac_idents[i], &hmacid, sizeof(__u16)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
return 0;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit c80567c82ae4814a41287618e315a60ecf513be6 upstream.
... into returning a positive to path_openat(), which would interpret that
as "symlink had been encountered" and proceed to corrupt memory, etc.
It can only happen due to a bug in some ->open() instance or in some LSM
hook, etc., so we report any such event *and* make sure it doesn't trick
us into further unpleasantness.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/namei.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 3c87058..c8e698d 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3085,6 +3085,10 @@ opened:
goto exit_fput;
}
out:
+ if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ }
if (got_write)
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
path_put(&save_parent);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <[email protected]>
commit d045437a169f899dfb0f6f7ede24cc042543ced9 upstream.
The ftrace:function event is only displayed for parsing the function tracer
data. It is not used to enable function tracing, and does not include an
"enable" file in its event directory.
Originally, this event was kept separate from other events because it did
not have a ->reg parameter. But perf added a "reg" parameter for its use
which caused issues, because it made the event available to functions where
it was not compatible for.
Commit 9b63776fa3ca9 "tracing: Do not enable function event with enable"
added a TRACE_EVENT_FL_IGNORE_ENABLE flag that prevented the function event
from being enabled by normal trace events. But this commit missed keeping
the function event from being displayed by the "available_events" directory,
which is used to show what events can be enabled by set_event.
One documented way to enable all events is to:
cat available_events > set_event
But because the function event is displayed in the available_events, this
now causes an INVALID error:
cat: write error: Invalid argument
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <[email protected]>
Fixes: 9b63776fa3ca9 "tracing: Do not enable function event with enable"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
index 396c823..1a79aff 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
@@ -604,7 +604,8 @@ t_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
* The ftrace subsystem is for showing formats only.
* They can not be enabled or disabled via the event files.
*/
- if (call->class && call->class->reg)
+ if (call->class && call->class->reg &&
+ !(call->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_IGNORE_ENABLE))
return file;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
commit b6853f78e763d42c7a158d8de3549c9827c604ab upstream.
The delete opration can allocate additional space on the HPFS filesystem
due to btree split. The HPFS driver checks in advance if there is
available space, so that it won't corrupt the btree if we run out of space
during splitting.
If there is not enough available space, the HPFS driver attempted to
truncate the file, but this results in a deadlock since the commit
7dd29d8d865efdb00c0542a5d2c87af8c52ea6c7 ("HPFS: Introduce a global mutex
and lock it on every callback from VFS").
This patch removes the code that tries to truncate the file and -ENOSPC is
returned instead. If the user hits -ENOSPC on delete, he should try to
delete other files (that are stored in a leaf btree node), so that the
delete operation will make some space for deleting the file stored in
non-leaf btree node.
Reported-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/hpfs/namei.c | 31 +++----------------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/hpfs/namei.c b/fs/hpfs/namei.c
index 5f60bb2..12da295 100644
--- a/fs/hpfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/hpfs/namei.c
@@ -377,12 +377,11 @@ static int hpfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
dnode_secno dno;
int r;
- int rep = 0;
int err;
hpfs_lock(dir->i_sb);
hpfs_adjust_length(name, &len);
-again:
+
err = -ENOENT;
de = map_dirent(dir, hpfs_i(dir)->i_dno, name, len, &dno, &qbh);
if (!de)
@@ -402,33 +401,9 @@ again:
hpfs_error(dir->i_sb, "there was error when removing dirent");
err = -EFSERROR;
break;
- case 2: /* no space for deleting, try to truncate file */
-
+ case 2: /* no space for deleting */
err = -ENOSPC;
- if (rep++)
- break;
-
- dentry_unhash(dentry);
- if (!d_unhashed(dentry)) {
- hpfs_unlock(dir->i_sb);
- return -ENOSPC;
- }
- if (generic_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE) ||
- !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) ||
- get_write_access(inode)) {
- d_rehash(dentry);
- } else {
- struct iattr newattrs;
- /*printk("HPFS: truncating file before delete.\n");*/
- newattrs.ia_size = 0;
- newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME;
- err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
- put_write_access(inode);
- if (!err)
- goto again;
- }
- hpfs_unlock(dir->i_sb);
- return -ENOSPC;
+ break;
default:
drop_nlink(inode);
err = 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mike Krinkin <[email protected]>
commit 17e4bce0ae63c7e03f3c7fa8d80890e7af3d4971 upstream.
Ubsan reports the following warning due to a typo in
update_accessed_dirty_bits template, the patch fixes
the typo:
[ 168.791851] ================================================================================
[ 168.791862] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h:252:15
[ 168.791866] index 4 is out of range for type 'u64 [4]'
[ 168.791871] CPU: 0 PID: 2950 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G O L 4.5.0-rc5-next-20160222 #7
[ 168.791873] Hardware name: LENOVO 23205NG/23205NG, BIOS G2ET95WW (2.55 ) 07/09/2013
[ 168.791876] 0000000000000000 ffff8801cfcaf208 ffffffff81c9f780 0000000041b58ab3
[ 168.791882] ffffffff82eb2cc1 ffffffff81c9f6b4 ffff8801cfcaf230 ffff8801cfcaf1e0
[ 168.791886] 0000000000000004 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffffffffa1981600
[ 168.791891] Call Trace:
[ 168.791899] [<ffffffff81c9f780>] dump_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[ 168.791904] [<ffffffff81c9f6b4>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4
[ 168.791910] [<ffffffff81da9e81>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x8a
[ 168.791914] [<ffffffff81daafa2>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x15c/0x1a3
[ 168.791918] [<ffffffff81daae46>] ? __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x2bd/0x2bd
[ 168.791922] [<ffffffff811287ef>] ? get_user_pages_fast+0x2bf/0x360
[ 168.791954] [<ffffffffa1794050>] ? kvm_largepages_enabled+0x30/0x30 [kvm]
[ 168.791958] [<ffffffff81128530>] ? __get_user_pages_fast+0x360/0x360
[ 168.791987] [<ffffffffa181b818>] paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x1b28/0x2600 [kvm]
[ 168.792014] [<ffffffffa1819cf0>] ? init_kvm_mmu+0x1100/0x1100 [kvm]
[ 168.792019] [<ffffffff8129e350>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x350/0x350
[ 168.792044] [<ffffffffa1819cf0>] ? init_kvm_mmu+0x1100/0x1100 [kvm]
[ 168.792076] [<ffffffffa181c36d>] paging64_gva_to_gpa+0x7d/0x110 [kvm]
[ 168.792121] [<ffffffffa181c2f0>] ? paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x2600/0x2600 [kvm]
[ 168.792130] [<ffffffff812e848b>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x7b/0x90
[ 168.792178] [<ffffffffa17d9a4a>] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x27a/0x1150 [kvm]
[ 168.792208] [<ffffffffa1794d44>] ? __kvm_read_guest_page+0x54/0x70 [kvm]
[ 168.792234] [<ffffffffa17d97d0>] ? kvm_task_switch+0x160/0x160 [kvm]
[ 168.792238] [<ffffffff812e848b>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x7b/0x90
[ 168.792263] [<ffffffffa17daa07>] emulator_read_write+0xe7/0x6d0 [kvm]
[ 168.792290] [<ffffffffa183b620>] ? em_cr_write+0x230/0x230 [kvm]
[ 168.792314] [<ffffffffa17db005>] emulator_write_emulated+0x15/0x20 [kvm]
[ 168.792340] [<ffffffffa18465f8>] segmented_write+0xf8/0x130 [kvm]
[ 168.792367] [<ffffffffa1846500>] ? em_lgdt+0x20/0x20 [kvm]
[ 168.792374] [<ffffffffa14db512>] ? vmx_read_guest_seg_ar+0x42/0x1e0 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792400] [<ffffffffa1846d82>] writeback+0x3f2/0x700 [kvm]
[ 168.792424] [<ffffffffa1846990>] ? em_sidt+0xa0/0xa0 [kvm]
[ 168.792449] [<ffffffffa185554d>] ? x86_decode_insn+0x1b3d/0x4f70 [kvm]
[ 168.792474] [<ffffffffa1859032>] x86_emulate_insn+0x572/0x3010 [kvm]
[ 168.792499] [<ffffffffa17e71dd>] x86_emulate_instruction+0x3bd/0x2110 [kvm]
[ 168.792524] [<ffffffffa17e6e20>] ? reexecute_instruction.part.110+0x2e0/0x2e0 [kvm]
[ 168.792532] [<ffffffffa14e9a81>] handle_ept_misconfig+0x61/0x460 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792539] [<ffffffffa14e9a20>] ? handle_pause+0x450/0x450 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792546] [<ffffffffa15130ea>] vmx_handle_exit+0xd6a/0x1ad0 [kvm_intel]
[ 168.792572] [<ffffffffa17f6a6c>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xbdc/0x6090 [kvm]
[ 168.792597] [<ffffffffa17f6bcd>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xd3d/0x6090 [kvm]
[ 168.792621] [<ffffffffa17f6a6c>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xbdc/0x6090 [kvm]
[ 168.792627] [<ffffffff8293b530>] ? __ww_mutex_lock_interruptible+0x1630/0x1630
[ 168.792651] [<ffffffffa17f5e90>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable+0x4f0/0x4f0 [kvm]
[ 168.792656] [<ffffffff811eeb30>] ? preempt_notifier_unregister+0x190/0x190
[ 168.792681] [<ffffffffa17e0447>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x127/0x650 [kvm]
[ 168.792704] [<ffffffffa178e9a3>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x553/0xda0 [kvm]
[ 168.792727] [<ffffffffa178e450>] ? vcpu_put+0x40/0x40 [kvm]
[ 168.792732] [<ffffffff8129e350>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x350/0x350
[ 168.792735] [<ffffffff82946087>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 168.792740] [<ffffffff8163a943>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1673/0x2e40
[ 168.792744] [<ffffffff8129daa8>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x478/0x6c0
[ 168.792747] [<ffffffff8129dcfd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 168.792751] [<ffffffff812e848b>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x7b/0x90
[ 168.792756] [<ffffffff81725a80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b0/0x12b0
[ 168.792759] [<ffffffff817258d0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x210/0x210
[ 168.792763] [<ffffffff8174aef3>] ? __fget+0x273/0x4a0
[ 168.792766] [<ffffffff8174acd0>] ? __fget+0x50/0x4a0
[ 168.792770] [<ffffffff8174b1f6>] ? __fget_light+0x96/0x2b0
[ 168.792773] [<ffffffff81726bf9>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
[ 168.792777] [<ffffffff82946880>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
[ 168.792780] ================================================================================
Signed-off-by: Mike Krinkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
index 90c4570..3d7d3fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static int FNAME(update_accessed_dirty_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return ret;
mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, table_gfn);
- walker->ptes[level] = pte;
+ walker->ptes[level - 1] = pte;
}
return 0;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
commit d7444794a02ff655eda87e3cc54e86b940e7736f upstream.
In async_pf we try to allocate with NOWAIT to get an element quickly
or fail. This code also handle failures gracefully. Lets silence
potential page allocation failures under load.
qemu-system-s39: page allocation failure: order:0,mode:0x2200000
[...]
Call Trace:
([<00000000001146b8>] show_trace+0xf8/0x148)
[<000000000011476a>] show_stack+0x62/0xe8
[<00000000004a36b8>] dump_stack+0x70/0x98
[<0000000000272c3a>] warn_alloc_failed+0xd2/0x148
[<000000000027709e>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x94e/0xb38
[<00000000002cd36a>] new_slab+0x382/0x400
[<00000000002cf7ac>] ___slab_alloc.constprop.30+0x2dc/0x378
[<00000000002d03d0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[<0000000000133db4>] kvm_setup_async_pf+0x6c/0x198
[<000000000013dee8>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xd48/0xd58
[<000000000012fcaa>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x372/0x690
[<00000000002f66f6>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x3be/0x510
[<00000000002f68ec>] SyS_ioctl+0xa4/0xb8
[<0000000000781c5e>] system_call+0xd6/0x264
[<000003ffa24fa06a>] 0x3ffa24fa06a
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Dingel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
virt/kvm/async_pf.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/async_pf.c b/virt/kvm/async_pf.c
index f2c80d5..9190950 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/async_pf.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/async_pf.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int kvm_setup_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn,
* do alloc nowait since if we are going to sleep anyway we
* may as well sleep faulting in page
*/
- work = kmem_cache_zalloc(async_pf_cache, GFP_NOWAIT);
+ work = kmem_cache_zalloc(async_pf_cache, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!work)
return 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
commit b7052cd7bcf3c1478796e93e3dff2b44c9e82943 upstream.
The qword_get() function NUL-terminates its output buffer. If the input
string is in hex format \xXXXX... and the same length as the output
buffer, there is an off-by-one:
int qword_get(char **bpp, char *dest, int bufsize)
{
...
while (len < bufsize) {
...
*dest++ = (h << 4) | l;
len++;
}
...
*dest = '\0';
return len;
}
This patch ensures the NUL terminator doesn't fall outside the output
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/sunrpc/cache.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/cache.c b/net/sunrpc/cache.c
index 8a6e3b0..f3e2b7d 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/cache.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/cache.c
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ int qword_get(char **bpp, char *dest, int bufsize)
if (bp[0] == '\\' && bp[1] == 'x') {
/* HEX STRING */
bp += 2;
- while (len < bufsize) {
+ while (len < bufsize - 1) {
int h, l;
h = hex_to_bin(bp[0]);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Simon Guinot <[email protected]>
commit 59ceeaaf355fa0fb16558ef7c24413c804932ada upstream.
In __request_region, if a conflict with a BUSY and MUXED resource is
detected, then the caller goes to sleep and waits for the resource to be
released. A pointer on the conflicting resource is kept. At wake-up
this pointer is used as a parent to retry to request the region.
A first problem is that this pointer might well be invalid (if for
example the conflicting resource have already been freed). Another
problem is that the next call to __request_region() fails to detect a
remaining conflict. The previously conflicting resource is passed as a
parameter and __request_region() will look for a conflict among the
children of this resource and not at the resource itself. It is likely
to succeed anyway, even if there is still a conflict.
Instead, the parent of the conflicting resource should be passed to
__request_region().
As a fix, this patch doesn't update the parent resource pointer in the
case we have to wait for a muxed region right after.
Reported-and-tested-by: Vincent Pelletier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Guinot <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vincent Donnefort <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
kernel/resource.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
index 3f285dc..449282e 100644
--- a/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/kernel/resource.c
@@ -961,9 +961,10 @@ struct resource * __request_region(struct resource *parent,
if (!conflict)
break;
if (conflict != parent) {
- parent = conflict;
- if (!(conflict->flags & IORESOURCE_BUSY))
+ if (!(conflict->flags & IORESOURCE_BUSY)) {
+ parent = conflict;
continue;
+ }
}
if (conflict->flags & flags & IORESOURCE_MUXED) {
add_wait_queue(&muxed_resource_wait, &wait);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Lisa Du <[email protected]>
commit 7a64cd887fdb97f074c3fda03bee0bfb9faceac3 upstream.
There's one point was missed in the patch commit da49889deb34 ("staging:
binder: Support concurrent 32 bit and 64 bit processes."). When configure
BINDER_IPC_32BIT, the size of binder_uintptr_t was 32bits, but size of
void * is 64bit on 64bit system. Correct it here.
Signed-off-by: Lisa Du <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Boichat <[email protected]>
Fixes: da49889deb34 ("staging: binder: Support concurrent 32 bit and 64 bit processes.")
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- binder is still in staging in the 3.16 kernel]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/staging/android/binder.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/binder.c b/drivers/staging/android/binder.c
index 1432d95..c3997bd 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/binder.c
@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (get_user(cookie, (void __user * __user *)ptr))
return -EFAULT;
- ptr += sizeof(void *);
+ ptr += sizeof(cookie);
list_for_each_entry(w, &proc->delivered_death, entry) {
struct binder_ref_death *tmp_death = container_of(w, struct binder_ref_death, work);
if (tmp_death->cookie == cookie) {
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 74dae4278546b897eb81784fdfcce872ddd8b2b8 upstream.
Competing overwrite DIO in dioread_nolock mode will just overwrite
pointer to io_end in the inode. This may result in data corruption or
extent conversion happening from IO completion interrupt because we
don't properly set buffer_defer_completion() when unlocked DIO races
with locked DIO to unwritten extent.
Since unlocked DIO doesn't need io_end for anything, just avoid
allocating it and corrupting pointer from inode for locked DIO.
A cleaner fix would be to avoid these games with io_end pointer from the
inode but that requires more intrusive changes so we leave that for
later.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index 5fc5e63..ee51f12 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -3209,29 +3209,29 @@ static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(int rw, struct kiocb *iocb,
* case, we allocate an io_end structure to hook to the iocb.
*/
iocb->private = NULL;
- ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, NULL);
- if (!is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) {
- io_end = ext4_init_io_end(inode, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!io_end) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto retake_lock;
- }
- /*
- * Grab reference for DIO. Will be dropped in ext4_end_io_dio()
- */
- iocb->private = ext4_get_io_end(io_end);
- /*
- * we save the io structure for current async direct
- * IO, so that later ext4_map_blocks() could flag the
- * io structure whether there is a unwritten extents
- * needs to be converted when IO is completed.
- */
- ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, io_end);
- }
-
if (overwrite) {
get_block_func = ext4_get_block_write_nolock;
} else {
+ ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, NULL);
+ if (!is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) {
+ io_end = ext4_init_io_end(inode, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!io_end) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto retake_lock;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Grab reference for DIO. Will be dropped in
+ * ext4_end_io_dio()
+ */
+ iocb->private = ext4_get_io_end(io_end);
+ /*
+ * we save the io structure for current async direct
+ * IO, so that later ext4_map_blocks() could flag the
+ * io structure whether there is a unwritten extents
+ * needs to be converted when IO is completed.
+ */
+ ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, io_end);
+ }
get_block_func = ext4_get_block_write;
dio_flags = DIO_LOCKING;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Gerhard Uttenthaler <[email protected]>
commit 90cfde46586d2286488d8ed636929e936c0c9ab2 upstream.
This patch fixes the problem that more CAN messages could be sent to the
interface as could be send on the CAN bus. This was more likely for slow baud
rates. The sleeping _start_xmit was woken up in the _write_bulk_callback. Under
heavy TX load this produced another bulk transfer without checking the
free_slots variable and hence caused the overflow in the interface.
Signed-off-by: Gerhard Uttenthaler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c
index 8aeec0b..9d2ee05 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
*/
#define EMS_USB_ARM7_CLOCK 8000000
+#define CPC_TX_QUEUE_TRIGGER_LOW 25
+#define CPC_TX_QUEUE_TRIGGER_HIGH 35
+
/*
* CAN-Message representation in a CPC_MSG. Message object type is
* CPC_MSG_TYPE_CAN_FRAME or CPC_MSG_TYPE_RTR_FRAME or
@@ -279,6 +282,11 @@ static void ems_usb_read_interrupt_callback(struct urb *urb)
switch (urb->status) {
case 0:
dev->free_slots = dev->intr_in_buffer[1];
+ if(dev->free_slots > CPC_TX_QUEUE_TRIGGER_HIGH){
+ if (netif_queue_stopped(netdev)){
+ netif_wake_queue(netdev);
+ }
+ }
break;
case -ECONNRESET: /* unlink */
@@ -530,8 +538,6 @@ static void ems_usb_write_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
/* Release context */
context->echo_index = MAX_TX_URBS;
- if (netif_queue_stopped(netdev))
- netif_wake_queue(netdev);
}
/*
@@ -591,7 +597,7 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb *dev)
int err, i;
dev->intr_in_buffer[0] = 0;
- dev->free_slots = 15; /* initial size */
+ dev->free_slots = 50; /* initial size */
for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) {
struct urb *urb = NULL;
@@ -842,7 +848,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ems_usb_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ne
/* Slow down tx path */
if (atomic_read(&dev->active_tx_urbs) >= MAX_TX_URBS ||
- dev->free_slots < 5) {
+ dev->free_slots < CPC_TX_QUEUE_TRIGGER_LOW) {
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
}
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 13d5e5d4725c64ec06040d636832e78453f477b7 upstream.
The commit [7f0973e973cd: ALSA: seq: Fix lockdep warnings due to
double mutex locks] split the management of two linked lists (source
and destination) into two individual calls for avoiding the AB/BA
deadlock. However, this may leave the possible double deletion of one
of two lists when the counterpart is being deleted concurrently.
It ends up with a list corruption, as revealed by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch fixes it by checking the list emptiness and skipping the
deletion and the following process.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+bay9qsrz6dQu31EcGaH9XwfW7o3oBzSQUG9fMszoh=Sg@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 7f0973e973cd ('ALSA: seq: Fix lockdep warnings due to 'double mutex locks)
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
index 3bf67ec..0cb3c28 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
@@ -538,19 +538,22 @@ static void delete_and_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
bool is_src, bool ack)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp;
+ struct list_head *list;
+ bool empty;
grp = is_src ? &port->c_src : &port->c_dest;
+ list = is_src ? &subs->src_list : &subs->dest_list;
down_write(&grp->list_mutex);
write_lock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
- if (is_src)
- list_del(&subs->src_list);
- else
- list_del(&subs->dest_list);
+ empty = list_empty(list);
+ if (!empty)
+ list_del_init(list);
grp->exclusive = 0;
write_unlock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
up_write(&grp->list_mutex);
- unsubscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, ack);
+ if (!empty)
+ unsubscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, ack);
}
/* connect two ports */
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit ed8ad83808f009ade97ebbf6519bc3a97fefbc0c upstream.
ext4 can update bh->b_state non-atomically in _ext4_get_block() and
ext4_da_get_block_prep(). Usually this is fine since bh is just a
temporary storage for mapping information on stack but in some cases it
can be fully living bh attached to a page. In such case non-atomic
update of bh->b_state can race with an atomic update which then gets
lost. Usually when we are mapping bh and thus updating bh->b_state
non-atomically, nobody else touches the bh and so things work out fine
but there is one case to especially worry about: ext4_finish_bio() uses
BH_Uptodate_Lock on the first bh in the page to synchronize handling of
PageWriteback state. So when blocksize < pagesize, we can be atomically
modifying bh->b_state of a buffer that actually isn't under IO and thus
can race e.g. with delalloc trying to map that buffer. The result is
that we can mistakenly set / clear BH_Uptodate_Lock bit resulting in the
corruption of PageWriteback state or missed unlock of BH_Uptodate_Lock.
Fix the problem by always updating bh->b_state bits atomically.
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- replaced READ_ONCE() by ACCESS_ONCE() ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index 776de0e..5fc5e63 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -704,6 +704,34 @@ has_zeroout:
return retval;
}
+/*
+ * Update EXT4_MAP_FLAGS in bh->b_state. For buffer heads attached to pages
+ * we have to be careful as someone else may be manipulating b_state as well.
+ */
+static void ext4_update_bh_state(struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ unsigned long old_state;
+ unsigned long new_state;
+
+ flags &= EXT4_MAP_FLAGS;
+
+ /* Dummy buffer_head? Set non-atomically. */
+ if (!bh->b_page) {
+ bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | flags;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Someone else may be modifying b_state. Be careful! This is ugly but
+ * once we get rid of using bh as a container for mapping information
+ * to pass to / from get_block functions, this can go away.
+ */
+ do {
+ old_state = ACCESS_ONCE(bh->b_state);
+ new_state = (old_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | flags;
+ } while (unlikely(
+ cmpxchg(&bh->b_state, old_state, new_state) != old_state));
+}
+
/* Maximum number of blocks we map for direct IO at once. */
#define DIO_MAX_BLOCKS 4096
@@ -740,7 +768,7 @@ static int _ext4_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
ext4_io_end_t *io_end = ext4_inode_aio(inode);
map_bh(bh, inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);
- bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | map.m_flags;
+ ext4_update_bh_state(bh, map.m_flags);
if (io_end && io_end->flag & EXT4_IO_END_UNWRITTEN)
set_buffer_defer_completion(bh);
bh->b_size = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize * map.m_len;
@@ -1703,7 +1731,7 @@ int ext4_da_get_block_prep(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
return ret;
map_bh(bh, inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);
- bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | map.m_flags;
+ ext4_update_bh_state(bh, map.m_flags);
if (buffer_unwritten(bh)) {
/* A delayed write to unwritten bh should be marked
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>
commit d9dfd8d741683347ee159d25f5b50c346a0df557 upstream.
In the case where d_add_unique() finds an appropriate alias to use it will
have already incremented the reference count. An additional dget() to swap
the open context's dentry is unnecessary and will leak a reference.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>
Fixes: 275bb307865a3 ("NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index e2cff31..2962bbc 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -2184,9 +2184,9 @@ static int _nfs4_open_and_get_state(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata,
dentry = d_add_unique(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
if (dentry == NULL) {
dentry = opendata->dentry;
- } else if (dentry != ctx->dentry) {
+ } else {
dput(ctx->dentry);
- ctx->dentry = dget(dentry);
+ ctx->dentry = dentry;
}
nfs_set_verifier(dentry,
nfs_save_change_attribute(opendata->dir->d_inode));
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ken Lin <[email protected]>
commit 6627ae19385283b89356a199d7f03c75ba35fb29 upstream.
Add USB ID for cp2104/5 devices on GE B650v3 and B850v3 boards.
Signed-off-by: Ken Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Akshay Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
index 8971c2c..16b5d50 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1ADB, 0x0001) }, /* Schweitzer Engineering C662 Cable */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1B1C, 0x1C00) }, /* Corsair USB Dongle */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1BA4, 0x0002) }, /* Silicon Labs 358x factory default */
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Peter Rosin <[email protected]>
commit acc146943957d7418a6846f06e029b2c5e87e0d5 upstream.
Make the divisor signed as DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST is undefined for negative
dividends when the divisor is unsigned.
Signed-off-by: Peter Rosin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hwmon/ads1015.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/ads1015.c b/drivers/hwmon/ads1015.c
index 1265164..44223f5 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/ads1015.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/ads1015.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int ads1015_reg_to_mv(struct i2c_client *client, unsigned int channel,
struct ads1015_data *data = i2c_get_clientdata(client);
unsigned int pga = data->channel_data[channel].pga;
int fullscale = fullscale_table[pga];
- const unsigned mask = data->id == ads1115 ? 0x7fff : 0x7ff0;
+ const int mask = data->id == ads1115 ? 0x7fff : 0x7ff0;
return DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(reg * fullscale, mask);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
commit bc3f5d8c4ca01555820617eb3b6c0857e4df710d upstream.
We need to use post-decrement to get the pci_map_page undone also for
i==0, and to avoid some very unpleasant behaviour if pci_map_page
failed already at i==0.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
index 02d3c38..f5931e5 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static int radeon_ttm_tt_populate(struct ttm_tt *ttm)
0, PAGE_SIZE,
PCI_DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (pci_dma_mapping_error(rdev->pdev, gtt->ttm.dma_address[i])) {
- while (--i) {
+ while (i--) {
pci_unmap_page(rdev->pdev, gtt->ttm.dma_address[i],
PAGE_SIZE, PCI_DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
gtt->ttm.dma_address[i] = 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrey Skvortsov <[email protected]>
commit 3158a8d416f4e1b79dcc867d67cb50013140772c upstream.
$ lsusb:
Bus 001 Device 101: ID 1e0e:9001 Qualcomm / Option
$ usb-devices:
T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#=101 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 2
P: Vendor=1e0e ProdID=9001 Rev= 2.32
S: Manufacturer=SimTech, Incorporated
S: Product=SimTech, Incorporated
S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:* If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I:* If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
The last interface (6) is used for Android Composite ADB interface.
Serial port layout:
0: QCDM/DIAG
1: NMEA
2: AT
3: AT/PPP
4: audio
Signed-off-by: Andrey Skvortsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 1f193fd..21bf218 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb);
#define TOSHIBA_PRODUCT_G450 0x0d45
#define ALINK_VENDOR_ID 0x1e0e
+#define SIMCOM_PRODUCT_SIM7100E 0x9001 /* Yes, ALINK_VENDOR_ID */
#define ALINK_PRODUCT_PH300 0x9100
#define ALINK_PRODUCT_3GU 0x9200
@@ -617,6 +618,10 @@ static const struct option_blacklist_info zte_1255_blacklist = {
.reserved = BIT(3) | BIT(4),
};
+static const struct option_blacklist_info simcom_sim7100e_blacklist = {
+ .reserved = BIT(5) | BIT(6),
+};
+
static const struct option_blacklist_info telit_le910_blacklist = {
.sendsetup = BIT(0),
.reserved = BIT(1) | BIT(2),
@@ -1654,6 +1659,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(ALINK_VENDOR_ID, 0x9000) },
{ USB_DEVICE(ALINK_VENDOR_ID, ALINK_PRODUCT_PH300) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ALINK_VENDOR_ID, ALINK_PRODUCT_3GU, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(ALINK_VENDOR_ID, SIMCOM_PRODUCT_SIM7100E),
+ .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&simcom_sim7100e_blacklist },
{ USB_DEVICE(ALCATEL_VENDOR_ID, ALCATEL_PRODUCT_X060S_X200),
.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&alcatel_x200_blacklist
},
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit b33c8ff4431a343561e2319f17c14286f2aa52e2 upstream.
In my randconfig tests, I came across a bug that involves several
components:
* gcc-4.9 through at least 5.3
* CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL enabling -fprofile-arcs for all files
* CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES overriding every if()
* The optimized implementation of do_div() that tries to
replace a library call with an division by multiplication
* code in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.c doing
u32 adc_clock = 450560; /* 45.056 MHz */
if (state->config.adc_clock)
adc_clock = state->config.adc_clock;
do_div(value, adc_clock);
In this case, gcc fails to determine whether the divisor
in do_div() is __builtin_constant_p(). In particular, it
concludes that __builtin_constant_p(adc_clock) is false, while
__builtin_constant_p(!!adc_clock) is true.
That in turn throws off the logic in do_div() that also uses
__builtin_constant_p(), and instead of picking either the
constant- optimized division, and the code in ilog2() that uses
__builtin_constant_p() to figure out whether it knows the answer at
compile time. The result is a link error from failing to find
multiple symbols that should never have been called based on
the __builtin_constant_p():
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `____ilog2_NaN'
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `__aeabi_uldivmod'
ERROR: "____ilog2_NaN" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "__aeabi_uldivmod" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
This patch avoids the problem by changing __trace_if() to check
whether the condition is known at compile-time to be nonzero, rather
than checking whether it is actually a constant.
I see this one link error in roughly one out of 1600 randconfig builds
on ARM, and the patch fixes all known instances.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Fixes: ab3c9c686e22 ("branch tracer, intel-iommu: fix build with CONFIG_BRANCH_TRACER=y")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index a2329c5..a2ce6f8 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_branch_data *f, int val, int expect);
*/
#define if(cond, ...) __trace_if( (cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) )
#define __trace_if(cond) \
- if (__builtin_constant_p((cond)) ? !!(cond) : \
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(!!(cond)) ? !!(cond) : \
({ \
int ______r; \
static struct ftrace_branch_data \
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <[email protected]>
commit f37755490fe9bf76f6ba1d8c6591745d3574a6a6 upstream.
The tracepoint infrastructure uses RCU sched protection to enable and
disable tracepoints safely. There are some instances where tracepoints are
used in infrastructure code (like kfree()) that get called after a CPU is
going offline, and perhaps when it is coming back online but hasn't been
registered yet.
This can probuce the following warning:
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.4.0-00006-g0fe53e8-dirty #34 Tainted: G S
-------------------------------
include/trace/events/kmem.h:141 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
RCU used illegally from offline CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by swapper/8/0.
stack backtrace:
CPU: 8 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8 Tainted: G S 4.4.0-00006-g0fe53e8-dirty #34
Call Trace:
[c0000005b76c78d0] [c0000000008b9540] .dump_stack+0x98/0xd4 (unreliable)
[c0000005b76c7950] [c00000000010c898] .lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x108/0x170
[c0000005b76c79e0] [c00000000029adc0] .kfree+0x390/0x440
[c0000005b76c7a80] [c000000000055f74] .destroy_context+0x44/0x100
[c0000005b76c7b00] [c0000000000934a0] .__mmdrop+0x60/0x150
[c0000005b76c7b90] [c0000000000e3ff0] .idle_task_exit+0x130/0x140
[c0000005b76c7c20] [c000000000075804] .pseries_mach_cpu_die+0x64/0x310
[c0000005b76c7cd0] [c000000000043e7c] .cpu_die+0x3c/0x60
[c0000005b76c7d40] [c0000000000188d8] .arch_cpu_idle_dead+0x28/0x40
[c0000005b76c7db0] [c000000000101e6c] .cpu_startup_entry+0x50c/0x560
[c0000005b76c7ed0] [c000000000043bd8] .start_secondary+0x328/0x360
[c0000005b76c7f90] [c000000000008a6c] start_secondary_prolog+0x10/0x14
This warning is not a false positive either. RCU is not protecting code that
is being executed while the CPU is offline.
Instead of playing "whack-a-mole(TM)" and adding conditional statements to
the tracepoints we find that are used in this instance, simply add a
cpu_online() test to the tracepoint code where the tracepoint will be
ignored if the CPU is offline.
Use of raw_smp_processor_id() is fine, as there should never be a case where
the tracepoint code goes from running on a CPU that is online and suddenly
gets migrated to a CPU that is offline.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: Denis Kirjanov <[email protected]>
Fixes: 97e1c18e8d17b ("tracing: Kernel Tracepoints")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- included linux/percpu.h as suggested by Steven for other stable kernels ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/tracepoint.h | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/tracepoint.h b/include/linux/tracepoint.h
index bbed018..95b15ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/tracepoint.h
+++ b/include/linux/tracepoint.h
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@
* See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
+#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/static_key.h>
@@ -126,6 +129,9 @@ static inline void tracepoint_synchronize_unregister(void)
void *it_func; \
void *__data; \
\
+ if (!cpu_online(raw_smp_processor_id())) \
+ return; \
+ \
if (!(cond)) \
return; \
prercu; \
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit d99a36f4728fcbcc501b78447f625bdcce15b842 upstream.
When multiple concurrent writes happen on the ALSA sequencer device
right after the open, it may try to allocate vmalloc buffer for each
write and leak some of them. It's because the presence check and the
assignment of the buffer is done outside the spinlock for the pool.
The fix is to move the check and the assignment into the spinlock.
(The current implementation is suboptimal, as there can be multiple
unnecessary vmallocs because the allocation is done before the check
in the spinlock. But the pool size is already checked beforehand, so
this isn't a big problem; that is, the only possible path is the
multiple writes before any pool assignment, and practically seen, the
current coverage should be "good enough".)
The issue was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+bSzazpXNvtAr=WXaL8hptqjHwqEyFA+VN2AWEx=aurkg@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c
index 99eaf4a..36c46e6 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c
@@ -383,15 +383,20 @@ int snd_seq_pool_init(struct snd_seq_pool *pool)
if (snd_BUG_ON(!pool))
return -EINVAL;
- if (pool->ptr) /* should be atomic? */
- return 0;
- pool->ptr = vmalloc(sizeof(struct snd_seq_event_cell) * pool->size);
- if (!pool->ptr)
+ cellptr = vmalloc(sizeof(struct snd_seq_event_cell) * pool->size);
+ if (!cellptr)
return -ENOMEM;
/* add new cells to the free cell list */
spin_lock_irqsave(&pool->lock, flags);
+ if (pool->ptr) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
+ vfree(cellptr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pool->ptr = cellptr;
pool->free = NULL;
for (cell = 0; cell < pool->size; cell++) {
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit 8d47065f7d1980dde52abb874b301054f3013602 upstream.
Commit 408fb0e5aa7fda0059db282ff58c3b2a4278baa0 (xen/pciback: Don't
allow MSI-X ops if PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY is not set) prevented enabling
MSI-X on passed-through virtual functions, because it checked the VF
for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY but this is not a valid bit for VFs.
Instead, check the physical function for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
index f64b7f5..a2da466 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
@@ -227,8 +227,9 @@ int xen_pcibk_enable_msix(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
/*
* PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY must be enabled, otherwise we may not be able
* to access the BARs where the MSI-X entries reside.
+ * But VF devices are unique in which the PF needs to be checked.
*/
- pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
+ pci_read_config_word(pci_physfn(dev), PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
if (dev->msi_enabled || !(cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY))
return -ENXIO;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit d159457b84395927b5a52adb72f748dd089ad5e5 upstream.
Commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 (xen/pciback: Save
xen_pci_op commands before processing it) broke enabling MSI-X because
it would never copy the resulting vectors into the response. The
number of vectors requested was being overwritten by the return value
(typically zero for success).
Save the number of vectors before processing the op, so the correct
number of vectors are copied afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
index a2da466..69f0d4d 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
@@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data = NULL;
struct xen_pci_op *op = &pdev->op;
int test_intx = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MSI
+ unsigned int nr = 0;
+#endif
*op = pdev->sh_info->op;
barrier();
@@ -361,6 +364,7 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
op->err = xen_pcibk_disable_msi(pdev, dev, op);
break;
case XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix:
+ nr = op->value;
op->err = xen_pcibk_enable_msix(pdev, dev, op);
break;
case XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msix:
@@ -383,7 +387,7 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
if (op->cmd == XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix && op->err == 0) {
unsigned int i;
- for (i = 0; i < op->value; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
pdev->sh_info->op.msix_entries[i].vector =
op->msix_entries[i].vector;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit ee1cdcdae59563535485a5f56ee72c894ab7d7ad upstream.
The commit 2895b2cad6e7 ("dmaengine: dw: fix cyclic transfer callbacks")
re-enabled BLOCK interrupts with regard to make cyclic transfers work. However,
this change becomes a regression for non-cyclic transfers as interrupt counters
under stress test had been grown enormously (approximately per 4-5 bytes in the
UART loop back test).
Taking into consideration above enable BLOCK interrupts if and only if channel
is programmed to perform cyclic transfer.
Fixes: 2895b2cad6e7 ("dmaengine: dw: fix cyclic transfer callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mans Rullgard <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mans Rullgard <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/dma/dw/core.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/dma/dw/core.c b/drivers/dma/dw/core.c
index 029a086..618653f 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/dw/core.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/dw/core.c
@@ -169,7 +169,6 @@ static void dwc_initialize(struct dw_dma_chan *dwc)
/* Enable interrupts */
channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.XFER, dwc->mask);
- channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.BLOCK, dwc->mask);
channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.ERROR, dwc->mask);
dwc->initialized = true;
@@ -593,6 +592,9 @@ static void dwc_handle_cyclic(struct dw_dma *dw, struct dw_dma_chan *dwc,
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
}
+
+ /* Re-enable interrupts */
+ channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.BLOCK, dwc->mask);
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
@@ -623,11 +625,8 @@ static void dw_dma_tasklet(unsigned long data)
dwc_scan_descriptors(dw, dwc);
}
- /*
- * Re-enable interrupts.
- */
+ /* Re-enable interrupts */
channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.XFER, dw->all_chan_mask);
- channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.BLOCK, dw->all_chan_mask);
channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.ERROR, dw->all_chan_mask);
}
@@ -1219,6 +1218,7 @@ static void dwc_free_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *chan)
int dw_dma_cyclic_start(struct dma_chan *chan)
{
struct dw_dma_chan *dwc = to_dw_dma_chan(chan);
+ struct dw_dma *dw = to_dw_dma(chan->device);
unsigned long flags;
if (!test_bit(DW_DMA_IS_CYCLIC, &dwc->flags)) {
@@ -1227,7 +1227,12 @@ int dw_dma_cyclic_start(struct dma_chan *chan)
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
+
+ /* Enable interrupts to perform cyclic transfer */
+ channel_set_bit(dw, MASK.BLOCK, dwc->mask);
+
dwc_dostart(dwc, dwc->cdesc->desc[0]);
+
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
return 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit 4d8c8bd6f2062c9988817183a91fe2e623c8aa5e upstream.
Occasionaly PV guests would crash with:
pciback 0000:00:00.1: Xen PCI mapped GSI0 to IRQ16
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000d1a8c0be0
.. snip..
<ffffffff8139ce1b>] find_next_bit+0xb/0x10
[<ffffffff81387f22>] cpumask_next_and+0x22/0x40
[<ffffffff813c1ef8>] pci_device_probe+0xb8/0x120
[<ffffffff81529097>] ? driver_sysfs_add+0x77/0xa0
[<ffffffff815293e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1a4/0x2d0
[<ffffffff813c1ddd>] ? pci_match_device+0xdd/0x110
[<ffffffff81529657>] __device_attach_driver+0xa7/0xb0
[<ffffffff815295b0>] ? __driver_attach+0xa0/0xa0
[<ffffffff81527622>] bus_for_each_drv+0x62/0x90
[<ffffffff8152978d>] __device_attach+0xbd/0x110
[<ffffffff815297fb>] device_attach+0xb/0x10
[<ffffffff813b75ac>] pci_bus_add_device+0x3c/0x70
[<ffffffff813b7618>] pci_bus_add_devices+0x38/0x80
[<ffffffff813dc34e>] pcifront_scan_root+0x13e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff817a0692>] pcifront_backend_changed+0x262/0x60b
[<ffffffff814644c6>] ? xenbus_gather+0xd6/0x160
[<ffffffff8120900f>] ? put_object+0x2f/0x50
[<ffffffff81465c1d>] xenbus_otherend_changed+0x9d/0xa0
[<ffffffff814678ee>] backend_changed+0xe/0x10
[<ffffffff81463a28>] xenwatch_thread+0xc8/0x190
[<ffffffff810f22f0>] ? woken_wake_function+0x10/0x10
which was the result of two things:
When we call pci_scan_root_bus we would pass in 'sd' (sysdata)
pointer which was an 'pcifront_sd' structure. However in the
pci_device_add it expects that the 'sd' is 'struct sysdata' and
sets the dev->node to what is in sd->node (offset 4):
set_dev_node(&dev->dev, pcibus_to_node(bus));
__pcibus_to_node(const struct pci_bus *bus)
{
const struct pci_sysdata *sd = bus->sysdata;
return sd->node;
}
However our structure was pcifront_sd which had nothing at that
offset:
struct pcifront_sd {
int domain; /* 0 4 */
/* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */
struct pcifront_device * pdev; /* 8 8 */
}
That is an hole - filled with garbage as we used kmalloc instead of
kzalloc (the second problem).
This patch fixes the issue by:
1) Use kzalloc to initialize to a well known state.
2) Put 'struct pci_sysdata' at the start of 'pcifront_sd'. That
way access to the 'node' will access the right offset.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c b/drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c
index eae7cd9..facd18c 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct pcifront_device {
};
struct pcifront_sd {
- int domain;
+ struct pci_sysdata sd;
struct pcifront_device *pdev;
};
@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ static inline void pcifront_init_sd(struct pcifront_sd *sd,
unsigned int domain, unsigned int bus,
struct pcifront_device *pdev)
{
- sd->domain = domain;
+ /* Because we do not expose that information via XenBus. */
+ sd->sd.node = first_online_node;
+ sd->sd.domain = domain;
sd->pdev = pdev;
}
@@ -464,8 +466,8 @@ static int pcifront_scan_root(struct pcifront_device *pdev,
dev_info(&pdev->xdev->dev, "Creating PCI Frontend Bus %04x:%02x\n",
domain, bus);
- bus_entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*bus_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- sd = kmalloc(sizeof(*sd), GFP_KERNEL);
+ bus_entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*bus_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ sd = kzalloc(sizeof(*sd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bus_entry || !sd) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]>
commit 9d862ababb609439c5d6987f6d3ddd09e703aa0b upstream.
Add refcount to the DASD device when a summary unit check worker is
scheduled. This prevents that the device is set offline with worker
in place.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
index d52d7a2..6a64e86 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_alias.c
@@ -264,8 +264,10 @@ void dasd_alias_disconnect_device_from_lcu(struct dasd_device *device)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lcu->lock, flags);
cancel_work_sync(&lcu->suc_data.worker);
spin_lock_irqsave(&lcu->lock, flags);
- if (device == lcu->suc_data.device)
+ if (device == lcu->suc_data.device) {
+ dasd_put_device(device);
lcu->suc_data.device = NULL;
+ }
}
was_pending = 0;
if (device == lcu->ruac_data.device) {
@@ -273,8 +275,10 @@ void dasd_alias_disconnect_device_from_lcu(struct dasd_device *device)
was_pending = 1;
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&lcu->ruac_data.dwork);
spin_lock_irqsave(&lcu->lock, flags);
- if (device == lcu->ruac_data.device)
+ if (device == lcu->ruac_data.device) {
+ dasd_put_device(device);
lcu->ruac_data.device = NULL;
+ }
}
private->lcu = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lcu->lock, flags);
@@ -549,8 +553,10 @@ static void lcu_update_work(struct work_struct *work)
if ((rc && (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)) || (lcu->flags & NEED_UAC_UPDATE)) {
DBF_DEV_EVENT(DBF_WARNING, device, "could not update"
" alias data in lcu (rc = %d), retry later", rc);
- schedule_delayed_work(&lcu->ruac_data.dwork, 30*HZ);
+ if (!schedule_delayed_work(&lcu->ruac_data.dwork, 30*HZ))
+ dasd_put_device(device);
} else {
+ dasd_put_device(device);
lcu->ruac_data.device = NULL;
lcu->flags &= ~UPDATE_PENDING;
}
@@ -593,8 +599,10 @@ static int _schedule_lcu_update(struct alias_lcu *lcu,
*/
if (!usedev)
return -EINVAL;
+ dasd_get_device(usedev);
lcu->ruac_data.device = usedev;
- schedule_delayed_work(&lcu->ruac_data.dwork, 0);
+ if (!schedule_delayed_work(&lcu->ruac_data.dwork, 0))
+ dasd_put_device(usedev);
return 0;
}
@@ -926,6 +934,7 @@ static void summary_unit_check_handling_work(struct work_struct *work)
/* 3. read new alias configuration */
_schedule_lcu_update(lcu, device);
lcu->suc_data.device = NULL;
+ dasd_put_device(device);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lcu->lock, flags);
}
@@ -985,6 +994,8 @@ void dasd_alias_handle_summary_unit_check(struct dasd_device *device,
}
lcu->suc_data.reason = reason;
lcu->suc_data.device = device;
+ dasd_get_device(device);
spin_unlock(&lcu->lock);
- schedule_work(&lcu->suc_data.worker);
+ if (!schedule_work(&lcu->suc_data.worker))
+ dasd_put_device(device);
};
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
commit 2d99b55d378c996b9692a0c93dd25f4ed5d58934 upstream.
Commit 35dc248383bbab0a7203fca4d722875bc81ef091 introduced a check for
current->mm to see if we have a user space context and only copies data
if we do. Now if an IO gets interrupted by a signal data isn't copied
into user space any more (as we don't have a user space context) but
user space isn't notified about it.
This patch modifies the behaviour to return -EINTR from bio_uncopy_user()
to notify userland that a signal has interrupted the syscall, otherwise
it could lead to a situation where the caller may get a buffer with
no data returned.
This can be reproduced by issuing SG_IO ioctl()s in one thread while
constantly sending signals to it.
[js] backport to 3.12
Fixes: 35dc248 [SCSI] sg: Fix user memory corruption when SG_IO is interrupted by a signal
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/bio.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/bio.c b/fs/bio.c
index 33d79a4..99367f4 100644
--- a/fs/bio.c
+++ b/fs/bio.c
@@ -1051,15 +1051,19 @@ int bio_uncopy_user(struct bio *bio)
if (!bio_flagged(bio, BIO_NULL_MAPPED)) {
/*
* if we're in a workqueue, the request is orphaned, so
- * don't copy into a random user address space, just free.
+ * don't copy into a random user address space, just free
+ * and return -EINTR so user space doesn't expect any data.
*/
if (current->mm)
ret = __bio_copy_iov(bio, bmd->iovecs, bmd->sgvecs,
bmd->nr_sgvecs, bio_data_dir(bio) == READ,
0, bmd->is_our_pages);
- else if (bmd->is_our_pages)
- bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, i)
- __free_page(bvec->bv_page);
+ else {
+ ret = -EINTR;
+ if (bmd->is_our_pages)
+ bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, i)
+ __free_page(bvec->bv_page);
+ }
}
bio_free_map_data(bmd);
bio_put(bio);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
commit bcff24887d00bce102e0857d7b0a8c44a40f53d1 upstream.
I notice ext4/307 fails occasionally on ppc64 host, reporting md5
checksum mismatch after moving data from original file to donor file.
The reason is that move_extent_per_page() calls __block_write_begin()
and block_commit_write() to write saved data from original inode blocks
to donor inode blocks, but __block_write_begin() not only maps buffer
heads but also reads block content from disk if the size is not block
size aligned. At this time the physical block number in mapped buffer
head is pointing to the donor file not the original file, and that
results in reading wrong data to page, which get written to disk in
following block_commit_write call.
This also can be reproduced by the following script on 1k block size ext4
on x86_64 host:
mnt=/mnt/ext4
donorfile=$mnt/donor
testfile=$mnt/testfile
e4compact=~/xfstests/src/e4compact
rm -f $donorfile $testfile
# reserve space for donor file, written by 0xaa and sync to disk to
# avoid EBUSY on EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT
xfs_io -fc "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 1m" -c "fsync" $donorfile
# create test file written by 0xbb
xfs_io -fc "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 1023" -c "fsync" $testfile
# compute initial md5sum
md5sum $testfile | tee md5sum.txt
# drop cache, force e4compact to read data from disk
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
# test defrag
echo "$testfile" | $e4compact -i -v -f $donorfile
# check md5sum
md5sum -c md5sum.txt
Fix it by creating & mapping buffer heads only but not reading blocks
from disk, because all the data in page is guaranteed to be up-to-date
in mext_page_mkuptodate().
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/move_extent.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c
index 773b503..66c1449 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c
@@ -915,10 +915,11 @@ move_extent_per_page(struct file *o_filp, struct inode *donor_inode,
unsigned long blocksize = orig_inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned int w_flags = 0;
unsigned int tmp_data_size, data_size, replaced_size;
- int err2, jblocks, retries = 0;
+ int i, err2, jblocks, retries = 0;
int replaced_count = 0;
int from = data_offset_in_page << orig_inode->i_blkbits;
int blocks_per_page = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE >> orig_inode->i_blkbits;
+ struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
/*
* It needs twice the amount of ordinary journal buffers because
@@ -1027,8 +1028,16 @@ data_copy:
}
/* Perform all necessary steps similar write_begin()/write_end()
* but keeping in mind that i_size will not change */
- *err = __block_write_begin(pagep[0], from, replaced_size,
- ext4_get_block);
+ if (!page_has_buffers(pagep[0]))
+ create_empty_buffers(pagep[0], 1 << orig_inode->i_blkbits, 0);
+ bh = page_buffers(pagep[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < data_offset_in_page; i++)
+ bh = bh->b_this_page;
+ for (i = 0; i < block_len_in_page; i++) {
+ *err = ext4_get_block(orig_inode, orig_blk_offset + i, bh, 0);
+ if (*err < 0)
+ break;
+ }
if (!*err)
*err = block_commit_write(pagep[0], from, from + replaced_size);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Sterba <[email protected]>
commit bc4ef7592f657ae81b017207a1098817126ad4cb upstream.
The value of ctx->pos in the last readdir call is supposed to be set to
INT_MAX due to 32bit compatibility, unless 'pos' is intentially set to a
larger value, then it's LLONG_MAX.
There's a report from PaX SIZE_OVERFLOW plugin that "ctx->pos++"
overflows (https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=4284), on a
64bit arch, where the value is 0x7fffffffffffffff ie. LLONG_MAX before
the increment.
We can get to that situation like that:
* emit all regular readdir entries
* still in the same call to readdir, bump the last pos to INT_MAX
* next call to readdir will not emit any entries, but will reach the
bump code again, finds pos to be INT_MAX and sets it to LLONG_MAX
Normally this is not a problem, but if we call readdir again, we'll find
'pos' set to LLONG_MAX and the unconditional increment will overflow.
The report from Victor at
(http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.btrfs/49500) with debugging
print shows that pattern:
Overflow: e
Overflow: 7fffffff
Overflow: 7fffffffffffffff
PAX: size overflow detected in function btrfs_real_readdir
fs/btrfs/inode.c:5760 cicus.935_282 max, count: 9, decl: pos; num: 0;
context: dir_context;
CPU: 0 PID: 2630 Comm: polkitd Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec #1
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. H81ND2H/H81ND2H, BIOS F3 08/11/2015
ffffffff81901608 0000000000000000 ffffffff819015e6 ffffc90004973d48
ffffffff81742f0f 0000000000000007 ffffffff81901608 ffffc90004973d78
ffffffff811cb706 0000000000000000 ffff8800d47359e0 ffffc90004973ed8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81742f0f>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x7f
[<ffffffff811cb706>] report_size_overflow+0x36/0x40
[<ffffffff812ef0bc>] btrfs_real_readdir+0x69c/0x6d0
[<ffffffff811dafc8>] iterate_dir+0xa8/0x150
[<ffffffff811e6d8d>] ? __fget_light+0x2d/0x70
[<ffffffff811dba3a>] SyS_getdents+0xba/0x1c0
Overflow: 1a
[<ffffffff811db070>] ? iterate_dir+0x150/0x150
[<ffffffff81749b69>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x83
The jump from 7fffffff to 7fffffffffffffff happens when new dir entries
are not yet synced and are processed from the delayed list. Then the code
could go to the bump section again even though it might not emit any new
dir entries from the delayed list.
The fix avoids entering the "bump" section again once we've finished
emitting the entries, both for synced and delayed entries.
References: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=4284
Reported-by: Victor <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c | 3 ++-
fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.h | 2 +-
fs/btrfs/inode.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c b/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c
index 8d292fb..fdaeb1c 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c
@@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ int btrfs_should_delete_dir_index(struct list_head *del_list,
*
*/
int btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(struct dir_context *ctx,
- struct list_head *ins_list)
+ struct list_head *ins_list, bool *emitted)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_delayed_item *curr, *next;
@@ -1710,6 +1710,7 @@ int btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(struct dir_context *ctx,
if (over)
return 1;
+ *emitted = true;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.h b/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.h
index a4b38f9..6d01e37 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ void btrfs_put_delayed_items(struct list_head *ins_list,
int btrfs_should_delete_dir_index(struct list_head *del_list,
u64 index);
int btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(struct dir_context *ctx,
- struct list_head *ins_list);
+ struct list_head *ins_list, bool *emitted);
/* for init */
int __init btrfs_delayed_inode_init(void);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
index e5ede86..6bc2412 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
@@ -5086,6 +5086,7 @@ static int btrfs_real_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
char *name_ptr;
int name_len;
int is_curr = 0; /* ctx->pos points to the current index? */
+ bool emitted;
/* FIXME, use a real flag for deciding about the key type */
if (root->fs_info->tree_root == root)
@@ -5114,6 +5115,7 @@ static int btrfs_real_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
+ emitted = false;
while (1) {
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
@@ -5193,6 +5195,7 @@ skip:
if (over)
goto nopos;
+ emitted = true;
di_len = btrfs_dir_name_len(leaf, di) +
btrfs_dir_data_len(leaf, di) + sizeof(*di);
di_cur += di_len;
@@ -5205,11 +5208,20 @@ next:
if (key_type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY) {
if (is_curr)
ctx->pos++;
- ret = btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(ctx, &ins_list);
+ ret = btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(ctx, &ins_list, &emitted);
if (ret)
goto nopos;
}
+ /*
+ * If we haven't emitted any dir entry, we must not touch ctx->pos as
+ * it was was set to the termination value in previous call. We assume
+ * that "." and ".." were emitted if we reach this point and set the
+ * termination value as well for an empty directory.
+ */
+ if (ctx->pos > 2 && !emitted)
+ goto nopos;
+
/* Reached end of directory/root. Bump pos past the last item. */
ctx->pos++;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Insu Yun <[email protected]>
commit 46901760b46064964b41015d00c140c83aa05bcf upstream.
Since sizeof(ext_new_group_data) > sizeof(ext_new_flex_group_data),
integer overflow could be happened.
Therefore, need to fix integer overflow sanitization.
Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/resize.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c
index 831cb30..ae8ce49 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static struct ext4_new_flex_group_data *alloc_flex_gd(unsigned long flexbg_size)
if (flex_gd == NULL)
goto out3;
- if (flexbg_size >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct ext4_new_flex_group_data))
+ if (flexbg_size >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct ext4_new_group_data))
goto out2;
flex_gd->count = flexbg_size;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
commit e972c37459c813190461dabfeaac228e00aae259 upstream.
Since the dawn of time the ICST code has only supported divide
by one or hang in an eternal loop. Luckily we were always dividing
by one because the reference frequency for the systems using
the ICSTs is 24MHz and the [min,max] values for the PLL input
if [10,320] MHz for ICST307 and [6,200] for ICST525, so the loop
will always terminate immediately without assigning any divisor
for the reference frequency.
But for the code to make sense, let's insert the missing i++
Reported-by: David Binderman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/common/icst.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/common/icst.c b/arch/arm/common/icst.c
index d3c0e69..d7ed252 100644
--- a/arch/arm/common/icst.c
+++ b/arch/arm/common/icst.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ icst_hz_to_vco(const struct icst_params *p, unsigned long freq)
if (f > p->vco_min && f <= p->vco_max)
break;
+ i++;
} while (i < 8);
if (i >= 8)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Anton Protopopov <[email protected]>
commit 4b550af519854421dfec9f7732cdddeb057134b2 upstream.
The setup_ntlmv2_rsp() function may return positive value ENOMEM instead
of -ENOMEM in case of kmalloc failure.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 3299778..0bd335a 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
- rc = ENOMEM;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
ses->auth_key.len = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
commit b241d31ef2f6a289d33dcaa004714b26e06f476f upstream.
Otherwise rmmod omap2430; rmmod phy-twl4030-usb; modprobe omap2430
will try to use a non-existing phy and oops:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address b6f7c1f0
...
[<c048a284>] (devm_usb_get_phy_by_node) from [<bf0758ac>]
(omap2430_musb_init+0x44/0x2b4 [omap2430])
[<bf0758ac>] (omap2430_musb_init [omap2430]) from [<bf055ec0>]
(musb_init_controller+0x194/0x878 [musb_hdrc])
Cc: Bin Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>
Cc: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/phy/phy-twl4030-usb.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/phy-twl4030-usb.c b/drivers/phy/phy-twl4030-usb.c
index 70b513a..5f429d5 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/phy-twl4030-usb.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/phy-twl4030-usb.c
@@ -740,6 +740,7 @@ static int twl4030_usb_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
struct twl4030_usb *twl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
int val;
+ usb_remove_phy(&twl->phy);
cancel_delayed_work(&twl->id_workaround_work);
device_remove_file(twl->dev, &dev_attr_vbus);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit ed8b1d6d2c741ab26d60d499d7fbb7ac801f0f51 upstream.
A slave timer element also unlinks at snd_timer_stop() but it takes
only slave_active_lock. When a slave is assigned to a master,
however, this may become a race against the master's interrupt
handling, eventually resulting in a list corruption. The actual bug
could be seen with a syzkaller fuzzer test case in BugLink below.
As a fix, we need to take timeri->timer->lock when timer isn't NULL,
i.e. assigned to a master, while the assignment to a master itself is
protected by slave_active_lock.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y_Bm+7epAb=8Wi=AaWd+DYS7qawX52qxdCfOfY49vozQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 44cbdde..cbb127b 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -511,9 +511,13 @@ static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
return -EBUSY;
}
+ if (timeri->timer)
+ spin_lock(&timeri->timer->lock);
timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
+ if (timeri->timer)
+ spin_unlock(&timeri->timer->lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
}
goto __end;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit ddce57a6f0a2d8d1bfacfa77f06043bc760403c2 upstream.
Currently the selected timer backend is referred at any moment from
the running PCM callbacks. When the backend is switched, it's
possible to lead to inconsistency from the running backend. This was
pointed by syzkaller fuzzer, and the commit [7ee96216c31a: ALSA:
dummy: Disable switching timer backend via sysfs] disabled the dynamic
switching for avoiding the crash.
This patch improves the handling of timer backend switching. It keeps
the reference to the selected backend during the whole operation of an
opened stream so that it won't be changed by other streams.
Together with this change, the hrtimer parameter is reenabled as
writable now.
NOTE: this patch also turned out to fix the still remaining race.
Namely, ops was still replaced dynamically at dummy_pcm_open:
static int dummy_pcm_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
....
dummy->timer_ops = &dummy_systimer_ops;
if (hrtimer)
dummy->timer_ops = &dummy_hrtimer_ops;
Since dummy->timer_ops is common among all streams, and when the
replacement happens during accesses of other streams, it may lead to a
crash. This was actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer and KASAN.
This patch rewrites the code not to use the ops shared by all streams
any longer, too.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+aZ+xisrpuM6cOXbL21DuM0yVxPYXf4cD4Md9uw0C3dBQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/drivers/dummy.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/drivers/dummy.c b/sound/drivers/dummy.c
index f4d626c..8946cef 100644
--- a/sound/drivers/dummy.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/dummy.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(pcm_substreams, "PCM substreams # (1-128) for dummy driver.");
module_param(fake_buffer, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(fake_buffer, "Fake buffer allocations.");
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS
-module_param(hrtimer, bool, 0444);
+module_param(hrtimer, bool, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(hrtimer, "Use hrtimer as the timer source.");
#endif
@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ struct dummy_timer_ops {
snd_pcm_uframes_t (*pointer)(struct snd_pcm_substream *);
};
+#define get_dummy_ops(substream) \
+ (*(const struct dummy_timer_ops **)(substream)->runtime->private_data)
+
struct dummy_model {
const char *name;
int (*playback_constraints)(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime);
@@ -137,7 +140,6 @@ struct snd_dummy {
int iobox;
struct snd_kcontrol *cd_volume_ctl;
struct snd_kcontrol *cd_switch_ctl;
- const struct dummy_timer_ops *timer_ops;
};
/*
@@ -231,6 +233,8 @@ struct dummy_model *dummy_models[] = {
*/
struct dummy_systimer_pcm {
+ /* ops must be the first item */
+ const struct dummy_timer_ops *timer_ops;
spinlock_t lock;
struct timer_list timer;
unsigned long base_time;
@@ -368,6 +372,8 @@ static struct dummy_timer_ops dummy_systimer_ops = {
*/
struct dummy_hrtimer_pcm {
+ /* ops must be the first item */
+ const struct dummy_timer_ops *timer_ops;
ktime_t base_time;
ktime_t period_time;
atomic_t running;
@@ -494,31 +500,25 @@ static struct dummy_timer_ops dummy_hrtimer_ops = {
static int dummy_pcm_trigger(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd)
{
- struct snd_dummy *dummy = snd_pcm_substream_chip(substream);
-
switch (cmd) {
case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START:
case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME:
- return dummy->timer_ops->start(substream);
+ return get_dummy_ops(substream)->start(substream);
case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP:
case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_SUSPEND:
- return dummy->timer_ops->stop(substream);
+ return get_dummy_ops(substream)->stop(substream);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static int dummy_pcm_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
- struct snd_dummy *dummy = snd_pcm_substream_chip(substream);
-
- return dummy->timer_ops->prepare(substream);
+ return get_dummy_ops(substream)->prepare(substream);
}
static snd_pcm_uframes_t dummy_pcm_pointer(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
- struct snd_dummy *dummy = snd_pcm_substream_chip(substream);
-
- return dummy->timer_ops->pointer(substream);
+ return get_dummy_ops(substream)->pointer(substream);
}
static struct snd_pcm_hardware dummy_pcm_hardware = {
@@ -564,17 +564,19 @@ static int dummy_pcm_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
struct snd_dummy *dummy = snd_pcm_substream_chip(substream);
struct dummy_model *model = dummy->model;
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ const struct dummy_timer_ops *ops;
int err;
- dummy->timer_ops = &dummy_systimer_ops;
+ ops = &dummy_systimer_ops;
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS
if (hrtimer)
- dummy->timer_ops = &dummy_hrtimer_ops;
+ ops = &dummy_hrtimer_ops;
#endif
- err = dummy->timer_ops->create(substream);
+ err = ops->create(substream);
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ get_dummy_ops(substream) = ops;
runtime->hw = dummy->pcm_hw;
if (substream->pcm->device & 1) {
@@ -596,7 +598,7 @@ static int dummy_pcm_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
err = model->capture_constraints(substream->runtime);
}
if (err < 0) {
- dummy->timer_ops->free(substream);
+ get_dummy_ops(substream)->free(substream);
return err;
}
return 0;
@@ -604,8 +606,7 @@ static int dummy_pcm_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
static int dummy_pcm_close(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
- struct snd_dummy *dummy = snd_pcm_substream_chip(substream);
- dummy->timer_ops->free(substream);
+ get_dummy_ops(substream)->free(substream);
return 0;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
commit 00cd29b799e3449f0c68b1cc77cd4a5f95b42d17 upstream.
The starting node for a klist iteration is often passed in from
somewhere way above the klist infrastructure, meaning there's no
guarantee the node is still on the list. We've seen this in SCSI where
we use bus_find_device() to iterate through a list of devices. In the
face of heavy hotplug activity, the last device returned by
bus_find_device() can be removed before the next call. This leads to
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28073 at include/linux/kref.h:47 klist_iter_init_node+0x3d/0x50()
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Modules linked in: scsi_debug x86_pkg_temp_thermal kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crc32c_intel joydev iTCO_wdt dcdbas ipmi_devintf acpi_power_meter iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si imsghandler pcspkr wmi acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis tpm shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core nfsd nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc tg3 ptp pps_core
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 28073 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.4.0-rc1+ #2
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R320/08VT7V, BIOS 2.0.22 11/19/2013
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffffffff81a20e77 ffff880613acfd18 ffffffff81321eef 0000000000000000
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffff880613acfd50 ffffffff8107ca52 ffff88061176b198 0000000000000000
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffffffff814542b0 ffff880610cfb100 ffff88061176b198 ffff880613acfd60
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Call Trace:
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff81321eef>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff8107ca52>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff814542b0>] ? proc_scsi_show+0x20/0x20
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff8107cb4a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff8167225d>] klist_iter_init_node+0x3d/0x50
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff81421d41>] bus_find_device+0x51/0xb0
Dec 3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [<ffffffff814545ad>] scsi_seq_next+0x2d/0x40
[...]
And an eventual crash. It can actually occur in any hotplug system
which has a device finder and a starting device.
We can fix this globally by making sure the starting node for
klist_iter_init_node() is actually a member of the list before using it
(and by starting from the beginning if it isn't).
Reported-by: Ewan D. Milne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ewan D. Milne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
lib/klist.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/klist.c b/lib/klist.c
index 358a368a..2e59aec 100644
--- a/lib/klist.c
+++ b/lib/klist.c
@@ -282,9 +282,9 @@ void klist_iter_init_node(struct klist *k, struct klist_iter *i,
struct klist_node *n)
{
i->i_klist = k;
- i->i_cur = n;
- if (n)
- kref_get(&n->n_ref);
+ i->i_cur = NULL;
+ if (n && kref_get_unless_zero(&n->n_ref))
+ i->i_cur = n;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(klist_iter_init_node);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit c44d9b1181cf34e0860c72cc8a00e0c47417aac0 upstream.
Some Sony VAIO AiO models (VGC-JS4EF and VGC-JS25G, both with PCI SSID
104d:9044) need the same quirk to make the speaker working properly.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112031
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
index add04b5..facc57f 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -2217,6 +2217,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc882_fixup_tbl[] = {
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x9047, "Sony Vaio TT", ALC889_FIXUP_VAIO_TT),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x905a, "Sony Vaio Z", ALC882_FIXUP_NO_PRIMARY_HP),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x9043, "Sony Vaio VGC-LN51JGB", ALC882_FIXUP_NO_PRIMARY_HP),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x104d, 0x9044, "Sony VAIO AiO", ALC882_FIXUP_NO_PRIMARY_HP),
/* All Apple entries are in codec SSIDs */
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x106b, 0x00a0, "MacBookPro 3,1", ALC889_FIXUP_MBP_VREF),
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Herton R. Krzesinski" <[email protected]>
commit 1f55c718c290616889c04946864a13ef30f64929 upstream.
Considering current pty code and multiple devpts instances, it's possible
to umount a devpts file system while a program still has /dev/tty opened
pointing to a previosuly closed pty pair in that instance. In the case all
ptmx and pts/N files are closed, umount can be done. If the program closes
/dev/tty after umount is done, devpts_kill_index will use now an invalid
super_block, which was already destroyed in the umount operation after
running ->kill_sb. This is another "use after free" type of issue, but now
related to the allocated super_block instance.
To avoid the problem (warning at ida_remove and potential crashes) for
this specific case, I added two functions in devpts which grabs additional
references to the super_block, which pty code now uses so it makes sure
the super block structure is still valid until pty shutdown is done.
I also moved the additional inode references to the same functions, which
also covered similar case with inode being freed before /dev/tty final
close/shutdown.
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/pty.c | 9 ++++++---
fs/devpts/inode.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/devpts_fs.h | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/pty.c b/drivers/tty/pty.c
index 5f37f0d..c3f9b99 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/pty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/pty.c
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ static void pty_unix98_shutdown(struct tty_struct *tty)
else
ptmx_inode = tty->link->driver_data;
devpts_kill_index(ptmx_inode, tty->index);
- iput(ptmx_inode); /* drop reference we acquired at ptmx_open */
+ devpts_del_ref(ptmx_inode);
}
static const struct tty_operations ptm_unix98_ops = {
@@ -720,9 +720,12 @@ static int ptmx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
* still have /dev/tty opened pointing to the master/slave pair (ptmx
* is closed/released before /dev/tty), we must make sure that the inode
* is still valid when we call the final pty_unix98_shutdown, thus we
- * hold an additional reference to the ptmx inode
+ * hold an additional reference to the ptmx inode. For the same /dev/tty
+ * last close case, we also need to make sure the super_block isn't
+ * destroyed (devpts instance unmounted), before /dev/tty is closed and
+ * on its release devpts_kill_index is called.
*/
- ihold(inode);
+ devpts_add_ref(inode);
tty_add_file(tty, filp);
diff --git a/fs/devpts/inode.c b/fs/devpts/inode.c
index a726b9f..61af24e 100644
--- a/fs/devpts/inode.c
+++ b/fs/devpts/inode.c
@@ -564,6 +564,26 @@ void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode, int idx)
mutex_unlock(&allocated_ptys_lock);
}
+/*
+ * pty code needs to hold extra references in case of last /dev/tty close
+ */
+
+void devpts_add_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
+
+ atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
+ ihold(ptmx_inode);
+}
+
+void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = pts_sb_from_inode(ptmx_inode);
+
+ iput(ptmx_inode);
+ deactivate_super(sb);
+}
+
/**
* devpts_pty_new -- create a new inode in /dev/pts/
* @ptmx_inode: inode of the master
diff --git a/include/linux/devpts_fs.h b/include/linux/devpts_fs.h
index 251a209..e0ee0b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/devpts_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/devpts_fs.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
int devpts_new_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode);
void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode, int idx);
+void devpts_add_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode);
+void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode);
/* mknod in devpts */
struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct inode *ptmx_inode, dev_t device, int index,
void *priv);
@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ void devpts_pty_kill(struct inode *inode);
/* Dummy stubs in the no-pty case */
static inline int devpts_new_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline void devpts_kill_index(struct inode *ptmx_inode, int idx) { }
+static inline void devpts_add_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode) { }
+static inline void devpts_del_ref(struct inode *ptmx_inode) { }
static inline struct inode *devpts_pty_new(struct inode *ptmx_inode,
dev_t device, int index, void *priv)
{
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: xuejiufei <[email protected]>
commit c95a51807b730e4681e2ecbdfd669ca52601959e upstream.
When recovery master down, dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup() only remove
the $RECOVERY lock owned by dead node, but do not clear the refmap bit.
Which will make umount thread falling in dead loop migrating $RECOVERY
to the dead node.
Signed-off-by: xuejiufei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
index fe29f79..4b93d96 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
@@ -2332,6 +2332,8 @@ static void dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm, u8 dead_node)
break;
}
}
+ dlm_lockres_clear_refmap_bit(dlm, res,
+ dead_node);
spin_unlock(&res->spinlock);
continue;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Herton R. Krzesinski" <[email protected]>
commit 2831c89f42dcde440cfdccb9fee9f42d54bbc1ef upstream.
This change fixes a bug for a corner case where we have the the last
release from a pty master/slave coming from a previously opened /dev/tty
file. When this happens, the tty->driver_data can be stale, due to all
ptmx or pts/N files having already been closed before (and thus the inode
related to these files, which tty->driver_data points to, being already
freed/destroyed).
The fix here is to keep a reference on the opened master ptmx inode.
We maintain the inode referenced until the final pty_unix98_shutdown,
and only pass this inode to devpts_kill_index.
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/pty.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/pty.c b/drivers/tty/pty.c
index e49616e..5f37f0d 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/pty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/pty.c
@@ -617,7 +617,14 @@ static void pty_unix98_remove(struct tty_driver *driver, struct tty_struct *tty)
/* this is called once with whichever end is closed last */
static void pty_unix98_shutdown(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
- devpts_kill_index(tty->driver_data, tty->index);
+ struct inode *ptmx_inode;
+
+ if (tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
+ ptmx_inode = tty->driver_data;
+ else
+ ptmx_inode = tty->link->driver_data;
+ devpts_kill_index(ptmx_inode, tty->index);
+ iput(ptmx_inode); /* drop reference we acquired at ptmx_open */
}
static const struct tty_operations ptm_unix98_ops = {
@@ -708,6 +715,15 @@ static int ptmx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
set_bit(TTY_PTY_LOCK, &tty->flags); /* LOCK THE SLAVE */
tty->driver_data = inode;
+ /*
+ * In the case where all references to ptmx inode are dropped and we
+ * still have /dev/tty opened pointing to the master/slave pair (ptmx
+ * is closed/released before /dev/tty), we must make sure that the inode
+ * is still valid when we call the final pty_unix98_shutdown, thus we
+ * hold an additional reference to the ptmx inode
+ */
+ ihold(inode);
+
tty_add_file(tty, filp);
slave_inode = devpts_pty_new(inode,
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
commit 63e41ebc6630f39422d87f8a4bade1e793f37a01 upstream.
We miss to take the crypto_alg_sem semaphore when traversing the
crypto_alg_list for CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG dumps. This allows a race with
crypto_unregister_alg() removing algorithms from the list while we're
still traversing it, thereby leading to a use-after-free as show below:
[ 3482.071639] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 3482.075639] Modules linked in: aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw ablk_helper cryptd gf128mul ipv6 pcspkr serio_raw virtio_net microcode virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio sr_mod cdrom [last unloaded: aesni_intel]
[ 3482.075639] CPU: 1 PID: 11065 Comm: crconf Not tainted 4.3.4-grsec+ #126
[ 3482.075639] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 3482.075639] task: ffff88001cd41a40 ti: ffff88001cd422c8 task.ti: ffff88001cd422c8
[ 3482.075639] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff93722bd3>] [<ffffffff93722bd3>] strncpy+0x13/0x30
[ 3482.075639] RSP: 0018:ffff88001f713b60 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 3482.075639] RAX: ffff88001f6c4430 RBX: ffff88001f6c43a0 RCX: ffff88001f6c4430
[ 3482.075639] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: fefefefefefeff16 RDI: ffff88001f6c4430
[ 3482.075639] RBP: ffff88001f713b60 R08: ffff88001f6c4470 R09: ffff88001f6c4480
[ 3482.075639] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff88001ce2aa28
[ 3482.075639] R13: ffff880000093700 R14: ffff88001f5e4bf8 R15: 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] FS: 0000033826fa2700(0000) GS:ffff88001e900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3482.075639] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3482.075639] CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000139ec000 CR4: 00000000001606f0
[ 3482.075639] Stack:
[ 3482.075639] ffff88001f713bd8 ffffffff936ccd00 ffff88001e5c4200 ffff880000093700
[ 3482.075639] ffff88001f713bd0 ffffffff938ef4bf 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] ffff88001f5e4bf8 ffff88001f5e4848 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20
[ 3482.075639] Call Trace:
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936ccd00>] crypto_report_alg+0xc0/0x3e0
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff938ef4bf>] ? __alloc_skb+0x16f/0x300
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cd08a>] crypto_dump_report+0x6a/0x90
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93935707>] netlink_dump+0x147/0x2e0
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93935f99>] __netlink_dump_start+0x159/0x190
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936ccb13>] crypto_user_rcv_msg+0xc3/0x130
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cd020>] ? crypto_report_alg+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cc4b0>] ? alg_test_crc32c+0x120/0x120
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93933145>] ? __netlink_lookup+0xd5/0x120
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cca50>] ? crypto_add_alg+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93938141>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe1/0x130
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cc4f8>] crypto_netlink_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff939375a8>] netlink_unicast+0x108/0x180
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93937c21>] netlink_sendmsg+0x541/0x770
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff938e31e1>] sock_sendmsg+0x21/0x40
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff938e4763>] SyS_sendto+0xf3/0x130
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93444203>] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x13/0x20
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93444470>] ? __do_page_fault+0x80/0x3a0
[ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff939d80cb>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6e
[ 3482.075639] Code: 88 4a ff 75 ed 5d 48 0f ba 2c 24 3f c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 85 d2 48 89 f8 48 89 f9 4c 8d 04 17 48 89 e5 74 15 <0f> b6 16 80 fa 01 88 11 48 83 de ff 48 83 c1 01 4c 39 c1 75 eb
[ 3482.075639] RIP [<ffffffff93722bd3>] strncpy+0x13/0x30
To trigger the race run the following loops simultaneously for a while:
$ while : ; do modprobe aesni-intel; rmmod aesni-intel; done
$ while : ; do crconf show all > /dev/null; done
Fix the race by taking the crypto_alg_sem read lock, thereby preventing
crypto_unregister_alg() from modifying the algorithm list during the
dump.
This bug has been detected by the PaX memory sanitize feature.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
crypto/crypto_user.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index c7666f4..a3dfc0d 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (link->dump == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
+ down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_for_each_entry(alg, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list)
dump_alloc += CRYPTO_REPORT_MAXSIZE;
@@ -486,8 +487,11 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
.done = link->done,
.min_dump_alloc = dump_alloc,
};
- return netlink_dump_start(crypto_nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
+ err = netlink_dump_start(crypto_nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
+ up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
+
+ return err;
}
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, crypto_msg_min[type], attrs, CRYPTOCFGA_MAX,
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
commit 732042821cfa106b3c20b9780e4c60fee9d68900 upstream.
Helper radix_tree_iter_retry() resets next_index to the current index.
In following radix_tree_next_slot current chunk size becomes zero. This
isn't checked and it tries to dereference null pointer in slot.
Tagged iterator is fine because retry happens only at slot 0 where tag
bitmask in iter->tags is filled with single bit.
Fixes: 46437f9a554f ("radix-tree: fix race in gang lookup")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ohad Ben-Cohen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeremiah Mahler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/radix-tree.h | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/radix-tree.h b/include/linux/radix-tree.h
index cbeae48..af1cdb1 100644
--- a/include/linux/radix-tree.h
+++ b/include/linux/radix-tree.h
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ void **radix_tree_iter_retry(struct radix_tree_iter *iter)
* @iter: pointer to radix tree iterator
* Returns: current chunk size
*/
-static __always_inline unsigned
+static __always_inline long
radix_tree_chunk_size(struct radix_tree_iter *iter)
{
return iter->next_index - iter->index;
@@ -378,9 +378,9 @@ radix_tree_next_slot(void **slot, struct radix_tree_iter *iter, unsigned flags)
return slot + offset + 1;
}
} else {
- unsigned size = radix_tree_chunk_size(iter) - 1;
+ long size = radix_tree_chunk_size(iter);
- while (size--) {
+ while (--size > 0) {
slot++;
iter->index++;
if (likely(*slot))
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 564e81a57f9788b1475127012e0fd44e9049e342 upstream.
Jan Stancek has reported that system occasionally hanging after "oom01"
testcase from LTP triggers OOM. Guessing from a result that there is a
kworker thread doing memory allocation and the values between "Node 0
Normal free:" and "Node 0 Normal:" differs when hanging, vmstat is not
up-to-date for some reason.
According to commit 373ccbe59270 ("mm, vmstat: allow WQ concurrency to
discover memory reclaim doesn't make any progress"), it meant to force
the kworker thread to take a short sleep, but it by error used
schedule_timeout(1). We missed that schedule_timeout() in state
TASK_RUNNING doesn't do anything.
Fix it by using schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1) which forces the
kworker thread to take a short sleep in order to make sure that vmstat
is up-to-date.
Fixes: 373ccbe59270 ("mm, vmstat: allow WQ concurrency to discover memory reclaim doesn't make any progress")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Cristopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
mm/backing-dev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/backing-dev.c b/mm/backing-dev.c
index d8b4973..756fb6d 100644
--- a/mm/backing-dev.c
+++ b/mm/backing-dev.c
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ long wait_iff_congested(struct zone *zone, int sync, long timeout)
* here rather than calling cond_resched().
*/
if (current->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER)
- schedule_timeout(1);
+ schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
else
cond_resched();
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
commit 64566b5e767f9bc3161055ca1b443a51afb52aad upstream.
drm_fixp_from_fraction allows us to create a fixed point directly
from a fraction, rather than creating fixed point values and dividing
later. This avoids overflow of our 64 bit value for large numbers.
drm_fixp2int_ceil allows us to return the ceiling of our fixed point
value.
[airlied: squash Jordan's fix]
32-bit-build-fix: Jordan Lazare <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/drm/drm_fixed.h | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/drm/drm_fixed.h b/include/drm/drm_fixed.h
index d639049..553210c 100644
--- a/include/drm/drm_fixed.h
+++ b/include/drm/drm_fixed.h
@@ -73,18 +73,28 @@ static inline u32 dfixed_div(fixed20_12 A, fixed20_12 B)
#define DRM_FIXED_ONE (1ULL << DRM_FIXED_POINT)
#define DRM_FIXED_DECIMAL_MASK (DRM_FIXED_ONE - 1)
#define DRM_FIXED_DIGITS_MASK (~DRM_FIXED_DECIMAL_MASK)
+#define DRM_FIXED_EPSILON 1LL
+#define DRM_FIXED_ALMOST_ONE (DRM_FIXED_ONE - DRM_FIXED_EPSILON)
static inline s64 drm_int2fixp(int a)
{
return ((s64)a) << DRM_FIXED_POINT;
}
-static inline int drm_fixp2int(int64_t a)
+static inline int drm_fixp2int(s64 a)
{
return ((s64)a) >> DRM_FIXED_POINT;
}
-static inline unsigned drm_fixp_msbset(int64_t a)
+static inline int drm_fixp2int_ceil(s64 a)
+{
+ if (a > 0)
+ return drm_fixp2int(a + DRM_FIXED_ALMOST_ONE);
+ else
+ return drm_fixp2int(a - DRM_FIXED_ALMOST_ONE);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned drm_fixp_msbset(s64 a)
{
unsigned shift, sign = (a >> 63) & 1;
@@ -136,6 +146,45 @@ static inline s64 drm_fixp_div(s64 a, s64 b)
return result;
}
+static inline s64 drm_fixp_from_fraction(s64 a, s64 b)
+{
+ s64 res;
+ bool a_neg = a < 0;
+ bool b_neg = b < 0;
+ u64 a_abs = a_neg ? -a : a;
+ u64 b_abs = b_neg ? -b : b;
+ u64 rem;
+
+ /* determine integer part */
+ u64 res_abs = div64_u64_rem(a_abs, b_abs, &rem);
+
+ /* determine fractional part */
+ {
+ u32 i = DRM_FIXED_POINT;
+
+ do {
+ rem <<= 1;
+ res_abs <<= 1;
+ if (rem >= b_abs) {
+ res_abs |= 1;
+ rem -= b_abs;
+ }
+ } while (--i != 0);
+ }
+
+ /* round up LSB */
+ {
+ u64 summand = (rem << 1) >= b_abs;
+
+ res_abs += summand;
+ }
+
+ res = (s64) res_abs;
+ if (a_neg ^ b_neg)
+ res = -res;
+ return res;
+}
+
static inline s64 drm_fixp_exp(s64 x)
{
s64 tolerance = div64_s64(DRM_FIXED_ONE, 1000000);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
commit 82c43310508eb19eb41fe7862e89afeb74030b84 upstream.
I have a Marvell 88SE9230 SATA Controller that has some sort of
integrated console SCSI device attached to one of the ports.
ata14: SATA link up 1.5 Gbps (SStatus 113 SControl 300)
ata14.00: ATAPI: MARVELL VIRTUALL, 1.09, max UDMA/66
ata14.00: configured for UDMA/66
scsi 13:0:0:0: Processor Marvell Console 1.01 PQ: 0 ANSI: 5
Sending it VPD INQUIRY command seem to always fail with following error:
ata14.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x0 action 0x6
ata14.00: irq_stat 0x40000001
ata14.00: cmd a0/01:00:00:00:01/00:00:00:00:00/a0 tag 2 dma 16640 in
Inquiry 12 01 00 00 ff 00res 00/00:00:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/00 Emask 0x3 (HSM violation)
ata14: hard resetting link
This has been minor annoyance (only error printed on dmesg) until commit
09e2b0b14690 ("scsi: rescan VPD attributes") added call to scsi_attach_vpd()
in scsi_rescan_device(). The commit causes the system to splat out
following errors continuously without ever reaching the UI:
ata14.00: configured for UDMA/66
ata14: EH complete
ata14.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x0 action 0x6
ata14.00: irq_stat 0x40000001
ata14.00: cmd a0/01:00:00:00:01/00:00:00:00:00/a0 tag 6 dma 16640 in
Inquiry 12 01 00 00 ff 00res 00/00:00:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/00 Emask 0x3 (HSM violation)
ata14: hard resetting link
ata14: SATA link up 1.5 Gbps (SStatus 113 SControl 300)
ata14.00: configured for UDMA/66
ata14: EH complete
ata14.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x0 action 0x6
ata14.00: irq_stat 0x40000001
ata14.00: cmd a0/01:00:00:00:01/00:00:00:00:00/a0 tag 7 dma 16640 in
Inquiry 12 01 00 00 ff 00res 00/00:00:00:00:00/00:00:00:00:00/00 Emask 0x3 (HSM violation)
Without in-depth understanding of SCSI layer and the Marvell controller,
I suspect this happens because when the link goes down (because of an
error) we schedule scsi_rescan_device() which again fails to read VPD
data... ad infinitum.
Since VPD data cannot be read from the device anyway we prevent the SCSI
layer from even trying by blacklisting the device. This gets away the
error and the system starts up normally.
[mkp: Widened the match to all revisions of this device]
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
index 9f77d23..6e2256f 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static struct {
{"Intel", "Multi-Flex", NULL, BLIST_NO_RSOC},
{"iRiver", "iFP Mass Driver", NULL, BLIST_NOT_LOCKABLE | BLIST_INQUIRY_36},
{"LASOUND", "CDX7405", "3.10", BLIST_MAX5LUN | BLIST_SINGLELUN},
+ {"Marvell", "Console", NULL, BLIST_SKIP_VPD_PAGES},
{"MATSHITA", "PD-1", NULL, BLIST_FORCELUN | BLIST_SINGLELUN},
{"MATSHITA", "DMC-LC5", NULL, BLIST_NOT_LOCKABLE | BLIST_INQUIRY_36},
{"MATSHITA", "DMC-LC40", NULL, BLIST_NOT_LOCKABLE | BLIST_INQUIRY_36},
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit d7ce36924344ace0dbdc855b1206cacc46b36d45 upstream.
Some servers experienced fatal deadlocks because of a combination of
bugs, leading to multiple cpus calling dump_stack().
The checksumming bug was fixed in commit 34ae6a1aa054 ("ipv6: update
skb->csum when CE mark is propagated").
The second problem is a faulty locking in dump_stack()
CPU1 runs in process context and calls dump_stack(), grabs dump_lock.
CPU2 receives a TCP packet under softirq, grabs socket spinlock, and
call dump_stack() from netdev_rx_csum_fault().
dump_stack() spins on atomic_cmpxchg(&dump_lock, -1, 2), since
dump_lock is owned by CPU1
While dumping its stack, CPU1 is interrupted by a softirq, and happens
to process a packet for the TCP socket locked by CPU2.
CPU1 spins forever in spin_lock() : deadlock
Stack trace on CPU1 looked like :
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tcp_v6_rcv+0x243/0x620
ip6_input_finish+0x11f/0x330
ip6_input+0x38/0x40
ip6_rcv_finish+0x3c/0x90
ipv6_rcv+0x2a9/0x500
process_backlog+0x461/0xaa0
net_rx_action+0x147/0x430
__do_softirq+0x167/0x2d0
call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
do_softirq+0x3f/0x80
irq_exit+0x6e/0xc0
smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x35/0x40
call_function_single_interrupt+0x6a/0x70
<EOI>
printk+0x4d/0x4f
printk_address+0x31/0x33
print_trace_address+0x33/0x3c
print_context_stack+0x7f/0x119
dump_trace+0x26b/0x28e
show_trace_log_lvl+0x4f/0x5c
show_stack_log_lvl+0x104/0x113
show_stack+0x42/0x44
dump_stack+0x46/0x58
netdev_rx_csum_fault+0x38/0x3c
__skb_checksum_complete_head+0x6e/0x80
__skb_checksum_complete+0x11/0x20
tcp_rcv_established+0x2bd5/0x2fd0
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x13c/0x620
sk_backlog_rcv+0x15/0x30
release_sock+0xd2/0x150
tcp_recvmsg+0x1c1/0xfc0
inet_recvmsg+0x7d/0x90
sock_recvmsg+0xaf/0xe0
___sys_recvmsg+0x111/0x3b0
SyS_recvmsg+0x5c/0xb0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Fixes: b58d977432c8 ("dump_stack: serialize the output from dump_stack()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Thorlton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
lib/dump_stack.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/dump_stack.c b/lib/dump_stack.c
index f23b63f..1e21b46 100644
--- a/lib/dump_stack.c
+++ b/lib/dump_stack.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static atomic_t dump_lock = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
asmlinkage void dump_stack(void)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
int was_locked;
int old;
int cpu;
@@ -33,9 +34,8 @@ asmlinkage void dump_stack(void)
* Permit this cpu to perform nested stack dumps while serialising
* against other CPUs
*/
- preempt_disable();
-
retry:
+ local_irq_save(flags);
cpu = smp_processor_id();
old = atomic_cmpxchg(&dump_lock, -1, cpu);
if (old == -1) {
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ retry:
} else if (old == cpu) {
was_locked = 1;
} else {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
cpu_relax();
goto retry;
}
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ retry:
if (!was_locked)
atomic_set(&dump_lock, -1);
- preempt_enable();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
}
#else
asmlinkage void dump_stack(void)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
commit d2d06d4fe0f2cc2df9b17fefec96e6e1a1271d91 upstream.
If MODE SELECT returns with sense '05/91/36' (command lock violation)
it should always be retried without counting the number of retries.
During an HBA upgrade or similar circumstances one might see a flood
of MODE SELECT command from various HBAs, which will easily trigger
the sense code and exceed the retry count.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c
index 4b9cf93..d233170 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int mode_select_handle_sense(struct scsi_device *sdev,
/*
* Command Lock contention
*/
- err = SCSI_DH_RETRY;
+ err = SCSI_DH_IMM_RETRY;
break;
default:
break;
@@ -619,6 +619,8 @@ retry:
err = mode_select_handle_sense(sdev, h->sense);
if (err == SCSI_DH_RETRY && retry_cnt--)
goto retry;
+ if (err == SCSI_DH_IMM_RETRY)
+ goto retry;
}
if (err == SCSI_DH_OK) {
h->state = RDAC_STATE_ACTIVE;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 0c0fe3b0fa45082cd752553fdb3a4b42503a118e upstream.
While doing some tests I ran into an hang on an extent buffer's rwlock
that produced the following trace:
[39389.800012] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#15 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32166]
[39389.800016] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#14 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32165]
[39389.800016] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs]
[39389.800016] irq event stamp: 0
[39389.800016] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null)
[39389.800016] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35
[39389.800016] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35
[39389.800016] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null)
[39389.800016] CPU: 14 PID: 32165 Comm: fdm-stress Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1
[39389.800016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[39389.800016] task: ffff880175b1ca40 ti: ffff8800a185c000 task.ti: ffff8800a185c000
[39389.800016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810902af>] [<ffffffff810902af>] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x57/0x158
[39389.800016] RSP: 0018:ffff8800a185fb80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[39389.800016] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e9c RCX: 0000000000000101
[39389.800016] RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
[39389.800016] RBP: ffff8800a185fb98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[39389.800016] R10: ffff8800a185fb68 R11: 6db6db6db6db6db7 R12: ffff8801710c4e98
[39389.800016] R13: ffff880175b1ca40 R14: ffff8800a185fc10 R15: ffff880175b1ca40
[39389.800016] FS: 00007f6d37fff700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[39389.800016] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[39389.800016] CR2: 00007f6d300019b8 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
[39389.800016] Stack:
[39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880175b1ca40 ffff8800a185fbb0
[39389.800016] ffffffff81091e11 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbc8 ffffffff81091895
[39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbe8 ffffffff81486c5c ffffffffa067288c
[39389.800016] Call Trace:
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091e11>] queued_read_lock_slowpath+0x46/0x60
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091895>] do_raw_read_lock+0x3e/0x41
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff81486c5c>] _raw_read_lock+0x3d/0x44
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] ? btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0622ced>] ? btrfs_find_item+0xa7/0xd2 [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa069363f>] btrfs_ref_to_path+0xd6/0x174 [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693730>] inode_to_path+0x53/0xa2 [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693e2e>] paths_from_inode+0x117/0x2ec [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0670cff>] btrfs_ioctl+0xd5b/0x2793 [btrfs]
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff81276727>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x15
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79
[39389.800016] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
[39389.800016] Code: b9 01 01 00 00 f7 c6 00 ff ff ff 75 32 83 fe 01 89 ca 89 f0 0f 45 d7 f0 0f b1 13 39 f0 74 04 89 c6 eb e2 ff ca 0f 84 fa 00 00 00 <8b> 03 84 c0 74 04 f3 90 eb f6 66 c7 03 01 00 e9 e6 00 00 00 e8
[39389.800012] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs]
[39389.800012] irq event stamp: 0
[39389.800012] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null)
[39389.800012] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35
[39389.800012] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35
[39389.800012] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null)
[39389.800012] CPU: 15 PID: 32166 Comm: fdm-stress Tainted: G L 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1
[39389.800012] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[39389.800012] task: ffff880179294380 ti: ffff880034a60000 task.ti: ffff880034a60000
[39389.800012] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81091e8d>] [<ffffffff81091e8d>] queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x62/0x72
[39389.800012] RSP: 0018:ffff880034a639f0 EFLAGS: 00000206
[39389.800012] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e98 RCX: 0000000000000000
[39389.800012] RDX: 00000000000000ff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8801710c4e9c
[39389.800012] RBP: ffff880034a639f8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[39389.800012] R10: ffff880034a639b0 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff8801710c4e98
[39389.800012] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff880172cbc000 R15: ffff8801710c4e00
[39389.800012] FS: 00007f6d377fe700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9e0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[39389.800012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[39389.800012] CR2: 00007f6d3d3c1000 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
[39389.800012] Stack:
[39389.800012] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880034a63a10 ffffffff81091963 ffff8801710c4e98
[39389.800012] ffff880034a63a30 ffffffff81486f1b ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00
[39389.800012] ffff880034a63a78 ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 ffff880034a63a58
[39389.800012] Call Trace:
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff81091963>] do_raw_write_lock+0x72/0x8c
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486f1b>] _raw_write_lock+0x3a/0x41
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] ? btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061aeba>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x5d [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce13>] ? btrfs_root_node+0xda/0xe6 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce83>] btrfs_lock_root_node+0x22/0x42 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa062046b>] btrfs_search_slot+0x1b8/0x758 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff810fc6b0>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa06365db>] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x31/0x95 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108d62f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8148482b>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x397/0x3bc
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068821b>] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x59/0x1c0 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068858e>] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x194/0x5aa [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486ab7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x31/0x44
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688a48>] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0xa4/0x15c [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688d62>] btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x11/0x13 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa064048e>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x234/0x96e [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0618d10>] btrfs_sync_fs+0x145/0x1ad [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0671176>] btrfs_ioctl+0x11d2/0x2793 [btrfs]
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79
[39389.800012] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
[39389.800012] Code: f0 0f b1 13 85 c0 75 ef eb 2a f3 90 8a 03 84 c0 75 f8 f0 0f b0 13 84 c0 75 f0 ba ff 00 00 00 eb 0a f0 0f b1 13 ff c8 74 0b f3 90 <8b> 03 83 f8 01 75 f7 eb ed c6 43 04 00 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00
This happens because in the code path executed by the inode_paths ioctl we
end up nesting two calls to read lock a leaf's rwlock when after the first
call to read_lock() and before the second call to read_lock(), another
task (running the delayed items as part of a transaction commit) has
already called write_lock() against the leaf's rwlock. This situation is
illustrated by the following diagram:
Task A Task B
btrfs_ref_to_path() btrfs_commit_transaction()
read_lock(&eb->lock);
btrfs_run_delayed_items()
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items()
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode()
btrfs_lookup_inode()
write_lock(&eb->lock);
--> task waits for lock
read_lock(&eb->lock);
--> makes this task hang
forever (and task B too
of course)
So fix this by avoiding doing the nested read lock, which is easily
avoidable. This issue does not happen if task B calls write_lock() after
task A does the second call to read_lock(), however there does not seem
to exist anything in the documentation that mentions what is the expected
behaviour for recursive locking of rwlocks (leaving the idea that doing
so is not a good usage of rwlocks).
Also, as a side effect necessary for this fix, make sure we do not
needlessly read lock extent buffers when the input path has skip_locking
set (used when called from send).
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/backref.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/backref.c b/fs/btrfs/backref.c
index e6b6cc0..dbe50f0 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/backref.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/backref.c
@@ -1263,7 +1263,8 @@ char *btrfs_ref_to_path(struct btrfs_root *fs_root, struct btrfs_path *path,
read_extent_buffer(eb, dest + bytes_left,
name_off, name_len);
if (eb != eb_in) {
- btrfs_tree_read_unlock_blocking(eb);
+ if (!path->skip_locking)
+ btrfs_tree_read_unlock_blocking(eb);
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
ret = inode_ref_info(parent, 0, fs_root, path, &found_key);
@@ -1282,9 +1283,10 @@ char *btrfs_ref_to_path(struct btrfs_root *fs_root, struct btrfs_path *path,
eb = path->nodes[0];
/* make sure we can use eb after releasing the path */
if (eb != eb_in) {
- atomic_inc(&eb->refs);
- btrfs_tree_read_lock(eb);
- btrfs_set_lock_blocking_rw(eb, BTRFS_READ_LOCK);
+ if (!path->skip_locking)
+ btrfs_set_lock_blocking_rw(eb, BTRFS_READ_LOCK);
+ path->nodes[0] = NULL;
+ path->locks[0] = 0;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
iref = btrfs_item_ptr(eb, slot, struct btrfs_inode_ref);
--
2.7.0
On 09.03.2016 18:13, Kamal Mostafa wrote:
> 3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
Please drop the patch for now, it causes a NULL pointer dereference on
kernels <= 3.17. We will follow up with a correctly backported patch.
Thanks,
Nicolai
>
> ---8<------------------------------------------------------------
>
> From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolai=20H=C3=A4hnle?= <[email protected]>
>
> commit f6ff4f67cdf8455d0a4226eeeaf5af17c37d05eb upstream.
>
> An arbitrary amount of time can pass between spin_unlock and
> radeon_fence_wait_any, so we need to ensure that nobody frees the
> fences from under us.
>
> Based on the analogous fix for amdgpu.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolai Hähnle <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> index f0bac68..bb16684 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> @@ -349,8 +349,13 @@ int radeon_sa_bo_new(struct radeon_device *rdev,
> /* see if we can skip over some allocations */
> } while (radeon_sa_bo_next_hole(sa_manager, fences, tries));
>
> + for (i = 0; i < RADEON_NUM_RINGS; ++i)
> + radeon_fence_ref(fences[i]);
> +
> spin_unlock(&sa_manager->wq.lock);
> r = radeon_fence_wait_any(rdev, fences, false);
> + for (i = 0; i < RADEON_NUM_RINGS; ++i)
> + radeon_fence_unref(&fences[i]);
> spin_lock(&sa_manager->wq.lock);
> /* if we have nothing to wait for block */
> if (r == -ENOENT && block) {
>
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 131e6abc674edb9f9a59090bb35bf6650569b7e7 ]
Now that TASK_ABORTED status is not generated for all cases by
TMR ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET, a new TFO->abort_task() caller is
necessary in order to give fabric drivers a chance to unmap
hardware / software resources before the se_cmd descriptor is
released via the normal TFO->release_cmd() codepath.
This patch adds TFO->aborted_task() in core_tmr_abort_task()
in place of the original transport_send_task_abort(), and
also updates all fabric drivers to implement this caller.
The fabric drivers that include changes to perform cleanup
via ->aborted_task() are:
- iscsi-target
- iser-target
- srpt
- tcm_qla2xxx
The fabric drivers that currently set ->aborted_task() to
NOPs are:
- loopback
- tcm_fc
- usb-gadget
- sbp-target
- vhost-scsi
For the latter five, there appears to be no additional cleanup
required before invoking TFO->release_cmd() to release the
se_cmd descriptor.
v2 changes:
- Move ->aborted_task() call into transport_cmd_finish_abort (Alex)
Cc: Alex Leung <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rustad <[email protected]>
Cc: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
Cc: Vu Pham <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Boot <[email protected]>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Giridhar Malavali <[email protected]>
Cc: Saurav Kashyap <[email protected]>
Cc: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/tcm_qla2xxx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 13 +++++++++++++
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c | 8 ++++++++
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.c | 4 ++--
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.h | 1 +
drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c | 4 ++++
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tcm_fc.h | 1 +
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_cmd.c | 5 +++++
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_conf.c | 1 +
drivers/usb/gadget/tcm_usb_gadget.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 6 ++++++
include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h | 1 +
include/target/target_core_fabric.h | 1 +
18 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c
index b4b7a9d..d95b14e 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c
@@ -2025,6 +2025,24 @@ isert_put_response(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_cmd *cmd)
return isert_post_response(isert_conn, isert_cmd);
}
+static void
+isert_aborted_task(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct isert_cmd *isert_cmd = iscsit_priv_cmd(cmd);
+ struct isert_conn *isert_conn = (struct isert_conn *)conn->context;
+ struct isert_device *device = isert_conn->conn_device;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&conn->cmd_lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&cmd->i_conn_node))
+ list_del_init(&cmd->i_conn_node);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&conn->cmd_lock);
+
+ if (cmd->data_direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE)
+ iscsit_stop_dataout_timer(cmd);
+
+ device->unreg_rdma_mem(isert_cmd, isert_conn);
+}
+
static int
isert_put_nopin(struct iscsi_cmd *cmd, struct iscsi_conn *conn,
bool nopout_response)
@@ -2958,6 +2976,7 @@ static struct iscsit_transport iser_target_transport = {
.iscsit_get_dataout = isert_get_dataout,
.iscsit_queue_data_in = isert_put_datain,
.iscsit_queue_status = isert_put_response,
+ .iscsit_aborted_task = isert_aborted_task,
};
static int __init isert_init(void)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
index 97309e4..206f181 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
@@ -3093,6 +3093,14 @@ static void srpt_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *cmd)
srpt_queue_response(cmd);
}
+static void srpt_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx = container_of(cmd,
+ struct srpt_send_ioctx, cmd);
+
+ srpt_unmap_sg_to_ib_sge(ioctx->ch, ioctx);
+}
+
static int srpt_queue_status(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx;
@@ -3940,6 +3948,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops srpt_template = {
.queue_data_in = srpt_queue_data_in,
.queue_status = srpt_queue_status,
.queue_tm_rsp = srpt_queue_tm_rsp,
+ .aborted_task = srpt_aborted_task,
/*
* Setup function pointers for generic logic in
* target_core_fabric_configfs.c
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/tcm_qla2xxx.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/tcm_qla2xxx.c
index dcfad2e..d1ddd55 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/tcm_qla2xxx.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/tcm_qla2xxx.c
@@ -717,6 +717,20 @@ static void tcm_qla2xxx_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
qlt_xmit_tm_rsp(mcmd);
}
+static void tcm_qla2xxx_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ struct qla_tgt_cmd *cmd = container_of(se_cmd,
+ struct qla_tgt_cmd, se_cmd);
+ struct scsi_qla_host *vha = cmd->vha;
+ struct qla_hw_data *ha = vha->hw;
+
+ if (!cmd->sg_mapped)
+ return;
+
+ pci_unmap_sg(ha->pdev, cmd->sg, cmd->sg_cnt, cmd->dma_data_direction);
+ cmd->sg_mapped = 0;
+}
+
/* Local pointer to allocated TCM configfs fabric module */
struct target_fabric_configfs *tcm_qla2xxx_fabric_configfs;
struct target_fabric_configfs *tcm_qla2xxx_npiv_fabric_configfs;
@@ -1753,6 +1767,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops tcm_qla2xxx_ops = {
.queue_data_in = tcm_qla2xxx_queue_data_in,
.queue_status = tcm_qla2xxx_queue_status,
.queue_tm_rsp = tcm_qla2xxx_queue_tm_rsp,
+ .aborted_task = tcm_qla2xxx_aborted_task,
/*
* Setup function pointers for generic logic in
* target_core_fabric_configfs.c
@@ -1800,6 +1815,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops tcm_qla2xxx_npiv_ops = {
.queue_data_in = tcm_qla2xxx_queue_data_in,
.queue_status = tcm_qla2xxx_queue_status,
.queue_tm_rsp = tcm_qla2xxx_queue_tm_rsp,
+ .aborted_task = tcm_qla2xxx_aborted_task,
/*
* Setup function pointers for generic logic in
* target_core_fabric_configfs.c
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
index a0a5737..b4ad1c8 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -499,6 +499,18 @@ static int iscsit_queue_rsp(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_cmd *cmd)
return 0;
}
+static void iscsit_aborted_task(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ bool scsi_cmd = (cmd->iscsi_opcode == ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&conn->cmd_lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&cmd->i_conn_node))
+ list_del_init(&cmd->i_conn_node);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&conn->cmd_lock);
+
+ __iscsit_free_cmd(cmd, scsi_cmd, true);
+}
+
static struct iscsit_transport iscsi_target_transport = {
.name = "iSCSI/TCP",
.transport_type = ISCSI_TCP,
@@ -513,6 +525,7 @@ static struct iscsit_transport iscsi_target_transport = {
.iscsit_response_queue = iscsit_response_queue,
.iscsit_queue_data_in = iscsit_queue_rsp,
.iscsit_queue_status = iscsit_queue_rsp,
+ .iscsit_aborted_task = iscsit_aborted_task,
};
static int __init iscsi_target_init_module(void)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
index 8346561..4a28c5f 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
@@ -1815,6 +1815,13 @@ static void lio_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
iscsit_add_cmd_to_response_queue(cmd, cmd->conn, cmd->i_state);
}
+static void lio_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ struct iscsi_cmd *cmd = container_of(se_cmd, struct iscsi_cmd, se_cmd);
+
+ cmd->conn->conn_transport->iscsit_aborted_task(cmd->conn, cmd);
+}
+
static char *lio_tpg_get_endpoint_wwn(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg)
{
struct iscsi_portal_group *tpg = se_tpg->se_tpg_fabric_ptr;
@@ -2013,6 +2020,7 @@ int iscsi_target_register_configfs(void)
fabric->tf_ops.queue_data_in = &lio_queue_data_in;
fabric->tf_ops.queue_status = &lio_queue_status;
fabric->tf_ops.queue_tm_rsp = &lio_queue_tm_rsp;
+ fabric->tf_ops.aborted_task = &lio_aborted_task;
/*
* Setup function pointers for generic logic in target_core_fabric_configfs.c
*/
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.c
index 09e3b0b..a8eb9e0 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.c
@@ -706,8 +706,8 @@ void iscsit_release_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *cmd)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iscsit_release_cmd);
-static void __iscsit_free_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *cmd, bool scsi_cmd,
- bool check_queues)
+void __iscsit_free_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *cmd, bool scsi_cmd,
+ bool check_queues)
{
struct iscsi_conn *conn = cmd->conn;
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.h b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.h
index e4fc34a..ea49f72 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.h
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_util.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ extern void iscsit_remove_cmd_from_tx_queues(struct iscsi_cmd *, struct iscsi_co
extern bool iscsit_conn_all_queues_empty(struct iscsi_conn *);
extern void iscsit_free_queue_reqs_for_conn(struct iscsi_conn *);
extern void iscsit_release_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *);
+extern void __iscsit_free_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *, bool, bool);
extern void iscsit_free_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *, bool);
extern int iscsit_check_session_usage_count(struct iscsi_session *);
extern void iscsit_dec_session_usage_count(struct iscsi_session *);
diff --git a/drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c b/drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c
index c5bccec..de0e243 100644
--- a/drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c
+++ b/drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c
@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ static void tcm_loop_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
wake_up(&tl_tmr->tl_tmr_wait);
}
+static void tcm_loop_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static char *tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba)
{
switch (tl_hba->tl_proto_id) {
@@ -1455,6 +1460,7 @@ static int tcm_loop_register_configfs(void)
fabric->tf_ops.queue_data_in = &tcm_loop_queue_data_in;
fabric->tf_ops.queue_status = &tcm_loop_queue_status;
fabric->tf_ops.queue_tm_rsp = &tcm_loop_queue_tm_rsp;
+ fabric->tf_ops.aborted_task = &tcm_loop_aborted_task;
/*
* Setup function pointers for generic logic in target_core_fabric_configfs.c
diff --git a/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c b/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c
index 24884ca..ad04ea9 100644
--- a/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c
@@ -1846,6 +1846,11 @@ static void sbp_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
}
+static void sbp_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static int sbp_check_stop_free(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
struct sbp_target_request *req = container_of(se_cmd,
@@ -2526,6 +2531,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops sbp_ops = {
.queue_data_in = sbp_queue_data_in,
.queue_status = sbp_queue_status,
.queue_tm_rsp = sbp_queue_tm_rsp,
+ .aborted_task = sbp_aborted_task,
.check_stop_free = sbp_check_stop_free,
.fabric_make_wwn = sbp_make_tport,
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c b/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c
index afcbb04..16a15e5 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c
@@ -457,6 +457,10 @@ static int target_fabric_tf_ops_check(
pr_err("Missing tfo->queue_tm_rsp()\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!tfo->aborted_task) {
+ pr_err("Missing tfo->aborted_task()\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
/*
* We at least require tfo->fabric_make_wwn(), tfo->fabric_drop_wwn()
* tfo->fabric_make_tpg() and tfo->fabric_drop_tpg() in
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index 28f4c67..9477737 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -579,6 +579,12 @@ void transport_cmd_finish_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd, int remove)
{
if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SE_LUN_CMD)
transport_lun_remove_cmd(cmd);
+ /*
+ * Allow the fabric driver to unmap any resources before
+ * releasing the descriptor via TFO->release_cmd()
+ */
+ if (remove)
+ cmd->se_tfo->aborted_task(cmd);
if (transport_cmd_check_stop_to_fabric(cmd))
return;
diff --git a/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tcm_fc.h b/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tcm_fc.h
index 752863a..4f4b971 100644
--- a/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tcm_fc.h
+++ b/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tcm_fc.h
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ int ft_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *);
u32 ft_get_task_tag(struct se_cmd *);
int ft_get_cmd_state(struct se_cmd *);
void ft_queue_tm_resp(struct se_cmd *);
+void ft_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *);
/*
* other internal functions.
diff --git a/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_cmd.c b/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_cmd.c
index d22cdc7..f5fd515 100644
--- a/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_cmd.c
@@ -426,6 +426,11 @@ void ft_queue_tm_resp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
ft_send_resp_code(cmd, code);
}
+void ft_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static void ft_send_work(struct work_struct *work);
/*
diff --git a/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_conf.c b/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_conf.c
index c6932fb..67d00e8 100644
--- a/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_conf.c
+++ b/drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_conf.c
@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops ft_fabric_ops = {
.queue_data_in = ft_queue_data_in,
.queue_status = ft_queue_status,
.queue_tm_rsp = ft_queue_tm_resp,
+ .aborted_task = ft_aborted_task,
/*
* Setup function pointers for generic logic in
* target_core_fabric_configfs.c
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/tcm_usb_gadget.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/tcm_usb_gadget.c
index 460c266..cdec249 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/tcm_usb_gadget.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/tcm_usb_gadget.c
@@ -1471,6 +1471,11 @@ static void usbg_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
}
+static void usbg_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static const char *usbg_check_wwn(const char *name)
{
const char *n;
@@ -1897,6 +1902,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops usbg_ops = {
.queue_data_in = usbg_send_read_response,
.queue_status = usbg_send_status_response,
.queue_tm_rsp = usbg_queue_tm_rsp,
+ .aborted_task = usbg_aborted_task,
.check_stop_free = usbg_check_stop_free,
.fabric_make_wwn = usbg_make_tport,
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
index 885ee65..f3e24d3 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
@@ -539,6 +539,11 @@ static void tcm_vhost_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
return;
}
+static void tcm_vhost_aborted_task(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static void tcm_vhost_free_evt(struct vhost_scsi *vs, struct tcm_vhost_evt *evt)
{
vs->vs_events_nr--;
@@ -2154,6 +2159,7 @@ static struct target_core_fabric_ops tcm_vhost_ops = {
.queue_data_in = tcm_vhost_queue_data_in,
.queue_status = tcm_vhost_queue_status,
.queue_tm_rsp = tcm_vhost_queue_tm_rsp,
+ .aborted_task = tcm_vhost_aborted_task,
/*
* Setup callers for generic logic in target_core_fabric_configfs.c
*/
diff --git a/include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h b/include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h
index 78edd78..817431a 100644
--- a/include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h
+++ b/include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct iscsit_transport {
int (*iscsit_get_dataout)(struct iscsi_conn *, struct iscsi_cmd *, bool);
int (*iscsit_queue_data_in)(struct iscsi_conn *, struct iscsi_cmd *);
int (*iscsit_queue_status)(struct iscsi_conn *, struct iscsi_cmd *);
+ void (*iscsit_aborted_task)(struct iscsi_conn *, struct iscsi_cmd *);
};
static inline void *iscsit_priv_cmd(struct iscsi_cmd *cmd)
diff --git a/include/target/target_core_fabric.h b/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
index 4cf4fda..560419e 100644
--- a/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct target_core_fabric_ops {
int (*queue_data_in)(struct se_cmd *);
int (*queue_status)(struct se_cmd *);
void (*queue_tm_rsp)(struct se_cmd *);
+ void (*aborted_task)(struct se_cmd *);
/*
* fabric module calls for target_core_fabric_configfs.c
*/
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
commit ac75fe5d8fe4a0bf063be18fb29684405279e79e upstream.
That prevents this bug:
[ 2382.269496] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000540
[ 2382.270013] IP: [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd]
[ 2382.270013] PGD 0
[ 2382.270013] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 2382.270013] Modules linked in: saa7134_alsa(-) tda1004x saa7134_dvb videobuf2_dvb dvb_core tda827x tda8290 tuner saa7134 tveeprom videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_core v4l2_common videodev media auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc tun bridge stp llc ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack it87 hwmon_vid snd_hda_codec_idt snd_hda_codec_generic iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_seq pcspkr i2c_i801 snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer lpc_ich snd mfd_core soundcore binfmt_misc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm r8169 ata_generic serio_raw pata_acpi mii i2c_core [last unloaded: videobuf2_memops]
[ 2382.270013] CPU: 0 PID: 4899 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 4.5.0-rc1+ #4
[ 2382.270013] Hardware name: PCCHIPS P17G/P17G, BIOS 080012 05/14/2008
[ 2382.270013] task: ffff880039c38000 ti: ffff88003c764000 task.ti: ffff88003c764000
[ 2382.270013] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01fe616>] [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd]
[ 2382.270013] RSP: 0018:ffff88003c767ea0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 2382.270013] RAX: ffff88003c767eb8 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000006260
[ 2382.270013] RDX: ffffffffa020a060 RSI: ffffffffa0206de1 RDI: ffff88003c767eb0
[ 2382.270013] RBP: ffff88003c767ed8 R08: 0000000000019960 R09: ffffffff811a5412
[ 2382.270013] R10: ffffea0000d7c200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003c767ea8
[ 2382.270013] R13: 00007ffe760617f7 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557625d7f1e0
[ 2382.270013] FS: 00007f80bb1c0700(0000) GS:ffff88003f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2382.270013] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 2382.270013] CR2: 0000000000000540 CR3: 000000003c00f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 2382.270013] Stack:
[ 2382.270013] 000000003c767ed8 ffffffff00000000 ffff880000000000 ffff88003c767eb8
[ 2382.270013] ffff88003c767eb8 ffffffffa049a890 00007ffe76060060 ffff88003c767ef0
[ 2382.270013] ffffffffa049889d ffffffffa049a500 ffff88003c767f48 ffffffff8111079c
[ 2382.270013] Call Trace:
[ 2382.270013] [<ffffffffa049889d>] saa7134_alsa_exit+0x1d/0x780 [saa7134_alsa]
[ 2382.270013] [<ffffffff8111079c>] SyS_delete_module+0x19c/0x1f0
[ 2382.270013] [<ffffffff8170fc2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
[ 2382.270013] Code: 20 a0 48 c7 c6 e1 6d 20 a0 48 89 e5 41 54 53 4c 8d 65 d0 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 28 c7 45 d0 00 00 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 08 e8 7a 55 ed e0 <4c> 89 a3 40 05 00 00 48 89 df e8 eb fd ff ff 85 c0 75 1a 48 8d
[ 2382.270013] RIP [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd]
[ 2382.270013] RSP <ffff88003c767ea0>
[ 2382.270013] CR2: 0000000000000540
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-alsa.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-alsa.c b/drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-alsa.c
index dd67c8a..6bac4a5 100644
--- a/drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-alsa.c
+++ b/drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-alsa.c
@@ -1145,6 +1145,8 @@ static int alsa_device_init(struct saa7134_dev *dev)
static int alsa_device_exit(struct saa7134_dev *dev)
{
+ if (!snd_saa7134_cards[dev->nr])
+ return 1;
snd_card_free(snd_saa7134_cards[dev->nr]);
snd_saa7134_cards[dev->nr] = NULL;
@@ -1194,7 +1196,8 @@ static void saa7134_alsa_exit(void)
int idx;
for (idx = 0; idx < SNDRV_CARDS; idx++) {
- snd_card_free(snd_saa7134_cards[idx]);
+ if (snd_saa7134_cards[idx])
+ snd_card_free(snd_saa7134_cards[idx]);
}
saa7134_dmasound_init = NULL;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
commit 310d3d314be7f0a84011ebdc4bdccbcae9755a87 upstream.
This patch fixes a race between setting of SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS
in transport_send_task_abort(), and check of the same bit in
transport_check_aborted_status().
It adds a __transport_check_aborted_status() version that is
used by target_execute_cmd() when se_cmd->t_state_lock is
held, and a transport_check_aborted_status() wrapper for
all other existing callers.
Also, it handles the case where the check happens before
transport_send_task_abort() gets called. For this, go
ahead and set SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS early when necessary,
and have transport_send_task_abort() send the abort.
Cc: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Cc: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Grover <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index 09268ad..8430a15 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -1716,19 +1716,21 @@ static bool target_handle_task_attr(struct se_cmd *cmd)
return true;
}
+static int __transport_check_aborted_status(struct se_cmd *, int);
+
void target_execute_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
/*
- * If the received CDB has aleady been aborted stop processing it here.
- */
- if (transport_check_aborted_status(cmd, 1))
- return;
-
- /*
* Determine if frontend context caller is requesting the stopping of
* this command for frontend exceptions.
+ *
+ * If the received CDB has aleady been aborted stop processing it here.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ if (__transport_check_aborted_status(cmd, 1)) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return;
+ }
if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_STOP) {
pr_debug("%s:%d CMD_T_STOP for ITT: 0x%08x\n",
__func__, __LINE__,
@@ -2811,8 +2813,13 @@ after_reason:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(transport_send_check_condition_and_sense);
-int transport_check_aborted_status(struct se_cmd *cmd, int send_status)
+static int __transport_check_aborted_status(struct se_cmd *cmd, int send_status)
+ __releases(&cmd->t_state_lock)
+ __acquires(&cmd->t_state_lock)
{
+ assert_spin_locked(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
+
if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED))
return 0;
@@ -2820,19 +2827,37 @@ int transport_check_aborted_status(struct se_cmd *cmd, int send_status)
* If cmd has been aborted but either no status is to be sent or it has
* already been sent, just return
*/
- if (!send_status || !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS))
+ if (!send_status || !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS)) {
+ if (send_status)
+ cmd->se_cmd_flags |= SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS;
return 1;
+ }
- pr_debug("Sending delayed SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED status for CDB: 0x%02x ITT: 0x%08x\n",
- cmd->t_task_cdb[0], cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(cmd));
+ pr_debug("Sending delayed SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED status for CDB:"
+ " 0x%02x ITT: 0x%08x\n", cmd->t_task_cdb[0],
+ cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(cmd));
cmd->se_cmd_flags &= ~SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS;
cmd->scsi_status = SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED;
trace_target_cmd_complete(cmd);
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
cmd->se_tfo->queue_status(cmd);
+ spin_lock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
return 1;
}
+
+int transport_check_aborted_status(struct se_cmd *cmd, int send_status)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ ret = __transport_check_aborted_status(cmd, send_status);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(transport_check_aborted_status);
void transport_send_task_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd)
@@ -2854,12 +2879,17 @@ void transport_send_task_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd)
*/
if (cmd->data_direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE) {
if (cmd->se_tfo->write_pending_status(cmd) != 0) {
- cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ goto send_abort;
+ }
cmd->se_cmd_flags |= SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS;
- smp_mb__after_atomic_inc();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
return;
}
}
+send_abort:
cmd->scsi_status = SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED;
transport_lun_remove_cmd(cmd);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 094fd3be87b0f102589e2d5c3fa5d06b7e20496d upstream.
In ALSA timer core, the active timer instance is managed in
active_list linked list. Each element is added / removed dynamically
at timer start, stop and in timer interrupt. The problem is that
snd_timer_interrupt() has a thinko and leaves the element in
active_list when it's the last opened element. This eventually leads
to list corruption or use-after-free error.
This hasn't been revealed because we used to delete the list forcibly
in snd_timer_stop() in the past. However, the recent fix avoids the
double-stop behavior (in commit [f784beb75ce8: ALSA: timer: Fix link
corruption due to double start or stop]), and this leak hits reality.
This patch fixes the link management in snd_timer_interrupt(). Now it
simply unlinks no matter which stream is.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Yy2aukHP-EDp8-ziNqNNmb-NTf=jDWXMP7jB8HDa2vng@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 2c2d3d1..79e57a7 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -728,8 +728,8 @@ void snd_timer_interrupt(struct snd_timer * timer, unsigned long ticks_left)
ti->cticks = ti->ticks;
} else {
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
- if (--timer->running)
- list_del_init(&ti->active_list);
+ --timer->running;
+ list_del_init(&ti->active_list);
}
if ((timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_TASKLET) ||
(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST))
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
commit ebde1ca5a908b10312db4ecd7553e3ba039319ab upstream.
This patch fixes a bug in TMR task aborted status (TAS)
handling when multiple sessions are connected to the
same target WWPN endpoint and se_node_acl descriptor,
resulting in TASK_ABORTED status to not be generated
for aborted se_cmds on the remote port.
This is due to core_tmr_handle_tas_abort() incorrectly
comparing se_node_acl instead of se_session, for which
the multi-session case is expected to be sharing the
same se_node_acl.
Instead, go ahead and update core_tmr_handle_tas_abort()
to compare tmr_sess + cmd->se_sess in order to determine
if the LUN_RESET was received on a different I_T nexus,
and TASK_ABORTED status response needs to be generated.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Cc: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Grover <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
index 7adc5f5..5e7f5bd 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void core_tmr_release_req(
}
static void core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(
- struct se_node_acl *tmr_nacl,
+ struct se_session *tmr_sess,
struct se_cmd *cmd,
int tas)
{
@@ -91,8 +91,7 @@ static void core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(
/*
* TASK ABORTED status (TAS) bit support
*/
- if ((tmr_nacl &&
- (tmr_nacl != cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl)) && tas) {
+ if (tmr_sess && tmr_sess != cmd->se_sess && tas) {
remove = false;
transport_send_task_abort(cmd);
}
@@ -278,7 +277,7 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(
static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
struct se_device *dev,
struct se_cmd *prout_cmd,
- struct se_node_acl *tmr_nacl,
+ struct se_session *tmr_sess,
int tas,
struct list_head *preempt_and_abort_list)
{
@@ -369,7 +368,7 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
cancel_work_sync(&cmd->work);
transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
- core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(tmr_nacl, cmd, tas);
+ core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(tmr_sess, cmd, tas);
target_put_sess_cmd(cmd->se_sess, cmd);
}
}
@@ -382,6 +381,7 @@ int core_tmr_lun_reset(
{
struct se_node_acl *tmr_nacl = NULL;
struct se_portal_group *tmr_tpg = NULL;
+ struct se_session *tmr_sess = NULL;
int tas;
/*
* TASK_ABORTED status bit, this is configurable via ConfigFS
@@ -400,8 +400,9 @@ int core_tmr_lun_reset(
* or struct se_device passthrough..
*/
if (tmr && tmr->task_cmd && tmr->task_cmd->se_sess) {
- tmr_nacl = tmr->task_cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl;
- tmr_tpg = tmr->task_cmd->se_sess->se_tpg;
+ tmr_sess = tmr->task_cmd->se_sess;
+ tmr_nacl = tmr_sess->se_node_acl;
+ tmr_tpg = tmr_sess->se_tpg;
if (tmr_nacl && tmr_tpg) {
pr_debug("LUN_RESET: TMR caller fabric: %s"
" initiator port %s\n",
@@ -414,7 +415,7 @@ int core_tmr_lun_reset(
dev->transport->name, tas);
core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(dev, tmr, preempt_and_abort_list);
- core_tmr_drain_state_list(dev, prout_cmd, tmr_nacl, tas,
+ core_tmr_drain_state_list(dev, prout_cmd, tmr_sess, tas,
preempt_and_abort_list);
/*
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
commit e8beb02343e7582980c6705816cd957cf4f74c7a upstream.
The tda1004x was updating the properties cache before locking.
If the device is not locked, the data at the registers are just
random values with no real meaning.
This caused the driver to fail with libdvbv5, as such library
calls GET_PROPERTY from time to time, in order to return the
DVB stats.
Tested with a saa7134 card 78:
ASUSTeK P7131 Dual, vendor PCI ID: 1043:4862
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda1004x.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda1004x.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda1004x.c
index a2631be..08e0f0d 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda1004x.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda1004x.c
@@ -903,9 +903,18 @@ static int tda1004x_get_fe(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct dtv_frontend_properties *fe_params = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
struct tda1004x_state* state = fe->demodulator_priv;
+ int status;
dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
+ status = tda1004x_read_byte(state, TDA1004X_STATUS_CD);
+ if (status == -1)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /* Only update the properties cache if device is locked */
+ if (!(status & 8))
+ return 0;
+
// inversion status
fe_params->inversion = INVERSION_OFF;
if (tda1004x_read_byte(state, TDA1004X_CONFC1) & 0x20)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
commit 0f4a943168f31d29a1701908931acaba518b131a upstream.
To address the bug where fabric driver level shutdown
of se_cmd occurs at the same time when TMR CMD_T_ABORTED
is happening resulting in a -1 ->cmd_kref, this patch
adds a CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP bit that is used to determine
when TMR + driver I_T nexus shutdown is happening
concurrently.
It changes target_sess_cmd_list_set_waiting() to obtain
se_cmd->cmd_kref + set CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP, and drop local
reference in target_wait_for_sess_cmds() and invoke extra
target_put_sess_cmd() during Task Aborted Status (TAS)
when necessary.
Also, it adds a new target_wait_free_cmd() wrapper around
transport_wait_for_tasks() for the special case within
transport_generic_free_cmd() to set CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP,
and is now aware of CMD_T_ABORTED + CMD_T_TAS status
bits to know when an extra transport_put_cmd() during
TAS is required.
Note transport_generic_free_cmd() is expected to block on
cmd->cmd_wait_comp in order to follow what iscsi-target
expects during iscsi_conn context se_cmd shutdown.
Cc: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Cc: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Grover <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 57 ++++++++++----
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
include/target/target_core_base.h | 2 +
3 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
index 5e7f5bd..47a90d6 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -82,16 +82,18 @@ void core_tmr_release_req(
kfree(tmr);
}
-static void core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(
- struct se_session *tmr_sess,
- struct se_cmd *cmd,
- int tas)
+static void core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd, int tas)
{
- bool remove = true;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ bool remove = true, send_tas;
/*
* TASK ABORTED status (TAS) bit support
- */
- if (tmr_sess && tmr_sess != cmd->se_sess && tas) {
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ send_tas = (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_TAS);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+
+ if (send_tas) {
remove = false;
transport_send_task_abort(cmd);
}
@@ -114,7 +116,8 @@ static int target_check_cdb_and_preempt(struct list_head *list,
return 1;
}
-static bool __target_check_io_state(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
+static bool __target_check_io_state(struct se_cmd *se_cmd,
+ struct se_session *tmr_sess, int tas)
{
struct se_session *sess = se_cmd->se_sess;
@@ -122,21 +125,33 @@ static bool __target_check_io_state(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
/*
* If command already reached CMD_T_COMPLETE state within
- * target_complete_cmd(), this se_cmd has been passed to
- * fabric driver and will not be aborted.
+ * target_complete_cmd() or CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP due to shutdown,
+ * this se_cmd has been passed to fabric driver and will
+ * not be aborted.
*
* Otherwise, obtain a local se_cmd->cmd_kref now for TMR
* ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET for CMD_T_ABORTED processing as
* long as se_cmd->cmd_kref is still active unless zero.
*/
spin_lock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
- if (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_COMPLETE) {
- pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u already complete,"
+ if (se_cmd->transport_state & (CMD_T_COMPLETE | CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP)) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u already complete or"
+ " fabric stop, skipping\n",
+ se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd));
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (sess->sess_tearing_down || se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
+ pr_debug("Attempted to abort io tag: %u already shutdown,"
" skipping\n", se_cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(se_cmd));
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return false;
}
se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
+
+ if ((tmr_sess != se_cmd->se_sess) && tas)
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_TAS;
+
spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
return kref_get_unless_zero(&se_cmd->cmd_kref);
@@ -164,7 +179,7 @@ void core_tmr_abort_task(
printk("ABORT_TASK: Found referenced %s task_tag: %u\n",
se_cmd->se_tfo->get_fabric_name(), ref_tag);
- if (!__target_check_io_state(se_cmd)) {
+ if (!__target_check_io_state(se_cmd, se_sess, 0)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
goto out;
@@ -234,7 +249,8 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(
spin_lock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
spin_lock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
- if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ACTIVE)) {
+ if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ACTIVE) ||
+ (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP)) {
spin_unlock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
continue;
@@ -244,15 +260,22 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_tmr_list(
spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
continue;
}
+ if (sess->sess_tearing_down || cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
+ spin_unlock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+ continue;
+ }
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
spin_unlock(&cmd->t_state_lock);
rc = kref_get_unless_zero(&cmd->cmd_kref);
- spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
if (!rc) {
printk("LUN_RESET TMR: non-zero kref_get_unless_zero\n");
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
continue;
}
+ spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
+
list_move_tail(&tmr_p->tmr_list, &drain_tmr_list);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->se_tmr_lock, flags);
@@ -329,7 +352,7 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
continue;
spin_lock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
- rc = __target_check_io_state(cmd);
+ rc = __target_check_io_state(cmd, tmr_sess, tas);
spin_unlock(&sess->sess_cmd_lock);
if (!rc)
continue;
@@ -368,7 +391,7 @@ static void core_tmr_drain_state_list(
cancel_work_sync(&cmd->work);
transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
- core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(tmr_sess, cmd, tas);
+ core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(cmd, tas);
target_put_sess_cmd(cmd->se_sess, cmd);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index 7d7f981..09268ad 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -2248,18 +2248,33 @@ static void transport_write_pending_qf(struct se_cmd *cmd)
}
}
+static bool
+__transport_wait_for_tasks(struct se_cmd *, bool, bool *, bool *,
+ unsigned long *flags);
+
+static void target_wait_free_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd, bool *aborted, bool *tas)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ __transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd, true, aborted, tas, &flags);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+}
+
int transport_generic_free_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd, int wait_for_tasks)
{
int ret = 0;
+ bool aborted = false, tas = false;
if (!(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SE_LUN_CMD)) {
if (wait_for_tasks && (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB))
- transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
+ target_wait_free_cmd(cmd, &aborted, &tas);
- ret = transport_put_cmd(cmd);
+ if (!aborted || tas)
+ ret = transport_put_cmd(cmd);
} else {
if (wait_for_tasks)
- transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd);
+ target_wait_free_cmd(cmd, &aborted, &tas);
/*
* Handle WRITE failure case where transport_generic_new_cmd()
* has already added se_cmd to state_list, but fabric has
@@ -2271,7 +2286,21 @@ int transport_generic_free_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd, int wait_for_tasks)
if (cmd->se_lun)
transport_lun_remove_cmd(cmd);
- ret = transport_put_cmd(cmd);
+ if (!aborted || tas)
+ ret = transport_put_cmd(cmd);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the task has been internally aborted due to TMR ABORT_TASK
+ * or LUN_RESET, target_core_tmr.c is responsible for performing
+ * the remaining calls to target_put_sess_cmd(), and not the
+ * callers of this function.
+ */
+ if (aborted) {
+ pr_debug("Detected CMD_T_ABORTED for ITT: %u\n",
+ cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(cmd));
+ wait_for_completion(&cmd->cmd_wait_comp);
+ cmd->se_tfo->release_cmd(cmd);
+ ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
@@ -2328,6 +2357,7 @@ static void target_release_cmd_kref(struct kref *kref)
{
struct se_cmd *se_cmd = container_of(kref, struct se_cmd, cmd_kref);
struct se_session *se_sess = se_cmd->se_sess;
+ bool fabric_stop;
if (list_empty(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list)) {
spin_unlock(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock);
@@ -2335,13 +2365,19 @@ static void target_release_cmd_kref(struct kref *kref)
se_cmd->se_tfo->release_cmd(se_cmd);
return;
}
- if (se_sess->sess_tearing_down && se_cmd->cmd_wait_set) {
+
+ spin_lock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ fabric_stop = (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP);
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+
+ if (se_cmd->cmd_wait_set || fabric_stop) {
+ list_del_init(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
spin_unlock(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock);
target_free_cmd_mem(se_cmd);
complete(&se_cmd->cmd_wait_comp);
return;
}
- list_del(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
+ list_del_init(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
spin_unlock(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock);
target_free_cmd_mem(se_cmd);
@@ -2373,6 +2409,7 @@ void target_sess_cmd_list_set_waiting(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
struct se_cmd *se_cmd;
unsigned long flags;
+ int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
if (se_sess->sess_tearing_down) {
@@ -2382,8 +2419,15 @@ void target_sess_cmd_list_set_waiting(struct se_session *se_sess)
se_sess->sess_tearing_down = 1;
list_splice_init(&se_sess->sess_cmd_list, &se_sess->sess_wait_list);
- list_for_each_entry(se_cmd, &se_sess->sess_wait_list, se_cmd_list)
- se_cmd->cmd_wait_set = 1;
+ list_for_each_entry(se_cmd, &se_sess->sess_wait_list, se_cmd_list) {
+ rc = kref_get_unless_zero(&se_cmd->cmd_kref);
+ if (rc) {
+ se_cmd->cmd_wait_set = 1;
+ spin_lock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ se_cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP;
+ spin_unlock(&se_cmd->t_state_lock);
+ }
+ }
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_sess->sess_cmd_lock, flags);
}
@@ -2396,15 +2440,25 @@ void target_wait_for_sess_cmds(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
struct se_cmd *se_cmd, *tmp_cmd;
unsigned long flags;
+ bool tas;
list_for_each_entry_safe(se_cmd, tmp_cmd,
&se_sess->sess_wait_list, se_cmd_list) {
- list_del(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
+ list_del_init(&se_cmd->se_cmd_list);
pr_debug("Waiting for se_cmd: %p t_state: %d, fabric state:"
" %d\n", se_cmd, se_cmd->t_state,
se_cmd->se_tfo->get_cmd_state(se_cmd));
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ tas = (se_cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_TAS);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+
+ if (!target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd)) {
+ if (tas)
+ target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
+ }
+
wait_for_completion(&se_cmd->cmd_wait_comp);
pr_debug("After cmd_wait_comp: se_cmd: %p t_state: %d"
" fabric state: %d\n", se_cmd, se_cmd->t_state,
@@ -2447,34 +2501,38 @@ int transport_clear_lun_ref(struct se_lun *lun)
return 0;
}
-/**
- * transport_wait_for_tasks - wait for completion to occur
- * @cmd: command to wait
- *
- * Called from frontend fabric context to wait for storage engine
- * to pause and/or release frontend generated struct se_cmd.
- */
-bool transport_wait_for_tasks(struct se_cmd *cmd)
+static bool
+__transport_wait_for_tasks(struct se_cmd *cmd, bool fabric_stop,
+ bool *aborted, bool *tas, unsigned long *flags)
+ __releases(&cmd->t_state_lock)
+ __acquires(&cmd->t_state_lock)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ assert_spin_locked(&cmd->t_state_lock);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ if (fabric_stop)
+ cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP;
+
+ if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED)
+ *aborted = true;
+
+ if (cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_TAS)
+ *tas = true;
+
if (!(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SE_LUN_CMD) &&
- !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB)) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB))
return false;
- }
if (!(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SUPPORTED_SAM_OPCODE) &&
- !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB)) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB))
return false;
- }
- if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ACTIVE)) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ACTIVE))
+ return false;
+
+ if (fabric_stop && *aborted)
return false;
- }
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_STOP;
@@ -2483,20 +2541,37 @@ bool transport_wait_for_tasks(struct se_cmd *cmd)
cmd, cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(cmd),
cmd->se_tfo->get_cmd_state(cmd), cmd->t_state);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, *flags);
wait_for_completion(&cmd->t_transport_stop_comp);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, *flags);
cmd->transport_state &= ~(CMD_T_ACTIVE | CMD_T_STOP);
pr_debug("wait_for_tasks: Stopped wait_for_completion("
"&cmd->t_transport_stop_comp) for ITT: 0x%08x\n",
cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(cmd));
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * transport_wait_for_tasks - wait for completion to occur
+ * @cmd: command to wait
+ *
+ * Called from frontend fabric context to wait for storage engine
+ * to pause and/or release frontend generated struct se_cmd.
+ */
+bool transport_wait_for_tasks(struct se_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ bool ret, aborted = false, tas = false;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
+ ret = __transport_wait_for_tasks(cmd, false, &aborted, &tas, &flags);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
- return true;
+ return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(transport_wait_for_tasks);
diff --git a/include/target/target_core_base.h b/include/target/target_core_base.h
index db8628c..40da81a 100644
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -474,6 +474,8 @@ struct se_cmd {
#define CMD_T_DEV_ACTIVE (1 << 7)
#define CMD_T_REQUEST_STOP (1 << 8)
#define CMD_T_BUSY (1 << 9)
+#define CMD_T_TAS (1 << 10)
+#define CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP (1 << 11)
spinlock_t t_state_lock;
struct completion t_transport_stop_comp;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
commit 5c82171167adb8e4ac77b91a42cd49fb211a81a0 upstream.
xhci driver frees data for all devices, both usb2 and and usb3 the
first time usb_remove_hcd() is called, including td_list and and xhci_ring
structures.
When usb_remove_hcd() is called a second time for the second xhci bus it
will try to dequeue all pending urbs, and touches td_list which is already
freed for that endpoint.
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joe Lawrence <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
index c363a36..3bd7470 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c
@@ -1527,7 +1527,9 @@ int xhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb, int status)
xhci_dbg_trace(xhci, trace_xhci_dbg_cancel_urb,
"HW died, freeing TD.");
urb_priv = urb->hcpriv;
- for (i = urb_priv->td_cnt; i < urb_priv->length; i++) {
+ for (i = urb_priv->td_cnt;
+ i < urb_priv->length && xhci->devs[urb->dev->slot_id];
+ i++) {
td = urb_priv->td[i];
if (!list_empty(&td->td_list))
list_del_init(&td->td_list);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Alex Leung <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 68259b5aac13a57cba797b9605ed9812158f0e72 ]
This patch addresses three of long standing issues wrt to Task
Aborted Status (TAS) handling.
The first is the incorrect assumption in core_tmr_handle_tas_abort()
that TASK_ABORTED status is sent for the task referenced by TMR
ABORT_TASK, and sending TASK_ABORTED status for TMR LUN_RESET on
the same nexus the LUN_RESET was received.
The second is to ensure the lun reference count is dropped within
transport_cmd_finish_abort() by calling transport_lun_remove_cmd()
before invoking transport_cmd_check_stop_to_fabric().
The last is to fix the delayed TAS handling to allow outstanding
WRITEs to complete before sending the TASK_ABORTED status. This
includes changing transport_check_aborted_status() to avoid
processing when SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS has not be set, and updating
transport_send_task_abort() to drop the SCF_SENT_DELAYED_TAS
check.
Signed-off-by: Alex Leung <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Leung <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c | 18 ++++++------------
drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 14 +++++++++++---
include/target/target_core_base.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
index 70c638f..3f0338f 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_tmr.c
@@ -87,14 +87,17 @@ static void core_tmr_handle_tas_abort(
struct se_cmd *cmd,
int tas)
{
+ bool remove = true;
/*
* TASK ABORTED status (TAS) bit support
*/
if ((tmr_nacl &&
- (tmr_nacl == cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl)) || tas)
+ (tmr_nacl != cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl)) && tas) {
+ remove = false;
transport_send_task_abort(cmd);
+ }
- transport_cmd_finish_abort(cmd, 0);
+ transport_cmd_finish_abort(cmd, remove);
}
static int target_check_cdb_and_preempt(struct list_head *list,
@@ -150,18 +153,9 @@ void core_tmr_abort_task(
cancel_work_sync(&se_cmd->work);
transport_wait_for_tasks(se_cmd);
- /*
- * Now send SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED status for the referenced
- * se_cmd descriptor..
- */
- transport_send_task_abort(se_cmd);
- /*
- * Also deal with possible extra acknowledge reference..
- */
- if (se_cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_ACK_KREF)
- target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
target_put_sess_cmd(se_sess, se_cmd);
+ transport_cmd_finish_abort(se_cmd, true);
printk("ABORT_TASK: Sending TMR_FUNCTION_COMPLETE for"
" ref_tag: %d\n", ref_tag);
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
index 7458b13..28f4c67 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
@@ -577,6 +577,9 @@ static void transport_lun_remove_cmd(struct se_cmd *cmd)
void transport_cmd_finish_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd, int remove)
{
+ if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SE_LUN_CMD)
+ transport_lun_remove_cmd(cmd);
+
if (transport_cmd_check_stop_to_fabric(cmd))
return;
if (remove)
@@ -2741,13 +2744,17 @@ int transport_check_aborted_status(struct se_cmd *cmd, int send_status)
if (!(cmd->transport_state & CMD_T_ABORTED))
return 0;
- if (!send_status || (cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SENT_DELAYED_TAS))
+ /*
+ * If cmd has been aborted but either no status is to be sent or it has
+ * already been sent, just return
+ */
+ if (!send_status || !(cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS))
return 1;
pr_debug("Sending delayed SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED status for CDB: 0x%02x ITT: 0x%08x\n",
cmd->t_task_cdb[0], cmd->se_tfo->get_task_tag(cmd));
- cmd->se_cmd_flags |= SCF_SENT_DELAYED_TAS;
+ cmd->se_cmd_flags &= ~SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS;
cmd->scsi_status = SAM_STAT_TASK_ABORTED;
trace_target_cmd_complete(cmd);
cmd->se_tfo->queue_status(cmd);
@@ -2761,7 +2768,7 @@ void transport_send_task_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd)
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
- if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & (SCF_SENT_CHECK_CONDITION | SCF_SENT_DELAYED_TAS)) {
+ if (cmd->se_cmd_flags & (SCF_SENT_CHECK_CONDITION)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmd->t_state_lock, flags);
return;
}
@@ -2776,6 +2783,7 @@ void transport_send_task_abort(struct se_cmd *cmd)
if (cmd->data_direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE) {
if (cmd->se_tfo->write_pending_status(cmd) != 0) {
cmd->transport_state |= CMD_T_ABORTED;
+ cmd->se_cmd_flags |= SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS;
smp_mb__after_atomic_inc();
return;
}
diff --git a/include/target/target_core_base.h b/include/target/target_core_base.h
index 9c12091..db8628c 100644
--- a/include/target/target_core_base.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_base.h
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ enum se_cmd_flags_table {
SCF_SENT_CHECK_CONDITION = 0x00000800,
SCF_OVERFLOW_BIT = 0x00001000,
SCF_UNDERFLOW_BIT = 0x00002000,
- SCF_SENT_DELAYED_TAS = 0x00004000,
+ SCF_SEND_DELAYED_TAS = 0x00004000,
SCF_ALUA_NON_OPTIMIZED = 0x00008000,
SCF_PASSTHROUGH_SG_TO_MEM_NOALLOC = 0x00020000,
SCF_ACK_KREF = 0x00040000,
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
commit a6835090716a85f2297668ba593bd00e1051e662 upstream.
This reverts commit e210c422b6fd ("xhci: don't finish a TD if we get a
short transfer event mid TD")
Turns out that most host controllers do not follow the xHCI specs and never
send the second event for the last TRB in the TD if there was a short event
mid-TD.
Returning the URB directly after the first short-transfer event is far
better than never returning the URB. (class drivers usually timeout
after 30sec). For the hosts that do send the second event we will go
back to treating it as misplaced event and print an error message for it.
The origial patch was sent to stable kernels and needs to be reverted from
there as well
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
index c207013..d4ce529 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -2361,10 +2361,6 @@ static int process_bulk_intr_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_td *td,
EVENT_TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(event->transfer_len)));
/* Fast path - was this the last TRB in the TD for this URB? */
if (event_trb == td->last_trb) {
- if (td->urb_length_set && trb_comp_code == COMP_SHORT_TX)
- return finish_td(xhci, td, event_trb, event, ep,
- status, false);
-
if (EVENT_TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(event->transfer_len)) != 0) {
td->urb->actual_length =
td->urb->transfer_buffer_length -
@@ -2416,12 +2412,6 @@ static int process_bulk_intr_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_td *td,
td->urb->actual_length +=
TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(cur_trb->generic.field[2])) -
EVENT_TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(event->transfer_len));
-
- if (trb_comp_code == COMP_SHORT_TX) {
- xhci_dbg(xhci, "mid bulk/intr SP, wait for last TRB event\n");
- td->urb_length_set = true;
- return 0;
- }
}
return finish_td(xhci, td, event_trb, event, ep, status, false);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
commit 461c7fa126794157484dca48e88effa4963e3af3 upstream.
Reduced testcase:
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <numaif.h>
#define SIZE 0x2000
int main()
{
int fd;
void *p;
fd = open("/dev/sg0", O_RDWR);
p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_LOCKED, fd, 0);
mbind(p, SIZE, 0, NULL, 0, MPOL_MF_MOVE);
return 0;
}
We shouldn't try to migrate pages in sg VMA as we don't have a way to
update Sg_scatter_hold::pages accordingly from mm core.
Let's mark the VMA as VM_IO to indicate to mm core that the VMA is not
migratable.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Doug Gilbert <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Shiraz Hashim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
index 721d839..0be16bf 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
}
sfp->mmap_called = 1;
- vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_private_data = sfp;
vma->vm_ops = &sg_mmap_vm_ops;
return 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 7f0973e973cd74aa40747c9d38844560cd184ee8 upstream.
The port subscription code uses double mutex locks for source and
destination ports, and this may become racy once when wrongly set up.
It leads to lockdep warning splat, typically triggered by fuzzer like
syzkaller, although the actual deadlock hasn't been seen, so far.
This patch simplifies the handling by reducing to two single locks, so
that no lockdep warning will be trigger any longer.
By splitting to two actions, a still-in-progress element shall be
added in one list while handling another. For ignoring this element,
a new check is added in deliver_to_subscribers().
Along with it, the code to add/remove the subscribers list element was
cleaned up and refactored.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+aKQXV7xkBW9hpQbzaDO7LrUvohxWh-UwMxXjDy-yBD=A@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 3 +
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
2 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
index ecfbf5f..08865dc 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
@@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ static int deliver_to_subscribers(struct snd_seq_client *client,
else
down_read(&grp->list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(subs, &grp->list_head, src_list) {
+ /* both ports ready? */
+ if (atomic_read(&subs->ref_count) != 2)
+ continue;
event->dest = subs->info.dest;
if (subs->info.flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_SUBS_TIMESTAMP)
/* convert time according to flag with subscription */
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
index 9516e5c..67c91d2 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
@@ -175,10 +175,6 @@ struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
}
/* */
-enum group_type {
- SRC_LIST, DEST_LIST
-};
-
static int subscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp,
@@ -205,6 +201,20 @@ static struct snd_seq_client_port *get_client_port(struct snd_seq_addr *addr,
return NULL;
}
+static void delete_and_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
+ struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
+ struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs,
+ bool is_src, bool ack);
+
+static inline struct snd_seq_subscribers *
+get_subscriber(struct list_head *p, bool is_src)
+{
+ if (is_src)
+ return list_entry(p, struct snd_seq_subscribers, src_list);
+ else
+ return list_entry(p, struct snd_seq_subscribers, dest_list);
+}
+
/*
* remove all subscribers on the list
* this is called from port_delete, for each src and dest list.
@@ -212,7 +222,7 @@ static struct snd_seq_client_port *get_client_port(struct snd_seq_addr *addr,
static void clear_subscriber_list(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp,
- int grptype)
+ int is_src)
{
struct list_head *p, *n;
@@ -221,15 +231,13 @@ static void clear_subscriber_list(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client *c;
struct snd_seq_client_port *aport;
- if (grptype == SRC_LIST) {
- subs = list_entry(p, struct snd_seq_subscribers, src_list);
+ subs = get_subscriber(p, is_src);
+ if (is_src)
aport = get_client_port(&subs->info.dest, &c);
- } else {
- subs = list_entry(p, struct snd_seq_subscribers, dest_list);
+ else
aport = get_client_port(&subs->info.sender, &c);
- }
- list_del(p);
- unsubscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, 0);
+ delete_and_unsubscribe_port(client, port, subs, is_src, false);
+
if (!aport) {
/* looks like the connected port is being deleted.
* we decrease the counter, and when both ports are deleted
@@ -237,21 +245,14 @@ static void clear_subscriber_list(struct snd_seq_client *client,
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&subs->ref_count))
kfree(subs);
- } else {
- /* ok we got the connected port */
- struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *agrp;
- agrp = (grptype == SRC_LIST) ? &aport->c_dest : &aport->c_src;
- down_write(&agrp->list_mutex);
- if (grptype == SRC_LIST)
- list_del(&subs->dest_list);
- else
- list_del(&subs->src_list);
- up_write(&agrp->list_mutex);
- unsubscribe_port(c, aport, agrp, &subs->info, 1);
- kfree(subs);
- snd_seq_port_unlock(aport);
- snd_seq_client_unlock(c);
+ continue;
}
+
+ /* ok we got the connected port */
+ delete_and_unsubscribe_port(c, aport, subs, !is_src, true);
+ kfree(subs);
+ snd_seq_port_unlock(aport);
+ snd_seq_client_unlock(c);
}
}
@@ -264,8 +265,8 @@ static int port_delete(struct snd_seq_client *client,
snd_use_lock_sync(&port->use_lock);
/* clear subscribers info */
- clear_subscriber_list(client, port, &port->c_src, SRC_LIST);
- clear_subscriber_list(client, port, &port->c_dest, DEST_LIST);
+ clear_subscriber_list(client, port, &port->c_src, true);
+ clear_subscriber_list(client, port, &port->c_dest, false);
if (port->private_free)
port->private_free(port->private_data);
@@ -484,85 +485,120 @@ static int match_subs_info(struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *r,
return 0;
}
-
-/* connect two ports */
-int snd_seq_port_connect(struct snd_seq_client *connector,
- struct snd_seq_client *src_client,
- struct snd_seq_client_port *src_port,
- struct snd_seq_client *dest_client,
- struct snd_seq_client_port *dest_port,
- struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *info)
+static int check_and_subscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
+ struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
+ struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs,
+ bool is_src, bool exclusive, bool ack)
{
- struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *src = &src_port->c_src;
- struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *dest = &dest_port->c_dest;
- struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs, *s;
- int err, src_called = 0;
- unsigned long flags;
- int exclusive;
+ struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp;
+ struct list_head *p;
+ struct snd_seq_subscribers *s;
+ int err;
- subs = kzalloc(sizeof(*subs), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (! subs)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- subs->info = *info;
- atomic_set(&subs->ref_count, 2);
-
- down_write(&src->list_mutex);
- down_write_nested(&dest->list_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
-
- exclusive = info->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_SUBS_EXCLUSIVE ? 1 : 0;
+ grp = is_src ? &port->c_src : &port->c_dest;
err = -EBUSY;
+ down_write(&grp->list_mutex);
if (exclusive) {
- if (! list_empty(&src->list_head) || ! list_empty(&dest->list_head))
+ if (!list_empty(&grp->list_head))
goto __error;
} else {
- if (src->exclusive || dest->exclusive)
+ if (grp->exclusive)
goto __error;
/* check whether already exists */
- list_for_each_entry(s, &src->list_head, src_list) {
- if (match_subs_info(info, &s->info))
- goto __error;
- }
- list_for_each_entry(s, &dest->list_head, dest_list) {
- if (match_subs_info(info, &s->info))
+ list_for_each(p, &grp->list_head) {
+ s = get_subscriber(p, is_src);
+ if (match_subs_info(&subs->info, &s->info))
goto __error;
}
}
- if ((err = subscribe_port(src_client, src_port, src, info,
- connector->number != src_client->number)) < 0)
- goto __error;
- src_called = 1;
-
- if ((err = subscribe_port(dest_client, dest_port, dest, info,
- connector->number != dest_client->number)) < 0)
+ err = subscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, ack);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ grp->exclusive = 0;
goto __error;
+ }
/* add to list */
- write_lock_irqsave(&src->list_lock, flags);
- // write_lock(&dest->list_lock); // no other lock yet
- list_add_tail(&subs->src_list, &src->list_head);
- list_add_tail(&subs->dest_list, &dest->list_head);
- // write_unlock(&dest->list_lock); // no other lock yet
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&src->list_lock, flags);
+ write_lock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
+ if (is_src)
+ list_add_tail(&subs->src_list, &grp->list_head);
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&subs->dest_list, &grp->list_head);
+ grp->exclusive = exclusive;
+ atomic_inc(&subs->ref_count);
+ write_unlock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
+ err = 0;
+
+ __error:
+ up_write(&grp->list_mutex);
+ return err;
+}
- src->exclusive = dest->exclusive = exclusive;
+static void delete_and_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
+ struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
+ struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs,
+ bool is_src, bool ack)
+{
+ struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp;
+
+ grp = is_src ? &port->c_src : &port->c_dest;
+ down_write(&grp->list_mutex);
+ write_lock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
+ if (is_src)
+ list_del(&subs->src_list);
+ else
+ list_del(&subs->dest_list);
+ grp->exclusive = 0;
+ write_unlock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
+ up_write(&grp->list_mutex);
+
+ unsubscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, ack);
+}
+
+/* connect two ports */
+int snd_seq_port_connect(struct snd_seq_client *connector,
+ struct snd_seq_client *src_client,
+ struct snd_seq_client_port *src_port,
+ struct snd_seq_client *dest_client,
+ struct snd_seq_client_port *dest_port,
+ struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *info)
+{
+ struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs;
+ bool exclusive;
+ int err;
+
+ subs = kzalloc(sizeof(*subs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!subs)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ subs->info = *info;
+ atomic_set(&subs->ref_count, 0);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&subs->src_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&subs->dest_list);
+
+ exclusive = !!(info->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_SUBS_EXCLUSIVE);
+
+ err = check_and_subscribe_port(src_client, src_port, subs, true,
+ exclusive,
+ connector->number != src_client->number);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto error;
+ err = check_and_subscribe_port(dest_client, dest_port, subs, false,
+ exclusive,
+ connector->number != dest_client->number);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto error_dest;
- up_write(&dest->list_mutex);
- up_write(&src->list_mutex);
return 0;
- __error:
- if (src_called)
- unsubscribe_port(src_client, src_port, src, info,
- connector->number != src_client->number);
+ error_dest:
+ delete_and_unsubscribe_port(src_client, src_port, subs, true,
+ connector->number != src_client->number);
+ error:
kfree(subs);
- up_write(&dest->list_mutex);
- up_write(&src->list_mutex);
return err;
}
-
/* remove the connection */
int snd_seq_port_disconnect(struct snd_seq_client *connector,
struct snd_seq_client *src_client,
@@ -572,37 +608,28 @@ int snd_seq_port_disconnect(struct snd_seq_client *connector,
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *info)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *src = &src_port->c_src;
- struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *dest = &dest_port->c_dest;
struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs;
int err = -ENOENT;
- unsigned long flags;
down_write(&src->list_mutex);
- down_write_nested(&dest->list_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
-
/* look for the connection */
list_for_each_entry(subs, &src->list_head, src_list) {
if (match_subs_info(info, &subs->info)) {
- write_lock_irqsave(&src->list_lock, flags);
- // write_lock(&dest->list_lock); // no lock yet
- list_del(&subs->src_list);
- list_del(&subs->dest_list);
- // write_unlock(&dest->list_lock);
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&src->list_lock, flags);
- src->exclusive = dest->exclusive = 0;
- unsubscribe_port(src_client, src_port, src, info,
- connector->number != src_client->number);
- unsubscribe_port(dest_client, dest_port, dest, info,
- connector->number != dest_client->number);
- kfree(subs);
+ atomic_dec(&subs->ref_count); /* mark as not ready */
err = 0;
break;
}
}
-
- up_write(&dest->list_mutex);
up_write(&src->list_mutex);
- return err;
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ delete_and_unsubscribe_port(src_client, src_port, subs, true,
+ connector->number != src_client->number);
+ delete_and_unsubscribe_port(dest_client, dest_port, subs, false,
+ connector->number != dest_client->number);
+ kfree(subs);
+ return 0;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit 3d44d51bd339766f0178f0cf2e8d048b4a4872aa upstream.
This doesn't seem to fix a regression -- I don't think the CLAC was
ever there.
I double-checked in a debugger: entries through the int80 gate do
not automatically clear AC.
Stable maintainers: I can provide a backport to 4.3 and earlier if
needed. This needs to be backported all the way to 3.10.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: 63bcff2a307b ("x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b02b7e71ae54074be01fc171cbd4b72517055c0e.1456345086.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
[ kamal: backport to 3.10 through 3.19-stable: file rename; context ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
index 92a2e93..b74ac9c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ ENTRY(ia32_syscall)
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET cs,CS-RIP*/
CFI_REL_OFFSET rip,RIP-RIP
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
+ ASM_CLAC /* Do this early to minimize exposure */
SWAPGS
/*
* No need to follow this irqs on/off section: the syscall
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 8eee1d3ed5b6fc8e14389567c9a6f53f82bb7224 upstream.
The bulk of ATA host state machine is implemented by
ata_sff_hsm_move(). The function is called from either the interrupt
handler or, if polling, a work item. Unlike from the interrupt path,
the polling path calls the function without holding the host lock and
ata_sff_hsm_move() selectively grabs the lock.
This is completely broken. If an IRQ triggers while polling is in
progress, the two can easily race and end up accessing the hardware
and updating state machine state at the same time. This can put the
state machine in an illegal state and lead to a crash like the
following.
kernel BUG at drivers/ata/libata-sff.c:1302!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 10679 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.5.0-rc1+ #300
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88002bd00000 ti: ffff88002e048000 task.ti: ffff88002e048000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff83a83409>] [<ffffffff83a83409>] ata_sff_hsm_move+0x619/0x1c60
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff83a84c31>] __ata_sff_port_intr+0x1e1/0x3a0 drivers/ata/libata-sff.c:1584
[<ffffffff83a85611>] ata_bmdma_port_intr+0x71/0x400 drivers/ata/libata-sff.c:2877
[< inline >] __ata_sff_interrupt drivers/ata/libata-sff.c:1629
[<ffffffff83a85bf3>] ata_bmdma_interrupt+0x253/0x580 drivers/ata/libata-sff.c:2902
[<ffffffff81479f98>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x108/0x7e0 kernel/irq/handle.c:157
[<ffffffff8147a717>] handle_irq_event+0xa7/0x140 kernel/irq/handle.c:205
[<ffffffff81484573>] handle_edge_irq+0x1e3/0x8d0 kernel/irq/chip.c:623
[< inline >] generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:146
[<ffffffff811a92bc>] handle_irq+0x10c/0x2a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:78
[<ffffffff811a7e4d>] do_IRQ+0x7d/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:240
[<ffffffff86653d4c>] common_interrupt+0x8c/0x8c arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:520
<EOI>
[< inline >] rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:490
[< inline >] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:874
[<ffffffff8164b4a1>] filemap_map_pages+0x131/0xba0 mm/filemap.c:2145
[< inline >] do_fault_around mm/memory.c:2943
[< inline >] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:2962
[< inline >] do_fault mm/memory.c:3133
[< inline >] handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3308
[< inline >] __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:3418
[<ffffffff816efb16>] handle_mm_fault+0x2516/0x49a0 mm/memory.c:3447
[<ffffffff8127dc16>] __do_page_fault+0x376/0x960 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1238
[<ffffffff8127e358>] trace_do_page_fault+0xe8/0x420 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1331
[<ffffffff8126f514>] do_async_page_fault+0x14/0xd0 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c:264
[<ffffffff86655578>] async_page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:986
Fix it by ensuring that the polling path is holding the host lock
before entering ata_sff_hsm_move() so that all hardware accesses and
state updates are performed under the host lock.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CACT4Y+b_JsOxJu2EZyEf+mOXORc_zid5V1-pLZSroJVxyWdSpw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/ata/libata-sff.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-sff.c b/drivers/ata/libata-sff.c
index 136803c..96e5ed1 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libata-sff.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-sff.c
@@ -997,12 +997,9 @@ static inline int ata_hsm_ok_in_wq(struct ata_port *ap,
static void ata_hsm_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc, int in_wq)
{
struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
- unsigned long flags;
if (ap->ops->error_handler) {
if (in_wq) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(ap->lock, flags);
-
/* EH might have kicked in while host lock is
* released.
*/
@@ -1014,8 +1011,6 @@ static void ata_hsm_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc, int in_wq)
} else
ata_port_freeze(ap);
}
-
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags);
} else {
if (likely(!(qc->err_mask & AC_ERR_HSM)))
ata_qc_complete(qc);
@@ -1024,10 +1019,8 @@ static void ata_hsm_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc, int in_wq)
}
} else {
if (in_wq) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(ap->lock, flags);
ata_sff_irq_on(ap);
ata_qc_complete(qc);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags);
} else
ata_qc_complete(qc);
}
@@ -1048,9 +1041,10 @@ int ata_sff_hsm_move(struct ata_port *ap, struct ata_queued_cmd *qc,
{
struct ata_link *link = qc->dev->link;
struct ata_eh_info *ehi = &link->eh_info;
- unsigned long flags = 0;
int poll_next;
+ lockdep_assert_held(ap->lock);
+
WARN_ON_ONCE((qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE) == 0);
/* Make sure ata_sff_qc_issue() does not throw things
@@ -1112,14 +1106,6 @@ fsm_start:
}
}
- /* Send the CDB (atapi) or the first data block (ata pio out).
- * During the state transition, interrupt handler shouldn't
- * be invoked before the data transfer is complete and
- * hsm_task_state is changed. Hence, the following locking.
- */
- if (in_wq)
- spin_lock_irqsave(ap->lock, flags);
-
if (qc->tf.protocol == ATA_PROT_PIO) {
/* PIO data out protocol.
* send first data block.
@@ -1135,9 +1121,6 @@ fsm_start:
/* send CDB */
atapi_send_cdb(ap, qc);
- if (in_wq)
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags);
-
/* if polling, ata_sff_pio_task() handles the rest.
* otherwise, interrupt handler takes over from here.
*/
@@ -1361,12 +1344,14 @@ static void ata_sff_pio_task(struct work_struct *work)
u8 status;
int poll_next;
+ spin_lock_irq(ap->lock);
+
BUG_ON(ap->sff_pio_task_link == NULL);
/* qc can be NULL if timeout occurred */
qc = ata_qc_from_tag(ap, link->active_tag);
if (!qc) {
ap->sff_pio_task_link = NULL;
- return;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
fsm_start:
@@ -1381,11 +1366,14 @@ fsm_start:
*/
status = ata_sff_busy_wait(ap, ATA_BUSY, 5);
if (status & ATA_BUSY) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(ap->lock);
ata_msleep(ap, 2);
+ spin_lock_irq(ap->lock);
+
status = ata_sff_busy_wait(ap, ATA_BUSY, 10);
if (status & ATA_BUSY) {
ata_sff_queue_pio_task(link, ATA_SHORT_PAUSE);
- return;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
}
@@ -1402,6 +1390,8 @@ fsm_start:
*/
if (poll_next)
goto fsm_start;
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irq(ap->lock);
}
/**
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
commit 46437f9a554fbe3e110580ca08ab703b59f2f95a upstream.
If the indirect_ptr bit is set on a slot, that indicates we need to redo
the lookup. Introduce a new function radix_tree_iter_retry() which
forces the loop to retry the lookup by setting 'slot' to NULL and
turning the iterator back to point at the problematic entry.
This is a pretty rare problem to hit at the moment; the lookup has to
race with a grow of the radix tree from a height of 0. The consequences
of hitting this race are that gang lookup could return a pointer to a
radix_tree_node instead of a pointer to whatever the user had inserted
in the tree.
Fixes: cebbd29e1c2f ("radix-tree: rewrite gang lookup using iterator")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ohad Ben-Cohen <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/radix-tree.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
lib/radix-tree.c | 12 ++++++++++--
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/radix-tree.h b/include/linux/radix-tree.h
index 4039407..cbeae48 100644
--- a/include/linux/radix-tree.h
+++ b/include/linux/radix-tree.h
@@ -323,6 +323,22 @@ void **radix_tree_next_chunk(struct radix_tree_root *root,
struct radix_tree_iter *iter, unsigned flags);
/**
+ * radix_tree_iter_retry - retry this chunk of the iteration
+ * @iter: iterator state
+ *
+ * If we iterate over a tree protected only by the RCU lock, a race
+ * against deletion or creation may result in seeing a slot for which
+ * radix_tree_deref_retry() returns true. If so, call this function
+ * and continue the iteration.
+ */
+static inline __must_check
+void **radix_tree_iter_retry(struct radix_tree_iter *iter)
+{
+ iter->next_index = iter->index;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
* radix_tree_chunk_size - get current chunk size
*
* @iter: pointer to radix tree iterator
diff --git a/lib/radix-tree.c b/lib/radix-tree.c
index 7811ed3..1153de4 100644
--- a/lib/radix-tree.c
+++ b/lib/radix-tree.c
@@ -1052,9 +1052,13 @@ radix_tree_gang_lookup(struct radix_tree_root *root, void **results,
return 0;
radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, root, &iter, first_index) {
- results[ret] = indirect_to_ptr(rcu_dereference_raw(*slot));
+ results[ret] = rcu_dereference_raw(*slot);
if (!results[ret])
continue;
+ if (radix_tree_is_indirect_ptr(results[ret])) {
+ slot = radix_tree_iter_retry(&iter);
+ continue;
+ }
if (++ret == max_items)
break;
}
@@ -1131,9 +1135,13 @@ radix_tree_gang_lookup_tag(struct radix_tree_root *root, void **results,
return 0;
radix_tree_for_each_tagged(slot, root, &iter, first_index, tag) {
- results[ret] = indirect_to_ptr(rcu_dereference_raw(*slot));
+ results[ret] = rcu_dereference_raw(*slot);
if (!results[ret])
continue;
+ if (radix_tree_is_indirect_ptr(results[ret])) {
+ slot = radix_tree_iter_retry(&iter);
+ continue;
+ }
if (++ret == max_items)
break;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 2154cc0e2d4ae15132d005d17e473327c70c9a06 upstream.
Mac Mini 7,1 model with CS4208 codec reports the headphone jack
detection wrongly in an inverted way. Moreover, the advertised pins
for the audio input and SPDIF output have actually no jack detection.
This patch addresses these issues. The inv_jack_detect flag is set
for fixing the headphone jack detection, and the pin configs for audio
input and SPDIF output are marked as non-detectable.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105161
Report-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_cirrus.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_cirrus.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_cirrus.c
index 3c90743..eef182b 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_cirrus.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_cirrus.c
@@ -617,6 +617,7 @@ enum {
CS4208_MAC_AUTO,
CS4208_MBA6,
CS4208_MBP11,
+ CS4208_MACMINI,
CS4208_GPIO0,
};
@@ -624,6 +625,7 @@ static const struct hda_model_fixup cs4208_models[] = {
{ .id = CS4208_GPIO0, .name = "gpio0" },
{ .id = CS4208_MBA6, .name = "mba6" },
{ .id = CS4208_MBP11, .name = "mbp11" },
+ { .id = CS4208_MACMINI, .name = "macmini" },
{}
};
@@ -635,6 +637,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cs4208_fixup_tbl[] = {
/* codec SSID matching */
static const struct snd_pci_quirk cs4208_mac_fixup_tbl[] = {
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x106b, 0x5e00, "MacBookPro 11,2", CS4208_MBP11),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x106b, 0x6c00, "MacMini 7,1", CS4208_MACMINI),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x106b, 0x7100, "MacBookAir 6,1", CS4208_MBA6),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x106b, 0x7200, "MacBookAir 6,2", CS4208_MBA6),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x106b, 0x7b00, "MacBookPro 12,1", CS4208_MBP11),
@@ -667,6 +670,24 @@ static void cs4208_fixup_mac(struct hda_codec *codec,
snd_hda_apply_fixup(codec, action);
}
+/* MacMini 7,1 has the inverted jack detection */
+static void cs4208_fixup_macmini(struct hda_codec *codec,
+ const struct hda_fixup *fix, int action)
+{
+ static const struct hda_pintbl pincfgs[] = {
+ { 0x18, 0x00ab9150 }, /* mic (audio-in) jack: disable detect */
+ { 0x21, 0x004be140 }, /* SPDIF: disable detect */
+ { }
+ };
+
+ if (action == HDA_FIXUP_ACT_PRE_PROBE) {
+ /* HP pin (0x10) has an inverted detection */
+ codec->inv_jack_detect = 1;
+ /* disable the bogus Mic and SPDIF jack detections */
+ snd_hda_apply_pincfgs(codec, pincfgs);
+ }
+}
+
static int cs4208_spdif_sw_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
{
@@ -710,6 +731,12 @@ static const struct hda_fixup cs4208_fixups[] = {
.chained = true,
.chain_id = CS4208_GPIO0,
},
+ [CS4208_MACMINI] = {
+ .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC,
+ .v.func = cs4208_fixup_macmini,
+ .chained = true,
+ .chain_id = CS4208_GPIO0,
+ },
[CS4208_GPIO0] = {
.type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC,
.v.func = cs4208_fixup_gpio0,
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
commit 2e7bac536106236104e9e339531ff0fcdb7b8147 upstream.
This trivial wrapper adds clarity and makes the following patch
smaller.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
kernel/module.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 16af9a9..7b8ccf6 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3387,6 +3387,11 @@ static inline int is_arm_mapping_symbol(const char *str)
&& (str[2] == '\0' || str[2] == '.');
}
+static const char *symname(struct module *mod, unsigned int symnum)
+{
+ return mod->strtab + mod->symtab[symnum].st_name;
+}
+
static const char *get_ksymbol(struct module *mod,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long *size,
@@ -3409,15 +3414,15 @@ static const char *get_ksymbol(struct module *mod,
/* We ignore unnamed symbols: they're uninformative
* and inserted at a whim. */
+ if (*symname(mod, i) == '\0'
+ || is_arm_mapping_symbol(symname(mod, i)))
+ continue;
+
if (mod->symtab[i].st_value <= addr
- && mod->symtab[i].st_value > mod->symtab[best].st_value
- && *(mod->strtab + mod->symtab[i].st_name) != '\0'
- && !is_arm_mapping_symbol(mod->strtab + mod->symtab[i].st_name))
+ && mod->symtab[i].st_value > mod->symtab[best].st_value)
best = i;
if (mod->symtab[i].st_value > addr
- && mod->symtab[i].st_value < nextval
- && *(mod->strtab + mod->symtab[i].st_name) != '\0'
- && !is_arm_mapping_symbol(mod->strtab + mod->symtab[i].st_name))
+ && mod->symtab[i].st_value < nextval)
nextval = mod->symtab[i].st_value;
}
@@ -3428,7 +3433,7 @@ static const char *get_ksymbol(struct module *mod,
*size = nextval - mod->symtab[best].st_value;
if (offset)
*offset = addr - mod->symtab[best].st_value;
- return mod->strtab + mod->symtab[best].st_name;
+ return symname(mod, best);
}
/* For kallsyms to ask for address resolution. NULL means not found. Careful
@@ -3529,8 +3534,7 @@ int module_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type,
if (symnum < mod->num_symtab) {
*value = mod->symtab[symnum].st_value;
*type = mod->symtab[symnum].st_info;
- strlcpy(name, mod->strtab + mod->symtab[symnum].st_name,
- KSYM_NAME_LEN);
+ strlcpy(name, symname(mod, symnum), KSYM_NAME_LEN);
strlcpy(module_name, mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
*exported = is_exported(name, *value, mod);
preempt_enable();
@@ -3547,7 +3551,7 @@ static unsigned long mod_find_symname(struct module *mod, const char *name)
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < mod->num_symtab; i++)
- if (strcmp(name, mod->strtab+mod->symtab[i].st_name) == 0 &&
+ if (strcmp(name, symname(mod, i)) == 0 &&
mod->symtab[i].st_info != 'U')
return mod->symtab[i].st_value;
return 0;
@@ -3589,7 +3593,7 @@ int module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol(int (*fn)(void *, const char *,
if (mod->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < mod->num_symtab; i++) {
- ret = fn(data, mod->strtab + mod->symtab[i].st_name,
+ ret = fn(data, symname(mod, i),
mod, mod->symtab[i].st_value);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 2d1b5c08366acd46c35a2e9aba5d650cb5bf5c19 upstream.
The virmidi driver has an open race at closing its assigned rawmidi
device, and this may lead to use-after-free in
snd_seq_deliver_single_event().
Plug the hole by properly protecting the linked list deletion and
calling in the right order in snd_virmidi_input_close().
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Zd66+w12fNN85-425cVQT=K23kWbhnCEcMB8s3us-Frw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c
index 4b50e60..0fa691e 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c
@@ -254,9 +254,13 @@ static int snd_virmidi_output_open(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
*/
static int snd_virmidi_input_close(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
{
+ struct snd_virmidi_dev *rdev = substream->rmidi->private_data;
struct snd_virmidi *vmidi = substream->runtime->private_data;
- snd_midi_event_free(vmidi->parser);
+
+ write_lock_irq(&rdev->filelist_lock);
list_del(&vmidi->list);
+ write_unlock_irq(&rdev->filelist_lock);
+ snd_midi_event_free(vmidi->parser);
substream->runtime->private_data = NULL;
kfree(vmidi);
return 0;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit b248371628aad599a48540962f6b85a21a8a0c3f upstream.
There are potential deadlocks in PCM OSS emulation code while
accessing read/write and mmap concurrently. This comes from the
infamous mmap_sem usage in copy_from/to_user(). Namely,
snd_pcm_oss_write() ->
&runtime->oss.params_lock ->
copy_to_user() ->
&mm->mmap_sem
mmap() ->
&mm->mmap_sem ->
snd_pcm_oss_mmap() ->
&runtime->oss.params_lock
Since we can't avoid taking params_lock from mmap code path, use
trylock variant and aborts with -EAGAIN as a workaround of this AB/BA
deadlock.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+bVrBKDG0G2_AcUgUQa+X91VKTeS4v+wN7BSHwHtqn3kQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
index 4c1cc51..7417f96 100644
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -834,7 +834,8 @@ static int choose_rate(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
return snd_pcm_hw_param_near(substream, params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, best_rate, NULL);
}
-static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
+static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
+ bool trylock)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params, *sparams;
@@ -848,7 +849,10 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
struct snd_mask sformat_mask;
struct snd_mask mask;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ if (trylock) {
+ if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock)))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
return -EINTR;
sw_params = kmalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL);
params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1091,7 +1095,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_active_substream(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_fil
if (asubstream == NULL)
asubstream = substream;
if (substream->runtime->oss.params) {
- err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream);
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
@@ -1130,7 +1134,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
return 0;
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (runtime->oss.params) {
- err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream);
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
@@ -2168,7 +2172,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_space(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int stre
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (runtime->oss.params &&
- (err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream)) < 0)
+ (err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream, false)) < 0)
return err;
info.fragsize = runtime->oss.period_bytes;
@@ -2804,7 +2808,12 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *area)
return -EIO;
if (runtime->oss.params) {
- if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream)) < 0)
+ /* use mutex_trylock() for params_lock for avoiding a deadlock
+ * between mmap_sem and params_lock taken by
+ * copy_from/to_user() in snd_pcm_oss_write/read()
+ */
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream, true);
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS_PLUGINS
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit cc85f7a634cfaf9f0713c6aa06d08817424db37a upstream.
NULL user-space buffer can be passed even in a normal path, thus it's
not good to spew a kernel warning with stack trace at each time.
Just drop snd_BUG_ON() macro usage there.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YfVJ3L+q0i-4vyQVyyPD7V=OMX0PWPi29x9Bo3QaBLdw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
index 7b596b5..b600dc2 100644
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ static long snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream,
long count1, result;
struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
- if (snd_BUG_ON(!kernelbuf && !userbuf))
+ if (!kernelbuf && !userbuf)
return -EINVAL;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!runtime->buffer))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit d81dac3c1c5295c61b15293074ac2bd3254e1875 upstream.
In twl4030_bci_probe() there are some failure paths where we call
iio_channel_release() with a NULL pointer. (Apparently, that driver can
opperate without a valid channel pointer). Let's fix it by adding a
NULL check in iio_channel_release().
Fixes: 2202e1fc5a29 ('drivers: power: twl4030_charger: fix link problems when building as module')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/iio/inkern.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/inkern.c b/drivers/iio/inkern.c
index 4fc88e6..e08b28f 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/inkern.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/inkern.c
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iio_channel_get);
void iio_channel_release(struct iio_channel *channel)
{
+ if (!channel)
+ return;
iio_device_put(channel->indio_dev);
kfree(channel);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit b1d353ad3d5835b16724653b33c05124e1b5acf1 upstream.
"count" is controlled by the user and it can be negative. Let's prevent
that by making it unsigned. You have to have CAP_SYS_RAWIO to call this
function so the bug is not as serious as it could be.
Fixes: 5369c02d951a ('intel_scu_ipc: Utility driver for intel scu ipc')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipcutil.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipcutil.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipcutil.c
index 02bc5a6..aa45424 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipcutil.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipcutil.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct scu_ipc_data {
static int scu_reg_access(u32 cmd, struct scu_ipc_data *data)
{
- int count = data->count;
+ unsigned int count = data->count;
if (count == 0 || count == 3 || count > 4)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
commit 8a9ebe717a133ba7bc90b06047f43cc6b8bcb8b3 upstream.
In a couple places we are not converting to/from the Linux
block layer 512 bytes sectors.
1.
The request queue values and what we do are a mismatch of
things:
max_discard_sectors - This is in linux block layer 512 byte
sectors. We are just copying this to max_unmap_lba_count.
discard_granularity - This is in bytes. We are converting it
to Linux block layer 512 byte sectors.
discard_alignment - This is in bytes. We are just copying
this over.
The problem is that the core LIO code exports these values in
spc_emulate_evpd_b0 and we use them to test request arguments
in sbc_execute_unmap, but we never convert to the block size
we export to the initiator. If we are not using 512 byte sectors
then we are exporting the wrong values or are checks are off.
And, for the discard_alignment/bytes case we are just plain messed
up.
2.
blkdev_issue_discard's start and number of sector arguments
are supposed to be in linux block layer 512 byte sectors. We are
currently passing in the values we get from the initiator which
might be based on some other sector size.
There is a similar problem in iblock_execute_write_same where
the bio functions want values in 512 byte sectors but we are
passing in what we got from the initiator.
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
- dropped changes to attribute unmap_zeroes_data as 3.16 doesn't
support LBPRZ
- functions rename:
* fd_execute_unmap -> fd_do_unmap
* iblock_execute_unmap -> iblock_do_unmap
- adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_device.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/target/target_core_file.c | 29 ++++++-------------
drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c | 56 +++++++++---------------------------
include/target/target_core_backend.h | 3 ++
4 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_device.c b/drivers/target/target_core_device.c
index 16829e4..e2ee13e 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_device.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_device.c
@@ -1485,6 +1485,49 @@ struct se_device *target_alloc_device(struct se_hba *hba, const char *name)
return dev;
}
+/*
+ * Check if the underlying struct block_device request_queue supports
+ * the QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD bit for UNMAP/WRITE_SAME in SCSI + TRIM
+ * in ATA and we need to set TPE=1
+ */
+bool target_configure_unmap_from_queue(struct se_dev_attrib *attrib,
+ struct request_queue *q, int block_size)
+{
+ if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
+ return false;
+
+ attrib->max_unmap_lba_count = (q->limits.max_discard_sectors << 9) /
+ block_size;
+ /*
+ * Currently hardcoded to 1 in Linux/SCSI code..
+ */
+ attrib->max_unmap_block_desc_count = 1;
+ attrib->unmap_granularity = q->limits.discard_granularity / block_size;
+ attrib->unmap_granularity_alignment = q->limits.discard_alignment /
+ block_size;
+ return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(target_configure_unmap_from_queue);
+
+/*
+ * Convert from blocksize advertised to the initiator to the 512 byte
+ * units unconditionally used by the Linux block layer.
+ */
+sector_t target_to_linux_sector(struct se_device *dev, sector_t lb)
+{
+ switch (dev->dev_attrib.block_size) {
+ case 4096:
+ return lb << 3;
+ case 2048:
+ return lb << 2;
+ case 1024:
+ return lb << 1;
+ default:
+ return lb;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(target_to_linux_sector);
+
int target_configure_device(struct se_device *dev)
{
struct se_hba *hba = dev->se_hba;
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c b/drivers/target/target_core_file.c
index f35b2de..30fc599 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_file.c
@@ -164,25 +164,11 @@ static int fd_configure_device(struct se_device *dev)
" block_device blocks: %llu logical_block_size: %d\n",
dev_size, div_u64(dev_size, fd_dev->fd_block_size),
fd_dev->fd_block_size);
- /*
- * Check if the underlying struct block_device request_queue supports
- * the QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD bit for UNMAP/WRITE_SAME in SCSI + TRIM
- * in ATA and we need to set TPE=1
- */
- if (blk_queue_discard(q)) {
- dev->dev_attrib.max_unmap_lba_count =
- q->limits.max_discard_sectors;
- /*
- * Currently hardcoded to 1 in Linux/SCSI code..
- */
- dev->dev_attrib.max_unmap_block_desc_count = 1;
- dev->dev_attrib.unmap_granularity =
- q->limits.discard_granularity >> 9;
- dev->dev_attrib.unmap_granularity_alignment =
- q->limits.discard_alignment;
+
+ if (target_configure_unmap_from_queue(&dev->dev_attrib, q,
+ fd_dev->fd_block_size))
pr_debug("IFILE: BLOCK Discard support available,"
- " disabled by default\n");
- }
+ " disabled by default\n");
/*
* Enable write same emulation for IBLOCK and use 0xFFFF as
* the smaller WRITE_SAME(10) only has a two-byte block count.
@@ -487,9 +473,12 @@ fd_do_unmap(struct se_cmd *cmd, void *priv, sector_t lba, sector_t nolb)
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
/* The backend is block device, use discard */
struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_bdev;
+ struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
- ret = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, lba,
- nolb, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+ ret = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev,
+ target_to_linux_sector(dev, lba),
+ target_to_linux_sector(dev, nolb),
+ GFP_KERNEL, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_warn("FILEIO: blkdev_issue_discard() failed: %d\n",
ret);
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c b/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c
index 6d070e5..0ecd98e 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c
@@ -125,27 +125,11 @@ static int iblock_configure_device(struct se_device *dev)
dev->dev_attrib.hw_max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
dev->dev_attrib.hw_queue_depth = q->nr_requests;
- /*
- * Check if the underlying struct block_device request_queue supports
- * the QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD bit for UNMAP/WRITE_SAME in SCSI + TRIM
- * in ATA and we need to set TPE=1
- */
- if (blk_queue_discard(q)) {
- dev->dev_attrib.max_unmap_lba_count =
- q->limits.max_discard_sectors;
-
- /*
- * Currently hardcoded to 1 in Linux/SCSI code..
- */
- dev->dev_attrib.max_unmap_block_desc_count = 1;
- dev->dev_attrib.unmap_granularity =
- q->limits.discard_granularity >> 9;
- dev->dev_attrib.unmap_granularity_alignment =
- q->limits.discard_alignment;
-
+ if (target_configure_unmap_from_queue(&dev->dev_attrib, q,
+ dev->dev_attrib.hw_block_size))
pr_debug("IBLOCK: BLOCK Discard support available,"
- " disabled by default\n");
- }
+ " disabled by default\n");
+
/*
* Enable write same emulation for IBLOCK and use 0xFFFF as
* the smaller WRITE_SAME(10) only has a two-byte block count.
@@ -384,9 +368,13 @@ iblock_do_unmap(struct se_cmd *cmd, void *priv,
sector_t lba, sector_t nolb)
{
struct block_device *bdev = priv;
+ struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
int ret;
- ret = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, lba, nolb, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+ ret = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev,
+ target_to_linux_sector(dev, lba),
+ target_to_linux_sector(dev, nolb),
+ GFP_KERNEL, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("blkdev_issue_discard() failed: %d\n", ret);
return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
@@ -426,8 +414,10 @@ iblock_execute_write_same(struct se_cmd *cmd)
struct scatterlist *sg;
struct bio *bio;
struct bio_list list;
- sector_t block_lba = cmd->t_task_lba;
- sector_t sectors = sbc_get_write_same_sectors(cmd);
+ struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
+ sector_t block_lba = target_to_linux_sector(dev, cmd->t_task_lba);
+ sector_t sectors = target_to_linux_sector(dev,
+ sbc_get_write_same_sectors(cmd));
sg = &cmd->t_data_sg[0];
@@ -591,12 +581,12 @@ iblock_execute_rw(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct scatterlist *sgl, u32 sgl_nents,
enum dma_data_direction data_direction)
{
struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
+ sector_t block_lba = target_to_linux_sector(dev, cmd->t_task_lba);
struct iblock_req *ibr;
struct bio *bio;
struct bio_list list;
struct scatterlist *sg;
u32 sg_num = sgl_nents;
- sector_t block_lba;
unsigned bio_cnt;
int rw = 0;
int i;
@@ -622,24 +612,6 @@ iblock_execute_rw(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct scatterlist *sgl, u32 sgl_nents,
rw = READ;
}
- /*
- * Convert the blocksize advertised to the initiator to the 512 byte
- * units unconditionally used by the Linux block layer.
- */
- if (dev->dev_attrib.block_size == 4096)
- block_lba = (cmd->t_task_lba << 3);
- else if (dev->dev_attrib.block_size == 2048)
- block_lba = (cmd->t_task_lba << 2);
- else if (dev->dev_attrib.block_size == 1024)
- block_lba = (cmd->t_task_lba << 1);
- else if (dev->dev_attrib.block_size == 512)
- block_lba = cmd->t_task_lba;
- else {
- pr_err("Unsupported SCSI -> BLOCK LBA conversion:"
- " %u\n", dev->dev_attrib.block_size);
- return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
- }
-
ibr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iblock_req), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ibr)
goto fail;
diff --git a/include/target/target_core_backend.h b/include/target/target_core_backend.h
index feacd9b..79f0a00 100644
--- a/include/target/target_core_backend.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_backend.h
@@ -86,5 +86,8 @@ sense_reason_t transport_generic_map_mem_to_cmd(struct se_cmd *,
struct scatterlist *, u32, struct scatterlist *, u32);
void array_free(void *array, int n);
+sector_t target_to_linux_sector(struct se_device *dev, sector_t lb);
+bool target_configure_unmap_from_queue(struct se_dev_attrib *attrib,
+ struct request_queue *q, int block_size);
#endif /* TARGET_CORE_BACKEND_H */
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Wang, Rui Y" <[email protected]>
commit fe09786178f9df713a4b2dd6b93c0a722346bf5e upstream.
hash_sendmsg/sendpage() need to wait for the completion
of crypto_ahash_init() otherwise it can cause panic.
Signed-off-by: Rui Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
crypto/algif_hash.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index a68b56a..c542c0d8 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
lock_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->more) {
- err = crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req);
+ err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req),
+ &ctx->completion);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ static ssize_t hash_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
} else {
if (!ctx->more) {
err = crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req);
+ err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(err, &ctx->completion);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Sachin Kulkarni <[email protected]>
commit 4fa11ec726a32ea6dd768dbb2e2af3453a98ec0a upstream.
During a sw scan ieee80211_iface_work ignores work items for all vifs.
However after the scan complete work is requeued only for STA, ADHOC
and MESH iftypes.
This occasionally results in event processing getting delayed/not
processed for iftype AP when it coexists with a STA. This can result
in data halt and eventually disconnection on the AP interface.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Kulkarni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/mac80211/ibss.c | 1 -
net/mac80211/mesh.c | 11 -----------
net/mac80211/mesh.h | 4 ----
net/mac80211/mlme.c | 2 --
net/mac80211/scan.c | 12 +++++++++++-
5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ibss.c b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
index 57ac06f..b1adfe8 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ibss.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
@@ -1653,7 +1653,6 @@ void ieee80211_ibss_notify_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_local *local)
if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC)
continue;
sdata->u.ibss.last_scan_completed = jiffies;
- ieee80211_queue_work(&local->hw, &sdata->work);
}
mutex_unlock(&local->iflist_mtx);
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
index 5b2c192..1b364f8 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c
@@ -1336,17 +1336,6 @@ out:
sdata_unlock(sdata);
}
-void ieee80211_mesh_notify_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_local *local)
-{
- struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
- if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif) &&
- ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata))
- ieee80211_queue_work(&local->hw, &sdata->work);
- rcu_read_unlock();
-}
void ieee80211_mesh_init_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
{
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.h b/net/mac80211/mesh.h
index 2bc7fd2..8b1cf3c 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mesh.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.h
@@ -357,14 +357,10 @@ static inline bool mesh_path_sel_is_hwmp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
return sdata->u.mesh.mesh_pp_id == IEEE80211_PATH_PROTOCOL_HWMP;
}
-void ieee80211_mesh_notify_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_local *local);
-
void mesh_path_flush_by_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata);
void mesh_sync_adjust_tbtt(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata);
void ieee80211s_stop(void);
#else
-static inline void
-ieee80211_mesh_notify_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_local *local) {}
static inline bool mesh_path_sel_is_hwmp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
{ return false; }
static inline void mesh_path_flush_by_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index a2df2c4..57d31ee 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -3482,8 +3482,6 @@ static void ieee80211_restart_sta_timer(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
if (!(flags & IEEE80211_HW_CONNECTION_MONITOR))
ieee80211_queue_work(&sdata->local->hw,
&sdata->u.mgd.monitor_work);
- /* and do all the other regular work too */
- ieee80211_queue_work(&sdata->local->hw, &sdata->work);
}
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/scan.c b/net/mac80211/scan.c
index 03a7f36..05edeb4 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/scan.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/scan.c
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ static void __ieee80211_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, bool aborted,
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
bool was_scanning = local->scanning;
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
lockdep_assert_held(&local->mtx);
@@ -327,7 +328,16 @@ static void __ieee80211_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, bool aborted,
ieee80211_mlme_notify_scan_completed(local);
ieee80211_ibss_notify_scan_completed(local);
- ieee80211_mesh_notify_scan_completed(local);
+
+ /* Requeue all the work that might have been ignored while
+ * the scan was in progress; if there was none this will
+ * just be a no-op for the particular interface.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) {
+ if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata))
+ ieee80211_queue_work(&sdata->local->hw, &sdata->work);
+ }
+
if (was_scanning)
ieee80211_start_next_roc(local);
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eliad Peller <[email protected]>
commit a2b70e833e189a4aefb2d3b668e3d7046dcc45c2 upstream.
On scan completion we try start any pending roc.
However, if scan was just pending (and not actually started)
there is no point in trying to start the roc, as it might
have started already.
This solves the following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3552 at net/mac80211/offchannel.c:269 ieee80211_start_next_roc+0x164/0x204 [mac80211]()
[<c001cd38>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf0)
[<c00181d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c05c0d8c>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x94)
[<c0047c08>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x68/0x8c)
[<c0047c48>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24)
[<bf4d6660>] (ieee80211_start_next_roc+0x164/0x204 [mac80211])
[<bf4d5a74>] (ieee80211_scan_cancel+0xe8/0x190 [mac80211])
[<bf4df970>] (ieee80211_do_stop+0x63c/0x79c [mac80211])
[<bf4dfae0>] (ieee80211_stop+0x10/0x18 [mac80211])
[<c0504d84>] (__dev_close_many+0x84/0xcc)
[<c0504df4>] (__dev_close+0x28/0x3c)
[<c0509708>] (__dev_change_flags+0x78/0x144)
[<c0509854>] (dev_change_flags+0x10/0x48)
[<c055fe3c>] (devinet_ioctl+0x614/0x6d0)
[<c04f22a0>] (sock_ioctl+0x5c/0x2a4)
[<c0124eb4>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x7c/0x5d8)
[<c012547c>] (SyS_ioctl+0x6c/0x7c)
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
net/mac80211/scan.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/scan.c b/net/mac80211/scan.c
index bcc4833..03a7f36 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/scan.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/scan.c
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static void __ieee80211_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, bool aborted,
bool was_hw_scan)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
+ bool was_scanning = local->scanning;
lockdep_assert_held(&local->mtx);
@@ -327,7 +328,8 @@ static void __ieee80211_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, bool aborted,
ieee80211_mlme_notify_scan_completed(local);
ieee80211_ibss_notify_scan_completed(local);
ieee80211_mesh_notify_scan_completed(local);
- ieee80211_start_next_roc(local);
+ if (was_scanning)
+ ieee80211_start_next_roc(local);
}
void ieee80211_scan_completed(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, bool aborted)
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: CQ Tang <[email protected]>
commit fda3bec12d0979aae3f02ee645913d66fbc8a26e upstream.
This is a 32-bit register. Apparently harmless on real hardware, but
causing justified warnings in simulation.
Signed-off-by: CQ Tang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/iommu/dmar.c | 2 +-
drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/dmar.c
index 8b452c9..012e8c5 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/dmar.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/dmar.c
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ void dmar_disable_qi(struct intel_iommu *iommu)
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->register_lock, flags);
- sts = dmar_readq(iommu->reg + DMAR_GSTS_REG);
+ sts = readl(iommu->reg + DMAR_GSTS_REG);
if (!(sts & DMA_GSTS_QIES))
goto end;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c b/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c
index bab10b1..0a73a49 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static void iommu_disable_irq_remapping(struct intel_iommu *iommu)
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->register_lock, flags);
- sts = dmar_readq(iommu->reg + DMAR_GSTS_REG);
+ sts = readl(iommu->reg + DMAR_GSTS_REG);
if (!(sts & DMA_GSTS_IRES))
goto end;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 566d1827df2ef0cbe921d3d6946ac3007b1a6938 upstream.
Some early controllers incorrectly reported zero ports in PORTS_IMPL
register and the ahci driver fabricates PORTS_IMPL from the number of
ports in those cases. This hasn't mattered but with the new nvme
controllers there are cases where zero PORTS_IMPL is valid and should
be honored.
Disable the workaround for >= AHCI 1.3.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CALCETrU7yMvXEDhjAUShoHEhDwifJGapdw--BKxsP0jmjKGmRw@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Sergei Shtylyov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/ata/libahci.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libahci.c b/drivers/ata/libahci.c
index 5cf1f6d..b2d6496 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libahci.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libahci.c
@@ -487,8 +487,8 @@ void ahci_save_initial_config(struct device *dev,
}
}
- /* fabricate port_map from cap.nr_ports */
- if (!port_map) {
+ /* fabricate port_map from cap.nr_ports for < AHCI 1.3 */
+ if (!port_map && vers < 0x10300) {
port_map = (1 << ahci_nr_ports(cap)) - 1;
dev_warn(dev, "forcing PORTS_IMPL to 0x%x\n", port_map);
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
commit 4fa03402cda2fac1a54248c7578b939d95931dc0 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
index ccc0133..a4949ce 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
@@ -1846,7 +1846,10 @@ static void register_cache(struct cache_sb *sb, struct page *sb_page,
if (kobject_add(&ca->kobj, &part_to_dev(bdev->bd_part)->kobj, "bcache"))
goto err;
+ mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
err = register_cache_set(ca);
+ mutex_unlock(&bch_register_lock);
+
if (err)
goto err;
@@ -1908,8 +1911,6 @@ static ssize_t register_bcache(struct kobject *k, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
return -EBUSY;
- mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
-
if (!(path = kstrndup(buffer, size, GFP_KERNEL)) ||
!(sb = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cache_sb), GFP_KERNEL)))
goto err;
@@ -1946,7 +1947,9 @@ static ssize_t register_bcache(struct kobject *k, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
if (!dc)
goto err_close;
+ mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
register_bdev(sb, sb_page, bdev, dc);
+ mutex_unlock(&bch_register_lock);
} else {
struct cache *ca = kzalloc(sizeof(*ca), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ca)
@@ -1959,7 +1962,6 @@ out:
put_page(sb_page);
kfree(sb);
kfree(path);
- mutex_unlock(&bch_register_lock);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
return ret;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
commit 07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7 upstream.
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
sound/usb/midi.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/usb/midi.c b/sound/usb/midi.c
index 9123fc5..424c1e8 100644
--- a/sound/usb/midi.c
+++ b/sound/usb/midi.c
@@ -2365,7 +2365,6 @@ int snd_usbmidi_create(struct snd_card *card,
else
err = snd_usbmidi_create_endpoints(umidi, endpoints);
if (err < 0) {
- snd_usbmidi_free(umidi);
return err;
}
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 09036f4..c54e14c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "evm.h"
int evm_initialized;
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
- rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
+ rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
sizeof(calc.digest));
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
--
2.7.0
3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hariprasad S <[email protected]>
commit 67f1aee6f45059fd6b0f5b0ecb2c97ad0451f6b3 upstream.
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c
index 095bb04..8753486 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int iwch_l2t_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb, struct l2t_en
error = l2t_send(tdev, skb, l2e);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
- return error;
+ return error < 0 ? error : 0;
}
int iwch_cxgb3_ofld_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int iwch_cxgb3_ofld_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
error = cxgb3_ofld_send(tdev, skb);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
- return error;
+ return error < 0 ? error : 0;
}
static void release_tid(struct t3cdev *tdev, u32 hwtid, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.7.0
On Wed, 2016-03-09 at 18:42 -0500, Nicolai Hähnle wrote:
> On 09.03.2016 18:13, Kamal Mostafa wrote:
> >
> > 3.13.11-ckt36 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections,
> > please let me know.
> Please drop the patch for now, it causes a NULL pointer dereference
> on
> kernels <= 3.17. We will follow up with a correctly backported patch.
>
> Thanks,
> Nicolai
Dropped from 3.13-stable. Thanks for the heads-up, Nicolai!
-Kamal
> >
> >
> > ---8<------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolai=20H=C3=A4hnle?= <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit f6ff4f67cdf8455d0a4226eeeaf5af17c37d05eb upstream.
> >
> > An arbitrary amount of time can pass between spin_unlock and
> > radeon_fence_wait_any, so we need to ensure that nobody frees the
> > fences from under us.
> >
> > Based on the analogous fix for amdgpu.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Nicolai Hähnle <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c | 5 +++++
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> > b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> > index f0bac68..bb16684 100644
> > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_sa.c
> > @@ -349,8 +349,13 @@ int radeon_sa_bo_new(struct radeon_device
> > *rdev,
> > /* see if we can skip over some
> > allocations */
> > } while (radeon_sa_bo_next_hole(sa_manager,
> > fences, tries));
> >
> > + for (i = 0; i < RADEON_NUM_RINGS; ++i)
> > + radeon_fence_ref(fences[i]);
> > +
> > spin_unlock(&sa_manager->wq.lock);
> > r = radeon_fence_wait_any(rdev, fences, false);
> > + for (i = 0; i < RADEON_NUM_RINGS; ++i)
> > + radeon_fence_unref(&fences[i]);
> > spin_lock(&sa_manager->wq.lock);
> > /* if we have nothing to wait for block */
> > if (r == -ENOENT && block) {
> >