Alan Cox napsal(a):
>> I noticed that the moxa input checking security bug described by
>> CVE-2005-0504 appears to remain unfixed upstream.
>>
>> The issue is described here:
>> http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0504
>>
>> Debian has been shipping the following patch from Andres Salomon. I
>> tried contacting the listed maintainer a few months ago but received
>> no response.
>
>
> case MOXA_LOAD_BIOS:
> case MOXA_FIND_BOARD:
> case MOXA_LOAD_C320B:
> case MOXA_LOAD_CODE:
> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> return -EPERM;
> break;
>
> At the point you abuse these calls you can already just load arbitary
> data from userspace anyway.
The problem is that we BUG_ON, when len < 0 in copy_from_user which is unlikely
something we want to cause?
regards,
--
http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/ Jiri Slaby
faculty of informatics, masaryk university, brno, cz
e-mail: jirislaby gmail com, gpg pubkey fingerprint:
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Jiri Slaby wrote:
> Alan Cox napsal(a):
>>> I noticed that the moxa input checking security bug described by
>>> CVE-2005-0504 appears to remain unfixed upstream.
>>>
>>> The issue is described here:
>>> http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0504
>>>
>>> Debian has been shipping the following patch from Andres Salomon. I
>>> tried contacting the listed maintainer a few months ago but received
>>> no response.
>>
>> case MOXA_LOAD_BIOS:
>> case MOXA_FIND_BOARD:
>> case MOXA_LOAD_C320B:
>> case MOXA_LOAD_CODE:
>> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
>> return -EPERM;
>> break;
>>
>> At the point you abuse these calls you can already just load arbitary
>> data from userspace anyway.
>
> The problem is that we BUG_ON, when len < 0 in copy_from_user which is unlikely
> something we want to cause?
>
> regards,
Right; the lack of input checking is most definitely a bug. It's no
longer a security issue, as a CAP_SYS_RAWIO check was added at some
point to the code path, but it's still a bug.
On Tue, May 01, 2007 at 04:29:27AM -0400, Andres Salomon wrote:
> Right; the lack of input checking is most definitely a bug. It's no
> longer a security issue, as a CAP_SYS_RAWIO check was added at some
> point to the code path, but it's still a bug.
I hadn't noticed this, but yes - the CAP_SYS_RAWIO check was added in
2.6.16.
--
dann frazier | HP Open Source and Linux Organization