Currently dump_security_xattr() is used to dump security xattr value
which is larger than 64 bytes, otherwise, pr_debug() is used. In order
to remove code duplication, refator dump_security_xattr() and call it in
all cases.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 33 ++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 52b811da6989..033804f5a5f2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
* Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexademical string.
* (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.)
*/
-static void dump_security_xattr(const char *prefix, const void *src,
- size_t count)
+static void dump_security_xattr_l(const char *prefix, const void *src,
+ size_t count)
{
#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
char *asciihex, *p;
@@ -200,6 +200,16 @@ static void dump_security_xattr(const char *prefix, const void *src,
#endif
}
+static void dump_security_xattr(const char *name, const char *value,
+ size_t value_len)
+{
+ if (value_len < 64)
+ pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", name, value_len,
+ (int)value_len, value);
+ else
+ dump_security_xattr_l(name, value, value_len);
+}
+
/*
* Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
*
@@ -254,15 +264,9 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
if (is_ima)
ima_present = true;
- if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
- pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
- req_xattr_value_len,
- (int)req_xattr_value_len,
- req_xattr_value);
- else
- dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
- req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len);
+ dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
+ req_xattr_value,
+ req_xattr_value_len);
continue;
}
size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,
@@ -286,12 +290,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
if (is_ima)
ima_present = true;
- if (xattr_size < 64)
- pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]", xattr->name, xattr_size,
- (int)xattr_size, xattr_value);
- else
- dump_security_xattr(xattr->name, xattr_value,
- xattr_size);
+ dump_security_xattr(xattr->name, xattr_value, xattr_size);
}
hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
--
2.17.1
> @@ -254,15 +264,9 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
> if (is_ima)
> ima_present = true;
>
> - if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
> - pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
> - req_xattr_value_len,
> - (int)req_xattr_value_len,
> - req_xattr_value);
> - else
> - dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
> - req_xattr_value,
> - req_xattr_value_len);
> + dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
> + req_xattr_value,
> + req_xattr_value_len);
> continue;
> }
> size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,
Hm, this patch doesn't apply properly.
Mimi
Hi,
On 2023/1/30 0:15, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> @@ -254,15 +264,9 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
>> if (is_ima)
>> ima_present = true;
>>
>> - if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
>> - pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
>> - req_xattr_value_len,
>> - (int)req_xattr_value_len,
>> - req_xattr_value);
>> - else
>> - dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
>> - req_xattr_value,
>> - req_xattr_value_len);
>> + dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
>> + req_xattr_value,
>> + req_xattr_value_len);
>> continue;
>> }
>> size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,
>
> Hm, this patch doesn't apply properly.
I noticed that the patch fails to apply on linux master, however this
patch is meant for linux-next, would you please maybe have a look?
>
> Mimi>
>
[Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>]
On Mon, 2023-01-30 at 12:02 +0800, xiujianfeng wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 2023/1/30 0:15, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >> @@ -254,15 +264,9 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
> >> if (is_ima)
> >> ima_present = true;
> >>
> >> - if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
> >> - pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
> >> - req_xattr_value_len,
> >> - (int)req_xattr_value_len,
> >> - req_xattr_value);
> >> - else
> >> - dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
> >> - req_xattr_value,
> >> - req_xattr_value_len);
> >> + dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
> >> + req_xattr_value,
> >> + req_xattr_value_len);
> >> continue;
> >> }
> >> size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,
> >
> > Hm, this patch doesn't apply properly.
>
> I noticed that the patch fails to apply on linux master, however this
> patch is meant for linux-next, would you please maybe have a look?
I wasn't aware of the change. However, merge conflicts should not be
"fixed", but mentioned immediately after the patch break line ("---") .
FYI, this merge conflict is a result of commit 4609e1f18e19 ("fs: port
->permission() to pass mnt_idmap").
Patches for the linux-integrity branch should be based on the next-
integrity branch.
--
thanks,
Mimi
On 2023/1/30 20:17, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> [Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>]
>
> On Mon, 2023-01-30 at 12:02 +0800, xiujianfeng wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 2023/1/30 0:15, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>> @@ -254,15 +264,9 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
>>>> if (is_ima)
>>>> ima_present = true;
>>>>
>>>> - if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
>>>> - pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
>>>> - req_xattr_value_len,
>>>> - (int)req_xattr_value_len,
>>>> - req_xattr_value);
>>>> - else
>>>> - dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
>>>> - req_xattr_value,
>>>> - req_xattr_value_len);
>>>> + dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
>>>> + req_xattr_value,
>>>> + req_xattr_value_len);
>>>> continue;
>>>> }
>>>> size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr->name,
>>>
>>> Hm, this patch doesn't apply properly.
>>
>> I noticed that the patch fails to apply on linux master, however this
>> patch is meant for linux-next, would you please maybe have a look?
>
> I wasn't aware of the change. However, merge conflicts should not be
> "fixed", but mentioned immediately after the patch break line ("---") .
> FYI, this merge conflict is a result of commit 4609e1f18e19 ("fs: port
> ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap").
>
> Patches for the linux-integrity branch should be based on the next-
> integrity branch.
Thanks mimi, I assume you mean next-integrity branch on
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git/,
new patch already sent.