This series of patches cleans up some usages of the audit
subsystem's API by IMA. We also introduce a new record type
that IMA creates while parsing policy rules.
Stefan
v2->v3:
- reworked patch 4; pass current->audit_context rather than NULL
v1->v2:
- dropped several patches that extended existing messages with missing
fields
- Using audit_log_task_info() for new record type in last patch
- rebased on security-next; new message type is now 1807
Stefan Berger (4):
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++++---
security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 6 +-----
5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--
2.13.6
If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 6a8f67714c83..94c2151331aa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config IMA
select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
+ select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT
help
The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3fcf0935468c..bc99713dfe57 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -628,6 +628,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
{
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
@@ -649,7 +652,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
bool uid_token;
int result = 0;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+ ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0bb372eed62a..e60473b13a8d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
/* iint action cache flags */
#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
@@ -199,6 +200,13 @@ static inline void evm_load_x509(void)
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
+
+static inline struct audit_buffer *
+integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
+{
+ return audit_log_start(ctx, gfp_mask, type);
+}
+
#else
static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname,
@@ -206,4 +214,11 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
int result, int info)
{
}
+
+static inline struct audit_buffer *
+integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
#endif
--
2.13.6
The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
---
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 65d9293f1fb8..cb358551376b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR 1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */
#define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index bc99713dfe57..f7230db217a7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -652,8 +652,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
bool uid_token;
int result = 0;
- ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
- AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+ ab = integrity_audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
--
2.13.6
Remove the usage of audit_log_string() and replace it with
audit_log_format().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 +--
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 6 +-----
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1d00db19d167..3fcf0935468c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -634,8 +634,7 @@ static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
- audit_log_string(ab, value);
- audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value);
}
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 90987d15b6fe..db30763d5525 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -45,11 +45,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
audit_log_task_context(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
- audit_log_string(ab, op);
- audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
- audit_log_string(ab, cause);
- audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s comm=", op, cause);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
if (fname) {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
--
2.13.6
The parameters passed to this logging function are all provided by
a privileged user and therefore we can call audit_log_string()
rather than audit_log_untrustedstring().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8bbc18eb07eb..1d00db19d167 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
+ audit_log_string(ab, value);
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
}
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
--
2.13.6
On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Stefan Berger
<[email protected]> wrote:
> If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 +++++-
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index 6a8f67714c83..94c2151331aa 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config IMA
> select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
> select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
> select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
> + select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT
> help
> The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
> Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 3fcf0935468c..bc99713dfe57 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -628,6 +628,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
> static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
> bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
> {
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
> audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
> else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
> @@ -649,7 +652,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> bool uid_token;
> int result = 0;
>
> - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> + ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
> + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
There was a lot of confusion here, so this is understandable, but you
should pass "audit_context()"[1] as the first parameter instead of
NULL. Other than that this patch looks fine.
[1] In Linus' tree at the moment you would need to use
current->audit_context, but the audit PR heading to Linus during this
merge window will introduce the "audit_context()" function which is
preferable as we may need to change things around a bit in the near
future.
> entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 0bb372eed62a..e60473b13a8d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> #include <linux/integrity.h>
> #include <crypto/sha.h>
> #include <linux/key.h>
> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>
> /* iint action cache flags */
> #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
> @@ -199,6 +200,13 @@ static inline void evm_load_x509(void)
> void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
> const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
> const char *cause, int result, int info);
> +
> +static inline struct audit_buffer *
> +integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
> +{
> + return audit_log_start(ctx, gfp_mask, type);
> +}
> +
> #else
> static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
> const unsigned char *fname,
> @@ -206,4 +214,11 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
> int result, int info)
> {
> }
> +
> +static inline struct audit_buffer *
> +integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
> +{
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> #endif
> --
> 2.13.6
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Stefan Berger
<[email protected]> wrote:
> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
> AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>
> Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
> audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
> the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
Aaand now I see you included the current->audit_context pointer I
mentioned in my comments for 3/4 ;)
So basically this should be fine, although I should point out that you
do not need to define a new message type to associate records
together. The fact that we don't associate all connected records is
basically a bug.
Anyway, patches 3/4 and 4/4 look good to me. Considering this is
likely going in during the *next* merge window, I would ask that you
convert from "current->audit_context" to "audit_context()" as soon as
this merge window closes.
Thanks!
> type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
> func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
> type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
> func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
> type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
> success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
> items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
> fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
> exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++--
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 65d9293f1fb8..cb358551376b 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR 1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */
>
> #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index bc99713dfe57..f7230db217a7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -652,8 +652,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> bool uid_token;
> int result = 0;
>
> - ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
> - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> + ab = integrity_audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
> + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
>
> entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> --
> 2.13.6
>
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
Hi Paul,
On Mon, 2018-06-04 at 20:21 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Stefan Berger
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> > The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> > the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
> > AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >
> > Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
> > audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
> > the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
>
> Aaand now I see you included the current->audit_context pointer I
> mentioned in my comments for 3/4 ;)
>
> So basically this should be fine, although I should point out that you
> do not need to define a new message type to associate records
> together. The fact that we don't associate all connected records is
> basically a bug.
>
> Anyway, patches 3/4 and 4/4 look good to me. Considering this is
> likely going in during the *next* merge window, I would ask that you
> convert from "current->audit_context" to "audit_context()" as soon as
> this merge window closes.
>
> Thanks!
Thanks, Paul. I'd like to start queueing patches for the next open
window now, instead of scrambling later. Can I add your Ack now, and
remember to make this change when rebasing?
Mimi
>
> > type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
> > func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1
> > type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \
> > func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1
> > type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \
> > success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \
> > items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \
> > fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \
> > exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++--
> > 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > index 65d9293f1fb8..cb358551376b 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
> > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
> > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR 1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */
> > +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */
> >
> > #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index bc99713dfe57..f7230db217a7 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -652,8 +652,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > bool uid_token;
> > int result = 0;
> >
> > - ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
> > - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> > + ab = integrity_audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
> > + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
> >
> > entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> > entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> > --
> > 2.13.6
> >
>
On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 10:15 AM, Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Paul,
>
> On Mon, 2018-06-04 at 20:21 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Stefan Berger
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
>> > the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
>> > AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>> >
>> > Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
>> > audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
>> > the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
>>
>> Aaand now I see you included the current->audit_context pointer I
>> mentioned in my comments for 3/4 ;)
>>
>> So basically this should be fine, although I should point out that you
>> do not need to define a new message type to associate records
>> together. The fact that we don't associate all connected records is
>> basically a bug.
>>
>> Anyway, patches 3/4 and 4/4 look good to me. Considering this is
>> likely going in during the *next* merge window, I would ask that you
>> convert from "current->audit_context" to "audit_context()" as soon as
>> this merge window closes.
>>
>> Thanks!
>
> Thanks, Paul. I'd like to start queueing patches for the next open
> window now, instead of scrambling later. Can I add your Ack now, and
> remember to make this change when rebasing?
Sure, go ahead and add my ACK to both 3/4 and 4/4 as long as you
double pinky swear you'll do the audit_context() fix-up during the
merge :)
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 18:18 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 10:15 AM, Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Hi Paul,
> >
> > On Mon, 2018-06-04 at 20:21 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Stefan Berger
> >> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> > The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> >> > the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
> >> > AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >> >
> >> > Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the
> >> > audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces
> >> > the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules:
> >>
> >> Aaand now I see you included the current->audit_context pointer I
> >> mentioned in my comments for 3/4 ;)
> >>
> >> So basically this should be fine, although I should point out that you
> >> do not need to define a new message type to associate records
> >> together. The fact that we don't associate all connected records is
> >> basically a bug.
> >>
> >> Anyway, patches 3/4 and 4/4 look good to me. Considering this is
> >> likely going in during the *next* merge window, I would ask that you
> >> convert from "current->audit_context" to "audit_context()" as soon as
> >> this merge window closes.
> >>
> >> Thanks!
> >
> > Thanks, Paul. I'd like to start queueing patches for the next open
> > window now, instead of scrambling later. Can I add your Ack now, and
> > remember to make this change when rebasing?
>
> Sure, go ahead and add my ACK to both 3/4 and 4/4 as long as you
> double pinky swear you'll do the audit_context() fix-up during the
> merge :)
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Sure, it will be really hard to miss. The next-integrity-queued
branch has:
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
*** Remember replace current->audit_context with call to audit_context() ***
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>