(resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch,
atd is broken at least on some distros.)
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().
One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/security.h | 3 +--
security/capability.c | 1 -
security/commoncap.c | 40 ----------------------------------------
3 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b07357c..c673dfd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2187,7 +2186,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
struct siginfo *info, int sig,
u32 secid)
{
- return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return 0;
}
static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
.inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
- .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
.task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
.task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
.task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
- * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
- * allowed.
- * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
- */
- if (p->uid == current->uid)
- return 0;
-
- /* sigcont is permitted within same session */
- if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
- return 0;
-
- if (secid)
- /*
- * Signal sent as a particular user.
- * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
- * only thing we can do at the moment.
- * Used only by usb drivers?
- */
- return 0;
- if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
- return 0;
- if (capable(CAP_KILL))
- return 0;
-
- return -EPERM;
-}
-
/*
* called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
* done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return 0;
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
#endif
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
--
1.5.2.5
Em Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> escreveu:
| (resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
| http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch,
| atd is broken at least on some distros.)
|
| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
|
| check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
|
| However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
| are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| as per the check in check_kill_permission().
|
| One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
|
| This patch removes cap_task_kill().
|
| Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
| Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
I've tested the -stable patch (no time to test this one, but it's
exactly the same patch), not sure if this applies to this but...
Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <[email protected]>
--
Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
> (resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
> http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch,
> atd is broken at least on some distros.)
So this fix is needed in 2.6.24.x?
> The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
>
> check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
> However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
> unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
> resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
>
> However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
> granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
> and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
> where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
> are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
> as per the check in check_kill_permission().
>
> One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This 2.6.25-rc6 patch doesn't apply correctly to 2.6.24. I can't find a
*formal* copy of your 2.6.24 patch on [email protected], so perhaps a
resend for -stable is in order.
Quoting Andrew Morton ([email protected]):
> On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > (resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
> > http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch,
> > atd is broken at least on some distros.)
>
> So this fix is needed in 2.6.24.x?
Yes it is.
> > The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
> >
> > check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
> > However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
> > unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
> > resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
> >
> > However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
> > granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
> > and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
> > where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
> > are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
> > as per the check in check_kill_permission().
> >
> > One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
>
> This 2.6.25-rc6 patch doesn't apply correctly to 2.6.24. I can't find a
> *formal* copy of your 2.6.24 patch on [email protected], so perhaps a
> resend for -stable is in order.
Argh, yes, will do. Thanks.
-serge
On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
> (resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
> http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch,
> atd is broken at least on some distros.)
>
> The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
>
> check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
> However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
> unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
> resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
>
> However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
> granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
> and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
> where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
> are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
> as per the check in check_kill_permission().
>
> One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
>
> This patch removes cap_task_kill().
umm,
security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function 'cap_task_kill'
On Wed, 19 Mar 2008, Andrew Morton wrote:
>
> umm,
>
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function 'cap_task_kill'
Serge, can you resend with that fixed and the tested-by added?
Linus
Quoting Linus Torvalds ([email protected]):
>
>
> On Wed, 19 Mar 2008, Andrew Morton wrote:
> >
> > umm,
> >
> > security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
> > security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function 'cap_task_kill'
Right, that was against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.
> Serge, can you resend with that fixed and the tested-by added?
>
> Linus
Following is the version against this morning's mmotm with the tested-by
added.
thanks,
-serge
>From c50b1c9f7a9e9434c8ddb50cb81e6b342638b8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-mmotm)
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().
One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/security.h | 3 +--
security/capability.c | 1 -
security/commoncap.c | 33 ---------------------------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 -----
4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2231526..13fd76a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
@@ -2276,7 +2275,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
struct siginfo *info, int sig,
u32 secid)
{
- return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return 0;
}
static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 8340655..38ac54e 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
.inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
- .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
.task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
.task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
.task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 200361d..e8c3f5e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -537,34 +537,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- /*
- * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
- * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
- * allowed.
- * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
- */
- if (p->uid == current->uid)
- return 0;
-
- if (secid)
- /*
- * Signal sent as a particular user.
- * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
- * only thing we can do at the moment.
- * Used only by usb drivers?
- */
- return 0;
- if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
- return 0;
- if (capable(CAP_KILL))
- return 0;
-
- return -EPERM;
-}
-
/*
* called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
* done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -596,11 +568,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return 0;
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
#endif
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4365fad..2a5eb83 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1117,11 +1117,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
/*
* Sending a signal requires that the sender
* can write the receiver.
--
1.5.2.5
On Wed, 19 Mar 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>
> Right, that was against
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
> which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.
Ok, now I'm _really_ confused. I have smack in my tree, it got merged
before -rc1.
So any patch that is against some version without smack is not a patch
against a -git tree for the last several weeks.
Me confused.
Linus
Quoting Linus Torvalds ([email protected]):
>
>
> On Wed, 19 Mar 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >
> > Right, that was against
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
> > which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.
>
> Ok, now I'm _really_ confused. I have smack in my tree, it got merged
> before -rc1.
No clearly I'm the one confused/on drugs.
I see it now. I swear I checked my own freshly pulled tree and
gitweb several times...
> So any patch that is against some version without smack is not a patch
> against a -git tree for the last several weeks.
>
> Me confused.
>
> Linus
New patch against -git attached.
thanks,
-serge
>From a0e56351e00b7b7442723b7ca6247c267c2628fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-git)
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().
One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/security.h | 3 +--
security/capability.c | 1 -
security/commoncap.c | 40 ----------------------------------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 -----
4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b07357c..c673dfd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2187,7 +2186,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
struct siginfo *info, int sig,
u32 secid)
{
- return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return 0;
}
static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
.inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
- .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
.task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
.task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
.task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
- * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
- * allowed.
- * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
- */
- if (p->uid == current->uid)
- return 0;
-
- /* sigcont is permitted within same session */
- if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
- return 0;
-
- if (secid)
- /*
- * Signal sent as a particular user.
- * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
- * only thing we can do at the moment.
- * Used only by usb drivers?
- */
- return 0;
- if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
- return 0;
- if (capable(CAP_KILL))
- return 0;
-
- return -EPERM;
-}
-
/*
* called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
* done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return 0;
}
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
#endif
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 38d7075..732ba27 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1117,11 +1117,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
/*
* Special cases where signals really ought to go through
* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
--
1.5.2.5
--- "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
> Quoting Linus Torvalds ([email protected]):
> >
> >
> > On Wed, 19 Mar 2008, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > >
> > > umm,
> > >
> > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
> > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function
> 'cap_task_kill'
>
> Right, that was against
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
> which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.
>
> > Serge, can you resend with that fixed and the tested-by added?
> >
> > Linus
>
> Following is the version against this morning's mmotm with the tested-by
> added.
>
> thanks,
> -serge
>
>
> >From c50b1c9f7a9e9434c8ddb50cb81e6b342638b8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
> Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-mmotm)
>
> The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
>
> check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
> However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
> unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
> resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
>
> However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
> granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
> and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
> where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
> are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
> as per the check in check_kill_permission().
>
> One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
>
> This patch removes cap_task_kill().
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
> Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 3 +--
> security/capability.c | 1 -
> security/commoncap.c | 33 ---------------------------------
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 -----
> 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2231526..13fd76a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t
> old_suid, int flags);
> extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
> -extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int
> sig, u32 secid);
> extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long
> arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
> extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct
> sched_param *lp);
> @@ -2276,7 +2275,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
> task_struct *p,
> struct siginfo *info, int sig,
> u32 secid)
> {
> - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> index 8340655..38ac54e 100644
> --- a/security/capability.c
> +++ b/security/capability.c
> @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
> .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
> .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
>
> - .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
> .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
> .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
> .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 200361d..e8c3f5e 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -537,34 +537,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> return cap_safe_nice(p);
> }
>
> -int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid)
> -{
> - /*
> - * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
> - * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
> - * allowed.
> - * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
> - */
> - if (p->uid == current->uid)
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (secid)
> - /*
> - * Signal sent as a particular user.
> - * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
> - * only thing we can do at the moment.
> - * Used only by usb drivers?
> - */
> - return 0;
> - if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
> - return 0;
> - if (capable(CAP_KILL))
> - return 0;
> -
> - return -EPERM;
> -}
> -
> /*
> * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
> * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
> @@ -596,11 +568,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> -int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> #endif
>
> int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 4365fad..2a5eb83 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -1117,11 +1117,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct
> *p)
> static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> int sig, u32 secid)
> {
> - int rc;
> -
> - rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> /*
> * Sending a signal requires that the sender
> * can write the receiver.
> --
> 1.5.2.5
>
> --
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>
>
Casey Schaufler
[email protected]