From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
The current x86 instruction decoder steps along through the
instruction stream but always ensures that it never steps farther
than the largest possible instruction size (MAX_INSN_SIZE).
The MPX code is now going to be doing some decoding of userspace
instructions. We copy those from userspace in to the kernel and
they're obviously completely untrusted coming from userspace. In
addition to the constraint that instructions can only be so long,
we also have to be aware of how long the buffer is that came in
from userspace. This _looks_ to be similar to what the perf and
kprobes is doing, but it's unclear to me whether they are
affected.
We shouldn't simply error out when we get short copy_from_user*()
results from userspace (like intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip() does
currently). It is perfectly valid to be executing an instruction
within MAX_INSN_SIZE bytes of an unreadable page. We should be
able to gracefully handle short reads in those cases.
This adds support to the decoder to record how long the buffer
being decoded is and to refuse to "validate" the instruction if
we would have gone over the end of the buffer to decode it.
The kprobes code probably needs to be looked at here a bit more
carefully. This patch still respects the MAX_INSN_SIZE limit
there but the kprobes code does look like it might be able to
be a bit more strict than it currently is.
Note: the v10 version of the MPX patches I just posted depends
on this patch.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jim Keniston <[email protected]>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <[email protected]>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
---
b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 10 ++++++----
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c | 9 ++++++---
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 2 +-
b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 8 +++++---
b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 4 +++-
b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 2 +-
b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c | 5 +++--
b/arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c | 2 +-
b/arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.952753062 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h 2014-11-12 12:45:52.969753829 -0800
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct insn {
unsigned char x86_64;
const insn_byte_t *kaddr; /* kernel address of insn to analyze */
+ const insn_byte_t *end_kaddr; /* kernel address of last insn in buffer */
const insn_byte_t *next_byte;
};
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ struct insn {
#define X86_VEX_P(vex) ((vex) & 0x03) /* VEX3 Byte2, VEX2 Byte1 */
#define X86_VEX_M_MAX 0x1f /* VEX3.M Maximum value */
-extern void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int x86_64);
+extern void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int buf_len, int x86_64);
extern void insn_get_prefixes(struct insn *insn);
extern void insn_get_opcode(struct insn *insn);
extern void insn_get_modrm(struct insn *insn);
@@ -115,12 +116,13 @@ static inline void insn_get_attribute(st
extern int insn_rip_relative(struct insn *insn);
/* Init insn for kernel text */
-static inline void kernel_insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr)
+static inline void kernel_insn_init(struct insn *insn,
+ const void *kaddr, int buf_len)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- insn_init(insn, kaddr, 1);
+ insn_init(insn, kaddr, buf_len, 1);
#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
- insn_init(insn, kaddr, 0);
+ insn_init(insn, kaddr, buf_len, 0);
#endif
}
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.954753152 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
unsigned long ip = regs->ip;
int is_64bit = 0;
void *kaddr;
+ int size;
/*
* We don't need to fixup if the PEBS assist is fault like
@@ -758,11 +759,12 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
return 1;
}
+ size = ip - to;
if (!kernel_ip(ip)) {
- int size, bytes;
+ int bytes;
u8 *buf = this_cpu_read(insn_buffer);
- size = ip - to; /* Must fit our buffer, see above */
+ /* 'size' must fit our buffer, see above */
bytes = copy_from_user_nmi(buf, (void __user *)to, size);
if (bytes != 0)
return 0;
@@ -780,11 +782,12 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
is_64bit = kernel_ip(to) || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
#endif
- insn_init(&insn, kaddr, is_64bit);
+ insn_init(&insn, kaddr, size, is_64bit);
insn_get_length(&insn);
to += insn.length;
kaddr += insn.length;
+ size -= insn.length;
} while (to < ip);
if (to == ip) {
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.956753243 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int branch_type(unsigned long fro
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
is64 = kernel_ip((unsigned long)addr) || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
#endif
- insn_init(&insn, addr, is64);
+ insn_init(&insn, addr, size, is64);
insn_get_opcode(&insn);
switch (insn.opcode.bytes[0]) {
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.957753288 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int can_probe(unsigned long paddr
* normally used, we just go through if there is no kprobe.
*/
__addr = recover_probed_instruction(buf, addr);
- kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)__addr);
+ kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)__addr, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
insn_get_length(&insn);
/*
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src
{
struct insn insn;
kprobe_opcode_t buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+ unsigned long recovered_insn =
+ recover_probed_instruction(buf, (unsigned long)src);
- kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recover_probed_instruction(buf, (unsigned long)src));
+ kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recovered_insn, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
insn_get_length(&insn);
/* Another subsystem puts a breakpoint, failed to recover */
if (insn.opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
@@ -342,7 +344,7 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src
if (insn_rip_relative(&insn)) {
s64 newdisp;
u8 *disp;
- kernel_insn_init(&insn, dest);
+ kernel_insn_init(&insn, dest, insn.length);
insn_get_displacement(&insn);
/*
* The copied instruction uses the %rip-relative addressing
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.959753378 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.971753919 -0800
@@ -251,13 +251,15 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long pa
/* Decode instructions */
addr = paddr - offset;
while (addr < paddr - offset + size) { /* Decode until function end */
+ unsigned long recovered_insn;
if (search_exception_tables(addr))
/*
* Since some fixup code will jumps into this function,
* we can't optimize kprobe in this function.
*/
return 0;
- kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recover_probed_instruction(buf, addr));
+ recovered_insn = recover_probed_instruction(buf, addr);
+ kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recovered_insn, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
insn_get_length(&insn);
/* Another subsystem puts a breakpoint */
if (insn.opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.961753468 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.971753919 -0800
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_
{
u32 volatile *good_insns;
- insn_init(insn, auprobe->insn, x86_64);
+ insn_init(insn, auprobe->insn, sizeof(auprobe->insn), x86_64);
/* has the side-effect of processing the entire instruction */
insn_get_length(insn);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!insn_complete(insn)))
diff -puN arch/x86/lib/insn.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/lib/insn.c
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.962753513 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.972753964 -0800
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
/* Verify next sizeof(t) bytes can be on the same instruction */
#define validate_next(t, insn, n) \
- ((insn)->next_byte + sizeof(t) + n - (insn)->kaddr <= MAX_INSN_SIZE)
+ ((insn)->next_byte + sizeof(t) + n < (insn)->end_kaddr)
#define __get_next(t, insn) \
({ t r = *(t*)insn->next_byte; insn->next_byte += sizeof(t); r; })
@@ -50,10 +50,11 @@
* @kaddr: address (in kernel memory) of instruction (or copy thereof)
* @x86_64: !0 for 64-bit kernel or 64-bit app
*/
-void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int x86_64)
+void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int buf_len, int x86_64)
{
memset(insn, 0, sizeof(*insn));
insn->kaddr = kaddr;
+ insn->end_kaddr = kaddr + buf_len;
insn->next_byte = kaddr;
insn->x86_64 = x86_64 ? 1 : 0;
insn->opnd_bytes = 4;
diff -puN arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c
--- a/arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.964753604 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.972753964 -0800
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
continue;
/* Decode an instruction */
- insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, x86_64);
+ insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, sizeof(insn_buf), x86_64);
insn_get_length(&insn);
if (insn.next_byte <= insn.kaddr ||
diff -puN arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c
--- a/arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.966753694 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.972753964 -0800
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
break;
}
/* Decode an instruction */
- insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, x86_64);
+ insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, sizeof(insn_buf), x86_64);
insn_get_length(&insn);
if (insn.length != nb) {
warnings++;
_
On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 02:53:52PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> We shouldn't simply error out when we get short copy_from_user*()
> results from userspace (like intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip() does
> currently). It is perfectly valid to be executing an instruction
> within MAX_INSN_SIZE bytes of an unreadable page. We should be
> able to gracefully handle short reads in those cases.
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.954753152 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
> @@ -758,11 +759,12 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
> return 1;
> }
>
> + size = ip - to;
> if (!kernel_ip(ip)) {
> - int size, bytes;
> + int bytes;
> u8 *buf = this_cpu_read(insn_buffer);
>
> - size = ip - to; /* Must fit our buffer, see above */
> + /* 'size' must fit our buffer, see above */
> bytes = copy_from_user_nmi(buf, (void __user *)to, size);
> if (bytes != 0)
> return 0;
Right, so we should better deal with short copies there. Should be
doable.
(2014/11/13 7:53), Dave Hansen wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
>
> The current x86 instruction decoder steps along through the
> instruction stream but always ensures that it never steps farther
> than the largest possible instruction size (MAX_INSN_SIZE).
>
> The MPX code is now going to be doing some decoding of userspace
> instructions. We copy those from userspace in to the kernel and
> they're obviously completely untrusted coming from userspace. In
> addition to the constraint that instructions can only be so long,
> we also have to be aware of how long the buffer is that came in
> from userspace. This _looks_ to be similar to what the perf and
> kprobes is doing, but it's unclear to me whether they are
> affected.
>
> We shouldn't simply error out when we get short copy_from_user*()
> results from userspace (like intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip() does
> currently). It is perfectly valid to be executing an instruction
> within MAX_INSN_SIZE bytes of an unreadable page. We should be
> able to gracefully handle short reads in those cases.
>
> This adds support to the decoder to record how long the buffer
> being decoded is and to refuse to "validate" the instruction if
> we would have gone over the end of the buffer to decode it.
>
> The kprobes code probably needs to be looked at here a bit more
> carefully. This patch still respects the MAX_INSN_SIZE limit
> there but the kprobes code does look like it might be able to
> be a bit more strict than it currently is.
Would you mean kprobes can copy shorter? Maybe, but I think current
one is enough because it is on a cold path.
OK, at least this looks good to me.
>
> Note: the v10 version of the MPX patches I just posted depends
> on this patch.
BTW, current insn decoder doesn't support MPX... That should be
updated (add bnd* to x86-insn-map.txt)
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
> Cc: Jim Keniston <[email protected]>
> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <[email protected]>
> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
> ---
>
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 10 ++++++----
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c | 9 ++++++---
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 2 +-
> b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 8 +++++---
> b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 4 +++-
> b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 2 +-
> b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c | 5 +++--
> b/arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c | 2 +-
> b/arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.952753062 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h 2014-11-12 12:45:52.969753829 -0800
> @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct insn {
> unsigned char x86_64;
>
> const insn_byte_t *kaddr; /* kernel address of insn to analyze */
> + const insn_byte_t *end_kaddr; /* kernel address of last insn in buffer */
> const insn_byte_t *next_byte;
> };
>
> @@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ struct insn {
> #define X86_VEX_P(vex) ((vex) & 0x03) /* VEX3 Byte2, VEX2 Byte1 */
> #define X86_VEX_M_MAX 0x1f /* VEX3.M Maximum value */
>
> -extern void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int x86_64);
> +extern void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int buf_len, int x86_64);
> extern void insn_get_prefixes(struct insn *insn);
> extern void insn_get_opcode(struct insn *insn);
> extern void insn_get_modrm(struct insn *insn);
> @@ -115,12 +116,13 @@ static inline void insn_get_attribute(st
> extern int insn_rip_relative(struct insn *insn);
>
> /* Init insn for kernel text */
> -static inline void kernel_insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr)
> +static inline void kernel_insn_init(struct insn *insn,
> + const void *kaddr, int buf_len)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> - insn_init(insn, kaddr, 1);
> + insn_init(insn, kaddr, buf_len, 1);
> #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
> - insn_init(insn, kaddr, 0);
> + insn_init(insn, kaddr, buf_len, 0);
> #endif
> }
>
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.954753152 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
> @@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
> unsigned long ip = regs->ip;
> int is_64bit = 0;
> void *kaddr;
> + int size;
>
> /*
> * We don't need to fixup if the PEBS assist is fault like
> @@ -758,11 +759,12 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
> return 1;
> }
>
> + size = ip - to;
> if (!kernel_ip(ip)) {
> - int size, bytes;
> + int bytes;
> u8 *buf = this_cpu_read(insn_buffer);
>
> - size = ip - to; /* Must fit our buffer, see above */
> + /* 'size' must fit our buffer, see above */
> bytes = copy_from_user_nmi(buf, (void __user *)to, size);
> if (bytes != 0)
> return 0;
> @@ -780,11 +782,12 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struc
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> is_64bit = kernel_ip(to) || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
> #endif
> - insn_init(&insn, kaddr, is_64bit);
> + insn_init(&insn, kaddr, size, is_64bit);
> insn_get_length(&insn);
>
> to += insn.length;
> kaddr += insn.length;
> + size -= insn.length;
> } while (to < ip);
>
> if (to == ip) {
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.956753243 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
> @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int branch_type(unsigned long fro
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> is64 = kernel_ip((unsigned long)addr) || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
> #endif
> - insn_init(&insn, addr, is64);
> + insn_init(&insn, addr, size, is64);
> insn_get_opcode(&insn);
>
> switch (insn.opcode.bytes[0]) {
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.957753288 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.970753874 -0800
> @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int can_probe(unsigned long paddr
> * normally used, we just go through if there is no kprobe.
> */
> __addr = recover_probed_instruction(buf, addr);
> - kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)__addr);
> + kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)__addr, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
> insn_get_length(&insn);
>
> /*
> @@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src
> {
> struct insn insn;
> kprobe_opcode_t buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
> + unsigned long recovered_insn =
> + recover_probed_instruction(buf, (unsigned long)src);
>
> - kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recover_probed_instruction(buf, (unsigned long)src));
> + kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recovered_insn, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
> insn_get_length(&insn);
> /* Another subsystem puts a breakpoint, failed to recover */
> if (insn.opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
> @@ -342,7 +344,7 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src
> if (insn_rip_relative(&insn)) {
> s64 newdisp;
> u8 *disp;
> - kernel_insn_init(&insn, dest);
> + kernel_insn_init(&insn, dest, insn.length);
> insn_get_displacement(&insn);
> /*
> * The copied instruction uses the %rip-relative addressing
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.959753378 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.971753919 -0800
> @@ -251,13 +251,15 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long pa
> /* Decode instructions */
> addr = paddr - offset;
> while (addr < paddr - offset + size) { /* Decode until function end */
> + unsigned long recovered_insn;
> if (search_exception_tables(addr))
> /*
> * Since some fixup code will jumps into this function,
> * we can't optimize kprobe in this function.
> */
> return 0;
> - kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recover_probed_instruction(buf, addr));
> + recovered_insn = recover_probed_instruction(buf, addr);
> + kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recovered_insn, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
> insn_get_length(&insn);
> /* Another subsystem puts a breakpoint */
> if (insn.opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.961753468 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.971753919 -0800
> @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_
> {
> u32 volatile *good_insns;
>
> - insn_init(insn, auprobe->insn, x86_64);
> + insn_init(insn, auprobe->insn, sizeof(auprobe->insn), x86_64);
> /* has the side-effect of processing the entire instruction */
> insn_get_length(insn);
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!insn_complete(insn)))
> diff -puN arch/x86/lib/insn.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/lib/insn.c
> --- a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.962753513 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.972753964 -0800
> @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
>
> /* Verify next sizeof(t) bytes can be on the same instruction */
> #define validate_next(t, insn, n) \
> - ((insn)->next_byte + sizeof(t) + n - (insn)->kaddr <= MAX_INSN_SIZE)
> + ((insn)->next_byte + sizeof(t) + n < (insn)->end_kaddr)
>
> #define __get_next(t, insn) \
> ({ t r = *(t*)insn->next_byte; insn->next_byte += sizeof(t); r; })
> @@ -50,10 +50,11 @@
> * @kaddr: address (in kernel memory) of instruction (or copy thereof)
> * @x86_64: !0 for 64-bit kernel or 64-bit app
> */
> -void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int x86_64)
> +void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int buf_len, int x86_64)
> {
> memset(insn, 0, sizeof(*insn));
> insn->kaddr = kaddr;
> + insn->end_kaddr = kaddr + buf_len;
> insn->next_byte = kaddr;
> insn->x86_64 = x86_64 ? 1 : 0;
> insn->opnd_bytes = 4;
> diff -puN arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c
> --- a/arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.964753604 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.972753964 -0800
> @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> continue;
>
> /* Decode an instruction */
> - insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, x86_64);
> + insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, sizeof(insn_buf), x86_64);
> insn_get_length(&insn);
>
> if (insn.next_byte <= insn.kaddr ||
> diff -puN arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c
> --- a/arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c~x86-insn-decoder-remove-arbitrary-limit 2014-11-12 12:45:52.966753694 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/tools/test_get_len.c 2014-11-12 12:45:52.972753964 -0800
> @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> break;
> }
> /* Decode an instruction */
> - insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, x86_64);
> + insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, sizeof(insn_buf), x86_64);
> insn_get_length(&insn);
> if (insn.length != nb) {
> warnings++;
> _
>
>
--
Masami HIRAMATSU
Software Platform Research Dept. Linux Technology Research Center
Hitachi, Ltd., Yokohama Research Laboratory
E-mail: [email protected]
On Wed, 2014-11-12 at 14:53 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
>
> The current x86 instruction decoder steps along through the
> instruction stream but always ensures that it never steps farther
> than the largest possible instruction size (MAX_INSN_SIZE).
...
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jim Keniston <[email protected]>
On 11/13/2014 06:49 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> (2014/11/13 7:53), Dave Hansen wrote:
>> The kprobes code probably needs to be looked at here a bit more
>> carefully. This patch still respects the MAX_INSN_SIZE limit
>> there but the kprobes code does look like it might be able to
>> be a bit more strict than it currently is.
>
> Would you mean kprobes can copy shorter? Maybe, but I think current
> one is enough because it is on a cold path.
> OK, at least this looks good to me.
As it stands now, if you happened to be decoding an instruction which is
short and it was *JUST* before a memory hole, I think it could oops the
kernel.
This doesn't look like it is very common (or maybe even possible) in
practice.
>> Note: the v10 version of the MPX patches I just posted depends
>> on this patch.
>
> BTW, current insn decoder doesn't support MPX... That should be
> updated (add bnd* to x86-insn-map.txt)
I think they're in there already:
> grep -i bnd arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
1a: BNDCL Ev,Gv | BNDCU Ev,Gv | BNDMOV Gv,Ev | BNDLDX Gv,Ev,Gv
1b: BNDCN Ev,Gv | BNDMOV Ev,Gv | BNDMK Gv,Ev | BNDSTX Ev,GV,Gv
Or were there others you were thinking of?
(2014/11/18 5:49), Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/13/2014 06:49 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
>> (2014/11/13 7:53), Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> The kprobes code probably needs to be looked at here a bit more
>>> carefully. This patch still respects the MAX_INSN_SIZE limit
>>> there but the kprobes code does look like it might be able to
>>> be a bit more strict than it currently is.
>>
>> Would you mean kprobes can copy shorter? Maybe, but I think current
>> one is enough because it is on a cold path.
>> OK, at least this looks good to me.
>
> As it stands now, if you happened to be decoding an instruction which is
> short and it was *JUST* before a memory hole, I think it could oops the
> kernel.
>
> This doesn't look like it is very common (or maybe even possible) in
> practice.
OK, then I'll add a check whether the end address is also in kernel_text.
(we've done it for the start address)
>
>>> Note: the v10 version of the MPX patches I just posted depends
>>> on this patch.
>>
>> BTW, current insn decoder doesn't support MPX... That should be
>> updated (add bnd* to x86-insn-map.txt)
>
> I think they're in there already:
>
>> grep -i bnd arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
> 1a: BNDCL Ev,Gv | BNDCU Ev,Gv | BNDMOV Gv,Ev | BNDLDX Gv,Ev,Gv
> 1b: BNDCN Ev,Gv | BNDMOV Ev,Gv | BNDMK Gv,Ev | BNDSTX Ev,GV,Gv
>
> Or were there others you were thinking of?
Ah, I misunderstood that AVX512 etc...
Thank you,
--
Masami HIRAMATSU
Software Platform Research Dept. Linux Technology Research Center
Hitachi, Ltd., Yokohama Research Laboratory
E-mail: [email protected]