2020-06-09 20:21:55

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 00/41] 5.6.18-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.6.18 release.
There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:51 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.6.18-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 5.6.18-rc1

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"

Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list

Mark Gross <[email protected]>
x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

Mark Gross <[email protected]>
x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

Mark Gross <[email protected]>
x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()

Mark Gross <[email protected]>
x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
nvmem: qfprom: remove incorrect write support

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CDC-ACM: heed quirk also in error handling

Pascal Terjan <[email protected]>
staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK

Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
tty: hvc_console, fix crashes on parallel open/close

Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii

Josh Triplett <[email protected]>
serial: 8250: Enable 16550A variants by default on non-x86

Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>
usb: musb: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

Bin Liu <[email protected]>
usb: musb: start session in resume for host port

Fabrice Gasnier <[email protected]>
iio: adc: stm32-adc: fix a wrong error message when probing interrupts

Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
iio:chemical:pms7003: Fix timestamp alignment and prevent data leak.

Mathieu Othacehe <[email protected]>
iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.

Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
iio:chemical:sps30: Fix timestamp alignment

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
USB: serial: ch341: fix lockup of devices with limited prescaler

Michael Hanselmann <[email protected]>
USB: serial: ch341: add basis for quirk detection

Daniele Palmas <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions

Bin Liu <[email protected]>
USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors

Matt Jolly <[email protected]>
USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support

Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: replace EINVAL in mlx5e_flower_parse_meta()

Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
net/sched: fix infinite loop in sch_fq_pie

Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
mptcp: fix unblocking connect()

Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
net: dsa: felix: send VLANs on CPU port as egress-tagged

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user

Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
vsock: fix timeout in vsock_accept()

Jia He <[email protected]>
virtio_vsock: Fix race condition in virtio_transport_recv_pkt

Jonas Falkevik <[email protected]>
sctp: check assoc before SCTP_ADDR_{MADE_PRIM, ADDED} event

Heinrich Kuhn <[email protected]>
nfp: flower: fix used time of merge flow statistics

Chuhong Yuan <[email protected]>
NFC: st21nfca: add missed kfree_skb() in an error path

Daniele Palmas <[email protected]>
net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit LE910C1-EUX composition

Fugang Duan <[email protected]>
net: stmmac: enable timestamp snapshot for required PTP packets in dwmac v5.10a

Mark Bloch <[email protected]>
net/mlx5: Fix crash upon suspend/resume

Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init()


-------------

Diffstat:

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 +
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +
.../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 +++
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 30 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 106 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 56 ++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c | 7 +-
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++
drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c | 34 ++---
drivers/iio/chemical/pms7003.c | 17 ++-
drivers/iio/chemical/sps30.c | 9 +-
drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c | 6 +-
drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c | 8 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 6 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 6 -
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 18 +++
.../net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/offload.c | 3 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 3 +-
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c | 4 +-
drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c | 14 --
drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h | 9 +-
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c | 23 ++--
drivers/tty/serial/8250/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 26 ++--
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 2 +-
drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c | 7 +
drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c | 10 +-
drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c | 68 +++++++++-
drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 4 +
drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 +
drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c | 4 +
include/linux/mod_devicetable.h | 6 +
include/linux/virtio_net.h | 25 +++-
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 16 ++-
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 1 +
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 3 +
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c | 29 +++-
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 30 +++--
net/mptcp/protocol.c | 20 ++-
net/sched/sch_fq_pie.c | 4 +-
net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 3 +
net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 2 +-
net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 8 ++
.../tc-testing/tc-tests/qdiscs/fq_pie.json | 21 +++
50 files changed, 694 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-)



2020-06-09 20:58:40

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 06/41] net: stmmac: enable timestamp snapshot for required PTP packets in dwmac v5.10a

From: Fugang Duan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f2fb6b6275eba9d312957ca44c487bd780da6169 ]

For rx filter 'HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V2_EVENT', it should be
PTP v2/802.AS1, any layer, any kind of event packet, but HW only
take timestamp snapshot for below PTP message: sync, Pdelay_req,
Pdelay_resp.

Then it causes below issue when test E2E case:
ptp4l[2479.534]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2481.423]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2481.758]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2483.524]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2484.233]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2485.750]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2486.888]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2487.265]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp
ptp4l[2487.316]: port 1: received DELAY_REQ without timestamp

Timestamp snapshot dependency on register bits in received path:
SNAPTYPSEL TSMSTRENA TSEVNTENA PTP_Messages
01 x 0 SYNC, Follow_Up, Delay_Req,
Delay_Resp, Pdelay_Req, Pdelay_Resp,
Pdelay_Resp_Follow_Up
01 0 1 SYNC, Pdelay_Req, Pdelay_Resp

For dwmac v5.10a, enabling all events by setting register
DWC_EQOS_TIME_STAMPING[SNAPTYPSEL] to 2’b01, clearing bit [TSEVNTENA]
to 0’b0, which can support all required events.

Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
@@ -630,7 +630,8 @@ static int stmmac_hwtstamp_set(struct ne
config.rx_filter = HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V2_EVENT;
ptp_v2 = PTP_TCR_TSVER2ENA;
snap_type_sel = PTP_TCR_SNAPTYPSEL_1;
- ts_event_en = PTP_TCR_TSEVNTENA;
+ if (priv->synopsys_id != DWMAC_CORE_5_10)
+ ts_event_en = PTP_TCR_TSEVNTENA;
ptp_over_ipv4_udp = PTP_TCR_TSIPV4ENA;
ptp_over_ipv6_udp = PTP_TCR_TSIPV6ENA;
ptp_over_ethernet = PTP_TCR_TSIPENA;


2020-06-09 20:59:01

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 36/41] x86/cpu: Add table argument to cpu_matches()

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

[ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1075,9 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
{}
};

-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
- const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);

return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -1097,31 +1097,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);

if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
- if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);

/*
@@ -1139,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;

/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1151,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);


2020-06-09 20:59:02

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 17/41] net/mlx5e: replace EINVAL in mlx5e_flower_parse_meta()

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a683012a8e77675a1947cc8f11f97cdc1d5bb769 ]

The drivers reports EINVAL to userspace through netlink on invalid meta
match. This is confusing since EINVAL is usually reserved for malformed
netlink messages. Replace it by more meaningful codes.

Fixes: 6d65bc64e232 ("net/mlx5e: Add mlx5e_flower_parse_meta support")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ static int mlx5e_flower_parse_meta(struc
flow_rule_match_meta(rule, &match);
if (match.mask->ingress_ifindex != 0xFFFFFFFF) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Unsupported ingress ifindex mask");
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

ingress_dev = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(filter_dev),
@@ -1832,13 +1832,13 @@ static int mlx5e_flower_parse_meta(struc
if (!ingress_dev) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack,
"Can't find the ingress port to match on");
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -ENOENT;
}

if (ingress_dev != filter_dev) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack,
"Can't match on the ingress filter port");
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

return 0;


2020-06-09 20:59:15

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 07/41] net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit LE910C1-EUX composition

From: Daniele Palmas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 591612aa578cd7148b7b9d74869ef40118978389 ]

Add support for Telit LE910C1-EUX composition

0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet
Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bbb, 0x0203, 2)}, /* Alcatel L800MA */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x0201, 4)}, /* TP-LINK HSUPA Modem MA180 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */
+ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1031, 3)}, /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)}, /* Telit LE922A */
{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1050, 2)}, /* Telit FN980 */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 */


2020-06-09 20:59:15

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 15/41] mptcp: fix unblocking connect()

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 41be81a8d3d09acb9033799938306349328861f9 ]

Currently unblocking connect() on MPTCP sockets fails frequently.
If mptcp_stream_connect() is invoked to complete a previously
attempted unblocking connection, it will still try to create
the first subflow via __mptcp_socket_create(). If the 3whs is
completed and the 'can_ack' flag is already set, the latter
will fail with -EINVAL.

This change addresses the issue checking for pending connect and
delegating the completion to the first subflow. Additionally
do msk addresses and sk_state changes only when needed.

Fixes: 2303f994b3e1 ("mptcp: Associate MPTCP context with TCP socket")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/mptcp/protocol.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
@@ -920,6 +920,14 @@ static int mptcp_stream_connect(struct s
int err;

lock_sock(sock->sk);
+ if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED && msk->subflow) {
+ /* pending connection or invalid state, let existing subflow
+ * cope with that
+ */
+ ssock = msk->subflow;
+ goto do_connect;
+ }
+
ssock = __mptcp_socket_create(msk, TCP_SYN_SENT);
if (IS_ERR(ssock)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ssock);
@@ -934,9 +942,17 @@ static int mptcp_stream_connect(struct s
mptcp_subflow_ctx(ssock->sk)->request_mptcp = 0;
#endif

+do_connect:
err = ssock->ops->connect(ssock, uaddr, addr_len, flags);
- inet_sk_state_store(sock->sk, inet_sk_state_load(ssock->sk));
- mptcp_copy_inaddrs(sock->sk, ssock->sk);
+ sock->state = ssock->state;
+
+ /* on successful connect, the msk state will be moved to established by
+ * subflow_finish_connect()
+ */
+ if (!err || err == EINPROGRESS)
+ mptcp_copy_inaddrs(sock->sk, ssock->sk);
+ else
+ inet_sk_state_store(sock->sk, inet_sk_state_load(ssock->sk));

unlock:
release_sock(sock->sk);


2020-06-09 20:59:50

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 04/41] net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry

From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6dd912f82680761d8fb6b1bb274a69d4c7010988 ]

Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with gso size exceeding len.

These packets are dropped in tcp_gso_segment and udp[46]_ufo_fragment.
But they may affect gso size calculations earlier in the path.

Now that we have thlen as of commit 9274124f023b ("net: stricter
validation of untrusted gso packets"), check gso_size at entry too.

Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/virtio_net.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h
+++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(
{
unsigned int gso_type = 0;
unsigned int thlen = 0;
+ unsigned int p_off = 0;
unsigned int ip_proto;

if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
@@ -68,7 +69,8 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
return -EINVAL;

- if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen > skb_headlen(skb))
+ p_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen;
+ if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb))
return -EINVAL;
} else {
/* gso packets without NEEDS_CSUM do not set transport_offset.
@@ -92,17 +94,25 @@ retry:
return -EINVAL;
}

- if (keys.control.thoff + thlen > skb_headlen(skb) ||
+ p_off = keys.control.thoff + thlen;
+ if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb) ||
keys.basic.ip_proto != ip_proto)
return -EINVAL;

skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff);
+ } else if (gso_type) {
+ p_off = thlen;
+ if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb))
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}

if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
u16 gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size);

+ if (skb->len - p_off <= gso_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = gso_size;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = gso_type;



2020-06-09 21:00:14

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 10/41] sctp: check assoc before SCTP_ADDR_{MADE_PRIM, ADDED} event

From: Jonas Falkevik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 45ebf73ebcec88a34a778f5feaa0b82b1c76069e ]

Make sure SCTP_ADDR_{MADE_PRIM,ADDED} are sent only for associations
that have been established.

These events are described in rfc6458#section-6.1
SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE:
This tag indicates that an address that is
part of an existing association has experienced a change of
state (e.g., a failure or return to service of the reachability
of an endpoint via a specific transport address).

Signed-off-by: Jonas Falkevik <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -343,6 +343,9 @@ void sctp_ulpevent_nofity_peer_addr_chan
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;

+ if (asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
+ return;
+
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
memcpy(&addr, &transport->ipaddr, transport->af_specific->sockaddr_len);



2020-06-09 21:00:21

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 35/41] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>

commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

[ bp: Massage.
tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c | 7 ++++++-
include/linux/mod_devicetable.h | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -9,6 +9,36 @@

#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>

+#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_D 0xd
+#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO 0xf
+
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings: Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
+ * @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
+ * required for this.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+ _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
+ .vendor = X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, \
+ .family = _family, \
+ .model = _model, \
+ .steppings = _steppings, \
+ .feature = _feature, \
+ .driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \
+}
+
/*
* Match specific microcode revisions.
*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -34,13 +34,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(c
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;

- for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+ for (m = match;
+ m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+ m++) {
if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
continue;
if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
continue;
if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
continue;
+ if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+ !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+ continue;
if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
continue;
return m;
--- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
+++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
@@ -657,6 +657,10 @@ struct mips_cdmm_device_id {
/*
* MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id.
* Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define.
+ *
+ * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the
+ * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream
+ * has been converted to proper C99 initializers.
*/
#define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id
struct x86_cpu_id {
@@ -665,6 +669,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
__u16 model;
__u16 feature; /* bit index */
kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
+ __u16 steppings;
};

#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
@@ -673,6 +678,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
#define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
#define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
#define X86_MODEL_ANY 0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
#define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0 /* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */

/*


2020-06-09 21:00:21

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 18/41] USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support

From: Matt Jolly <[email protected]>

commit 3429444abdd9dbd5faebd9bee552ec6162b17ad6 upstream.

Add support for Dell Wireless 5816e Download Mode (AKA boot & hold mode /
QDL download mode) to drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c

This is required to update device firmware.

Signed-off-by: Matt Jolly <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

---
drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)}, /* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
+ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */


2020-06-09 21:00:23

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 32/41] staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK

From: Pascal Terjan <[email protected]>

commit 15ea976a1f12b5fd76b1bd6ff3eb5132fd28047f upstream.

The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e462d
("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and
while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants
I noticed this driver uses the old value.

The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the
second definition.

Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

---
drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h | 9 +--------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bss
/* block-ack parameters */
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
+#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800

@@ -532,13 +532,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info {
#define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT 0x0004
#define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT 0x0010

-/* block-ack parameters */
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
-
/*
* A-PMDU buffer sizes
* According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2)


2020-06-09 21:00:33

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 38/41] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run
mds
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst
+ special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+ ============= ============ ========
+ common name Family_Model Stepping
+ ============= ============ ========
+ Haswell 06_3CH All
+ Haswell_L 06_45H All
+ Haswell_G 06_46H All
+
+ Broadwell_G 06_47H All
+ Broadwell 06_3DH All
+
+ Skylake_L 06_4EH All
+ Skylake 06_5EH All
+
+ Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC
+
+ Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD
+ ============= ============ ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+ ============== ===== =====================================
+ CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+ ============== ===== =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+ serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+ bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+ logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+ legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=". The option for this is:
+
+ ============= =============================================================
+ off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+ affected platforms.
+ ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+ mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+ effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+ enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+ disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is
+ affected but with no way to know if host
+ processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.


2020-06-09 21:01:15

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH 5.6 21/41] USB: serial: ch341: add basis for quirk detection

From: Michael Hanselmann <[email protected]>

commit c404bf4aa9236cb4d1068e499ae42acf48a6ff97 upstream.

A subset of CH341 devices does not support all features, namely the
prescaler is limited to a reduced precision and there is no support for
sending a RS232 break condition. This patch adds a detection function
which will be extended to set quirk flags as they're implemented.

The author's affected device has an imprint of "340" on the
turquoise-colored plug, but not all such devices appear to be affected.

Signed-off-by: Michael Hanselmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e1ae0da6082bb528a44ef323d4e1d3733d38858.1585697281.git.public@hansmi.ch
[ johan: use long type for quirks; rephrase and use port device for
messages; handle short reads; set quirk flags directly in
helper function ]
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 5.5
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

---
drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct ch341_private {
u8 mcr;
u8 msr;
u8 lcr;
+ unsigned long quirks;
};

static void ch341_set_termios(struct tty_struct *tty,
@@ -308,6 +309,53 @@ out: kfree(buffer);
return r;
}

+static int ch341_detect_quirks(struct usb_serial_port *port)
+{
+ struct ch341_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+ struct usb_device *udev = port->serial->dev;
+ const unsigned int size = 2;
+ unsigned long quirks = 0;
+ char *buffer;
+ int r;
+
+ buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * A subset of CH34x devices does not support all features. The
+ * prescaler is limited and there is no support for sending a RS232
+ * break condition. A read failure when trying to set up the latter is
+ * used to detect these devices.
+ */
+ r = usb_control_msg(udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0), CH341_REQ_READ_REG,
+ USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN,
+ CH341_REG_BREAK, 0, buffer, size, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT);
+ if (r == -EPIPE) {
+ dev_dbg(&port->dev, "break control not supported\n");
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (r != size) {
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = -EIO;
+ dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to read break control: %d\n", r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ if (quirks) {
+ dev_dbg(&port->dev, "enabling quirk flags: 0x%02lx\n", quirks);
+ priv->quirks |= quirks;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
static int ch341_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct ch341_private *priv;
@@ -330,6 +378,11 @@ static int ch341_port_probe(struct usb_s
goto error;

usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
+
+ r = ch341_detect_quirks(port);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto error;
+
return 0;

error: kfree(priv);


2020-06-10 06:35:34

by Naresh Kamboju

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.6 00/41] 5.6.18-rc1 review

On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 at 23:25, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.6.18 release.
> There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.6.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 5.6.18-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.6.y
git commit: 1bece508f6a987257cff511f9ba8b67da8734954
git describe: v5.6.17-42-g1bece508f6a9
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-5.6-oe/build/v5.6.17-42-g1bece508f6a9

No regressions (compared to build v5.6.16-44-g6266fb28693f)

No fixes (compared to build v5.6.16-44-g6266fb28693f)

Ran 29892 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- nxp-ls2088
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86
- x86-kasan

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* install-android-platform-tools-r2800
* kselftest
* kselftest/drivers
* kselftest/filesystems
* kselftest/net
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* perf
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* network-basic-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/drivers
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/filesystems
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/net
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/drivers
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/filesystems
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/net

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

2020-06-10 11:35:45

by Jon Hunter

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.6 00/41] 5.6.18-rc1 review


On 09/06/2020 18:45, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.6.18 release.
> There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.6.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.6:
11 builds: 11 pass, 0 fail
26 boots: 26 pass, 0 fail
50 tests: 50 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.6.18-rc1-g1bece508f6a9
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

--
nvpublic

2020-06-10 16:38:35

by Shuah Khan

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.6 00/41] 5.6.18-rc1 review

On 6/9/20 11:45 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.6.18 release.
> There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.6.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

2020-06-10 21:12:34

by Guenter Roeck

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.6 00/41] 5.6.18-rc1 review

On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 07:45:02PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.6.18 release.
> There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:51 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 431 pass: 431 fail: 0

Guenter