This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.189-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.9.189-rc1
Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQ
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
x86: cpufeatures: Sort feature word 7
Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
spi: bcm2835: Fix 3-wire mode if DMA is enabled
xiao jin <[email protected]>
block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
Sudarsana Reddy Kalluru <[email protected]>
bnx2x: Disable multi-cos feature.
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
ife: error out when nla attributes are empty
Haishuang Yan <[email protected]>
ip6_tunnel: fix possible use-after-free on xmit
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
compat_ioctl: pppoe: fix PPPOEIOCSFWD handling
Taras Kondratiuk <[email protected]>
tipc: compat: allow tipc commands without arguments
Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
net: sched: Fix a possible null-pointer dereference in dequeue_func()
Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
net/mlx5: Use reversed order when unregister devices
Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
net: fix ifindex collision during namespace removal
Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: mcast: don't delete permanent entries when fast leave is enabled
Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: delete local fdb on device init failure
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
atm: iphase: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
libceph: use kbasename() and kill ceph_file_part()
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Add rewind_stack_do_exit() to the noreturn list
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Add machine_real_restart() to the noreturn list
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
IB: directly cast the sockaddr union to aockaddr
Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
RDMA: Directly cast the sockaddr union to sockaddr
Sebastian Parschauer <[email protected]>
HID: Add quirk for HP X1200 PIXART OEM mouse
Aaron Armstrong Skomra <[email protected]>
HID: wacom: fix bit shift for Cintiq Companion 2
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: be more careful in tcp_fragment()
Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: cpufeature: Fix feature comparison for CTR_EL0.{CWG,ERG}
Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: cpufeature: Fix CTR_EL0 field definitions
Adam Ford <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: logicpd-som-lv: Fix Audio Mute
Adam Ford <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: Add pinmuxing for i2c2 and i2c3 for LogicPD torpedo
Adam Ford <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: Add pinmuxing for i2c2 and i2c3 for LogicPD SOM-LV
Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
scsi: fcoe: Embed fc_rport_priv in fcoe_rport structure
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +-
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi | 18 ++++
arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-torpedo-som.dtsi | 16 ++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 14 +++-
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 18 ++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 21 ++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 42 ++++++----
block/blk-core.c | 1 +
drivers/atm/iphase.c | 8 +-
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 +
drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c | 1 +
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c | 12 +--
drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 15 ++--
drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 10 +--
drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_ah.c | 5 +-
drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_hw.c | 5 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/dev.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 3 +
drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c | 13 +++
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 3 +
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c | 51 +++++-------
drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c | 5 +-
drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c | 3 +-
fs/compat_ioctl.c | 3 -
include/linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h | 6 +-
include/linux/if_pppox.h | 3 +
include/net/tcp.h | 17 ++++
include/scsi/libfcoe.h | 1 +
net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +
net/bridge/br_vlan.c | 5 ++
net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 13 ---
net/core/dev.c | 2 +
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 11 ++-
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 8 +-
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 3 +
net/sched/act_ife.c | 3 +
net/sched/sch_codel.c | 6 +-
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 11 ++-
tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +
44 files changed, 363 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5c725b6b65067909548ac9ca9bc777098ec9883d ]
When permanent entries were introduced by the commit below, they were
exempt from timing out and thus igmp leave wouldn't affect them unless
fast leave was enabled on the port which was added before permanent
entries existed. It shouldn't matter if fast leave is enabled or not
if the user added a permanent entry it shouldn't be deleted on igmp
leave.
Before:
$ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/eth4/brport/multicast_fast_leave
$ bridge mdb add dev br0 port eth4 grp 229.1.1.1 permanent
$ bridge mdb show
dev br0 port eth4 grp 229.1.1.1 permanent
< join and leave 229.1.1.1 on eth4 >
$ bridge mdb show
$
After:
$ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/eth4/brport/multicast_fast_leave
$ bridge mdb add dev br0 port eth4 grp 229.1.1.1 permanent
$ bridge mdb show
dev br0 port eth4 grp 229.1.1.1 permanent
< join and leave 229.1.1.1 on eth4 >
$ bridge mdb show
dev br0 port eth4 grp 229.1.1.1 permanent
Fixes: ccb1c31a7a87 ("bridge: add flags to distinguish permanent mdb entires")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -1489,6 +1489,9 @@ br_multicast_leave_group(struct net_brid
if (p->port != port)
continue;
+ if (p->flags & MDB_PG_FLAGS_PERMANENT)
+ break;
+
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p->next);
hlist_del_init(&p->mglist);
del_timer(&p->timer);
commit 147b9635e6347104b91f48ca9dca61eb0fbf2a54 upstream.
If CTR_EL0.{CWG,ERG} are 0b0000 then they must be interpreted to have
their architecturally maximum values, which defeats the use of
FTR_HIGHER_SAFE when sanitising CPU ID registers on heterogeneous
machines.
Introduce FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE so that these fields effectively
saturate at zero.
Fixes: 3c739b571084 ("arm64: Keep track of CPU feature registers")
Cc: <[email protected]> # 4.9.y only
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 ++++---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 8 ++++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 15868eca58de0..e7bef3d936d87 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -31,9 +31,10 @@
/* CPU feature register tracking */
enum ftr_type {
- FTR_EXACT, /* Use a predefined safe value */
- FTR_LOWER_SAFE, /* Smaller value is safe */
- FTR_HIGHER_SAFE,/* Bigger value is safe */
+ FTR_EXACT, /* Use a predefined safe value */
+ FTR_LOWER_SAFE, /* Smaller value is safe */
+ FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, /* Bigger value is safe */
+ FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, /* Bigger value is safe, but 0 is biggest */
};
#define FTR_STRICT true /* SANITY check strict matching required */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index e2ac72b7e89ca..9a8e45dc36bd0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 30, 1, 0),
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 29, 1, 1), /* DIC */
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 1, 1), /* IDC */
- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0), /* CWG */
- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0), /* ERG */
+ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, 24, 4, 0), /* CWG */
+ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, 20, 4, 0), /* ERG */
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT, 4, 1),
/*
* Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
@@ -392,6 +392,10 @@ static s64 arm64_ftr_safe_value(const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp, s64 new,
case FTR_LOWER_SAFE:
ret = new < cur ? new : cur;
break;
+ case FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE:
+ if (!cur || !new)
+ break;
+ /* Fallthrough */
case FTR_HIGHER_SAFE:
ret = new > cur ? new : cur;
break;
--
2.20.1
[ Upstream commit 5fe3c0fa0d54877c65e7c9b4442aeeb25cdf469a ]
Since I2C1 and I2C4 have explicit pinmuxing set, let's be on the
safe side and set the pin muxing for I2C2 and I2C3.
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi
index 876ed5f2922c4..43035cb71cbee 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi
@@ -114,10 +114,14 @@
};
&i2c2 {
+ pinctrl-names = "default";
+ pinctrl-0 = <&i2c2_pins>;
clock-frequency = <400000>;
};
&i2c3 {
+ pinctrl-names = "default";
+ pinctrl-0 = <&i2c3_pins>;
clock-frequency = <400000>;
};
@@ -239,6 +243,18 @@
OMAP3_WKUP_IOPAD(0x2a0c, PIN_OUTPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* sys_boot1.gpio_3 */
>;
};
+ i2c2_pins: pinmux_i2c2_pins {
+ pinctrl-single,pins = <
+ OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21be, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE0) /* i2c2_scl */
+ OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21c0, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE0) /* i2c2_sda */
+ >;
+ };
+ i2c3_pins: pinmux_i2c3_pins {
+ pinctrl-single,pins = <
+ OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21c2, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE0) /* i2c3_scl */
+ OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21c4, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE0) /* i2c3_sda */
+ >;
+ };
};
&omap3_pmx_core2 {
--
2.20.1
From: Taras Kondratiuk <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4da5f0018eef4c0de31675b670c80e82e13e99d1 ]
Commit 2753ca5d9009 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit")
broke older tipc tools that use compat interface (e.g. tipc-config from
tipcutils package):
% tipc-config -p
operation not supported
The commit started to reject TIPC netlink compat messages that do not
have attributes. It is too restrictive because some of such messages are
valid (they don't need any arguments):
% grep 'tx none' include/uapi/linux/tipc_config.h
#define TIPC_CMD_NOOP 0x0000 /* tx none, rx none */
#define TIPC_CMD_GET_MEDIA_NAMES 0x0002 /* tx none, rx media_name(s) */
#define TIPC_CMD_GET_BEARER_NAMES 0x0003 /* tx none, rx bearer_name(s) */
#define TIPC_CMD_SHOW_PORTS 0x0006 /* tx none, rx ultra_string */
#define TIPC_CMD_GET_REMOTE_MNG 0x4003 /* tx none, rx unsigned */
#define TIPC_CMD_GET_MAX_PORTS 0x4004 /* tx none, rx unsigned */
#define TIPC_CMD_GET_NETID 0x400B /* tx none, rx unsigned */
#define TIPC_CMD_NOT_NET_ADMIN 0xC001 /* tx none, rx none */
This patch relaxes the original fix and rejects messages without
arguments only if such arguments are expected by a command (reg_type is
non zero).
Fixes: 2753ca5d9009 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Taras Kondratiuk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct tipc_nl_compat_msg {
int rep_type;
int rep_size;
int req_type;
+ int req_size;
struct net *net;
struct sk_buff *rep;
struct tlv_desc *req;
@@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct
int err;
struct sk_buff *arg;
- if (msg->req_type && !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type))
+ if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
+ !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
return -EINVAL;
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(msg->rep_size);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_doit(struct ti
{
int err;
- if (msg->req_type && !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type))
+ if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
+ !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
return -EINVAL;
err = __tipc_nl_compat_doit(cmd, msg);
@@ -1267,8 +1270,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk
goto send;
}
- len = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
- if (!len || !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
+ msg.req_size = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
+ if (msg.req_size && !TLV_OK(msg.req, msg.req_size)) {
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto send;
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 055d88242a6046a1ceac3167290f054c72571cd9 ]
Support for handling the PPPOEIOCSFWD ioctl in compat mode was added in
linux-2.5.69 along with hundreds of other commands, but was always broken
sincen only the structure is compatible, but the command number is not,
due to the size being sizeof(size_t), or at first sizeof(sizeof((struct
sockaddr_pppox)), which is different on 64-bit architectures.
Guillaume Nault adds:
And the implementation was broken until 2016 (see 29e73269aa4d ("pppoe:
fix reference counting in PPPoE proxy")), and nobody ever noticed. I
should probably have removed this ioctl entirely instead of fixing it.
Clearly, it has never been used.
Fix it by adding a compat_ioctl handler for all pppoe variants that
translates the command number and then calls the regular ioctl function.
All other ioctl commands handled by pppoe are compatible between 32-bit
and 64-bit, and require compat_ptr() conversion.
This should apply to all stable kernels.
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 3 +++
drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c | 13 +++++++++++++
drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 3 +++
fs/compat_ioctl.c | 3 ---
include/linux/if_pppox.h | 3 +++
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 3 +++
6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -1134,6 +1134,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pppoe_ops
.recvmsg = pppoe_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
};
static const struct pppox_proto pppoe_proto = {
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
@@ -103,6 +104,18 @@ int pppox_ioctl(struct socket *sock, uns
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pppox_ioctl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+int pppox_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ if (cmd == PPPOEIOCSFWD32)
+ cmd = PPPOEIOCSFWD;
+
+ return pppox_ioctl(sock, cmd, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pppox_compat_ioctl);
+#endif
+
static int pppox_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
@@ -638,6 +638,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pptp_ops =
.recvmsg = sock_no_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
};
static const struct pppox_proto pppox_pptp_proto = {
--- a/fs/compat_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/compat_ioctl.c
@@ -1038,9 +1038,6 @@ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCDISCONN)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCATTCHAN)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCGCHAN)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS)
-/* PPPOX */
-COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPOEIOCSFWD)
-COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPOEIOCDFWD)
/* Big A */
/* sparc only */
/* Big Q for sound/OSS */
--- a/include/linux/if_pppox.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_pppox.h
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ extern int register_pppox_proto(int prot
extern void unregister_pppox_proto(int proto_num);
extern void pppox_unbind_sock(struct sock *sk);/* delete ppp-channel binding */
extern int pppox_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+extern int pppox_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+
+#define PPPOEIOCSFWD32 _IOW(0xB1 ,0, compat_size_t)
/* PPPoX socket states */
enum {
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -1790,6 +1790,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pppol2tp_o
.recvmsg = pppol2tp_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
};
static const struct pppox_proto pppol2tp_proto = {
From: Haishuang Yan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01f5bffad555f8e22a61f4b1261fe09cf1b96994 ]
ip4ip6/ip6ip6 tunnels run iptunnel_handle_offloads on xmit which
can cause a possible use-after-free accessing iph/ipv6h pointer
since the packet will be 'uncloned' running pskb_expand_head if
it is a cloned gso skb.
Fixes: 0e9a709560db ("ip6_tunnel, ip6_gre: fix setting of DSCP on encapsulated packets")
Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -1275,11 +1275,11 @@ ip4ip6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, str
fl6.flowi6_mark = skb->mark;
}
+ dsfield = INET_ECN_encapsulate(dsfield, ipv4_get_dsfield(iph));
+
if (iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, SKB_GSO_IPXIP6))
return -1;
- dsfield = INET_ECN_encapsulate(dsfield, ipv4_get_dsfield(iph));
-
skb_set_inner_ipproto(skb, IPPROTO_IPIP);
err = ip6_tnl_xmit(skb, dev, dsfield, &fl6, encap_limit, &mtu,
@@ -1362,11 +1362,11 @@ ip6ip6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, str
fl6.flowi6_mark = skb->mark;
}
+ dsfield = INET_ECN_encapsulate(dsfield, ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6h));
+
if (iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, SKB_GSO_IPXIP6))
return -1;
- dsfield = INET_ECN_encapsulate(dsfield, ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6h));
-
skb_set_inner_ipproto(skb, IPPROTO_IPV6);
err = ip6_tnl_xmit(skb, dev, dsfield, &fl6, encap_limit, &mtu,
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c8ec4632c6ac9cda0e8c3d51aa41eeab66585bd5 ]
act_ife at least requires TCA_IFE_PARMS, so we have to bail out
when there is no attribute passed in.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: ef6980b6becb ("introduce IFE action")
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sched/act_ife.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sched/act_ife.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_ife.c
@@ -477,6 +477,9 @@ static int tcf_ife_init(struct net *net,
int ret = 0;
int err;
+ if (!nla)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_IFE_MAX, nla, ife_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 18ec54fdd6d18d92025af097cd042a75cf0ea24c upstream.
Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any
conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in
the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
GS.
For example:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
mov (%reg), %reg1
When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can
speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which
uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
attack.
A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can
speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
of the speculative window.
The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:
a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
isn't user-controlled; and
b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
"from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
above).
The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
lfences can be skipped in those cases.
On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.
To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
features for alternative patching:
X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed.
The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Assign the CPU feature bits from word 7
- Add FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY to NMI entry, since it does not
use paranoid_entry
- Include <asm/cpufeatures.h> in calling.h
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
/*
@@ -201,6 +202,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
.byte 0xf1
.endm
+/*
+ * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
+ * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path,
+ * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from
+ * user space.
+ */
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
+.endm
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
+.endm
+
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
/*
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
* tracking that we're in kernel mode.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3
/*
@@ -433,8 +434,10 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
CALL_enter_from_user_mode
-
+ jmpq 2f
1:
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+2:
/*
* Save previous stack pointer, optionally switch to interrupt stack.
* irq_count is used to check if a CPU is already on an interrupt stack
@@ -1004,6 +1007,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
movq %rax, %cr3
2:
#endif
+ /*
+ * The above doesn't do an unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI
+ * case. So do an lfence to prevent GS speculation, regardless of
+ * whether PTI is enabled.
+ */
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+
ret
END(paranoid_entry)
@@ -1065,6 +1075,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* from user mode due to an IRET fault.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
/*
@@ -1076,6 +1087,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
CALL_enter_from_user_mode
ret
+.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
.Lerror_entry_done:
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
ret
@@ -1094,7 +1107,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
je .Lbstep_iret
cmpq $.Lgs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
- jne .Lerror_entry_done
+ jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence
/*
* hack: .Lgs_change can fail with user gsbase. If this happens, fix up
@@ -1102,6 +1115,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
jmp .Lerror_entry_done
.Lbstep_iret:
@@ -1115,6 +1129,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* Switch to kernel gsbase:
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1211,6 +1226,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
* to switch CR3 here.
*/
cld
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */
@@ -1499,6 +1515,7 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
movq %rax, %cr3
2:
#endif
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
/* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */
call do_nmi
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
-
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER ( 7*32+10) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL ( 7*32+11) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 64dbc122b20f75183d8822618c24f85144a5a94d upstream.
Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ
instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed. Some
assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP
when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation. For
some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot.
Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended.
Fixes: 18ec54fdd6d1 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
CALL_enter_from_user_mode
- jmpq 2f
+ jmp 2f
1:
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
2:
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
commit 641114d2af312d39ca9bbc2369d18a5823da51c6 upstream.
gcc 9 now does allocation size tracking and thinks that passing the member
of a union and then accessing beyond that member's bounds is an overflow.
Instead of using the union member, use the entire union with a cast to
get to the sockaddr. gcc will now know that the memory extends the full
size of the union.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 15 +++++++--------
drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_ah.c | 5 ++---
drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_hw.c | 5 ++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c
@@ -735,14 +735,13 @@ int rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(const u
struct net_device *dev;
union {
- struct sockaddr _sockaddr;
struct sockaddr_in _sockaddr_in;
struct sockaddr_in6 _sockaddr_in6;
} sgid_addr, dgid_addr;
- rdma_gid2ip(&sgid_addr._sockaddr, sgid);
- rdma_gid2ip(&dgid_addr._sockaddr, dgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&sgid_addr, sgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&dgid_addr, dgid);
memset(&dev_addr, 0, sizeof(dev_addr));
if (if_index)
@@ -751,8 +750,9 @@ int rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(const u
ctx.addr = &dev_addr;
init_completion(&ctx.comp);
- ret = rdma_resolve_ip(&self, &sgid_addr._sockaddr, &dgid_addr._sockaddr,
- &dev_addr, 1000, resolve_cb, &ctx);
+ ret = rdma_resolve_ip(&self, (struct sockaddr *)&sgid_addr,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&dgid_addr, &dev_addr, 1000,
+ resolve_cb, &ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -782,16 +782,15 @@ int rdma_addr_find_smac_by_sgid(union ib
int ret = 0;
struct rdma_dev_addr dev_addr;
union {
- struct sockaddr _sockaddr;
struct sockaddr_in _sockaddr_in;
struct sockaddr_in6 _sockaddr_in6;
} gid_addr;
- rdma_gid2ip(&gid_addr._sockaddr, sgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&gid_addr, sgid);
memset(&dev_addr, 0, sizeof(dev_addr));
dev_addr.net = &init_net;
- ret = rdma_translate_ip(&gid_addr._sockaddr, &dev_addr, vlan_id);
+ ret = rdma_translate_ip((struct sockaddr *)&gid_addr, &dev_addr, vlan_id);
if (ret)
return ret;
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_ah.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_ah.c
@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ static inline int set_av_attr(struct ocr
u8 nxthdr = 0x11;
struct iphdr ipv4;
union {
- struct sockaddr _sockaddr;
struct sockaddr_in _sockaddr_in;
struct sockaddr_in6 _sockaddr_in6;
} sgid_addr, dgid_addr;
@@ -131,9 +130,9 @@ static inline int set_av_attr(struct ocr
ipv4.tot_len = htons(0);
ipv4.ttl = attr->grh.hop_limit;
ipv4.protocol = nxthdr;
- rdma_gid2ip(&sgid_addr._sockaddr, sgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&sgid_addr, sgid);
ipv4.saddr = sgid_addr._sockaddr_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
- rdma_gid2ip(&dgid_addr._sockaddr, &attr->grh.dgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&dgid_addr, &attr->grh.dgid);
ipv4.daddr = dgid_addr._sockaddr_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
memcpy((u8 *)ah->av + eth_sz, &ipv4, sizeof(struct iphdr));
} else {
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_hw.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_hw.c
@@ -2505,7 +2505,6 @@ static int ocrdma_set_av_params(struct o
u32 vlan_id = 0xFFFF;
u8 mac_addr[6], hdr_type;
union {
- struct sockaddr _sockaddr;
struct sockaddr_in _sockaddr_in;
struct sockaddr_in6 _sockaddr_in6;
} sgid_addr, dgid_addr;
@@ -2550,8 +2549,8 @@ static int ocrdma_set_av_params(struct o
hdr_type = ib_gid_to_network_type(sgid_attr.gid_type, &sgid);
if (hdr_type == RDMA_NETWORK_IPV4) {
- rdma_gid2ip(&sgid_addr._sockaddr, &sgid);
- rdma_gid2ip(&dgid_addr._sockaddr, &ah_attr->grh.dgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&sgid_addr, &sgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&dgid_addr, &ah_attr->grh.dgid);
memcpy(&cmd->params.dgid[0],
&dgid_addr._sockaddr_in.sin_addr.s_addr, 4);
memcpy(&cmd->params.sgid[0],
Like commit 641114d2af31 ("RDMA: Directly cast the sockaddr union to
sockaddr") we need to quiet gcc 9 from warning about this crazy union.
That commit did not fix all of the warnings in 4.19 and older kernels
because the logic in roce_resolve_route_from_path() was rewritten
between 4.19 and 5.2 when that change happened.
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c
@@ -1109,7 +1109,6 @@ int ib_init_ah_from_path(struct ib_devic
.net = rec->net ? rec->net :
&init_net};
union {
- struct sockaddr _sockaddr;
struct sockaddr_in _sockaddr_in;
struct sockaddr_in6 _sockaddr_in6;
} sgid_addr, dgid_addr;
@@ -1117,12 +1116,13 @@ int ib_init_ah_from_path(struct ib_devic
if (!device->get_netdev)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- rdma_gid2ip(&sgid_addr._sockaddr, &rec->sgid);
- rdma_gid2ip(&dgid_addr._sockaddr, &rec->dgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&sgid_addr, &rec->sgid);
+ rdma_gid2ip((struct sockaddr *)&dgid_addr, &rec->dgid);
/* validate the route */
- ret = rdma_resolve_ip_route(&sgid_addr._sockaddr,
- &dgid_addr._sockaddr, &dev_addr);
+ ret = rdma_resolve_ip_route((struct sockaddr *)&sgid_addr,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&dgid_addr,
+ &dev_addr);
if (ret)
return ret;
From: Sebastian Parschauer <[email protected]>
commit 49869d2ea9eecc105a10724c1abf035151a3c4e2 upstream.
The PixArt OEM mice are known for disconnecting every minute in
runlevel 1 or 3 if they are not always polled. So add quirk
ALWAYS_POLL for this one as well.
Jonathan Teh (@jonathan-teh) reported and tested the quirk.
Reference: https://github.com/sriemer/fix-linux-mouse/issues/15
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Parschauer <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 +
drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -509,6 +509,7 @@
#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0A4A 0x0a4a
#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0B4A 0x0b4a
#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE 0x134a
+#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0641 0x0641
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_HUION 0x256c
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_HUION_TABLET 0x006e
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static const struct hid_blacklist {
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0A4A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0B4A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0641, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_C077, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_KEYBOARD_G710_PLUS, HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOUSE_C01A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
[ Upstream commit 95e59fc3c3fa3187a07a75f40b21637deb4bd12d ]
The Audio has worked, but the mute pin has a weak pulldown which alows
some of the audio signal to pass very quietly. This patch fixes
that so the mute pin is actively driven high for mute or low for normal
operation.
Fixes: ab8dd3aed011 ("ARM: DTS: Add minimal Support for Logic
PD DM3730 SOM-LV")
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi
index 43035cb71cbee..f82f193b88569 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-som-lv.dtsi
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
twl_audio: audio {
compatible = "ti,twl4030-audio";
codec {
+ ti,hs_extmute_gpio = <&gpio2 25 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
};
};
};
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@
pinctrl-single,pins = <
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21ba, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE0) /* i2c1_scl.i2c1_scl */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x21bc, PIN_INPUT | MUX_MODE0) /* i2c1_sda.i2c1_sda */
+ OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x20ba, PIN_OUTPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* gpmc_ncs6.gpio_57 */
>;
};
};
--
2.20.1
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 684fb246578b9e81fc7b4ca5c71eae22edb650b2 upstream.
machine_real_restart() is annotated as '__noreturn", so add it to the
objtool noreturn list. This fixes the following warning with clang and
CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE=y:
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.o: warning: objtool: native_machine_emergency_restart() falls through to next function machine_power_off()
Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/791712792aa4431bdd55bf1beb33a169ddf3b4a2.1529423255.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct ob
"__reiserfs_panic",
"lbug_with_loc",
"fortify_panic",
+ "machine_real_restart",
};
if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d7bae09fa008c6c9a489580db0a5a12063b97f97 ]
On initialization failure we have to delete the local fdb which was
inserted due to the default pvid creation. This problem has been present
since the inception of default_pvid. Note that currently there are 2 cases:
1) in br_dev_init() when br_multicast_init() fails
2) if register_netdevice() fails after calling ndo_init()
This patch takes care of both since br_vlan_flush() is called on both
occasions. Also the new fdb delete would be a no-op on normal bridge
device destruction since the local fdb would've been already flushed by
br_dev_delete(). This is not an issue for ports since nbp_vlan_init() is
called last when adding a port thus nothing can fail after it.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 5be5a2df40f0 ("bridge: Add filtering support for default_pvid")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/bridge/br_vlan.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
@@ -622,6 +622,11 @@ void br_vlan_flush(struct net_bridge *br
ASSERT_RTNL();
+ /* delete auto-added default pvid local fdb before flushing vlans
+ * otherwise it will be leaked on bridge device init failure
+ */
+ br_fdb_delete_by_port(br, NULL, 0, 1);
+
vg = br_vlan_group(br);
__vlan_flush(vg);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(br->vlgrp, NULL);
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ea443e5e98b5b74e317ef3d26bcaea54931ccdee ]
board is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2765 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2774 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2782 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2816 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2823 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2830 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue '_ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2845 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2856 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
Fix this by sanitizing board before using it to index ia_dev and _ia_dev
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/atm/iphase.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/atm/iphase.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/iphase.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "iphase.h"
#include "suni.h"
#define swap_byte_order(x) (((x & 0xff) << 8) | ((x & 0xff00) >> 8))
@@ -2760,8 +2761,11 @@ static int ia_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev,
}
if (copy_from_user(&ia_cmds, arg, sizeof ia_cmds)) return -EFAULT;
board = ia_cmds.status;
- if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
- board = 0;
+
+ if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
+ board = 0;
+ board = array_index_nospec(board, iadev_count + 1);
+
iadev = ia_dev[board];
switch (ia_cmds.cmd) {
case MEMDUMP:
From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
commit 6f4dbd149d2a151b89d1a5bbf7530ee5546c7908 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h | 6 +++---
net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 13 -------------
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_LIB_PRETTYDEBUG
/*
@@ -12,12 +14,10 @@
*/
# if defined(DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
-extern const char *ceph_file_part(const char *s, int len);
# define dout(fmt, ...) \
pr_debug("%.*s %12.12s:%-4d : " fmt, \
8 - (int)sizeof(KBUILD_MODNAME), " ", \
- ceph_file_part(__FILE__, sizeof(__FILE__)), \
- __LINE__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ kbasename(__FILE__), __LINE__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
# else
/* faux printk call just to see any compiler warnings. */
# define dout(fmt, ...) do { \
--- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
+++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
@@ -45,19 +45,6 @@ bool libceph_compatible(void *data)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(libceph_compatible);
-/*
- * find filename portion of a path (/foo/bar/baz -> baz)
- */
-const char *ceph_file_part(const char *s, int len)
-{
- const char *e = s + len;
-
- while (e != s && *(e-1) != '/')
- e--;
- return e;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_file_part);
-
const char *ceph_msg_type_name(int type)
{
switch (type) {
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 4fa5ecda2bf96be7464eb406df8aba9d89260227 upstream.
This fixes the following warning seen on GCC 7.3:
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.o: warning: objtool: oops_end() falls through to next function show_regs()
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3418ebf5a5a9f6ed7e80954c741c0b904b67b5dc.1554398240.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
tools/objtool/check.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct ob
"lbug_with_loc",
"fortify_panic",
"machine_real_restart",
+ "rewind_stack_do_exit",
};
if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
From: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 55b40dbf0e76b4bfb9d8b3a16a0208640a9a45df ]
Commit aca51397d014 ("netns: Fix arbitrary net_device-s corruptions
on net_ns stop.") introduced a possibility to hit a BUG in case device
is returning back to init_net and two following conditions are met:
1) dev->ifindex value is used in a name of another "dev%d"
device in init_net.
2) dev->name is used by another device in init_net.
Under real life circumstances this is hard to get. Therefore this has
been present happily for over 10 years. To reproduce:
$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 86:89:3f:86:61:29 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
3: enp0s2: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 52:54:00:12:34:56 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
$ ip netns add ns1
$ ip -n ns1 link add dummy1ns1 type dummy
$ ip -n ns1 link add dummy2ns1 type dummy
$ ip link set enp0s2 netns ns1
$ ip -n ns1 link set enp0s2 name dummy0
[ 100.858894] virtio_net virtio0 dummy0: renamed from enp0s2
$ ip link add dev4 type dummy
$ ip -n ns1 a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK> mtu 65536 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
2: dummy1ns1: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 16:63:4c:38:3e:ff brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
3: dummy2ns1: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether aa:9e:86:dd:6b:5d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
4: dummy0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 52:54:00:12:34:56 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 86:89:3f:86:61:29 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
4: dev4: <BROADCAST,NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
link/ether 5a:e1:4a:b6:ec:f8 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
$ ip netns del ns1
[ 158.717795] default_device_exit: failed to move dummy0 to init_net: -17
[ 158.719316] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 158.720591] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:9824!
[ 158.722260] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 158.723728] CPU: 0 PID: 56 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1+ #18
[ 158.725422] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014
[ 158.727508] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[ 158.728915] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit.cold+0x1d/0x1f
[ 158.730683] Code: 84 e8 18 c9 3e fe 0f 0b e9 70 90 ff ff e8 36 e4 52 fe 89 d9 4c 89 e2 48 c7 c6 80 d6 25 84 48 c7 c7 20 c0 25 84 e8 f4 c8 3e
[ 158.736854] RSP: 0018:ffff8880347e7b90 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 158.738752] RAX: 000000000000003b RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 158.741369] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8128013d RDI: ffffed10068fcf64
[ 158.743418] RBP: ffff888033550170 R08: 000000000000003b R09: fffffbfff0b94b9c
[ 158.745626] R10: fffffbfff0b94b9b R11: ffffffff85ca5cdf R12: ffff888032f28000
[ 158.748405] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8880335501b8 R15: 1ffff110068fcf72
[ 158.750638] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888036000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 158.752944] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 158.755245] CR2: 00007fe8b45d21d0 CR3: 00000000340b4005 CR4: 0000000000360ef0
[ 158.757654] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 158.760012] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 158.762758] Call Trace:
[ 158.763882] ? dev_change_net_namespace+0xbb0/0xbb0
[ 158.766148] ? devlink_nl_cmd_set_doit+0x520/0x520
[ 158.768034] ? dev_change_net_namespace+0xbb0/0xbb0
[ 158.769870] ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xa8/0x150
[ 158.771544] cleanup_net+0x446/0x8f0
[ 158.772945] ? unregister_pernet_operations+0x4a0/0x4a0
[ 158.775294] process_one_work+0xa1a/0x1740
[ 158.776896] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x310/0x310
[ 158.779143] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11b/0x280
[ 158.780848] worker_thread+0x9e/0x1060
[ 158.782500] ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
[ 158.784454] kthread+0x31b/0x420
[ 158.786082] ? __kthread_create_on_node+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 158.788286] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 158.789871] ---[ end trace defd6c657c71f936 ]---
[ 158.792273] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit.cold+0x1d/0x1f
[ 158.795478] Code: 84 e8 18 c9 3e fe 0f 0b e9 70 90 ff ff e8 36 e4 52 fe 89 d9 4c 89 e2 48 c7 c6 80 d6 25 84 48 c7 c7 20 c0 25 84 e8 f4 c8 3e
[ 158.804854] RSP: 0018:ffff8880347e7b90 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 158.807865] RAX: 000000000000003b RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 158.811794] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8128013d RDI: ffffed10068fcf64
[ 158.816652] RBP: ffff888033550170 R08: 000000000000003b R09: fffffbfff0b94b9c
[ 158.820930] R10: fffffbfff0b94b9b R11: ffffffff85ca5cdf R12: ffff888032f28000
[ 158.825113] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8880335501b8 R15: 1ffff110068fcf72
[ 158.829899] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888036000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 158.834923] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 158.838164] CR2: 00007fe8b45d21d0 CR3: 00000000340b4005 CR4: 0000000000360ef0
[ 158.841917] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 158.845149] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fix this by checking if a device with the same name exists in init_net
and fallback to original code - dev%d to allocate name - in case it does.
This was found using syzkaller.
Fixes: aca51397d014 ("netns: Fix arbitrary net_device-s corruptions on net_ns stop.")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/dev.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -8296,6 +8296,8 @@ static void __net_exit default_device_ex
/* Push remaining network devices to init_net */
snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%d", dev->ifindex);
+ if (__dev_get_by_name(&init_net, fb_name))
+ snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%%d");
err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, &init_net, fb_name);
if (err) {
pr_emerg("%s: failed to move %s to init_net: %d\n",
From: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 08aa5e7da6bce1a1963f63cf32c2e7ad434ad578 ]
When lag is active, which is controlled by the bonded mlx5e netdev, mlx5
interface unregestering must happen in the reverse order where rdma is
unregistered (unloaded) first, to guarantee all references to the lag
context in hardware is removed, then remove mlx5e netdev interface which
will cleanup the lag context from hardware.
Without this fix during destroy of LAG interface, we observed following
errors:
* mlx5_cmd_check:752:(pid 12556): DESTROY_LAG(0x843) op_mod(0x0) failed,
status bad parameter(0x3), syndrome (0xe4ac33)
* mlx5_cmd_check:752:(pid 12556): DESTROY_LAG(0x843) op_mod(0x0) failed,
status bad parameter(0x3), syndrome (0xa5aee8).
Fixes: a31208b1e11d ("net/mlx5_core: New init and exit flow for mlx5_core")
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/dev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/dev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/dev.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ void mlx5_unregister_device(struct mlx5_
struct mlx5_interface *intf;
mutex_lock(&mlx5_intf_mutex);
- list_for_each_entry(intf, &intf_list, list)
+ list_for_each_entry_reverse(intf, &intf_list, list)
mlx5_remove_device(intf, priv);
list_del(&priv->dev_list);
mutex_unlock(&mlx5_intf_mutex);
From: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 051c7b39be4a91f6b7d8c4548444e4b850f1f56c ]
In dequeue_func(), there is an if statement on line 74 to check whether
skb is NULL:
if (skb)
When skb is NULL, it is used on line 77:
prefetch(&skb->end);
Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.
To fix this bug, skb->end is used when skb is not NULL.
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Fixes: 76e3cc126bb2 ("codel: Controlled Delay AQM")
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sched/sch_codel.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sched/sch_codel.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_codel.c
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *dequeue_func(stru
struct Qdisc *sch = ctx;
struct sk_buff *skb = __qdisc_dequeue_head(&sch->q);
- if (skb)
+ if (skb) {
sch->qstats.backlog -= qdisc_pkt_len(skb);
-
- prefetch(&skb->end); /* we'll need skb_shinfo() */
+ prefetch(&skb->end); /* we'll need skb_shinfo() */
+ }
return skb;
}
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
This will make it clearer which bits are allocated, in case we need to
assign more feature bits for later backports.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -201,9 +201,6 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
-/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
-#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
-
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
@@ -214,6 +211,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
From: Sudarsana Reddy Kalluru <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d1f0b5dce8fda09a7f5f04c1878f181d548e42f5 ]
Commit 3968d38917eb ("bnx2x: Fix Multi-Cos.") which enabled multi-cos
feature after prolonged time in driver added some regression causing
numerous issues (sudden reboots, tx timeout etc.) reported by customers.
We plan to backout this commit and submit proper fix once we have root
cause of issues reported with this feature enabled.
Fixes: 3968d38917eb ("bnx2x: Fix Multi-Cos.")
Signed-off-by: Sudarsana Reddy Kalluru <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
@@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ u16 bnx2x_select_queue(struct net_device
}
/* select a non-FCoE queue */
- return fallback(dev, skb) % (BNX2X_NUM_ETH_QUEUES(bp) * bp->max_cos);
+ return fallback(dev, skb) % (BNX2X_NUM_ETH_QUEUES(bp));
}
void bnx2x_set_num_queues(struct bnx2x *bp)
From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
commit 8d8bef50365847134b51c1ec46786bc2873e4e47 upstream.
Commit 6935224da248 ("spi: bcm2835: enable support of 3-wire mode")
added 3-wire support to the BCM2835 SPI driver by setting the REN bit
(Read Enable) in the CS register when receiving data. The REN bit puts
the transmitter in high-impedance state. The driver recognizes that
data is to be received by checking whether the rx_buf of a transfer is
non-NULL.
Commit 3ecd37edaa2a ("spi: bcm2835: enable dma modes for transfers
meeting certain conditions") subsequently broke 3-wire support because
it set the SPI_MASTER_MUST_RX flag which causes spi_map_msg() to replace
rx_buf with a dummy buffer if it is NULL. As a result, rx_buf is
*always* non-NULL if DMA is enabled.
Reinstate 3-wire support by not only checking whether rx_buf is non-NULL,
but also checking that it is not the dummy buffer.
Fixes: 3ecd37edaa2a ("spi: bcm2835: enable dma modes for transfers meeting certain conditions")
Reported-by: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Sperl <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/328318841455e505370ef8ecad97b646c033dc8a.1562148527.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
@@ -554,7 +554,8 @@ static int bcm2835_spi_transfer_one(stru
bcm2835_wr(bs, BCM2835_SPI_CLK, cdiv);
/* handle all the 3-wire mode */
- if ((spi->mode & SPI_3WIRE) && (tfr->rx_buf))
+ if (spi->mode & SPI_3WIRE && tfr->rx_buf &&
+ tfr->rx_buf != master->dummy_rx)
cs |= BCM2835_SPI_CS_REN;
else
cs &= ~BCM2835_SPI_CS_REN;
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream.
The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled. Enable those features where applicable.
The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can
write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
handler:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible
because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
accesses.
NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
doesn't exist quite yet.
- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the
gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
needs to be read from user space first. Something like:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
mov (%reg1), %reg2
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without
tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
- If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively
disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
- If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably
only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.
[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Check for X86_FEATURE_KAISER instead of X86_FEATURE_PTI
- mitigations= parameter is x86-only here
- Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2484,6 +2484,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+ nospectre_v1 [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
@@ -2819,10 +2820,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
nohugeiomap [KNL,x86] Disable kernel huge I/O mappings.
- nospectre_v1 [PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
- check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
- in the system.
-
nosmt [KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
Equivalent to smt=1.
@@ -2830,6 +2827,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
via the sysfs control file.
+ nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+ (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+ possible in the system.
+
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -95,17 +96,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
- /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+ spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
-
- /*
- * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
- * Bypass vulnerability.
- */
ssb_select_mitigation();
-
l1tf_select_mitigation();
-
mds_select_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
@@ -271,6 +266,108 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
+
+enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
+static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
+};
+
+static bool is_swapgs_serializing(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
+ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
+ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
+ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
+ * good enough for our purposes.
+ */
+ return boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
+ * userspace?
+ */
+static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
+ * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
+ * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
+ * CPUs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ /*
+ * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
+ * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+ * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
+ * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
+ *
+ * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
+ * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
+ * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still
+ * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
+ */
+ if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
+ /*
+ * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
+ * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
+ * is serializing.
+ *
+ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE.
+ */
+ if (!is_swapgs_serializing() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
+
+ /*
+ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+ * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
+ * skipping swapgs.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
@@ -1265,7 +1362,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
break;
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
From: Aaron Armstrong Skomra <[email protected]>
commit 693c3dab4e50403f91bca4b52fc6d8562a3180f6 upstream.
The bit indicating BTN_6 on this device is overshifted
by 2 bits, resulting in the incorrect button being
reported.
Also fix copy-paste mistake in comments.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Armstrong Skomra <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ping Cheng <[email protected]>
Link: https://github.com/linuxwacom/xf86-input-wacom/issues/71
Fixes: c7f0522a1ad1 ("HID: wacom: Slim down wacom_intuos_pad processing")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
@@ -529,14 +529,14 @@ static int wacom_intuos_pad(struct wacom
*/
buttons = (data[4] << 1) | (data[3] & 0x01);
} else if (features->type == CINTIQ_COMPANION_2) {
- /* d-pad right -> data[4] & 0x10
- * d-pad up -> data[4] & 0x20
- * d-pad left -> data[4] & 0x40
- * d-pad down -> data[4] & 0x80
- * d-pad center -> data[3] & 0x01
+ /* d-pad right -> data[2] & 0x10
+ * d-pad up -> data[2] & 0x20
+ * d-pad left -> data[2] & 0x40
+ * d-pad down -> data[2] & 0x80
+ * d-pad center -> data[1] & 0x01
*/
buttons = ((data[2] >> 4) << 7) |
- ((data[1] & 0x04) << 6) |
+ ((data[1] & 0x04) << 4) |
((data[2] & 0x0F) << 2) |
(data[1] & 0x03);
} else if (features->type >= INTUOS5S && features->type <= INTUOSPL) {
[ Upstream commit b617158dc096709d8600c53b6052144d12b89fab ]
Some applications set tiny SO_SNDBUF values and expect
TCP to just work. Recent patches to address CVE-2019-11478
broke them in case of losses, since retransmits might
be prevented.
We should allow these flows to make progress.
This patch allows the first and last skb in retransmit queue
to be split even if memory limits are hit.
It also adds the some room due to the fact that tcp_sendmsg()
and tcp_sendpage() might overshoot sk_wmem_queued by about one full
TSO skb (64KB size). Note this allowance was already present
in stable backports for kernels < 4.15
Note for < 4.15 backports :
tcp_rtx_queue_tail() will probably look like :
static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);
return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
}
Fixes: f070ef2ac667 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrew Prout <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Prout <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jonathan Lemon <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Looney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
include/net/tcp.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 11 ++++++++++-
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 1eda31f7f013b..a474213ca015b 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1595,6 +1595,23 @@ static inline void tcp_check_send_head(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb_unli
tcp_sk(sk)->highest_sack = NULL;
}
+static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_head(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
+
+ if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
+ skb = NULL;
+
+ return skb;
+}
+
+static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);
+
+ return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
+}
+
static inline void __tcp_add_write_queue_tail(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 0c195b0f42169..9ddb05b98312c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -1175,6 +1175,7 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len,
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *buff;
int nsize, old_factor;
+ long limit;
int nlen;
u8 flags;
@@ -1185,7 +1186,15 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len,
if (nsize < 0)
nsize = 0;
- if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > sk->sk_sndbuf + 0x20000)) {
+ /* tcp_sendmsg() can overshoot sk_wmem_queued by one full size skb.
+ * We need some allowance to not penalize applications setting small
+ * SO_SNDBUF values.
+ * Also allow first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split.
+ */
+ limit = sk->sk_sndbuf + 2 * SKB_TRUESIZE(GSO_MAX_SIZE);
+ if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > limit &&
+ skb != tcp_rtx_queue_head(sk) &&
+ skb != tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk))) {
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG);
return -ENOMEM;
}
--
2.20.1
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8 upstream.
Intel provided the following information:
On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
speculatively written segment value.
That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.
Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- There's no whitelist entry (or any support) for Hygon CPUs
- Adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 +++------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -356,5 +356,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -281,18 +281,6 @@ static const char * const spectre_v1_str
[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
};
-static bool is_swapgs_serializing(void)
-{
- /*
- * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
- * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
- * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
- * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
- * good enough for our purposes.
- */
- return boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD;
-}
-
/*
* Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
* userspace?
@@ -343,9 +331,11 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mit
* PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
* is serializing.
*
- * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE.
+ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
+ * stop speculation through swapgs.
*/
- if (!is_swapgs_serializing() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -920,29 +921,37 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+ /*
+ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
+ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
+ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
+ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
+ * good enough for our purposes.
+ */
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
{}
};
@@ -979,6 +988,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
commit 023358b136d490ca91735ac6490db3741af5a8bd upstream.
Gcc-9 complains for a memset across pointer boundaries, which happens as
the code tries to allocate a flexible array on the stack. Turns out we
cannot do this without relying on gcc-isms, so with this patch we'll embed
the fc_rport_priv structure into fcoe_rport, can use the normal
'container_of' outcast, and will only have to do a memset over one
structure.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------
drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c | 5 +++-
include/scsi/libfcoe.h | 1
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fcoe_wwn_from_mac);
*/
static inline struct fcoe_rport *fcoe_ctlr_rport(struct fc_rport_priv *rdata)
{
- return (struct fcoe_rport *)(rdata + 1);
+ return container_of(rdata, struct fcoe_rport, rdata);
}
/**
@@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void fcoe_ctlr_vn_start(struct fc
*/
static int fcoe_ctlr_vn_parse(struct fcoe_ctlr *fip,
struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct fc_rport_priv *rdata)
+ struct fcoe_rport *frport)
{
struct fip_header *fiph;
struct fip_desc *desc = NULL;
@@ -2252,16 +2252,12 @@ static int fcoe_ctlr_vn_parse(struct fco
struct fip_wwn_desc *wwn = NULL;
struct fip_vn_desc *vn = NULL;
struct fip_size_desc *size = NULL;
- struct fcoe_rport *frport;
size_t rlen;
size_t dlen;
u32 desc_mask = 0;
u32 dtype;
u8 sub;
- memset(rdata, 0, sizeof(*rdata) + sizeof(*frport));
- frport = fcoe_ctlr_rport(rdata);
-
fiph = (struct fip_header *)skb->data;
frport->flags = ntohs(fiph->fip_flags);
@@ -2324,15 +2320,17 @@ static int fcoe_ctlr_vn_parse(struct fco
if (dlen != sizeof(struct fip_wwn_desc))
goto len_err;
wwn = (struct fip_wwn_desc *)desc;
- rdata->ids.node_name = get_unaligned_be64(&wwn->fd_wwn);
+ frport->rdata.ids.node_name =
+ get_unaligned_be64(&wwn->fd_wwn);
break;
case FIP_DT_VN_ID:
if (dlen != sizeof(struct fip_vn_desc))
goto len_err;
vn = (struct fip_vn_desc *)desc;
memcpy(frport->vn_mac, vn->fd_mac, ETH_ALEN);
- rdata->ids.port_id = ntoh24(vn->fd_fc_id);
- rdata->ids.port_name = get_unaligned_be64(&vn->fd_wwpn);
+ frport->rdata.ids.port_id = ntoh24(vn->fd_fc_id);
+ frport->rdata.ids.port_name =
+ get_unaligned_be64(&vn->fd_wwpn);
break;
case FIP_DT_FC4F:
if (dlen != sizeof(struct fip_fc4_feat))
@@ -2670,16 +2668,13 @@ static int fcoe_ctlr_vn_recv(struct fcoe
{
struct fip_header *fiph;
enum fip_vn2vn_subcode sub;
- struct {
- struct fc_rport_priv rdata;
- struct fcoe_rport frport;
- } buf;
+ struct fcoe_rport frport = { };
int rc;
fiph = (struct fip_header *)skb->data;
sub = fiph->fip_subcode;
- rc = fcoe_ctlr_vn_parse(fip, skb, &buf.rdata);
+ rc = fcoe_ctlr_vn_parse(fip, skb, &frport);
if (rc) {
LIBFCOE_FIP_DBG(fip, "vn_recv vn_parse error %d\n", rc);
goto drop;
@@ -2688,19 +2683,19 @@ static int fcoe_ctlr_vn_recv(struct fcoe
mutex_lock(&fip->ctlr_mutex);
switch (sub) {
case FIP_SC_VN_PROBE_REQ:
- fcoe_ctlr_vn_probe_req(fip, &buf.rdata);
+ fcoe_ctlr_vn_probe_req(fip, &frport.rdata);
break;
case FIP_SC_VN_PROBE_REP:
- fcoe_ctlr_vn_probe_reply(fip, &buf.rdata);
+ fcoe_ctlr_vn_probe_reply(fip, &frport.rdata);
break;
case FIP_SC_VN_CLAIM_NOTIFY:
- fcoe_ctlr_vn_claim_notify(fip, &buf.rdata);
+ fcoe_ctlr_vn_claim_notify(fip, &frport.rdata);
break;
case FIP_SC_VN_CLAIM_REP:
- fcoe_ctlr_vn_claim_resp(fip, &buf.rdata);
+ fcoe_ctlr_vn_claim_resp(fip, &frport.rdata);
break;
case FIP_SC_VN_BEACON:
- fcoe_ctlr_vn_beacon(fip, &buf.rdata);
+ fcoe_ctlr_vn_beacon(fip, &frport.rdata);
break;
default:
LIBFCOE_FIP_DBG(fip, "vn_recv unknown subcode %d\n", sub);
@@ -2724,22 +2719,18 @@ drop:
*/
static int fcoe_ctlr_vlan_parse(struct fcoe_ctlr *fip,
struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct fc_rport_priv *rdata)
+ struct fcoe_rport *frport)
{
struct fip_header *fiph;
struct fip_desc *desc = NULL;
struct fip_mac_desc *macd = NULL;
struct fip_wwn_desc *wwn = NULL;
- struct fcoe_rport *frport;
size_t rlen;
size_t dlen;
u32 desc_mask = 0;
u32 dtype;
u8 sub;
- memset(rdata, 0, sizeof(*rdata) + sizeof(*frport));
- frport = fcoe_ctlr_rport(rdata);
-
fiph = (struct fip_header *)skb->data;
frport->flags = ntohs(fiph->fip_flags);
@@ -2793,7 +2784,8 @@ static int fcoe_ctlr_vlan_parse(struct f
if (dlen != sizeof(struct fip_wwn_desc))
goto len_err;
wwn = (struct fip_wwn_desc *)desc;
- rdata->ids.node_name = get_unaligned_be64(&wwn->fd_wwn);
+ frport->rdata.ids.node_name =
+ get_unaligned_be64(&wwn->fd_wwn);
break;
default:
LIBFCOE_FIP_DBG(fip, "unexpected descriptor type %x "
@@ -2904,22 +2896,19 @@ static int fcoe_ctlr_vlan_recv(struct fc
{
struct fip_header *fiph;
enum fip_vlan_subcode sub;
- struct {
- struct fc_rport_priv rdata;
- struct fcoe_rport frport;
- } buf;
+ struct fcoe_rport frport = { };
int rc;
fiph = (struct fip_header *)skb->data;
sub = fiph->fip_subcode;
- rc = fcoe_ctlr_vlan_parse(fip, skb, &buf.rdata);
+ rc = fcoe_ctlr_vlan_parse(fip, skb, &frport);
if (rc) {
LIBFCOE_FIP_DBG(fip, "vlan_recv vlan_parse error %d\n", rc);
goto drop;
}
mutex_lock(&fip->ctlr_mutex);
if (sub == FIP_SC_VL_REQ)
- fcoe_ctlr_vlan_disc_reply(fip, &buf.rdata);
+ fcoe_ctlr_vlan_disc_reply(fip, &frport.rdata);
mutex_unlock(&fip->ctlr_mutex);
drop:
--- a/drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c
@@ -127,12 +127,15 @@ static struct fc_rport_priv *fc_rport_cr
u32 port_id)
{
struct fc_rport_priv *rdata;
+ size_t rport_priv_size = sizeof(*rdata);
rdata = lport->tt.rport_lookup(lport, port_id);
if (rdata)
return rdata;
- rdata = kzalloc(sizeof(*rdata) + lport->rport_priv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (lport->rport_priv_size > 0)
+ rport_priv_size = lport->rport_priv_size;
+ rdata = kzalloc(rport_priv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdata)
return NULL;
--- a/include/scsi/libfcoe.h
+++ b/include/scsi/libfcoe.h
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ struct fcoe_fcf {
* @vn_mac: VN_Node assigned MAC address for data
*/
struct fcoe_rport {
+ struct fc_rport_priv rdata;
unsigned long time;
u16 fcoe_len;
u16 flags;
From: xiao jin <[email protected]>
commit 54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24 upstream.
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
[groeck: backport to v4.4.y/v4.9.y (context change)]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alessio Balsini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
block/blk-core.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/block/blk-core.c
+++ b/block/blk-core.c
@@ -881,6 +881,7 @@ blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_
fail:
blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
+ q->fq = NULL;
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_init_allocated_queue);
Hello!
On 8/9/19 8:45 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
> There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.189-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.189-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: 260869840af4f3d7b3b46c4047642a931535c196
git describe: v4.9.187-76-g260869840af4
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.187-76-g260869840af4
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.188)
No fixes (compared to build v4.9.188)
Ran 23630 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* network-basic-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* prep-tmp-disk
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* ssuite
Greetings!
Daniel Díaz
[email protected]
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On 8/9/19 7:45 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
> There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.189-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
stable-rc/linux-4.9.y boot: 102 boots: 0 failed, 90 passed with 12 offline (v4.9.188-33-g260869840af4)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.188-33-g260869840af4/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.188-33-g260869840af4/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.9.y
Git Describe: v4.9.188-33-g260869840af4
Git Commit: 260869840af4f3d7b3b46c4047642a931535c196
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 51 unique boards, 22 SoC families, 15 builds out of 196
Boot Regressions Detected:
arm:
bcm2835_defconfig:
gcc-8:
bcm2835-rpi-b:
lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.9.187-43-g228fba508ff1 - first fail: v4.9.187-71-g399cf2b4ebf0)
sama5_defconfig:
gcc-8:
at91-sama5d4_xplained:
lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.9.187-43-g228fba508ff1 - first fail: v4.9.187-71-g399cf2b4ebf0)
socfpga_defconfig:
gcc-8:
socfpga_cyclone5_de0_sockit:
lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.9.187-43-g228fba508ff1 - first fail: v4.9.187-71-g399cf2b4ebf0)
arm64:
defconfig:
gcc-8:
apq8016-sbc:
lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.9.187-43-g228fba508ff1 - first fail: v4.9.187-71-g399cf2b4ebf0)
juno-r2:
lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.9.187-43-g228fba508ff1 - first fail: v4.9.187-71-g399cf2b4ebf0)
meson-gxbb-odroidc2:
lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.9.187-43-g228fba508ff1 - first fail: v4.9.187-71-g399cf2b4ebf0)
Offline Platforms:
arm64:
defconfig:
gcc-8
apq8016-sbc: 1 offline lab
juno-r2: 1 offline lab
meson-gxbb-odroidc2: 1 offline lab
arm:
bcm2835_defconfig:
gcc-8
bcm2835-rpi-b: 1 offline lab
sama5_defconfig:
gcc-8
at91-sama5d4_xplained: 1 offline lab
multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
alpine-db: 1 offline lab
at91-sama5d4_xplained: 1 offline lab
bcm4708-smartrg-sr400ac: 1 offline lab
socfpga_cyclone5_de0_sockit: 1 offline lab
sun5i-r8-chip: 1 offline lab
socfpga_defconfig:
gcc-8
socfpga_cyclone5_de0_sockit: 1 offline lab
sunxi_defconfig:
gcc-8
sun5i-r8-chip: 1 offline lab
---
For more info write to <[email protected]>
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 04:07:14PM -0600, shuah wrote:
> On 8/9/19 7:45 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
> > There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.189-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
>
> Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
Thanks for testing both of these and letting me know.
greg k-h
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 02:59:11PM -0500, Daniel Díaz wrote:
> Hello!
>
> On 8/9/19 8:45 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
> > There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.189-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
>
> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Great, thanks for testing!
greg k-h
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 03:45:03PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
> There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 356 pass: 356 fail: 0
Guenter
On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 08:45:28AM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 03:45:03PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.189 release.
> > There are 32 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sun 11 Aug 2019 01:38:45 PM UTC.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
>
> Build results:
> total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0
> Qemu test results:
> total: 356 pass: 356 fail: 0
Thanks for testing both of these and letting me know.
greg k-h