2023-04-19 15:14:55

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 00/14] HP BIOSCFG driver

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next

History

Version 10
Break down changes to single files per patch
Removed SPM/statusbin support
Patches
Documentation
biosattr-interface
bioscfg
int-attributes
ordered-attributes
passwdobj-attributes
string-attributes
bioscfg-h
enum-attributes
passwdattr-interface
spmobj-attributes
surestart-attributes
Makefile ../hp/Makefile ../hp/Kconfig
MAINTAINERS

Version 9
Includes only sysfs-class-firmware-attributes documentation

Version 8
Includes only sysfs-class-firmware-attributes documentation

Version 7
Includes only sysfs-class-firmware-attributes documentation

Version 6
Breaks down the changes into 4 patches
SureAdmin-attributes was removed

Version 5
Remove version 4 patch 1
Address review changes proposed in Version 4
Reorganize all patches number and file order


Jorge Lopez (14):
HP BIOSCFG driver - Documentation
HP BIOSCFG driver - biosattr-interface
HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg
HP BIOSCFG driver - int-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - ordered-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - passwdobj-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - string-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg-h
HP BIOSCFG driver - enum-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - passwdattr-interface
HP BIOSCFG driver - spmobj-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - surestart-attributes
HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile
HP BIOSCFG driver - MAINTAINERS

.../testing/sysfs-class-firmware-attributes | 98 +-
MAINTAINERS | 6 +
drivers/platform/x86/hp/Kconfig | 16 +
drivers/platform/x86/hp/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile | 13 +
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c | 305 ++++++
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c | 961 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h | 613 +++++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c | 543 ++++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c | 474 +++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c | 563 ++++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c | 51 +
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c | 668 ++++++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c | 405 ++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c | 451 ++++++++
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c | 130 +++
16 files changed, 5296 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c

--
2.34.1


2023-04-19 15:15:09

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 01/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Documentation

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../testing/sysfs-class-firmware-attributes | 98 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-firmware-attributes b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-firmware-attributes
index 4cdba3477176..73d7b8fbc0b2 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-firmware-attributes
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-firmware-attributes
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ Description:
- integer: a range of numerical values
- string

+ HP specific types
+ -----------------
+ - ordered-list - a set of ordered list valid values
+ - sure-start - report audit logs read from BIOS
+
+
All attribute types support the following values:

current_value:
@@ -126,6 +132,44 @@ Description:
value will not be effective through sysfs until this rule is
met.

+ HP specific class extensions
+ ------------------------------
+
+ On HP systems the following additional attributes are available:
+
+ "ordered-list"-type specific properties:
+
+ elements:
+ A file that can be read to obtain the possible
+ list of values of the <attr>. Values are separated using
+ semi-colon (``;``). The order individual elements are listed
+ according to their priority. An Element listed first has the
+ highest priority. Writing the list in a different order to
+ current_value alters the priority order for the particular
+ attribute.
+
+ "sure-start"-type specific properties:
+
+ audit_log_entries:
+ A read-only file that returns the events in the log.
+ Values are separated using semi-colon (``;``)
+
+ Audit log entry format
+
+ Byte 0-15: Requested Audit Log entry (Each Audit log is 16 bytes)
+ Byte 16-127: Unused
+
+ audit_log_entry_count:
+ A read-only file that returns the number of existing audit log events available to be read.
+ Values are separated using comma (``,``)
+
+ [No of entries],[log entry size],[Max number of entries supported]
+
+ log entry size identifies audit log size for the current BIOS version.
+ The current size is 16 bytes but it can be to up to 128 bytes long
+ in future BIOS versions.
+
+
What: /sys/class/firmware-attributes/*/authentication/
Date: February 2021
KernelVersion: 5.11
@@ -206,7 +250,7 @@ Description:
Drivers may emit a CHANGE uevent when a password is set or unset
userspace may check it again.

- On Dell and Lenovo systems, if Admin password is set, then all BIOS attributes
+ On Dell, Lenovo and HP systems, if Admin password is set, then all BIOS attributes
require password validation.
On Lenovo systems if you change the Admin password the new password is not active until
the next boot.
@@ -296,6 +340,15 @@ Description:
echo "signature" > authentication/Admin/signature
echo "password" > authentication/Admin/certificate_to_password

+ HP specific class extensions
+ --------------------------------
+
+ On HP systems the following additional settings are available:
+
+ role: enhanced-bios-auth:
+ This role is specific to Secure Platform Management (SPM) attribute.
+ It requires configuring an endorsement (kek) and signing certificate (sk).
+

What: /sys/class/firmware-attributes/*/attributes/pending_reboot
Date: February 2021
@@ -311,7 +364,7 @@ Description:
== =========================================
0 All BIOS attributes setting are current
1 A reboot is necessary to get pending BIOS
- attribute changes applied
+ attribute changes applied
== =========================================

Note, userspace applications need to follow below steps for efficient
@@ -364,3 +417,44 @@ Description:
use it to enable extra debug attributes or BIOS features for testing purposes.

Note that any changes to this attribute requires a reboot for changes to take effect.
+
+
+ HP specific class extensions - Secure Platform Manager (SPM)
+ --------------------------------
+
+What: /sys/class/firmware-attributes/*/authentication/SPM/kek
+Date: March 29
+KernelVersion: 5.18
+Contact: "Jorge Lopez" <[email protected]>
+Description: 'kek' Key-Encryption-Key is a write-only file that can be used to configure the
+ RSA public key that will be used by the BIOS to verify
+ signatures when setting the signing key. When written,
+ the bytes should correspond to the KEK certificate
+ (x509 .DER format containing an OU). The size of the
+ certificate must be less than or equal to 4095 bytes.
+
+
+What: /sys/class/firmware-attributes/*/authentication/SPM/sk
+Date: March 29
+KernelVersion: 5.18
+Contact: "Jorge Lopez" <[email protected]>
+Description: 'sk' Signature Key is a write-only file that can be used to configure the RSA
+ public key that will be used by the BIOS to verify signatures
+ when configuring BIOS settings and security features. When
+ written, the bytes should correspond to the modulus of the
+ public key. The exponent is assumed to be 0x10001.
+
+
+What: /sys/class/firmware-attributes/*/authentication/SPM/status
+Date: March 29
+KernelVersion: 5.18
+Contact: "Jorge Lopez" <[email protected]>
+Description: 'status' is a read-only file that returns ASCII text in JSON format reporting
+ the status information.
+
+ "State": "not provisioned | provisioned | provisioning in progress ",
+ "Version": " Major. Minor ",
+ "Nonce": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>,
+ "FeaturesInUse": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>,
+ "EndorsementKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>",
+ "SigningKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>"
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:09

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 04/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - int-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c | 474 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 474 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d8ee39dac3f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/int-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to integer type attributes under
+ * BIOS Enumeration GUID for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Hewlett-Packard Inc.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+GET_INSTANCE_ID(integer);
+
+static ssize_t current_value_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int instance_id = get_integer_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (instance_id < 0)
+ return instance_id;
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n",
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].current_value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate_integer_input() -
+ * Validate input of current_value against lower and upper bound
+ *
+ * @instance_id: The instance on which input is validated
+ * @buf: Input value
+ */
+static int validate_integer_input(int instance_id, char *buf)
+{
+ int in_val;
+ int ret;
+
+
+ /* BIOS treats it as a read only attribute */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ ret = kstrtoint(buf, 10, &in_val);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+
+ if (in_val < bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].lower_bound ||
+ in_val > bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].upper_bound)
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ /*
+ * set pending reboot flag depending on
+ * "RequiresPhysicalPresence" value
+ */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence)
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void update_integer_value(int instance_id, char *attr_value)
+{
+ int in_val;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtoint(attr_value, 10, &in_val);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].current_value = in_val;
+}
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name_language_code, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_display_name =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_PROPERTY_STORE(current_value, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_current_val =
+ __ATTR_RW_MODE(current_value, 0644);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(lower_bound, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_lower_bound =
+ __ATTR_RO(lower_bound);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(upper_bound, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_upper_bound =
+ __ATTR_RO(upper_bound);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites_size, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_prerequisites_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_prerequisites_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(scalar_increment, integer);
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_scalar_increment =
+ __ATTR_RO(scalar_increment);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "integer\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute integer_type =
+ __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+static struct attribute *integer_attrs[] = {
+ &integer_display_langcode.attr,
+ &integer_display_name.attr,
+ &integer_current_val.attr,
+ &integer_lower_bound.attr,
+ &integer_upper_bound.attr,
+ &integer_scalar_increment.attr,
+ &integer_prerequisites_size_val.attr,
+ &integer_prerequisites_val.attr,
+ &integer_type.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group integer_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = integer_attrs,
+};
+
+int alloc_integer_data(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_instances_count = get_instance_count(HP_WMI_BIOS_INTEGER_GUID);
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data = kcalloc(bioscfg_drv.integer_instances_count,
+ sizeof(struct integer_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.integer_data) {
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_instances_count = 0;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Expected Values types associated with each element */
+static const acpi_object_type expected_integer_types[] = {
+ [NAME] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [PATH] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [IS_READONLY] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [DISPLAY_IN_UI] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [SEQUENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [SECURITY_LEVEL] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [INT_LOWER_BOUND] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [INT_UPPER_BOUND] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [INT_SCALAR_INCREMENT] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER
+};
+
+/*
+ * populate_int_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under integer attribute
+ *
+ * @integer_obj: ACPI object with integer data
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_integer_package_data(union acpi_object *integer_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+ populate_integer_elements_from_package(integer_obj,
+ integer_obj->package.count,
+ instance_id);
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &integer_current_val);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &integer_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_integer_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *integer_obj,
+ int integer_obj_count,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *str_value = NULL;
+ int value_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 size = 0;
+ u32 int_value;
+ int elem = 0;
+ int reqs;
+ int eloc;
+
+ if (!integer_obj)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1, eloc = 1; elem < integer_obj_count; elem++, eloc++) {
+
+ /* ONLY look at the first INTEGER_ELEM_CNT elements */
+ if (eloc == INTEGER_ELEM_CNT)
+ goto exit_integer_package;
+
+ switch (integer_obj[elem].type) {
+ case ACPI_TYPE_STRING:
+
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(integer_obj[elem].string.pointer,
+ integer_obj[elem].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER:
+ int_value = (u32)integer_obj[elem].integer.value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported object type [%d]\n", integer_obj[elem].type);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check that both expected and read object type match */
+ if (expected_integer_types[eloc] != integer_obj[elem].type) {
+ pr_err("Error expected type %d for elem %d, but got type %d instead\n",
+ expected_integer_types[eloc], elem, integer_obj[elem].type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ /* Assign appropriate element value to corresponding field*/
+ switch (eloc) {
+ case VALUE:
+ ret = kstrtoint(str_value, 10, &int_value);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].current_value = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.path, str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value;
+
+ if (int_value > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. PREREQUISITES
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ if (elem >= integer_obj_count) {
+ pr_err("Error elem-objects package is too small\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(integer_obj[elem + reqs].string.pointer,
+ integer_obj[elem + reqs].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value;
+ break;
+ case INT_LOWER_BOUND:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].lower_bound = int_value;
+ break;
+ case INT_UPPER_BOUND:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].upper_bound = int_value;
+ break;
+ case INT_SCALAR_INCREMENT:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].scalar_increment = int_value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Integer attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+exit_integer_package:
+ kfree(str_value);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * populate_integer_buffer_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under integer attribute
+ *
+ * @buffer_ptr: Buffer pointer
+ * @buffer_size: Buffer size
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_integer_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size, int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ /* Populate integer elements */
+ populate_integer_elements_from_buffer(buffer_ptr, buffer_size,
+ instance_id);
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &integer_current_val);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &integer_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_integer_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *dst = NULL;
+ int elem;
+ int reqs;
+ int integer;
+ int size = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int dst_size = *buffer_size / sizeof(u16);
+
+ dst = kcalloc(dst_size, sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ elem = 0;
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1; elem < 3; elem++) {
+
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case VALUE:
+ ret = kstrtoint(dst, 10, &integer);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].current_value = integer;
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.path, dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Integer attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (elem = 3; elem < INTEGER_ELEM_CNT; elem++) {
+
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES) {
+ ret = get_integer_from_buffer((int **)&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, (int *)&integer);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (elem) {
+
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = integer;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = integer;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = integer;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.sequence = integer;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = integer;
+ size = integer;
+ if (size > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // PREREQUISITES:
+ elem++;
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].common.security_level = integer;
+ break;
+ case INT_LOWER_BOUND:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].lower_bound = integer;
+ break;
+ case INT_UPPER_BOUND:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].upper_bound = integer;
+ break;
+ case INT_SCALAR_INCREMENT:
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].scalar_increment = integer;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Integer attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(dst);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * exit_integer_attributes() - Clear all attribute data
+ *
+ * Clears all data allocated for this group of attributes
+ */
+void exit_integer_attributes(void)
+{
+ int instance_id;
+
+ for (instance_id = 0; instance_id < bioscfg_drv.integer_instances_count; instance_id++) {
+
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj = bioscfg_drv.integer_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj;
+
+ if (attr_name_kobj)
+ sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj, &integer_attr_group);
+ }
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_instances_count = 0;
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.integer_data);
+ bioscfg_drv.integer_data = NULL;
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:10

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 02/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - biosattr-interface

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c | 305 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 305 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bbe00c84c711
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to methods under BIOS interface GUID
+ * for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Hewlett-Packard Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/wmi.h>
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+#define SET_DEFAULT_VALUES_METHOD_ID 0x02
+#define SET_BIOS_DEFAULTS_METHOD_ID 0x03
+#define SET_ATTRIBUTE_METHOD_ID 0x04
+
+/*
+ * set_attribute() - Update an attribute value
+ * @a_name: The attribute name
+ * @a_value: The attribute value
+ *
+ * Sets an attribute to new value
+ */
+int hp_set_attribute(const char *a_name, const char *a_value)
+{
+ size_t security_area_size;
+ size_t a_name_size, a_value_size;
+ u16 *buffer = NULL;
+ u16 *start = NULL;
+ int buffer_size;
+ int ret;
+ int instance;
+ char *auth_empty_value = "";
+ char *auth_token_choice = NULL;
+
+
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_set_attribute;
+ }
+
+ instance = get_password_instance_for_type(SETUP_PASSWD);
+ if (instance < 0)
+ goto out_set_attribute;
+
+ if (strlen(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password) == 0)
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password,
+ auth_empty_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password));
+
+ /* Select which auth token to use; password or [auth token] */
+
+ if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token != NULL)
+ auth_token_choice = bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token;
+ else
+ auth_token_choice = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password;
+
+ a_name_size = bioscfg_calculate_string_buffer(a_name);
+ a_value_size = bioscfg_calculate_string_buffer(a_value);
+ security_area_size = calculate_security_buffer(auth_token_choice);
+ buffer_size = a_name_size + a_value_size + security_area_size;
+
+ buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_set_attribute;
+ }
+
+ /* build variables to set */
+ start = buffer;
+ start = ascii_to_utf16_unicode(start, a_name);
+ if (!start)
+ goto out_set_attribute;
+
+ start = ascii_to_utf16_unicode(start, a_value);
+ if (!start)
+ goto out_set_attribute;
+
+ populate_security_buffer(start, auth_token_choice);
+
+ ret = hp_wmi_set_bios_setting(buffer, buffer_size);
+
+
+out_set_attribute:
+ kfree(buffer);
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * hp_wmi_perform_query
+ *
+ * query: The commandtype (enum hp_wmi_commandtype)
+ * write: The command (enum hp_wmi_command)
+ * buffer: Buffer used as input and/or output
+ * insize: Size of input buffer
+ * outsize: Size of output buffer
+ *
+ * returns zero on success
+ * an HP WMI query specific error code (which is positive)
+ * -EINVAL if the query was not successful at all
+ * -EINVAL if the output buffer size exceeds buffersize
+ *
+ * Note: The buffersize must at least be the maximum of the input and output
+ * size. E.g. Battery info query is defined to have 1 byte input
+ * and 128 byte output. The caller would do:
+ * buffer = kzalloc(128, GFP_KERNEL);
+ * ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_BATTERY_QUERY, HPWMI_READ,
+ * buffer, 1, 128)
+ */
+int hp_wmi_perform_query(int query, enum hp_wmi_command command, void *buffer,
+ int insize, int outsize)
+{
+ struct acpi_buffer input, output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ struct bios_return *bios_return;
+ union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
+ struct bios_args *args = NULL;
+ int mid, actual_outsize;
+ size_t bios_args_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ mid = encode_outsize_for_pvsz(outsize);
+ if (WARN_ON(mid < 0))
+ return mid;
+
+ bios_args_size = struct_size(args, data, insize);
+ args = kmalloc(bios_args_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!args)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ input.length = bios_args_size;
+ input.pointer = args;
+
+ args->signature = 0x55434553;
+ args->command = command;
+ args->commandtype = query;
+ args->datasize = insize;
+ memcpy(args->data, buffer, flex_array_size(args, data, insize));
+
+ ret = wmi_evaluate_method(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID, 0, mid, &input, &output);
+ bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(ret);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ obj = output.pointer;
+ if (!obj) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (query != HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE &&
+ command != HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM)
+ if (obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER ||
+ obj->buffer.length < sizeof(*bios_return)) {
+ pr_warn("query 0x%x returned wrong type or too small buffer\n", query);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+
+ bios_return = (struct bios_return *)obj->buffer.pointer;
+ ret = bios_return->return_code;
+ bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(ret);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != HPWMI_RET_UNKNOWN_COMMAND &&
+ ret != HPWMI_RET_UNKNOWN_CMDTYPE)
+ pr_warn("query 0x%x returned error 0x%x\n", query, ret);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore output data of zero size */
+ if (!outsize)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ actual_outsize = min(outsize, (int)(obj->buffer.length - sizeof(*bios_return)));
+ memcpy(buffer, obj->buffer.pointer + sizeof(*bios_return), actual_outsize);
+ memset(buffer + actual_outsize, 0, outsize - actual_outsize);
+
+out_free:
+ kfree(obj);
+ kfree(args);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void *utf16_empty_string(u16 *p)
+{
+ *p++ = 2;
+ *p++ = (u8)0x00;
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ascii_to_utf16_unicode - Convert ascii string to UTF-16 unicode
+ *
+ * BIOS supports UTF-16 characters that are 2 bytes long. No variable
+ * multi-byte language supported.
+ *
+ * @p: Unicode buffer address
+ * @str: string to convert to unicode
+ *
+ * Returns a void pointer to the buffer containing unicode string
+ */
+void *ascii_to_utf16_unicode(u16 *p, const u8 *str)
+{
+ int len = strlen(str);
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Add null character when reading an empty string
+ * "02 00 00 00"
+ */
+ if (len == 0)
+ return utf16_empty_string(p);
+
+ /* Move pointer len * 2 number of bytes */
+ *p++ = len * 2;
+ ret = utf8s_to_utf16s(str, strlen(str), UTF16_HOST_ENDIAN, p, len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(bioscfg_drv.class_dev, "UTF16 conversion failed\n");
+ goto ascii_to_utf16_unicode_out;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret * sizeof(u16)) > U16_MAX) {
+ dev_err(bioscfg_drv.class_dev, "Error string too long\n");
+ goto ascii_to_utf16_unicode_out;
+ }
+
+ascii_to_utf16_unicode_out:
+ p += len;
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * hp_wmi_set_bios_setting - Set setting's value in BIOS
+ *
+ * @input_buffer: Input buffer address
+ * @input_size: Input buffer size
+ *
+ * Returns: Count of unicode characters written to BIOS if successful, otherwise
+ * -ENOMEM unable to allocate memory
+ * -EINVAL buffer not allocated or too small
+ */
+int hp_wmi_set_bios_setting(u16 *input_buffer, u32 input_size)
+{
+ union acpi_object *obj;
+ struct acpi_buffer input = {input_size, input_buffer};
+ struct acpi_buffer output = {ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL};
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = wmi_evaluate_method(HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID, 0, 1, &input, &output);
+
+ obj = output.pointer;
+ if (!obj)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = obj->integer.value;
+ bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(ret);
+
+ kfree(obj);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int bios_attr_set_interface_probe(struct wmi_device *wdev, const void *context)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev = wdev;
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void bios_attr_set_interface_remove(struct wmi_device *wdev)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+}
+
+static const struct wmi_device_id bios_attr_set_interface_id_table[] = {
+ { .guid_string = HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID},
+ { }
+};
+static struct wmi_driver bios_attr_set_interface_driver = {
+ .driver = {
+ .name = DRIVER_NAME
+ },
+ .probe = bios_attr_set_interface_probe,
+ .remove = bios_attr_set_interface_remove,
+ .id_table = bios_attr_set_interface_id_table
+};
+
+int init_bios_attr_set_interface(void)
+{
+ return wmi_driver_register(&bios_attr_set_interface_driver);
+}
+
+void exit_bios_attr_set_interface(void)
+{
+ wmi_driver_unregister(&bios_attr_set_interface_driver);
+}
+
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(wmi, bios_attr_set_interface_id_table);
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:10

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c | 961 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 961 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4b0d4f56e65f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,961 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Common methods for use with hp-bioscfg driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/wmi.h>
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+#include "../../firmware_attributes_class.h"
+#include <linux/nls.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HP BIOS Configuration Driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+struct bioscfg_priv bioscfg_drv = {
+ .mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(bioscfg_drv.mutex),
+};
+
+static struct class *fw_attr_class;
+
+int get_integer_from_buffer(int **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, int *integer)
+{
+ int *ptr = PTR_ALIGN(*buffer, 4);
+
+ /* Ensure there is enough space remaining to read the integer */
+ if (*buffer_size < sizeof(int))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *integer = *(ptr++);
+ *buffer = ptr;
+ *buffer_size -= sizeof(int);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int get_string_from_buffer(u8 **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, char *dst, u32 dst_size)
+{
+ u16 *src = (u16 *)*buffer;
+ u16 src_size;
+
+ u16 size;
+ int i;
+ int escape = 0;
+ int conv_dst_size;
+
+ if (*buffer_size < sizeof(u16))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ src_size = *(src++);
+ /* size value in u16 chars */
+ size = src_size / sizeof(u16);
+
+ /* Ensure there is enough space remaining to read and convert
+ * the string
+ */
+ if (*buffer_size < src_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ if (src[i] == '\\' ||
+ src[i] == '\r' ||
+ src[i] == '\n' ||
+ src[i] == '\t')
+ escape++;
+
+ size += escape;
+
+ /*
+ * Conversion is limited to destination string max number of
+ * bytes.
+ */
+ conv_dst_size = size;
+ if (size > dst_size)
+ conv_dst_size = dst_size - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * convert from UTF-16 unicode to ASCII
+ */
+ utf16s_to_utf8s(src, src_size, UTF16_HOST_ENDIAN, dst, conv_dst_size);
+ dst[conv_dst_size] = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size && i < conv_dst_size; i++) {
+ if (*src == '\\' ||
+ *src == '\r' ||
+ *src == '\n' ||
+ *src == '\t')
+ dst[i++] = '\\';
+
+ if (*src == '\r')
+ dst[i] = 'r';
+ else if (*src == '\n')
+ dst[i] = 'n';
+ else if (*src == '\t')
+ dst[i] = 't';
+ else if (*src == '"')
+ dst[i] = '\'';
+ else
+ dst[i] = *src;
+ src++;
+ }
+
+ *buffer = (u8 *)src;
+ *buffer_size -= size * sizeof(u16);
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * calculate_string_buffer() - determines size of string buffer for use with BIOS communication
+ * @str: the string to calculate based upon
+ */
+size_t bioscfg_calculate_string_buffer(const char *str)
+{
+ int length = strlen(str);
+ int size;
+
+ /* BIOS expects 4 bytes when an empty string is found */
+ if (!length)
+ length = 1;
+
+ /* u16 length field + one UTF16 char for each input char */
+ size = sizeof(u16) + length * sizeof(u16);
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+int bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(int error_code)
+{
+ char *error_msg = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (error_code) {
+ case SUCCESS:
+ error_msg = "Success";
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case CMD_FAILED:
+ error_msg = "Command failed";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case INVALID_SIGN:
+ error_msg = "Invalid signature";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case INVALID_CMD_VALUE:
+ error_msg = "Invalid command value/Feature not supported";
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ case INVALID_CMD_TYPE:
+ error_msg = "Invalid command type";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case INVALID_DATA_SIZE:
+ error_msg = "Invalid data size";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case INVALID_CMD_PARAM:
+ error_msg = "Invalid command parameter";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case ENCRYP_CMD_REQUIRED:
+ error_msg = "Secure/encrypted command required";
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ case NO_SECURE_SESSION:
+ error_msg = "No secure session established";
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ case SECURE_SESSION_FOUND:
+ error_msg = "Secure session already established";
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ case SECURE_SESSION_FAILED:
+ error_msg = "Secure session failed";
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ case AUTH_FAILED:
+ error_msg = "Other permission/Authentication failed";
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ case INVALID_BIOS_AUTH:
+ error_msg = "Invalid BIOS administrator password";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case NONCE_DID_NOT_MATCH:
+ error_msg = "Nonce did not match";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case GENERIC_ERROR:
+ error_msg = "Generic/Other error";
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ case BIOS_ADMIN_POLICY_NOT_MET:
+ error_msg = "BIOS Admin password does not meet password policy requirements";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case BIOS_ADMIN_NOT_SET:
+ error_msg = "BIOS Setup password is not set.";
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case P21_NO_PROVISIONED:
+ error_msg = "P21 is not provisioned";
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case P21_PROVISION_IN_PROGRESS:
+ error_msg = "P21 is already provisioned or provisioning is in progress and a signing key has already been sent.";
+ ret = -EINPROGRESS;
+ break;
+ case P21_IN_USE:
+ error_msg = "P21 in use (cannot deprovision)";
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case HEP_NOT_ACTIVE:
+ error_msg = "HEP not activated";
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case HEP_ALREADY_SET:
+ error_msg = "HEP Transport already set";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case HEP_CHECK_STATE:
+ error_msg = "Check the current HEP state";
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error_msg = "Generic/Other error";
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (error_code)
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("Returned error 0x%x, \"%s\"\n", error_code, error_msg);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pending_reboot_show() - sysfs implementaton for read pending_reboot
+ * @kobj: Kernel object for this attribute
+ * @attr: Kernel object attribute
+ * @buf: The buffer to display to userspace
+ *
+ * Stores default value as 0
+ * When current_value is changed this attribute is set to 1 to notify reboot may be required
+ */
+static ssize_t pending_reboot_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot);
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute pending_reboot = __ATTR_RO(pending_reboot);
+
+/*
+ * create_attributes_level_sysfs_files() - Creates pending_reboot attributes
+ */
+static int create_attributes_level_sysfs_files(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sysfs_create_file(&bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset->kobj, &pending_reboot.attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void attr_name_release(struct kobject *kobj)
+{
+ kfree(kobj);
+}
+
+static const struct kobj_type attr_name_ktype = {
+ .release = attr_name_release,
+ .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops,
+};
+
+/*
+ * get_wmiobj_pointer() - Get Content of WMI block for particular instance
+ *
+ * @instance_id: WMI instance ID
+ * @guid_string: WMI GUID (in str form)
+ *
+ * Fetches the content for WMI block (instance_id) under GUID (guid_string)
+ * Caller must kfree the return
+ */
+union acpi_object *get_wmiobj_pointer(int instance_id, const char *guid_string)
+{
+ struct acpi_buffer out = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+ acpi_status status;
+
+ status = wmi_query_block(guid_string, instance_id, &out);
+ return ACPI_SUCCESS(status) ? (union acpi_object *)out.pointer : NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get_instance_count() - Compute total number of instances under guid_string
+ *
+ * @guid_string: WMI GUID (in string form)
+ */
+int get_instance_count(const char *guid_string)
+{
+ union acpi_object *wmi_obj = NULL;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ do {
+ kfree(wmi_obj);
+ wmi_obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(i, guid_string);
+ i++;
+ } while (wmi_obj);
+
+ return i-1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * alloc_attributes_data() - Allocate attributes data for a particular type
+ *
+ * @attr_type: Attribute type to allocate
+ */
+static int alloc_attributes_data(int attr_type)
+{
+ int retval = 0;
+
+ switch (attr_type) {
+ case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
+ retval = alloc_string_data();
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
+ retval = alloc_integer_data();
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
+ retval = alloc_enumeration_data();
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
+ retval = alloc_ordered_list_data();
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
+ retval = alloc_password_data();
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int convert_hexstr_to_str(const char *input, u32 input_len, char **str, int *len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int new_len = 0;
+ char tmp[] = "0x00";
+ char *new_str = NULL;
+ long ch;
+ int i;
+
+ if (input_len <= 0 || input == NULL || str == NULL || len == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ *str = NULL;
+
+ new_str = kmalloc(input_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < input_len; i += 5) {
+ strncpy(tmp, input + i, strlen(tmp));
+ if (kstrtol(tmp, 16, &ch) == 0) {
+ // escape char
+ if (ch == '\\' || ch == '\r' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\t') {
+ if (ch == '\r')
+ ch = 'r';
+ else if (ch == '\n')
+ ch = 'n';
+ else if (ch == '\t')
+ ch = 't';
+ new_str[new_len++] = '\\';
+ }
+ new_str[new_len++] = ch;
+ if (ch == '\0')
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (new_len) {
+ new_str[new_len] = '\0';
+ *str = krealloc(new_str, (new_len + 1) * sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*str)
+ *len = new_len;
+ else
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ kfree(new_str);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* map output size to the corresponding WMI method id */
+int encode_outsize_for_pvsz(int outsize)
+{
+ if (outsize > 4096)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (outsize > 1024)
+ return 5;
+ if (outsize > 128)
+ return 4;
+ if (outsize > 4)
+ return 3;
+ if (outsize > 0)
+ return 2;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update friendly display name for several attributes associated to
+ * 'Schedule Power-On'
+ */
+void friendly_user_name_update(char *path, const char *attr_name,
+ char *attr_display, int attr_size)
+{
+ char *found = NULL;
+
+ found = strstr(path, SCHEDULE_POWER_ON);
+ if (found)
+ snprintf(attr_display,
+ attr_size,
+ "%s - %s",
+ SCHEDULE_POWER_ON,
+ attr_name);
+ else
+ strscpy(attr_display, attr_name, attr_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * update_attribute_permissions() - Update attributes permissions when
+ * isReadOnly value is 1
+ *
+ * @isReadOnly: ReadOnly value
+ * @current_val: kobj_attribute corresponding to attribute.
+ *
+ */
+void update_attribute_permissions(u32 isReadOnly, struct kobj_attribute *current_val)
+{
+ if (isReadOnly)
+ current_val->attr.mode = (umode_t)0444;
+ else
+ current_val->attr.mode = (umode_t)0644;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * destroy_attribute_objs() - Free a kset of kobjects
+ * @kset: The kset to destroy
+ *
+ * Fress kobjects created for each attribute_name under attribute type kset
+ */
+static void destroy_attribute_objs(struct kset *kset)
+{
+ struct kobject *pos, *next;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &kset->list, entry)
+ kobject_put(pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * release_attributes_data() - Clean-up all sysfs directories and files created
+ */
+static void release_attributes_data(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+
+ exit_string_attributes();
+ exit_integer_attributes();
+ exit_enumeration_attributes();
+ exit_ordered_list_attributes();
+ exit_password_attributes();
+ exit_sure_start_attributes();
+ exit_secure_platform_attributes();
+
+ if (bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
+ destroy_attribute_objs(bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset);
+ kset_unregister(bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset);
+ bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset = NULL;
+ }
+ if (bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
+ sysfs_remove_file(&bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset->kobj, &pending_reboot.attr);
+ destroy_attribute_objs(bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset);
+ kset_unregister(bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset);
+ bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = NULL;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * hp_add_other_attributes - Initialize HP custom attributes not reported by
+ * BIOS and required to support Secure Platform, Sure Start, and Sure
+ * Admin.
+ * @attr_type: Custom HP attribute not reported by BIOS
+ *
+ * Initialiaze all 3 types of attributes: Platform, Sure Start, and Sure
+ * Admin object. Populates each attrbute types respective properties
+ * under sysfs files.
+ *
+ * Returns zero(0) if successful. Otherwise, a negative value.
+ */
+static int hp_add_other_attributes(int attr_type)
+{
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
+ int retval = 0;
+ u8 *attr_name;
+
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+
+ attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!attr_name_kobj) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_other_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if attribute type is supported */
+ switch (attr_type) {
+ case HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE:
+ attr_name_kobj->kset = bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
+ attr_name = SPM_STR;
+ break;
+
+ case HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE:
+ attr_name_kobj->kset = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
+ attr_name = SURE_START_STR;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_err("Error: Unknown attr_type: %d\n", attr_type);
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_other_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj, &attr_name_ktype,
+ NULL, "%s", attr_name);
+ if (retval) {
+ pr_err("Error encountered [%d]\n", retval);
+ kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
+ goto err_other_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ /* Populate attribute data */
+ switch (attr_type) {
+ case HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_secure_platform_data(attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+
+ case HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_sure_start_data(attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ goto err_other_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ return 0;
+
+err_other_attr_init:
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ kfree(obj);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * hp_init_bios_attributes - Initialize all attributes for a type
+ * @attr_type: The attribute type to initialize
+ * @guid: The WMI GUID associated with this type to initialize
+ *
+ * Initialiaze all 5 types of attributes: enumeration, integer,
+ * string, password, ordered list object. Populates each attrbute types
+ * respective properties under sysfs files
+ */
+static int hp_init_bios_attributes(int attr_type, const char *guid)
+{
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
+ union acpi_object *elements;
+ struct kset *tmp_set;
+ int min_elements;
+ char str[MAX_BUFF];
+
+ char *temp_str = NULL;
+ char *str_value = NULL;
+ int str_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ u8 *buffer_ptr = NULL;
+ int buffer_size;
+
+
+ /* instance_id needs to be reset for each type GUID
+ * also, instance IDs are unique within GUID but not across
+ */
+ int instance_id = 0;
+ int retval = 0;
+
+ retval = alloc_attributes_data(attr_type);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ switch (attr_type) {
+ case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
+ min_elements = 12;
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
+ min_elements = 13;
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
+ min_elements = 13;
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
+ min_elements = 12;
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
+ min_elements = 15;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("Error: Unknown attr_type: %d\n", attr_type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* need to use specific instance_id and guid combination to get right data */
+ obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(instance_id, guid);
+ if (!obj)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ while (obj) {
+ if (obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE && obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
+ pr_err("Error: Expected ACPI-package or buffer type, got: %d\n", obj->type);
+ retval = -EIO;
+ goto err_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ /* Take action appropriate to each ACPI TYPE */
+ if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE) {
+ if (obj->package.count < min_elements) {
+ pr_err("ACPI-package does not have enough elements: %d < %d\n",
+ obj->package.count, min_elements);
+ goto nextobj;
+ }
+
+ elements = obj->package.elements;
+
+ /* sanity checking */
+ if (elements[NAME].type != ACPI_TYPE_STRING) {
+ pr_debug("incorrect element type\n");
+ goto nextobj;
+ }
+ if (strlen(elements[NAME].string.pointer) == 0) {
+ pr_debug("empty attribute found\n");
+ goto nextobj;
+ }
+
+ if (attr_type == HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE)
+ tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
+ else
+ tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
+
+ /* convert attribute name to string */
+ retval = convert_hexstr_to_str(elements[NAME].string.pointer,
+ elements[NAME].string.length,
+ &str_value, &str_len);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate integer package data. Error [0%0x]\n", ret);
+ kfree(str_value);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (kset_find_obj(tmp_set, str_value)) {
+ pr_debug("Duplicate attribute name found - %s\n",
+ str_value);
+ goto nextobj;
+ }
+
+ /* build attribute */
+ attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!attr_name_kobj) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ attr_name_kobj->kset = tmp_set;
+
+ retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj, &attr_name_ktype,
+ NULL, "%s", str_value);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
+ goto err_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ /* enumerate all of these attributes */
+ switch (attr_type) {
+ case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_string_package_data(elements,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_integer_package_data(elements,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_enumeration_package_data(elements,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_ordered_list_package_data(elements,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_password_package_data(elements,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+
+ if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
+
+ buffer_size = obj->buffer.length;
+ buffer_ptr = obj->buffer.pointer;
+
+ retval = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, &buffer_size, str, MAX_BUFF);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto err_attr_init;
+
+ if (attr_type == HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE || attr_type == HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE)
+ tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
+ else
+ tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
+
+ if (kset_find_obj(tmp_set, str)) {
+ pr_warn("Duplicate attribute name found - %s\n", str);
+ goto nextobj;
+ }
+
+ /* build attribute */
+ attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!attr_name_kobj) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ attr_name_kobj->kset = tmp_set;
+
+ temp_str = str;
+ if (attr_type == HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE)
+ temp_str = "SPM";
+
+ retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj,
+ &attr_name_ktype, NULL, "%s",
+ temp_str);
+ if (retval) {
+ kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
+ goto err_attr_init;
+ }
+
+ /* enumerate all of these attributes */
+ switch (attr_type) {
+ case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_string_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
+ &buffer_size,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_integer_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
+ &buffer_size,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_enumeration_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
+ &buffer_size,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_ordered_list_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
+ &buffer_size,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
+ retval = populate_password_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
+ &buffer_size,
+ instance_id,
+ attr_name_kobj);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+nextobj:
+ kfree(str_value);
+ kfree(obj);
+ instance_id++;
+ obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(instance_id, guid);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ return 0;
+
+err_attr_init:
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ kfree(obj);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
+
+ if (!bios_capable) {
+ pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ ret = init_bios_attr_set_interface();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = init_bios_attr_pass_interface();
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface;
+
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev || !bioscfg_drv.password_attr_wdev) {
+ pr_debug("Failed to find set or pass interface\n");
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
+ }
+
+ ret = fw_attributes_class_get(&fw_attr_class);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.class_dev = device_create(fw_attr_class, NULL, MKDEV(0, 0),
+ NULL, "%s", DRIVER_NAME);
+ if (IS_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev);
+ goto err_unregister_class;
+ }
+
+ bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("attributes", NULL,
+ &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ pr_debug("Failed to create and add attributes\n");
+ goto err_destroy_classdev;
+ }
+
+ bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("authentication", NULL,
+ &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ pr_debug("Failed to create and add authentication\n");
+ goto err_release_attributes_data;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * sysfs level attributes.
+ * - pending_reboot
+ */
+ ret = create_attributes_level_sysfs_files();
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to create sysfs level attributes\n");
+
+ ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_STRING_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate string type attributes\n");
+
+ ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_INTEGER_GUID);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate integer type attributes\n");
+
+ ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_ENUMERATION_GUID);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate enumeration type attributes\n");
+
+ ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_ORDERED_LIST_GUID);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate ordered list object type attributes\n");
+
+ ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate password object type attributes\n");
+
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = NULL;
+ ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate secure platform object type attribute\n");
+
+ bioscfg_drv.sure_start_attr_kobj = NULL;
+ ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("Failed to populate sure start object type attribute\n");
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_release_attributes_data:
+ release_attributes_data();
+
+err_destroy_classdev:
+ device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
+
+err_unregister_class:
+ fw_attributes_class_put();
+
+err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface:
+ exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
+
+err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface:
+ exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit bioscfg_exit(void)
+{
+ release_attributes_data();
+ device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
+
+ fw_attributes_class_put();
+ exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
+ exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
+}
+
+module_init(bioscfg_init);
+module_exit(bioscfg_exit);
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:15

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 05/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - ordered-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c | 563 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 563 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5e5d540f728d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/ordered-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to ordered list type attributes under
+ * BIOS ORDERED LIST GUID for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+GET_INSTANCE_ID(ordered_list);
+
+static ssize_t current_value_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+
+ int instance_id = get_ordered_list_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (instance_id < 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate_ordered_list_value -
+ * Validate input of current_value against possible values
+ *
+ * @instance_id: The instance on which input is validated
+ * @buf: Input value
+ */
+static int validate_ordered_list_values(int instance_id, const char *buf)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int found = 0;
+ char *new_values = NULL;
+ char *value;
+ int elem;
+ int elem_found = 0;
+
+ /* Is it a read only attribute */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ new_values = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ /*
+ * Changes to ordered list values require checking that new
+ * values are found in the list of elements.
+ */
+ elem_found = 0;
+ while (elem_found < bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size) {
+
+ value = strsep(&new_values, ",");
+ if (value != NULL) {
+ if (!*value)
+ continue;
+ elem_found++;
+ }
+
+ found = 0;
+ for (elem = 0; elem < bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size; elem++) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements[elem], value)) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ if (!found) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_list_value;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (elem_found == bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size) {
+ pr_warn("Number of new values is not equal to number of ordered list elements (%d)\n",
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_list_value;
+ }
+
+out_list_value:
+ kfree(new_values);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate_ordered_input() -
+ * Validate input of current_value against possible values
+ *
+ * @instance_id: The instance on which input is validated
+ * @buf: Input value
+ */
+static int validate_ordered_list_input(int instance_id, const char *buf)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = validate_ordered_list_values(instance_id, buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * set pending reboot flag depending on
+ * "RequiresPhysicalPresence" value
+ */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence)
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void update_ordered_list_value(int instance_id, char *attr_value)
+{
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ attr_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value));
+}
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name_language_code, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_display_name =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_PROPERTY_STORE(current_value, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_current_val =
+ __ATTR_RW_MODE(current_value, 0644);
+
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites_size, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_prerequisites_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_prerequisites_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(elements_size, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_elements_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(elements_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_VALUES_PROPERTY_SHOW(elements, ordered_list);
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_elements_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(elements);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "ordered-list\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute ordered_list_type =
+ __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+static struct attribute *ordered_list_attrs[] = {
+ &ordered_list_display_langcode.attr,
+ &ordered_list_display_name.attr,
+ &ordered_list_current_val.attr,
+ &ordered_list_prerequisites_size_val.attr,
+ &ordered_list_prerequisites_val.attr,
+ &ordered_list_elements_val.attr,
+ &ordered_list_elements_size_val.attr,
+ &ordered_list_type.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group ordered_list_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = ordered_list_attrs,
+};
+
+int alloc_ordered_list_data(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_instances_count =
+ get_instance_count(HP_WMI_BIOS_ORDERED_LIST_GUID);
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data = kcalloc(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_instances_count,
+ sizeof(struct ordered_list_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data) {
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_instances_count = 0;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_ordered_list_package_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under ordered_list attribute
+ *
+ * @order_obj: ACPI object with ordered_list data
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_ordered_list_package_data(union acpi_object *order_obj, int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ populate_ordered_list_elements_from_package(order_obj,
+ order_obj->package.count,
+ instance_id);
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &ordered_list_current_val);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &ordered_list_attr_group);
+}
+
+/* Expected Values types associated with each element */
+static const acpi_object_type expected_order_types[] = {
+ [NAME] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [PATH] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [IS_READONLY] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [DISPLAY_IN_UI] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [SEQUENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [SECURITY_LEVEL] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [ORD_LIST_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING
+};
+
+
+int populate_ordered_list_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *order_obj,
+ int order_obj_count,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *str_value = NULL;
+ int value_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 size = 0;
+ u32 int_value;
+ int elem = 0;
+ int reqs;
+ int eloc;
+ char *tmpstr = NULL;
+ char *part_tmp = NULL;
+ int tmp_len = 0;
+ char *part = NULL;
+
+ if (!order_obj)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1, eloc = 1; elem < order_obj_count; elem++, eloc++) {
+
+ /* ONLY look at the first ORDERED_ELEM_CNT elements */
+ if (eloc == ORDERED_ELEM_CNT)
+ goto exit_list_package;
+
+ switch (order_obj[elem].type) {
+ case ACPI_TYPE_STRING:
+
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES && elem != ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(order_obj[elem].string.pointer,
+ order_obj[elem].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER:
+ int_value = (u32)order_obj[elem].integer.value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported object type [%d]\n", order_obj[elem].type);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that both expected and read object type match */
+ if (expected_order_types[eloc] != order_obj[elem].type) {
+ pr_err("Error expected type %d for elem %d, but got type %d instead\n",
+ expected_order_types[eloc], elem, order_obj[elem].type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* Assign appropriate element value to corresponding field*/
+ switch (eloc) {
+ case VALUE:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ str_value, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value));
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.path, str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. PREREQUISITES
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(order_obj[elem + reqs].string.pointer,
+ order_obj[elem + reqs].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value;
+ break;
+
+ case ORD_LIST_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_ELEMENTS_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Ordered List size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+ case ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Ordered list data is stored in hex and comma separated format
+ * Convert the data and split it to show each element
+ */
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(str_value, value_len, &tmpstr, &tmp_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto exit_list_package;
+
+ part_tmp = tmpstr;
+ part = strsep(&part_tmp, ",");
+ if (!part)
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements[0],
+ tmpstr,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements[0]));
+
+ for (elem = 1; elem < MAX_ELEMENTS_SIZE && part; elem++) {
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements[elem],
+ part,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements[elem]));
+ part = strsep(&part_tmp, ",");
+ }
+
+ kfree(tmpstr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Ordered_List attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ kfree(tmpstr);
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+
+exit_list_package:
+ kfree(tmpstr);
+ kfree(str_value);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_ordered_list_data() - Populate all properties of an
+ * instance under ordered list attribute
+ *
+ * @buffer_ptr: Buffer pointer
+ * @buffer_size: Buffer size
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ * @enum_property_count: Total properties count under ordered list type
+ */
+int populate_ordered_list_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size, int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ /* Populate ordered list elements */
+ populate_ordered_list_elements_from_buffer(buffer_ptr, buffer_size,
+ instance_id);
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &ordered_list_current_val);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &ordered_list_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_ordered_list_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char *dst = NULL;
+ int elem;
+ int reqs;
+ int integer;
+ int size = 0;
+ int values;
+ int dst_size = *buffer_size / sizeof(u16);
+
+ dst = kcalloc(dst_size, sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ elem = 0;
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1; elem < 3; elem++) {
+
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case VALUE:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ dst, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].current_value));
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.path, dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Ordered list attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ for (elem = 3; elem < ORDERED_ELEM_CNT; elem++) {
+
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES && elem != ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS) {
+ ret = get_integer_from_buffer((int **)&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, (int *)&integer);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (elem) {
+
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = integer;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = integer;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = integer;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.sequence = integer;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = integer;
+ if (integer > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // PREREQUISITES:
+ elem++;
+ size = bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ }
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].common.security_level = integer;
+ break;
+ case ORD_LIST_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size = integer;
+ if (integer > MAX_ELEMENTS_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Ordered List size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS:
+ elem++;
+ size = bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements_size;
+ for (values = 0; values < size && values < MAX_ELEMENTS_SIZE; values++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements[values],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].elements)[values]);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Ordered list attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(dst);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * exit_ordered_list_attributes() - Clear all attribute data
+ *
+ * Clears all data allocated for this group of attributes
+ */
+void exit_ordered_list_attributes(void)
+{
+ int instance_id;
+
+ for (instance_id = 0; instance_id < bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_instances_count; instance_id++) {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj = bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj;
+
+ if (attr_name_kobj)
+ sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj,
+ &ordered_list_attr_group);
+ }
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_instances_count = 0;
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data);
+ bioscfg_drv.ordered_list_data = NULL;
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:27

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 06/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - passwdobj-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c | 668 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 668 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..861fad3baed4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to password object type attributes under
+ * BIOS PASSWORD for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+#include <asm-generic/posix_types.h>
+
+GET_INSTANCE_ID(password);
+/*
+ * Clear all passwords copied to memory for a particular
+ * authentication instance
+ */
+int clear_passwords(const int instance)
+{
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].is_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password,
+ 0, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].current_password));
+ memset(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].new_password,
+ 0, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].new_password));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear all credentials copied to memory for both Power-ON and Setup
+ * BIOS instances
+ */
+int clear_all_credentials(void)
+{
+ int instance;
+
+ /* clear all passwords */
+ for (instance = 0; instance < bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count; instance++)
+ clear_passwords(instance);
+
+ /* clear auth_token */
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int get_password_instance_for_type(const char *name)
+{
+ int count = bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count;
+ int instance;
+
+ for (instance = 0; instance < count; instance++) {
+ if (strcmp(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance].common.display_name, name) == 0)
+ return instance;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int validate_password_input(int instance_id, const char *buf)
+{
+ int length;
+
+ length = strlen(buf);
+ if (buf[length-1] == '\n')
+ length--;
+
+ if (length > MAX_PASSWD_SIZE)
+ return INVALID_BIOS_AUTH;
+
+ if (bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].min_password_length > length ||
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].max_password_length < length)
+ return INVALID_BIOS_AUTH;
+ return SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int password_is_set(const char *name)
+{
+ int id;
+
+ id = get_password_instance_for_type(name);
+ if (id < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].is_enabled;
+}
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(is_enabled, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_is_password_set = __ATTR_RO(is_enabled);
+
+static ssize_t current_password_store(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ char *p, *buf_cp;
+ int id, ret = 0;
+
+ buf_cp = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf_cp) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit_password;
+ }
+
+ p = memchr(buf_cp, '\n', count);
+
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ id = get_password_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (id >= 0)
+ ret = validate_password_input(id, buf_cp);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].current_password,
+ buf_cp,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].current_password));
+ /*
+ * set pending reboot flag depending on
+ * "RequiresPhysicalPresence" value
+ */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].common.requires_physical_presence)
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+ }
+
+exit_password:
+ kfree(buf_cp);
+ return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_current_password = __ATTR_WO(current_password);
+
+static ssize_t new_password_store(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ char *p, *buf_cp = NULL;
+ int id, ret = -EIO;
+
+ buf_cp = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf_cp) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit_password;
+ }
+
+ p = memchr(buf_cp, '\n', count);
+
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ id = get_password_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (id >= 0)
+ ret = validate_password_input(id, buf_cp);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password,
+ buf_cp,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password));
+
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = hp_set_attribute(kobj->name, buf_cp);
+
+exit_password:
+ /*
+ * Regardless of the results both new and current passwords
+ * will be set to zero and avoid security issues
+ */
+ clear_passwords(id);
+
+ kfree(buf_cp);
+ return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute password_new_password = __ATTR_WO(new_password);
+
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(min_password_length, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_min_password_length = __ATTR_RO(min_password_length);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(max_password_length, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_max_password_length = __ATTR_RO(max_password_length);
+
+static ssize_t role_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ if (strcmp(kobj->name, SETUP_PASSWD) == 0)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", BIOS_ADMIN);
+
+ if (strcmp(kobj->name, POWER_ON_PASSWD) == 0)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", POWER_ON);
+
+ return -EIO;
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_role = __ATTR_RO(role);
+
+static ssize_t mechanism_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ int i = get_password_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ return i;
+
+ if (bioscfg_drv.password_data[i].mechanism != PASSWORD)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", PASSWD_MECHANISM_TYPES);
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_mechanism = __ATTR_RO(mechanism);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "password\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_type = __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_display_name =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name_language_code, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites_size, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_prerequisites_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_prerequisites_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(encodings_size, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_encodings_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(encodings_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_VALUES_PROPERTY_SHOW(encodings, password);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_encodings_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(encodings);
+
+
+static struct attribute *password_attrs[] = {
+ &password_is_password_set.attr,
+ &password_min_password_length.attr,
+ &password_max_password_length.attr,
+ &password_current_password.attr,
+ &password_new_password.attr,
+ &password_role.attr,
+ &password_mechanism.attr,
+ &password_type.attr,
+ &password_display_name.attr,
+ &password_display_langcode.attr,
+ &password_prerequisites_size_val.attr,
+ &password_prerequisites_val.attr,
+ &password_encodings_val.attr,
+ &password_encodings_size_val.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group bios_password_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = password_attrs
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group system_password_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = password_attrs
+};
+
+int alloc_password_data(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count = get_instance_count(HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID);
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data = kcalloc(bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count,
+ sizeof(struct password_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.password_data) {
+ bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count = 0;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_password_package_data -
+ * Populate all properties for an instance under password attribute
+ *
+ * @password_obj: ACPI object with password data
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_password_package_data(union acpi_object *password_obj, int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ populate_password_elements_from_package(password_obj,
+ password_obj->package.count,
+ instance_id);
+
+ if (strcmp(attr_name_kobj->name, "Setup Password") == 0) {
+ /* Save system authentication instance for easy access */
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &bios_password_attr_group);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &system_password_attr_group);
+}
+
+/* Expected Values types associated with each element */
+static const acpi_object_type expected_password_types[] = {
+ [NAME] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [PATH] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [IS_READONLY] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [DISPLAY_IN_UI] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [SEQUENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [SECURITY_LEVEL] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PSWD_MIN_LENGTH] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PSWD_MAX_LENGTH] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PSWD_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PSWD_ENCODINGS] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [PSWD_IS_SET] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER
+};
+
+
+int populate_password_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *password_obj,
+ int password_obj_count,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *str_value = NULL;
+ int value_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 size = 0;
+ u32 int_value;
+ int elem = 0;
+ int reqs;
+ int eloc;
+ int pos_values;
+
+
+ if (!password_obj)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1, eloc = 1; elem < password_obj_count; elem++, eloc++) {
+
+ /* ONLY look at the first PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT elements */
+ if (eloc == PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT)
+ goto exit_package;
+
+ switch (password_obj[elem].type) {
+ case ACPI_TYPE_STRING:
+
+ if (PREREQUISITES != elem && PSWD_ENCODINGS != elem) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(password_obj[elem].string.pointer,
+ password_obj[elem].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER:
+ int_value = (u32)password_obj[elem].integer.value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported object type [%d]\n", password_obj[elem].type);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that both expected and read object type match */
+ if (expected_password_types[eloc] != password_obj[elem].type) {
+ pr_err("Error expected type %d for elem %d, but got type %d instead\n",
+ expected_password_types[eloc], elem, password_obj[elem].type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* Assign appropriate element value to corresponding field*/
+ switch (eloc) {
+ case VALUE:
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path, str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. PREREQUISITES
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size; reqs++) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(password_obj[elem + reqs].string.pointer,
+ password_obj[elem + reqs].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value;
+ break;
+
+ case PSWD_MIN_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].min_password_length = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PSWD_MAX_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].max_password_length = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PSWD_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Password Encoding size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. PSWD_ENCODINGS
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+
+ case PSWD_ENCODINGS:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size;
+
+ for (pos_values = 0; pos_values < size && pos_values < MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE; pos_values++) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(password_obj[elem + pos_values].string.pointer,
+ password_obj[elem + pos_values].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[pos_values],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[pos_values]));
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+ case PSWD_IS_SET:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].is_enabled = int_value;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Password attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+
+exit_package:
+ kfree(str_value);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_password_buffer_data -
+ * Populate all properties for an instance under password object attribute
+ *
+ * @buffer_ptr: Buffer pointer
+ * @buffer_size: Buffer size
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_password_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size, int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ /* Populate Password attributes */
+ populate_password_elements_from_buffer(buffer_ptr, buffer_size,
+ instance_id);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+ if (strcmp(attr_name_kobj->name, "Setup Password") == 0)
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &bios_password_attr_group);
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &system_password_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_password_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char *dst = NULL;
+ int elem;
+ int reqs;
+ int integer;
+ int size = 0;
+ int values;
+ int dst_size = *buffer_size / sizeof(u16);
+
+ dst = kcalloc(dst_size, sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ elem = 0;
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1; elem < 3; elem++) {
+
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case VALUE:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].current_password,
+ dst, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].current_password));
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path, dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Password attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (elem = 3; elem < PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT; elem++) {
+
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES && elem != PSWD_ENCODINGS) {
+ ret = get_integer_from_buffer((int **)&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, (int *)&integer);
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = integer;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = integer;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = integer;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.sequence = integer;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = integer;
+ if (integer > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // PREREQUISITES:
+ elem++;
+ size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ }
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].common.security_level = integer;
+ break;
+
+ case PSWD_MIN_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].min_password_length = integer;
+ break;
+ case PSWD_MAX_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].max_password_length = integer;
+ break;
+ case PSWD_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size = integer;
+ if (integer > MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Password Encoding size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // PSWD_ENCODINGS:
+ elem++;
+ size = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings_size;
+ for (values = 0; values < size && values < MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE; values++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[values],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].encodings[values]));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case PSWD_IS_SET:
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].is_enabled = integer;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Password attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(dst);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * exit_password_attributes() - Clear all attribute data
+ *
+ * Clears all data allocated for this group of attributes
+ */
+void exit_password_attributes(void)
+{
+ int instance_id;
+
+ for (instance_id = 0; instance_id < bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count; instance_id++) {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj = bioscfg_drv.password_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj;
+
+ if (attr_name_kobj) {
+ if (strcmp(attr_name_kobj->name, SETUP_PASSWD) == 0)
+ sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj,
+ &bios_password_attr_group);
+ else
+ sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj,
+ &system_password_attr_group);
+ }
+ }
+ bioscfg_drv.password_instances_count = 0;
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.password_data);
+ bioscfg_drv.password_data = NULL;
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:33

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 08/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg-h

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h | 613 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 613 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3f7d33b1b032
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ *
+ * Definitions for kernel modules using hp_bioscfg driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _HP_BIOSCFG_H_
+#define _HP_BIOSCFG_H_
+
+#include <linux/wmi.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/nls.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+
+
+#define DRIVER_NAME "hp-bioscfg"
+
+#define MAX_BUFF 512
+#define MAX_KEY_MOD 256
+#define MAX_PASSWD_SIZE 64
+#define MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE 256
+#define MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE 20
+#define MAX_REQ_ELEM_SIZE 128
+#define MAX_VALUES_SIZE 16
+#define MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE 16
+#define MAX_ELEMENTS_SIZE 16
+
+#define SPM_STR_DESC "Secure Platform Management"
+#define SPM_STR "SPM"
+#define SURE_START_DESC "Sure Start"
+#define SURE_START_STR "Sure_Start"
+#define SETUP_PASSWD "Setup Password"
+#define POWER_ON_PASSWD "Power-On Password"
+
+#define LANG_CODE_STR "en_US.UTF-8"
+#define SCHEDULE_POWER_ON "Scheduled Power-On"
+
+/* Sure Admin Functions */
+
+#define UTF_PREFIX "<utf-16/>"
+#define BEAM_PREFIX "<BEAM/>"
+
+/* mechanism - Authentication attribute */
+
+#define MAX_MECHANISM_TYPES 3
+
+enum mechanism_values {
+ PASSWORD = 0x00,
+ NOT_PROVISION = 0x00,
+ SIGNING_KEY = 0x01,
+ ENDORSEMENT_KEY = 0x02
+};
+
+#define BIOS_ADMIN "bios-admin"
+#define POWER_ON "power-on"
+#define BIOS_SPM "enhanced-bios-auth"
+
+#define PASSWD_MECHANISM_TYPES "password"
+
+#define HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID "5FB7F034-2C63-45e9-BE91-3D44E2C707E4"
+
+#define HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID "988D08E3-68F4-4c35-AF3E-6A1B8106F83C"
+#define HP_WMI_BIOS_INTEGER_GUID "8232DE3D-663D-4327-A8F4-E293ADB9BF05"
+#define HP_WMI_BIOS_ENUMERATION_GUID "2D114B49-2DFB-4130-B8FE-4A3C09E75133"
+#define HP_WMI_BIOS_ORDERED_LIST_GUID "14EA9746-CE1F-4098-A0E0-7045CB4DA745"
+#define HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID "322F2028-0F84-4901-988E-015176049E2D"
+#define HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID "1F4C91EB-DC5C-460b-951D-C7CB9B4B8D5E"
+
+enum hp_wmi_spm_commandtype {
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE = 0x10,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_KEK = 0x11,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_SK = 0x12
+};
+
+enum hp_wmi_surestart_commandtype {
+ HPWMI_SURESTART_GET_LOG_COUNT = 0x01,
+ HPWMI_SURESTART_GET_LOG = 0x02
+};
+
+enum hp_wmi_command {
+ HPWMI_READ = 0x01,
+ HPWMI_WRITE = 0x02,
+ HPWMI_ODM = 0x03,
+ HPWMI_SURESTART = 0x20006,
+ HPWMI_GM = 0x20008,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM = 0x20010
+};
+
+struct bios_return {
+ u32 sigpass;
+ u32 return_code;
+};
+
+enum hp_return_value {
+ HPWMI_RET_WRONG_SIGNATURE = 0x02,
+ HPWMI_RET_UNKNOWN_COMMAND = 0x03,
+ HPWMI_RET_UNKNOWN_CMDTYPE = 0x04,
+ HPWMI_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS = 0x05
+};
+
+enum wmi_error_values {
+ SUCCESS = 0x00,
+ CMD_FAILED = 0x01,
+ INVALID_SIGN = 0x02,
+ INVALID_CMD_VALUE = 0x03,
+ INVALID_CMD_TYPE = 0x04,
+ INVALID_DATA_SIZE = 0x05,
+ INVALID_CMD_PARAM = 0x06,
+ ENCRYP_CMD_REQUIRED = 0x07,
+ NO_SECURE_SESSION = 0x08,
+ SECURE_SESSION_FOUND = 0x09,
+ SECURE_SESSION_FAILED = 0x0A,
+ AUTH_FAILED = 0x0B,
+ INVALID_BIOS_AUTH = 0x0E,
+ NONCE_DID_NOT_MATCH = 0x18,
+ GENERIC_ERROR = 0x1C,
+ BIOS_ADMIN_POLICY_NOT_MET = 0x28,
+ BIOS_ADMIN_NOT_SET = 0x38,
+ P21_NO_PROVISIONED = 0x1000,
+ P21_PROVISION_IN_PROGRESS = 0x1001,
+ P21_IN_USE = 0x1002,
+ HEP_NOT_ACTIVE = 0x1004,
+ HEP_ALREADY_SET = 0x1006,
+ HEP_CHECK_STATE = 0x1007
+};
+
+enum spm_features {
+ HEP_ENABLED = 0x01,
+ PLATFORM_RECOVERY = 0x02,
+ ENHANCED_BIOS_AUTH_MODE = 0x04
+};
+
+#define MAX_KEK_BLOB_SIZE 4160
+#define MAX_SK_BLOB_SIZE 516
+
+enum spm_states_values {
+ NOT_PROVISIONED = 0x00,
+ PROVISIONED = 0x01,
+ PROVISIONING_IN_PROGRESS = 0x02
+};
+
+
+
+/*
+ * struct bios_args buffer is dynamically allocated. New WMI command types
+ * were introduced that exceeds 128-byte data size. Changes to handle
+ * the data size allocation scheme were kept in hp_wmi_perform_qurey function.
+ */
+struct bios_args {
+ u32 signature;
+ u32 command;
+ u32 commandtype;
+ u32 datasize;
+ u8 data[];
+};
+
+struct secureplatform_provisioning_data {
+ u8 state;
+ u8 version[2];
+ u8 reserved1;
+ u32 features;
+ u32 nonce;
+ u8 reserved2[28];
+ u8 sk_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD];
+ u8 kek_mod[MAX_KEY_MOD];
+};
+
+struct common_data {
+ u8 display_name[MAX_BUFF];
+ u8 path[MAX_BUFF];
+ u32 is_readonly;
+ u32 display_in_ui;
+ u32 requires_physical_presence;
+ u32 sequence;
+ u32 prerequisites_size;
+ u8 prerequisites[MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE][MAX_BUFF];
+ u32 security_level;
+ u8 display_name_language_code[MAX_BUFF];
+};
+
+
+struct string_data {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ u8 current_value[MAX_BUFF];
+ u8 new_value[MAX_BUFF];
+ u32 min_length;
+ u32 max_length;
+ struct common_data common;
+};
+
+struct integer_data {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ u32 current_value;
+ u32 new_value;
+ u32 lower_bound;
+ u32 upper_bound;
+ u32 scalar_increment;
+ struct common_data common;
+};
+
+struct enumeration_data {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ u8 current_value[MAX_BUFF];
+ u8 new_value[MAX_BUFF];
+ u32 possible_values_size;
+ u8 possible_values[MAX_VALUES_SIZE][MAX_BUFF];
+ struct common_data common;
+};
+
+struct ordered_list_data {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ u8 current_value[MAX_BUFF];
+ u8 new_value[MAX_BUFF];
+ u32 elements_size;
+ u8 elements[MAX_ELEMENTS_SIZE][MAX_BUFF];
+ struct common_data common;
+};
+
+struct password_data {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ u8 current_password[MAX_PASSWD_SIZE];
+ u8 new_password[MAX_PASSWD_SIZE];
+ u32 min_password_length;
+ u32 max_password_length;
+ u32 encodings_size;
+ u8 encodings[MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE][MAX_BUFF];
+ u32 is_enabled;
+
+ // 'bios-admin' 'power-on'
+ u32 role;
+
+ //'password'
+ u32 mechanism;
+
+ struct common_data common;
+};
+
+struct secure_platform_data {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
+ u8 attribute_name[MAX_BUFF];
+ u8 display_name[MAX_BUFF];
+
+ u8 *endorsement_key;
+ u8 *signing_key;
+ u8 *auth_token;
+
+ u32 is_enabled;
+ u32 mechanism;
+};
+
+struct bioscfg_priv {
+ struct wmi_device *password_attr_wdev;
+ struct wmi_device *bios_attr_wdev;
+ struct kset *authentication_dir_kset;
+ struct kset *main_dir_kset;
+ struct device *class_dev;
+ struct string_data *string_data;
+ u32 string_instances_count;
+ struct integer_data *integer_data;
+ u32 integer_instances_count;
+ struct enumeration_data *enumeration_data;
+ u32 enumeration_instances_count;
+ struct ordered_list_data *ordered_list_data;
+ u32 ordered_list_instances_count;
+ struct password_data *password_data;
+ u32 password_instances_count;
+
+ struct kobject *sure_start_attr_kobj;
+ struct secure_platform_data spm_data;
+
+ bool pending_reboot;
+ struct mutex mutex;
+};
+
+/* global structure used by multiple WMI interfaces */
+extern struct bioscfg_priv bioscfg_drv;
+
+enum hp_wmi_data_type {
+ HPWMI_STRING_TYPE = 0x00,
+ HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE = 0x01,
+ HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE = 0x02,
+ HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE = 0x03,
+ HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE = 0x04,
+ HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE = 0x05,
+ HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE = 0x06
+};
+
+enum hp_wmi_data_elements {
+
+ /* Common elements */
+ NAME = 0,
+ VALUE = 1,
+ PATH = 2,
+ IS_READONLY = 3,
+ DISPLAY_IN_UI = 4,
+ REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE = 5,
+ SEQUENCE = 6,
+ PREREQUISITES_SIZE = 7,
+ PREREQUISITES = 8,
+ SECURITY_LEVEL = 9,
+
+ /* String elements */
+ STR_MIN_LENGTH = 10,
+ STR_MAX_LENGTH = 11,
+
+ /* Integer elements */
+ INT_LOWER_BOUND = 10,
+ INT_UPPER_BOUND = 11,
+ INT_SCALAR_INCREMENT = 12,
+
+ /* Enumeration elements */
+ ENUM_CURRENT_VALUE = 10,
+ ENUM_SIZE = 11,
+ ENUM_POSSIBLE_VALUES = 12,
+
+ /* Ordered list elements */
+ ORD_LIST_SIZE = 10,
+ ORD_LIST_ELEMENTS = 11,
+
+ /* Password elements */
+ PSWD_MIN_LENGTH = 10,
+ PSWD_MAX_LENGTH = 11,
+ PSWD_SIZE = 12,
+ PSWD_ENCODINGS = 13,
+ PSWD_IS_SET = 14
+};
+
+
+enum hp_wmi_elements_count {
+ STRING_ELEM_CNT = 12,
+ INTEGER_ELEM_CNT = 13,
+ ENUM_ELEM_CNT = 13,
+ ORDERED_ELEM_CNT = 12,
+ PASSWORD_ELEM_CNT = 15
+};
+
+#define GET_INSTANCE_ID(type) \
+ static int get_##type##_instance_id(struct kobject *kobj) \
+ { \
+ int i; \
+ \
+ for (i = 0; i <= bioscfg_drv.type##_instances_count; i++) { \
+ if (!(strcmp(kobj->name, bioscfg_drv.type##_data[i].attr_name_kobj->name))) \
+ return i; \
+ } \
+ return -EIO; \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_S_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+ char *buf) \
+ { \
+ int i = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ if (i >= 0) \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", bioscfg_drv.type##_data[i].name); \
+ return -EIO; \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+ char *buf) \
+ { \
+ int i = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ if (i >= 0) \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bioscfg_drv.type##_data[i].name); \
+ return -EIO; \
+ }
+
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_PROPERTY_STORE(curr_val, type) \
+ static ssize_t curr_val##_store(struct kobject *kobj, \
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+ const char *buf, size_t count) \
+ { \
+ char *p = NULL; \
+ char *attr_value = NULL; \
+ int i; \
+ int ret = -EIO; \
+ \
+ attr_value = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL); \
+ if (!attr_value) \
+ return -ENOMEM; \
+ \
+ p = memchr(attr_value, '\n', count); \
+ if (p != NULL) \
+ *p = '\0'; \
+ \
+ i = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ if (i >= 0) \
+ ret = validate_##type##_input(i, attr_value); \
+ if (!ret) \
+ ret = hp_set_attribute(kobj->name, attr_value); \
+ if (!ret) \
+ update_##type##_value(i, attr_value); \
+ \
+ clear_all_credentials(); \
+ kfree(attr_value); \
+ \
+ return ret ? ret : count; \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_SPM_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
+ { \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bioscfg_drv.type##_data.name); \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_SPM_S_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
+ { \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", bioscfg_drv.type##_data.name); \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_VALUES_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
+ { \
+ int i; \
+ int len = 0; \
+ int instance_id = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ \
+ if (instance_id < 0) \
+ return 0; \
+ \
+ for (i = 0; i < bioscfg_drv.type##_data[instance_id].name##_size; i++) { \
+ if (i) \
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "%s", ";"); \
+ \
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "%s", \
+ bioscfg_drv.type##_data[instance_id].name[i]); \
+ } \
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\n"); \
+ return len; \
+ }
+
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+ char *buf) \
+ { \
+ int i = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ if (i >= 0) \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", bioscfg_drv.type##_data[i].common.name); \
+ return -EIO; \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+ char *buf) \
+ { \
+ int i = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ if (i >= 0) \
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bioscfg_drv.type##_data[i].common.name); \
+ return -EIO; \
+ }
+
+#define ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(name, type) \
+ static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
+ { \
+ int i; \
+ int len = 0; \
+ int instance_id = get_##type##_instance_id(kobj); \
+ \
+ if (instance_id < 0) \
+ return 0; \
+ \
+ for (i = 0; i < bioscfg_drv.type##_data[instance_id].common.name##_size; i++) { \
+ if (i) \
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "%s", ";"); \
+ \
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "%s", \
+ bioscfg_drv.type##_data[instance_id].common.name[i]); \
+ } \
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\n"); \
+ return len; \
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+union acpi_object *get_wmiobj_pointer(int instance_id, const char *guid_string);
+int get_instance_count(const char *guid_string);
+void update_attribute_permissions(u32 isReadOnly, struct kobj_attribute *current_val);
+void friendly_user_name_update(char *path, const char *attr_name,
+ char *attr_display, int attr_size);
+int bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(int error_code);
+
+/* String attributes */
+int populate_string_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+
+int populate_string_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id);
+
+//enum hp_wmi_data_type type);
+int alloc_string_data(void);
+void exit_string_attributes(void);
+int populate_string_package_data(union acpi_object *str_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_string_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *str_obj,
+ int str_obj_count,
+ int instance_id);
+
+/* Integer attributes */
+int populate_integer_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_integer_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id);
+int alloc_integer_data(void);
+void exit_integer_attributes(void);
+int populate_integer_package_data(union acpi_object *integer_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_integer_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *integer_obj,
+ int integer_obj_count,
+ int instance_id);
+
+/* Enumeration attributes */
+int populate_enumeration_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_enumeration_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id);
+int alloc_enumeration_data(void);
+void exit_enumeration_attributes(void);
+int populate_enumeration_package_data(union acpi_object *enum_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_enumeration_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *enum_obj,
+ int enum_obj_count,
+ int instance_id);
+
+/* Ordered list */
+int populate_ordered_list_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr,
+ u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_ordered_list_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr,
+ u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id);
+int alloc_ordered_list_data(void);
+void exit_ordered_list_attributes(void);
+int populate_ordered_list_package_data(union acpi_object *order_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_ordered_list_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *order_obj,
+ int order_obj_count,
+ int instance_id);
+
+/* Password authentication attributes */
+int populate_password_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_password_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id);
+int populate_password_package_data(union acpi_object *password_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int populate_password_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *password_obj,
+ int password_obj_count,
+ int instance_id);
+int alloc_password_data(void);
+int alloc_secure_platform_data(void);
+void exit_password_attributes(void);
+void exit_secure_platform_attributes(void);
+int populate_secure_platform_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+int password_is_set(const char *auth);
+int check_spm_is_enabled(void);
+int hp_wmi_set_bios_setting(u16 *input_buffer, u32 input_size);
+int hp_wmi_perform_query(int query, enum hp_wmi_command command,
+ void *buffer, int insize, int outsize);
+int validate_password_input(int instance_id, const char *buf);
+
+/* Sure Start attributes */
+void exit_sure_start_attributes(void);
+int populate_sure_start_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj);
+
+int set_bios_defaults(u8 defType);
+int get_password_instance_for_type(const char *name);
+int clear_all_credentials(void);
+int clear_passwords(const int instance);
+void exit_bios_attr_set_interface(void);
+int init_bios_attr_set_interface(void);
+size_t bioscfg_calculate_string_buffer(const char *str);
+size_t calculate_security_buffer(const char *authentication);
+void populate_security_buffer(u16 *buffer, const char *authentication);
+int set_new_password(const char *password_type, const char *new_password);
+int init_bios_attr_pass_interface(void);
+void exit_bios_attr_pass_interface(void);
+void *ascii_to_utf16_unicode(u16 *p, const u8 *str);
+int get_integer_from_buffer(int **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, int *integer);
+int get_string_from_buffer(u8 **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, char *dst, u32 dst_size);
+int convert_hexstr_to_str(const char *input, u32 input_len, char **str, int *len);
+int encode_outsize_for_pvsz(int outsize);
+int hp_set_attribute(const char *a_name, const char *a_value);
+
+/* SPM Attributes */
+ssize_t update_spm_state(void);
+ssize_t statusbin(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+ssize_t statusbin_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+ssize_t status_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+
+#endif
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:41

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 09/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - enum-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c | 543 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 543 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..20defa92da6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/enum-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to enumeration type attributes under
+ * BIOS Enumeration GUID for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+GET_INSTANCE_ID(enumeration);
+
+static ssize_t current_value_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int instance_id = get_enumeration_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (instance_id < 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate_enumeration_input() -
+ * Validate input of current_value against possible values
+ *
+ * @instance_id: The instance on which input is validated
+ * @buf: Input value
+ */
+static int validate_enumeration_input(int instance_id, const char *buf)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int found = 0;
+ int i;
+ int possible_values;
+
+ /* Is it a read only attribute */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ possible_values = bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values_size;
+ for (i = 0; i < possible_values && !found; i++)
+ if (!strcasecmp(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values[i], buf))
+ found = 1;
+
+ if (!found) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit_enum_input;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * set pending reboot flag depending on
+ * "RequiresPhysicalPresence" value
+ */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence)
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+
+exit_enum_input:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void update_enumeration_value(int instance_id, char *attr_value)
+{
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ attr_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value));
+}
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name_language_code, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_display_name =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_PROPERTY_STORE(current_value, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_current_val =
+ __ATTR_RW_MODE(current_value, 0644);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites_size, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_prerequisites_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_prerequisites_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(possible_values_size, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_possible_values_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(possible_values_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_VALUES_PROPERTY_SHOW(possible_values, enumeration);
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_poss_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(possible_values);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "enumeration\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute enumeration_type =
+ __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+static struct attribute *enumeration_attrs[] = {
+ &enumeration_display_langcode.attr,
+ &enumeration_display_name.attr,
+ &enumeration_current_val.attr,
+ &enumeration_prerequisites_size_val.attr,
+ &enumeration_prerequisites_val.attr,
+ &enumeration_possible_values_size_val.attr,
+ &enumeration_poss_val.attr,
+ &enumeration_type.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group enumeration_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = enumeration_attrs,
+};
+
+int alloc_enumeration_data(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_instances_count =
+ get_instance_count(HP_WMI_BIOS_ENUMERATION_GUID);
+
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data = kcalloc(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_instances_count,
+ sizeof(struct enumeration_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data) {
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_instances_count = 0;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Expected Values types associated with each element */
+static const acpi_object_type expected_enum_types[] = {
+ [NAME] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [PATH] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [IS_READONLY] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [DISPLAY_IN_UI] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [SEQUENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [SECURITY_LEVEL] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [ENUM_CURRENT_VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [ENUM_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [ENUM_POSSIBLE_VALUES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING
+};
+
+/*
+ * populate_enumeration_package_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under enumeration attribute
+ *
+ * @enum_obj: ACPI object with enumeration data
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_enumeration_package_data(union acpi_object *enum_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ populate_enumeration_elements_from_package(enum_obj,
+ enum_obj->package.count,
+ instance_id);
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &enumeration_current_val);
+ /*
+ * Several attributes have names such "MONDAY". Friendly
+ * user nane is generated to make the name more descriptive
+ */
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &enumeration_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_enumeration_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *enum_obj,
+ int enum_obj_count,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *str_value = NULL;
+ int value_len;
+ u32 size = 0;
+ u32 int_value;
+ int elem = 0;
+ int reqs;
+ int pos_values;
+ int ret;
+ int eloc;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1, eloc = 1; elem < enum_obj_count; elem++, eloc++) {
+
+ /* ONLY look at the first ENUM_ELEM_CNT elements */
+ if (eloc == ENUM_ELEM_CNT)
+ goto exit_enumeration_package;
+
+ switch (enum_obj[elem].type) {
+ case ACPI_TYPE_STRING:
+
+ if (PREREQUISITES != elem && ENUM_POSSIBLE_VALUES != elem) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(enum_obj[elem].string.pointer,
+ enum_obj[elem].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER:
+ int_value = (u32)enum_obj[elem].integer.value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported object type [%d]\n", enum_obj[elem].type);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that both expected and read object type match */
+ if (expected_enum_types[eloc] != enum_obj[elem].type) {
+ pr_err("Error expected type %d for elem %d, but got type %d instead\n",
+ expected_enum_types[eloc], elem, enum_obj[elem].type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* Assign appropriate element value to corresponding field */
+ switch (eloc) {
+ case NAME:
+ case VALUE:
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.path, str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. PREREQUISITES
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+
+ case PREREQUISITES:
+
+ size = bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ if (elem >= enum_obj_count) {
+ pr_err("Error enum-objects package is too small\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(enum_obj[elem + reqs].string.pointer,
+ enum_obj[elem + reqs].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ strlcpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value;
+ break;
+
+ case ENUM_CURRENT_VALUE:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ str_value, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value));
+ break;
+ case ENUM_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_VALUES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Possible number values size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. POSSIBLE_VALUES
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+
+ case ENUM_POSSIBLE_VALUES:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values_size;
+
+ for (pos_values = 0; pos_values < size && pos_values < MAX_VALUES_SIZE; pos_values++) {
+ if (elem >= enum_obj_count) {
+ pr_err("Error enum-objects package is too small\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(enum_obj[elem + pos_values].string.pointer,
+ enum_obj[elem + pos_values].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * ignore strings when possible values size
+ * is greater than MAX_VALUES_SIZE
+ */
+ if (size < MAX_VALUES_SIZE)
+ strlcpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values[pos_values],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values[pos_values]));
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Enumeration attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+
+exit_enumeration_package:
+ kfree(str_value);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_enumeration_buffer_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under enumeration attribute
+ *
+ * @buffer_ptr: Buffer pointer
+ * @buffer_size: Buffer size
+ * @enum_obj: ACPI object with enumeration data
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ * @enumeration_property_count: Total properties count under enumeration type
+ */
+int populate_enumeration_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ /* Populate enumeration elements */
+ populate_enumeration_elements_from_buffer(buffer_ptr, buffer_size,
+ instance_id);
+
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &enumeration_current_val);
+ /*
+ * Several attributes have names such "MONDAY". A Friendlier
+ * user nane is generated to make the name more descriptive
+ */
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &enumeration_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_enumeration_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *dst = NULL;
+ int elem;
+ int reqs;
+ int integer;
+ int size = 0;
+ int values;
+ int ret;
+ int dst_size = *buffer_size / sizeof(u16);
+
+ dst = kcalloc(dst_size, sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ elem = 0;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1; elem < 3; elem++) {
+
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ /* Ignore. Zero length string values */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case VALUE:
+ /* Skip 'Value' since 'CurrentValue' is reported. */
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ dst, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Enumeration attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (elem = 3; elem < ENUM_ELEM_CNT; elem++) {
+ if (PREREQUISITES != elem && ENUM_CURRENT_VALUE != elem && ENUM_POSSIBLE_VALUES != elem) {
+ ret = get_integer_from_buffer((int **)&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, (int *)&integer);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = integer;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = integer;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = integer;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.sequence = integer;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = integer;
+ if (integer > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // PREREQUISITES:
+ elem++;
+
+ size = bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ /* Ignore. expect zero length strings at the end of prerequisite values */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ }
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].common.security_level = integer;
+ break;
+ case ENUM_CURRENT_VALUE:
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].current_value));
+ break;
+ case ENUM_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values_size = integer;
+ if (integer > MAX_VALUES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Possible size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+
+ // ENUM_POSSIBLE_VALUES:
+ elem++;
+
+ size = bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values_size;
+ for (values = 0; values < size && values < MAX_VALUES_SIZE; values++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ /* Ignore expect zero size strings at the end of all possible values */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values[values],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].possible_values[values]));
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in Enumeration attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ kfree(dst);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * exit_enumeration_attributes() - Clear all attribute data
+ *
+ * Clears all data allocated for this group of attributes
+ */
+void exit_enumeration_attributes(void)
+{
+ int instance_id;
+
+ for (instance_id = 0; instance_id < bioscfg_drv.enumeration_instances_count; instance_id++) {
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj = bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj;
+
+ if (attr_name_kobj)
+ sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj, &enumeration_attr_group);
+ }
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_instances_count = 0;
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data);
+ bioscfg_drv.enumeration_data = NULL;
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:41

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 07/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - string-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c | 451 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 451 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a14585d5506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/string-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,451 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to string type attributes under
+ * HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+#define WMI_STRING_TYPE "HPBIOS_BIOSString"
+
+GET_INSTANCE_ID(string);
+
+static ssize_t current_value_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int instance_id = get_string_instance_id(kobj);
+
+ if (instance_id < 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate_string_input() -
+ * Validate input of current_value against min and max lengths
+ *
+ * @instance_id: The instance on which input is validated
+ * @buf: Input value
+ */
+static int validate_string_input(int instance_id, const char *buf)
+{
+ int in_len = strlen(buf);
+
+ /* BIOS treats it as a read only attribute */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if ((in_len < bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].min_length) ||
+ (in_len > bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].max_length))
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ /*
+ * set pending reboot flag depending on
+ * "RequiresPhysicalPresence" value
+ */
+ if (bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence)
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void update_string_value(int instance_id, char *attr_value)
+{
+ /* Write settings to BIOS */
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ attr_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value));
+}
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name_language_code, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_S_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(display_name, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_display_name =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_PROPERTY_STORE(current_value, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_current_val =
+ __ATTR_RW_MODE(current_value, 0644);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(min_length, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_min_length =
+ __ATTR_RO(min_length);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(max_length, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_max_length =
+ __ATTR_RO(max_length);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_N_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites_size, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_prerequisites_size_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites_size);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_V_COMMON_PROPERTY_SHOW(prerequisites, string);
+static struct kobj_attribute string_prerequisites_val =
+ __ATTR_RO(prerequisites);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "string\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute string_type =
+ __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+static struct attribute *string_attrs[] = {
+ &string_display_langcode.attr,
+ &string_display_name.attr,
+ &string_current_val.attr,
+ &string_min_length.attr,
+ &string_max_length.attr,
+ &string_prerequisites_size_val.attr,
+ &string_prerequisites_val.attr,
+ &string_type.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group string_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = string_attrs,
+};
+
+int alloc_string_data(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.string_instances_count = get_instance_count(HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID);
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data = kcalloc(bioscfg_drv.string_instances_count,
+ sizeof(struct string_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.string_data) {
+ bioscfg_drv.string_instances_count = 0;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Expected Values types associated with each element */
+static const acpi_object_type expected_string_types[] = {
+ [NAME] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [VALUE] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [PATH] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [IS_READONLY] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [DISPLAY_IN_UI] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [SEQUENCE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES_SIZE] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [PREREQUISITES] = ACPI_TYPE_STRING,
+ [SECURITY_LEVEL] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [STR_MIN_LENGTH] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ [STR_MAX_LENGTH] = ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER
+};
+
+/*
+ * populate_string_package_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under string attribute
+ *
+ * @string_obj: ACPI object with string data
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_string_package_data(union acpi_object *string_obj,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ populate_string_elements_from_package(string_obj,
+ string_obj->package.count,
+ instance_id);
+
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &string_current_val);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &string_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_string_elements_from_package(union acpi_object *string_obj,
+ int string_obj_count,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ char *str_value = NULL;
+ int value_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 size = 0;
+ u32 int_value;
+ int elem = 0;
+ int reqs;
+ int eloc;
+
+ if (!string_obj)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1, eloc = 1; elem < string_obj_count; elem++, eloc++) {
+
+ /* ONLY look at the first STRING_ELEM_CNT elements */
+ if (eloc == STRING_ELEM_CNT)
+ goto exit_string_package;
+
+ switch (string_obj[elem].type) {
+ case ACPI_TYPE_STRING:
+
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES) {
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(string_obj[elem].string.pointer,
+ string_obj[elem].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER:
+ int_value = (u32)string_obj[elem].integer.value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported object type [%d]\n", string_obj[elem].type);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that both expected and read object type match */
+ if (expected_string_types[eloc] != string_obj[elem].type) {
+ pr_err("Error expected type %d for elem %d, but got type %d instead\n",
+ expected_string_types[eloc], elem, string_obj[elem].type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* Assign appropriate element value to corresponding field*/
+ switch (eloc) {
+ case VALUE:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ str_value, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value));
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.path, str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value;
+ if (size > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+ /*
+ * This HACK is needed to keep the expected
+ * element list pointing to the right obj[elem].type
+ * when the size is zero. PREREQUISITES
+ * object is omitted by BIOS when the size is
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (int_value == 0)
+ eloc++;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ if (elem >= string_obj_count) {
+ pr_err("Error elem-objects package is too small\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = convert_hexstr_to_str(string_obj[elem + reqs].string.pointer,
+ string_obj[elem + reqs].string.length,
+ &str_value, &value_len);
+
+ if (ret)
+ continue;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ str_value,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value;
+ break;
+ case STR_MIN_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].min_length = int_value;
+ break;
+ case STR_MAX_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].max_length = int_value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in String attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(str_value);
+ }
+
+exit_string_package:
+ kfree(str_value);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_string_data() -
+ * Populate all properties of an instance under string attribute
+ *
+ * @buffer_ptr: Buffer pointer
+ * @buffer_size: Buffer size
+ * @instance_id: The instance to enumerate
+ * @attr_name_kobj: The parent kernel object
+ */
+int populate_string_buffer_data(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id,
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ populate_string_elements_from_buffer(buffer_ptr, buffer_size,
+ instance_id);
+
+ update_attribute_permissions(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly,
+ &string_current_val);
+ friendly_user_name_update(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.path,
+ attr_name_kobj->name,
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name));
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &string_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_string_elements_from_buffer(u8 *buffer_ptr, u32 *buffer_size,
+ int instance_id)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char *dst = NULL;
+ int elem;
+ int reqs;
+ int int_value;
+ int size = 0;
+ int dst_size = *buffer_size / sizeof(u16);
+
+ dst = kcalloc(dst_size, sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code,
+ LANG_CODE_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_name_language_code));
+
+ for (elem = 1; elem < 3; elem++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ /* Ignore. Zero length string values */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case VALUE:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value,
+ dst, sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].current_value));
+ break;
+ case PATH:
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.path, dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.path));
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in String attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (elem = 3; elem < STRING_ELEM_CNT; elem++) {
+ if (elem != PREREQUISITES) {
+ ret = get_integer_from_buffer((int **)&buffer_ptr,
+ buffer_size,
+ (int *)&int_value);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (elem) {
+ case IS_READONLY:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.is_readonly = int_value;
+ break;
+ case DISPLAY_IN_UI:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.display_in_ui = int_value;
+ break;
+ case REQUIRES_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.requires_physical_presence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case SEQUENCE:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.sequence = int_value;
+ break;
+ case PREREQUISITES_SIZE:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size = int_value;
+ if (int_value > MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Prerequisites size value exceeded the maximum number of elements supported or data may be malformed\n");
+ break;
+
+ case PREREQUISITES:
+ size = bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites_size;
+ for (reqs = 0; reqs < size && reqs < MAX_PREREQUISITES_SIZE; reqs++) {
+ ret = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, buffer_size, dst, dst_size);
+ /* Ignore. Zero length string values */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs],
+ dst,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.prerequisites[reqs]));
+ }
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_LEVEL:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].common.security_level = int_value;
+ break;
+ case STR_MIN_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].min_length = int_value;
+ break;
+ case STR_MAX_LENGTH:
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].max_length = int_value;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Invalid element: %d found in String attribute or data may be malformed\n", elem);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(dst);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * exit_string_attributes() - Clear all attribute data
+ *
+ * Clears all data allocated for this group of attributes
+ */
+void exit_string_attributes(void)
+{
+ int instance_id;
+
+ for (instance_id = 0; instance_id < bioscfg_drv.string_instances_count; instance_id++) {
+
+ struct kobject *attr_name_kobj = bioscfg_drv.string_data[instance_id].attr_name_kobj;
+
+ if (attr_name_kobj)
+ sysfs_remove_group(attr_name_kobj, &string_attr_group);
+ }
+ bioscfg_drv.string_instances_count = 0;
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.string_data);
+ bioscfg_drv.string_data = NULL;
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:15:52

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 10/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - passwdattr-interface

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..02fc766eb3cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdattr-interface.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to SET password methods under
+ * HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID for use with hp-bioscfg driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Hewlett-Packard Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/wmi.h>
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+static int bios_attr_pass_interface_probe(struct wmi_device *wdev,
+ const void *context)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ bioscfg_drv.password_attr_wdev = wdev;
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void bios_attr_pass_interface_remove(struct wmi_device *wdev)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+ bioscfg_drv.password_attr_wdev = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
+}
+
+static const struct wmi_device_id bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] = {
+ { .guid_string = HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID },
+ { },
+};
+static struct wmi_driver bios_attr_pass_interface_driver = {
+ .driver = {
+ .name = DRIVER_NAME"-password"
+ },
+ .probe = bios_attr_pass_interface_probe,
+ .remove = bios_attr_pass_interface_remove,
+ .id_table = bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table,
+};
+
+int init_bios_attr_pass_interface(void)
+{
+ return wmi_driver_register(&bios_attr_pass_interface_driver);
+}
+
+void exit_bios_attr_pass_interface(void)
+{
+ wmi_driver_unregister(&bios_attr_pass_interface_driver);
+}
+
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(wmi, bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table);
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:16:20

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 12/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - surestart-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 130 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..43bd405403e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to sure start object type attributes under
+ * BIOS for use with hp-bioscfg driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+#include <asm-generic/posix_types.h>
+
+#define LOG_MAX_ENTRIES 254
+#define LOG_ENTRY_SIZE 16
+
+/*
+ * audit_log_entry_count_show - Reports the number of
+ * existing audit log entries available
+ * to be read
+ */
+static ssize_t audit_log_entry_count_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u32 count = 0;
+
+ ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SURESTART_GET_LOG_COUNT,
+ HPWMI_SURESTART,
+ &count, 1, sizeof(count));
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d,%d,%d\n", count, LOG_ENTRY_SIZE,
+ LOG_MAX_ENTRIES);
+}
+
+/*
+ * audit_log_entries_show() - Return all entries found in log file
+ */
+static ssize_t audit_log_entries_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+ u32 count = 0;
+
+ // Get the number of event logs
+ ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SURESTART_GET_LOG_COUNT,
+ HPWMI_SURESTART,
+ &count, 1, sizeof(count));
+
+ /*
+ * The show() api will not work if the audit logs ever go
+ * beyond 4KB
+ */
+ if (count * LOG_ENTRY_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We are guaranteed the buffer is 4KB so today all the event
+ * logs will fit
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; ((i < count) & (ret >= 0)); i++) {
+ *buf = (i + 1);
+ ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SURESTART_GET_LOG,
+ HPWMI_SURESTART,
+ buf, 1, 128);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ buf += LOG_ENTRY_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return (count * LOG_ENTRY_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute sure_start_audit_log_entry_count = __ATTR_RO(audit_log_entry_count);
+struct kobj_attribute sure_start_audit_log_entries = __ATTR_RO(audit_log_entries);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "sure-start\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute sure_start_type = __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+static ssize_t display_name_language_code_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", LANG_CODE_STR);
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute sure_start_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+
+static ssize_t display_name_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", SURE_START_DESC);
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute sure_start_display_name = __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+static struct attribute *sure_start_attrs[] = {
+ &sure_start_display_name.attr,
+ &sure_start_display_langcode.attr,
+ &sure_start_audit_log_entry_count.attr,
+ &sure_start_audit_log_entries.attr,
+ &sure_start_type.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group sure_start_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = sure_start_attrs,
+};
+
+void exit_sure_start_attributes(void)
+{
+ sysfs_remove_group(bioscfg_drv.sure_start_attr_kobj,
+ &sure_start_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_sure_start_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ bioscfg_drv.sure_start_attr_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &sure_start_attr_group);
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:16:24

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 11/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - spmobj-attributes

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
.../x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 405 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..df8e71d2eb64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Functions corresponding to secure platform management object type
+ * attributes under BIOS PASSWORD for use with hp-bioscfg driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
+ */
+
+#include "bioscfg.h"
+
+
+static const char * const spm_state_types[] = {
+ "not provisioned",
+ "provisioned",
+ "provisioning in progress"
+};
+
+static const char * const spm_mechanism_types[] = {
+ "not provision",
+ "signing-key",
+ "endorsement-key"
+};
+
+
+int check_spm_is_enabled(void)
+{
+ /* do we need to check the admin password is also configured */
+ return bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate_security_buffer() - determines size of security buffer
+ * for authentication scheme
+ *
+ * @authentication: the authentication content
+ *
+ * Currently only supported type is Admin password
+ */
+size_t calculate_security_buffer(const char *authentication)
+{
+ int size;
+
+ if (authentication != NULL && strlen(authentication) > 0) {
+
+ size = (sizeof(u16) + (strlen(authentication) * sizeof(u16)));
+ if (strncmp(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX, strlen(BEAM_PREFIX)) != 0)
+ size += (strlen(UTF_PREFIX) * sizeof(u16));
+
+ return size;
+ }
+
+ size = sizeof(u16) * 2;
+ return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * populate_security_buffer() - builds a security buffer for
+ * authentication scheme
+ *
+ * @buffer: the buffer to populate
+ * @authentication: the authentication content
+ *
+ * Currently only supported type is PLAIN TEXT
+ */
+void populate_security_buffer(u16 *buffer, const char *authentication)
+{
+ u16 *auth = buffer;
+ char *strprefix = NULL;
+
+ if (strncmp(authentication, BEAM_PREFIX, strlen(BEAM_PREFIX)) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * BEAM_PREFIX is append to buffer when a signature
+ * is provided and Sure Admin is enabled in BIOS
+ */
+ // BEAM_PREFIX found, convert part to unicode
+ auth = ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, authentication);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * UTF-16 prefix is append to the * buffer when a BIOS
+ * admin password is configured in BIOS
+ */
+
+ // append UTF_PREFIX to part and then convert it to unicode
+ strprefix = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s%s", UTF_PREFIX,
+ authentication);
+ if (!strprefix)
+ goto out_buffer;
+
+ auth = ascii_to_utf16_unicode(auth, strprefix);
+ }
+out_buffer:
+
+ kfree(strprefix);
+}
+
+ssize_t update_spm_state(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct secureplatform_provisioning_data *data = NULL;
+
+ data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto state_exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, data, 0,
+ sizeof(*data));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto state_exit;
+
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = data->state;
+ if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism)
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 1;
+
+state_exit:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t statusbin(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_GET_STATE,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM, buf, 0,
+ sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data));
+
+ return ret ? -ENODEV : sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * status_show - Reads SPM status
+ */
+ssize_t status_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute
+ *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ int ret, i;
+ struct secureplatform_provisioning_data *data = NULL;
+
+ data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct secureplatform_provisioning_data),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto status_exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = statusbin(kobj, attr, (char *)data);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto status_exit;
+
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s{\n", buf);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"State\": \"%s\",\n", buf,
+ spm_state_types[data->state]);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"Version\": \"%d.%d\",\n", buf, data->version[0],
+ data->version[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * state == 0 means secure platform management
+ * feature is not configured in BIOS.
+ */
+ if (data->state == 0)
+ goto status_exit;
+
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"Nonce\": %d,\n", buf, data->nonce);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"FeaturesInUse\": %d,\n", buf, data->features);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"EndorsementKeyMod\": \"", buf);
+
+ for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--)
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s %u", buf, data->kek_mod[i]);
+
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s \",\n", buf);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\t\"SigningKeyMod\": \"", buf);
+
+ for (i = 255; i >= 0; i--)
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s %u", buf, data->sk_mod[i]);
+
+ /* Return buf contents */
+
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s \"\n", buf);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, "%s}\n", buf);
+
+status_exit:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return strnlen(buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+struct kobj_attribute password_spm_status = __ATTR_RO(status);
+
+ATTRIBUTE_SPM_N_PROPERTY_SHOW(is_enabled, spm);
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_is_key_enabled = __ATTR_RO(is_enabled);
+
+
+static ssize_t key_mechanism_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ spm_mechanism_types[bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism]);
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_key_mechanism = __ATTR_RO(key_mechanism);
+
+static ssize_t sk_store(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int length;
+
+ length = count;
+ if (buf[length-1] == '\n')
+ length--;
+
+ /* allocate space and copy current signing key */
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit_sk;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key, buf, length);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key[length] = '\0';
+
+ /* submit signing key payload */
+ ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_SK,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM,
+ (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key,
+ length, 0);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = SIGNING_KEY;
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+ }
+
+exit_sk:
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL;
+
+ return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_signing_key = __ATTR_WO(sk);
+
+static ssize_t kek_store(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int length;
+
+ length = count;
+ if (buf[length-1] == '\n')
+ length--;
+
+ /* allocate space and copy current signing key */
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = kmalloc(length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit_kek;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key, buf, length);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key[length] = '\0';
+
+ ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM_SET_KEK,
+ HPWMI_SECUREPLATFORM,
+ (void *)bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key,
+ count, 0);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = ENDORSEMENT_KEY;
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = true;
+ }
+
+exit_kek:
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL;
+
+ return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_endorsement_key = __ATTR_WO(kek);
+
+static ssize_t display_name_language_code_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", LANG_CODE_STR);
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_display_langcode =
+ __ATTR_RO(display_name_language_code);
+
+
+static ssize_t display_name_show(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", SPM_STR_DESC);
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_display_name = __ATTR_RO(display_name);
+
+static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "secure-platform-management\n");
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_type = __ATTR_RO(type);
+
+static ssize_t role_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", BIOS_SPM);
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_role = __ATTR_RO(role);
+
+static ssize_t auth_token_store(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int length;
+
+ length = count;
+ if (buf[length-1] == '\n')
+ length--;
+
+ /* allocate space and copy current auth token */
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit_token;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token, buf, count);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token[length] = '\0';
+ return count;
+
+
+exit_token:
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+static struct kobj_attribute password_spm_auth_token = __ATTR_WO(auth_token);
+
+static struct attribute *secure_platform_attrs[] = {
+ &password_spm_display_name.attr,
+ &password_spm_display_langcode.attr,
+ &password_spm_is_key_enabled.attr,
+ &password_spm_signing_key.attr,
+ &password_spm_endorsement_key.attr,
+ &password_spm_key_mechanism.attr,
+ &password_spm_status.attr,
+ &password_spm_type.attr,
+ &password_spm_role.attr,
+ &password_spm_auth_token.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group secure_platform_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = secure_platform_attrs,
+};
+
+void exit_secure_platform_attributes(void)
+{
+ /* remove secure platform sysfs entry and free key data*/
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL;
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL;
+
+ kfree(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token);
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL;
+
+ if (bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj)
+ sysfs_remove_group(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj,
+ &secure_platform_attr_group);
+}
+
+int populate_secure_platform_data(struct kobject *attr_name_kobj)
+{
+ /* Populate data for Secure Platform Management */
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = attr_name_kobj;
+
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name, SPM_STR,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attribute_name));
+ strscpy(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.display_name, SPM_STR_DESC,
+ sizeof(bioscfg_drv.spm_data.display_name));
+
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.is_enabled = 0;
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.mechanism = 0;
+ bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot = false;
+ update_spm_state();
+
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.endorsement_key = NULL;
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = NULL;
+ bioscfg_drv.spm_data.auth_token = NULL;
+
+ return sysfs_create_group(attr_name_kobj, &secure_platform_attr_group);
+}
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:17:05

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 14/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - MAINTAINERS

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
MAINTAINERS | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 0c9011f5fc17..7d1f261af539 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -9367,6 +9367,12 @@ S: Obsolete
W: http://w1.fi/hostap-driver.html
F: drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/

+HP BIOSCFG DRIVER
+M: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>
+L: [email protected]
+S: Maintained
+F: drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/
+
HP COMPAQ TC1100 TABLET WMI EXTRAS DRIVER
L: [email protected]
S: Orphan
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 15:17:15

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile

HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
notebooks.

Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
migration to Linux environments.

The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
by the driver.

Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
management utilities and the BIOS.

HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
setting.

Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
Other published security components are under Windows.

Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

---
Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
---
drivers/platform/x86/hp/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/platform/x86/hp/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile | 13 +++++++++++++
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Kconfig b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Kconfig
index ae165955311c..7fef4f12e498 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Kconfig
@@ -60,4 +60,20 @@ config TC1100_WMI
This is a driver for the WMI extensions (wireless and bluetooth power
control) of the HP Compaq TC1100 tablet.

+config HP_BIOSCFG
+ tristate "HP BIOS Configuration Driver"
+ default m
+ depends on ACPI_WMI
+ select NLS
+ select FW_ATTR_CLASS
+ help
+ This driver enables administrators to securely manage BIOS settings
+ using digital certificates and public-key cryptography that eliminate
+ the need for passwords for both remote and local management. It supports
+ changing BIOS settings on many HP machines from 2018 and newer without
+ the use of any additional software.
+
+ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module will
+ be called hp-bioscfg.
+
endif # X86_PLATFORM_DRIVERS_HP
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Makefile b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Makefile
index db1eed4cd7c7..e4f908a61acf 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_HP_ACCEL) += hp_accel.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HP_WMI) += hp-wmi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TC1100_WMI) += tc1100-wmi.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_HP_BIOSCFG) += hp-bioscfg/
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..529eba6fa47f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_HP_BIOSCFG) := hp-bioscfg.o
+
+hp-bioscfg-objs := bioscfg.o \
+ enum-attributes.o \
+ int-attributes.o \
+ string-attributes.o \
+ passwdobj-attributes.o \
+ biosattr-interface.o \
+ passwdattr-interface.o \
+ ordered-attributes.o \
+ surestart-attributes.o \
+ spmobj-attributes.o
+
--
2.34.1

2023-04-19 18:09:47

by Armin Wolf

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

Am 19.04.23 um 17:13 schrieb Jorge Lopez:

> HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
> the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
> to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
> notebooks.
>
> Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using Windows
> Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-Based
> Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based interface
> for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
> a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
> migration to Linux environments.
>
> The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
> managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
> filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
> documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
> Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
> feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
> by the driver.
>
> Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
> Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
> management with public key cryptography. PC secure product management
> begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
> that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
> management utilities and the BIOS.
>
> HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
> behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
> To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
> be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
> string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
> setting.
>
> Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
> The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
> Other published security components are under Windows.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>
>
> ---
> Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
> ---
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c | 961 +++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 961 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
>
> diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..4b0d4f56e65f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,961 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Common methods for use with hp-bioscfg driver
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
> + */
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/wmi.h>
> +#include "bioscfg.h"
> +#include "../../firmware_attributes_class.h"
> +#include <linux/nls.h>
> +#include <linux/errno.h>
> +
> +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>");
> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HP BIOS Configuration Driver");
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> +
> +struct bioscfg_priv bioscfg_drv = {
> + .mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(bioscfg_drv.mutex),
> +};
> +
> +static struct class *fw_attr_class;
> +
> +int get_integer_from_buffer(int **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, int *integer)
> +{
> + int *ptr = PTR_ALIGN(*buffer, 4);
> +
> + /* Ensure there is enough space remaining to read the integer */
> + if (*buffer_size < sizeof(int))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + *integer = *(ptr++);
> + *buffer = ptr;
> + *buffer_size -= sizeof(int);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
> +int get_string_from_buffer(u8 **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, char *dst, u32 dst_size)
> +{
> + u16 *src = (u16 *)*buffer;
> + u16 src_size;
> +
> + u16 size;
> + int i;
> + int escape = 0;
> + int conv_dst_size;
> +
> + if (*buffer_size < sizeof(u16))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + src_size = *(src++);
> + /* size value in u16 chars */
> + size = src_size / sizeof(u16);
> +
> + /* Ensure there is enough space remaining to read and convert
> + * the string
> + */
> + if (*buffer_size < src_size)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
> + if (src[i] == '\\' ||
> + src[i] == '\r' ||
> + src[i] == '\n' ||
> + src[i] == '\t')
> + escape++;
> +
> + size += escape;
> +
> + /*
> + * Conversion is limited to destination string max number of
> + * bytes.
> + */
> + conv_dst_size = size;
> + if (size > dst_size)
> + conv_dst_size = dst_size - 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * convert from UTF-16 unicode to ASCII
> + */
> + utf16s_to_utf8s(src, src_size, UTF16_HOST_ENDIAN, dst, conv_dst_size);
> + dst[conv_dst_size] = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < size && i < conv_dst_size; i++) {
> + if (*src == '\\' ||
> + *src == '\r' ||
> + *src == '\n' ||
> + *src == '\t')
> + dst[i++] = '\\';
> +
> + if (*src == '\r')
> + dst[i] = 'r';
> + else if (*src == '\n')
> + dst[i] = 'n';
> + else if (*src == '\t')
> + dst[i] = 't';
> + else if (*src == '"')
> + dst[i] = '\'';
> + else
> + dst[i] = *src;
> + src++;
> + }
> +
> + *buffer = (u8 *)src;
> + *buffer_size -= size * sizeof(u16);
> +
> + return size;
> +}
> +
> +
> +/*
> + * calculate_string_buffer() - determines size of string buffer for use with BIOS communication
> + * @str: the string to calculate based upon
> + */
> +size_t bioscfg_calculate_string_buffer(const char *str)
> +{
> + int length = strlen(str);
> + int size;
> +
> + /* BIOS expects 4 bytes when an empty string is found */
> + if (!length)
> + length = 1;
> +
> + /* u16 length field + one UTF16 char for each input char */
> + size = sizeof(u16) + length * sizeof(u16);
> +
> + return size;
> +}
> +
> +int bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(int error_code)
> +{
> + char *error_msg = NULL;
> + int ret;
> +
> + switch (error_code) {
> + case SUCCESS:
> + error_msg = "Success";
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> + case CMD_FAILED:
> + error_msg = "Command failed";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case INVALID_SIGN:
> + error_msg = "Invalid signature";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case INVALID_CMD_VALUE:
> + error_msg = "Invalid command value/Feature not supported";
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + break;
> + case INVALID_CMD_TYPE:
> + error_msg = "Invalid command type";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case INVALID_DATA_SIZE:
> + error_msg = "Invalid data size";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case INVALID_CMD_PARAM:
> + error_msg = "Invalid command parameter";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case ENCRYP_CMD_REQUIRED:
> + error_msg = "Secure/encrypted command required";
> + ret = -EACCES;
> + break;
> + case NO_SECURE_SESSION:
> + error_msg = "No secure session established";
> + ret = -EACCES;
> + break;
> + case SECURE_SESSION_FOUND:
> + error_msg = "Secure session already established";
> + ret = -EACCES;
> + break;
> + case SECURE_SESSION_FAILED:
> + error_msg = "Secure session failed";
> + ret = -EIO;
> + break;
> + case AUTH_FAILED:
> + error_msg = "Other permission/Authentication failed";
> + ret = -EACCES;
> + break;
> + case INVALID_BIOS_AUTH:
> + error_msg = "Invalid BIOS administrator password";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case NONCE_DID_NOT_MATCH:
> + error_msg = "Nonce did not match";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case GENERIC_ERROR:
> + error_msg = "Generic/Other error";
> + ret = -EIO;
> + break;
> + case BIOS_ADMIN_POLICY_NOT_MET:
> + error_msg = "BIOS Admin password does not meet password policy requirements";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case BIOS_ADMIN_NOT_SET:
> + error_msg = "BIOS Setup password is not set.";
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + case P21_NO_PROVISIONED:
> + error_msg = "P21 is not provisioned";
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + case P21_PROVISION_IN_PROGRESS:
> + error_msg = "P21 is already provisioned or provisioning is in progress and a signing key has already been sent.";
> + ret = -EINPROGRESS;
> + break;
> + case P21_IN_USE:
> + error_msg = "P21 in use (cannot deprovision)";
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + case HEP_NOT_ACTIVE:
> + error_msg = "HEP not activated";
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + case HEP_ALREADY_SET:
> + error_msg = "HEP Transport already set";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case HEP_CHECK_STATE:
> + error_msg = "Check the current HEP state";
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + default:
> + error_msg = "Generic/Other error";
> + ret = -EIO;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (error_code)
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("Returned error 0x%x, \"%s\"\n", error_code, error_msg);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +
> +/*
> + * pending_reboot_show() - sysfs implementaton for read pending_reboot
> + * @kobj: Kernel object for this attribute
> + * @attr: Kernel object attribute
> + * @buf: The buffer to display to userspace
> + *
> + * Stores default value as 0
> + * When current_value is changed this attribute is set to 1 to notify reboot may be required
> + */
> +static ssize_t pending_reboot_show(struct kobject *kobj,
> + struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> + char *buf)
> +{
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot);
> +}
> +static struct kobj_attribute pending_reboot = __ATTR_RO(pending_reboot);
> +
> +/*
> + * create_attributes_level_sysfs_files() - Creates pending_reboot attributes
> + */
> +static int create_attributes_level_sysfs_files(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = sysfs_create_file(&bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset->kobj, &pending_reboot.attr);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
> +static void attr_name_release(struct kobject *kobj)
> +{
> + kfree(kobj);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct kobj_type attr_name_ktype = {
> + .release = attr_name_release,
> + .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops,
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * get_wmiobj_pointer() - Get Content of WMI block for particular instance
> + *
> + * @instance_id: WMI instance ID
> + * @guid_string: WMI GUID (in str form)
> + *
> + * Fetches the content for WMI block (instance_id) under GUID (guid_string)
> + * Caller must kfree the return
> + */
> +union acpi_object *get_wmiobj_pointer(int instance_id, const char *guid_string)
> +{
> + struct acpi_buffer out = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
> + acpi_status status;
> +
> + status = wmi_query_block(guid_string, instance_id, &out);
> + return ACPI_SUCCESS(status) ? (union acpi_object *)out.pointer : NULL;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * get_instance_count() - Compute total number of instances under guid_string
> + *
> + * @guid_string: WMI GUID (in string form)
> + */
> +int get_instance_count(const char *guid_string)
> +{
> + union acpi_object *wmi_obj = NULL;
> + int i = 0;
> +
> + do {
> + kfree(wmi_obj);
> + wmi_obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(i, guid_string);
> + i++;
> + } while (wmi_obj);
> +

Hi,

the instance count of a WMI object is already known to the WMI driver core,
see drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c (struct guid_block). Unfortunately, there is currently
no way for WMI drivers to access this information.
Maybe you can implement such a function instead?

> + return i-1;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * alloc_attributes_data() - Allocate attributes data for a particular type
> + *
> + * @attr_type: Attribute type to allocate
> + */
> +static int alloc_attributes_data(int attr_type)
> +{
> + int retval = 0;
> +
> + switch (attr_type) {
> + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> + retval = alloc_string_data();
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> + retval = alloc_integer_data();
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> + retval = alloc_enumeration_data();
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> + retval = alloc_ordered_list_data();
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> + retval = alloc_password_data();
> + break;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return retval;
> +}
> +
> +int convert_hexstr_to_str(const char *input, u32 input_len, char **str, int *len)
> +{
> + int ret = 0;
> + int new_len = 0;
> + char tmp[] = "0x00";
> + char *new_str = NULL;
> + long ch;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (input_len <= 0 || input == NULL || str == NULL || len == NULL)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + *len = 0;
> + *str = NULL;
> +
> + new_str = kmalloc(input_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!new_str)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < input_len; i += 5) {
> + strncpy(tmp, input + i, strlen(tmp));
> + if (kstrtol(tmp, 16, &ch) == 0) {
> + // escape char
> + if (ch == '\\' || ch == '\r' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\t') {
> + if (ch == '\r')
> + ch = 'r';
> + else if (ch == '\n')
> + ch = 'n';
> + else if (ch == '\t')
> + ch = 't';
> + new_str[new_len++] = '\\';
> + }
> + new_str[new_len++] = ch;
> + if (ch == '\0')
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (new_len) {
> + new_str[new_len] = '\0';
> + *str = krealloc(new_str, (new_len + 1) * sizeof(char), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (*str)
> + *len = new_len;
> + else
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + } else {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + if (ret)
> + kfree(new_str);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/* map output size to the corresponding WMI method id */
> +int encode_outsize_for_pvsz(int outsize)
> +{
> + if (outsize > 4096)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (outsize > 1024)
> + return 5;
> + if (outsize > 128)
> + return 4;
> + if (outsize > 4)
> + return 3;
> + if (outsize > 0)
> + return 2;
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Update friendly display name for several attributes associated to
> + * 'Schedule Power-On'
> + */
> +void friendly_user_name_update(char *path, const char *attr_name,
> + char *attr_display, int attr_size)
> +{
> + char *found = NULL;
> +
> + found = strstr(path, SCHEDULE_POWER_ON);
> + if (found)
> + snprintf(attr_display,
> + attr_size,
> + "%s - %s",
> + SCHEDULE_POWER_ON,
> + attr_name);
> + else
> + strscpy(attr_display, attr_name, attr_size);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * update_attribute_permissions() - Update attributes permissions when
> + * isReadOnly value is 1
> + *
> + * @isReadOnly: ReadOnly value
> + * @current_val: kobj_attribute corresponding to attribute.
> + *
> + */
> +void update_attribute_permissions(u32 isReadOnly, struct kobj_attribute *current_val)
> +{
> + if (isReadOnly)
> + current_val->attr.mode = (umode_t)0444;
> + else
> + current_val->attr.mode = (umode_t)0644;
> +}
> +
> +
> +/**
> + * destroy_attribute_objs() - Free a kset of kobjects
> + * @kset: The kset to destroy
> + *
> + * Fress kobjects created for each attribute_name under attribute type kset
> + */
> +static void destroy_attribute_objs(struct kset *kset)
> +{
> + struct kobject *pos, *next;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &kset->list, entry)
> + kobject_put(pos);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * release_attributes_data() - Clean-up all sysfs directories and files created
> + */
> +static void release_attributes_data(void)
> +{
> + mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> +
> + exit_string_attributes();
> + exit_integer_attributes();
> + exit_enumeration_attributes();
> + exit_ordered_list_attributes();
> + exit_password_attributes();
> + exit_sure_start_attributes();
> + exit_secure_platform_attributes();
> +
> + if (bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
> + destroy_attribute_objs(bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset);
> + kset_unregister(bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset);
> + bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset = NULL;
> + }
> + if (bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
> + sysfs_remove_file(&bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset->kobj, &pending_reboot.attr);
> + destroy_attribute_objs(bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset);
> + kset_unregister(bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset);
> + bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = NULL;
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> +}
> +
> +
> +/*
> + * hp_add_other_attributes - Initialize HP custom attributes not reported by
> + * BIOS and required to support Secure Platform, Sure Start, and Sure
> + * Admin.
> + * @attr_type: Custom HP attribute not reported by BIOS
> + *
> + * Initialiaze all 3 types of attributes: Platform, Sure Start, and Sure
> + * Admin object. Populates each attrbute types respective properties
> + * under sysfs files.
> + *
> + * Returns zero(0) if successful. Otherwise, a negative value.
> + */
> +static int hp_add_other_attributes(int attr_type)
> +{
> + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
> + union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
> + int retval = 0;
> + u8 *attr_name;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> +
> + attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!attr_name_kobj) {
> + retval = -ENOMEM;
> + goto err_other_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + /* Check if attribute type is supported */
> + switch (attr_type) {
> + case HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE:
> + attr_name_kobj->kset = bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
> + attr_name = SPM_STR;
> + break;
> +
> + case HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE:
> + attr_name_kobj->kset = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
> + attr_name = SURE_START_STR;
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + pr_err("Error: Unknown attr_type: %d\n", attr_type);
> + retval = -EINVAL;
> + goto err_other_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj, &attr_name_ktype,
> + NULL, "%s", attr_name);
> + if (retval) {
> + pr_err("Error encountered [%d]\n", retval);
> + kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
> + goto err_other_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + /* Populate attribute data */
> + switch (attr_type) {
> + case HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_secure_platform_data(attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> +
> + case HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_sure_start_data(attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + goto err_other_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> + return 0;
> +
> +err_other_attr_init:
> + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> + kfree(obj);
> + return retval;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * hp_init_bios_attributes - Initialize all attributes for a type
> + * @attr_type: The attribute type to initialize
> + * @guid: The WMI GUID associated with this type to initialize
> + *
> + * Initialiaze all 5 types of attributes: enumeration, integer,
> + * string, password, ordered list object. Populates each attrbute types
> + * respective properties under sysfs files
> + */
> +static int hp_init_bios_attributes(int attr_type, const char *guid)
> +{
> + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
> + union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
> + union acpi_object *elements;
> + struct kset *tmp_set;
> + int min_elements;
> + char str[MAX_BUFF];
> +
> + char *temp_str = NULL;
> + char *str_value = NULL;
> + int str_len;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + u8 *buffer_ptr = NULL;
> + int buffer_size;
> +
> +
> + /* instance_id needs to be reset for each type GUID
> + * also, instance IDs are unique within GUID but not across
> + */
> + int instance_id = 0;
> + int retval = 0;
> +
> + retval = alloc_attributes_data(attr_type);
> + if (retval)
> + return retval;
> +
> + switch (attr_type) {
> + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> + min_elements = 12;
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> + min_elements = 13;
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> + min_elements = 13;
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> + min_elements = 12;
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> + min_elements = 15;
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_err("Error: Unknown attr_type: %d\n", attr_type);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* need to use specific instance_id and guid combination to get right data */
> + obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(instance_id, guid);
> + if (!obj)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> + while (obj) {
> + if (obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE && obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
> + pr_err("Error: Expected ACPI-package or buffer type, got: %d\n", obj->type);
> + retval = -EIO;
> + goto err_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + /* Take action appropriate to each ACPI TYPE */
> + if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE) {
> + if (obj->package.count < min_elements) {
> + pr_err("ACPI-package does not have enough elements: %d < %d\n",
> + obj->package.count, min_elements);
> + goto nextobj;
> + }
> +
> + elements = obj->package.elements;
> +
> + /* sanity checking */
> + if (elements[NAME].type != ACPI_TYPE_STRING) {
> + pr_debug("incorrect element type\n");
> + goto nextobj;
> + }
> + if (strlen(elements[NAME].string.pointer) == 0) {
> + pr_debug("empty attribute found\n");
> + goto nextobj;
> + }
> +
> + if (attr_type == HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE)
> + tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
> + else
> + tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
> +
> + /* convert attribute name to string */
> + retval = convert_hexstr_to_str(elements[NAME].string.pointer,
> + elements[NAME].string.length,
> + &str_value, &str_len);
> +
> + if (retval) {
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate integer package data. Error [0%0x]\n", ret);
> + kfree(str_value);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + if (kset_find_obj(tmp_set, str_value)) {
> + pr_debug("Duplicate attribute name found - %s\n",
> + str_value);
> + goto nextobj;
> + }
> +
> + /* build attribute */
> + attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!attr_name_kobj) {
> + retval = -ENOMEM;
> + goto err_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + attr_name_kobj->kset = tmp_set;
> +
> + retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj, &attr_name_ktype,
> + NULL, "%s", str_value);
> +
> + if (retval) {
> + kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
> + goto err_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + /* enumerate all of these attributes */
> + switch (attr_type) {
> + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_string_package_data(elements,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_integer_package_data(elements,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_enumeration_package_data(elements,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_ordered_list_package_data(elements,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_password_package_data(elements,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + kfree(str_value);
> + }
> +
> + if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
> +
> + buffer_size = obj->buffer.length;
> + buffer_ptr = obj->buffer.pointer;
> +
> + retval = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr, &buffer_size, str, MAX_BUFF);
> + if (retval < 0)
> + goto err_attr_init;
> +
> + if (attr_type == HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE || attr_type == HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE)
> + tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
> + else
> + tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
> +
> + if (kset_find_obj(tmp_set, str)) {
> + pr_warn("Duplicate attribute name found - %s\n", str);
> + goto nextobj;
> + }
> +
> + /* build attribute */
> + attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!attr_name_kobj) {
> + retval = -ENOMEM;
> + goto err_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + attr_name_kobj->kset = tmp_set;
> +
> + temp_str = str;
> + if (attr_type == HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE)
> + temp_str = "SPM";
> +
> + retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj,
> + &attr_name_ktype, NULL, "%s",
> + temp_str);
> + if (retval) {
> + kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
> + goto err_attr_init;
> + }
> +
> + /* enumerate all of these attributes */
> + switch (attr_type) {
> + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_string_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> + &buffer_size,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_integer_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> + &buffer_size,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_enumeration_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> + &buffer_size,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_ordered_list_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> + &buffer_size,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> + retval = populate_password_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> + &buffer_size,
> + instance_id,
> + attr_name_kobj);
> + break;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +nextobj:
> + kfree(str_value);
> + kfree(obj);
> + instance_id++;
> + obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(instance_id, guid);
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> + return 0;
> +
> +err_attr_init:
> + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> + kfree(obj);
> + return retval;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret = 0;
> + int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
> +
> + if (!bios_capable) {
> + pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> +

Currently, this driver will no get automatically loaded on supported hardware,
something which would be quite beneficial for users to have.
Since the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is already handled by the hp-wmi driver, maybe this
driver (which also already implements a function similar to hp_wmi_perform_query())
could register a platform device which is then used by this driver? This together
with MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() would allow for automatically loading the module on supported hardware.

Armin Wolf

> + ret = init_bios_attr_set_interface();
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = init_bios_attr_pass_interface();
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface;
> +
> + if (!bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev || !bioscfg_drv.password_attr_wdev) {
> + pr_debug("Failed to find set or pass interface\n");
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
> + }
> +
> + ret = fw_attributes_class_get(&fw_attr_class);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
> +
> + bioscfg_drv.class_dev = device_create(fw_attr_class, NULL, MKDEV(0, 0),
> + NULL, "%s", DRIVER_NAME);
> + if (IS_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev);
> + goto err_unregister_class;
> + }
> +
> + bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("attributes", NULL,
> + &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
> + if (!bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + pr_debug("Failed to create and add attributes\n");
> + goto err_destroy_classdev;
> + }
> +
> + bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("authentication", NULL,
> + &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
> + if (!bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + pr_debug("Failed to create and add authentication\n");
> + goto err_release_attributes_data;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * sysfs level attributes.
> + * - pending_reboot
> + */
> + ret = create_attributes_level_sysfs_files();
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to create sysfs level attributes\n");
> +
> + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_STRING_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate string type attributes\n");
> +
> + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_INTEGER_GUID);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate integer type attributes\n");
> +
> + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_ENUMERATION_GUID);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate enumeration type attributes\n");
> +
> + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_ORDERED_LIST_GUID);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate ordered list object type attributes\n");
> +
> + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate password object type attributes\n");
> +
> + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = NULL;
> + ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate secure platform object type attribute\n");
> +
> + bioscfg_drv.sure_start_attr_kobj = NULL;
> + ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE);
> + if (ret)
> + pr_debug("Failed to populate sure start object type attribute\n");
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +err_release_attributes_data:
> + release_attributes_data();
> +
> +err_destroy_classdev:
> + device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
> +
> +err_unregister_class:
> + fw_attributes_class_put();
> +
> +err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface:
> + exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
> +
> +err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface:
> + exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static void __exit bioscfg_exit(void)
> +{
> + release_attributes_data();
> + device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
> +
> + fw_attributes_class_put();
> + exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
> + exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
> +}
> +
> +module_init(bioscfg_init);
> +module_exit(bioscfg_exit);

2023-04-19 21:08:25

by Mario Limonciello

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

[Public]



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Armin Wolf <[email protected]>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2023 13:04
> To: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>; [email protected];
> [email protected]; [email protected];
> [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg
>
> Am 19.04.23 um 17:13 schrieb Jorge Lopez:
>
> > HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
> > the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
> > to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
> > notebooks.
> >
> > Many features of HP Commercial notebooks can be managed using
> Windows
> > Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is an implementation of Web-
> Based
> > Enterprise Management (WBEM) that provides a standards-based
> interface
> > for changing and monitoring system settings. HP BIOSCFG driver provides
> > a native Linux solution and the exposed features facilitates the
> > migration to Linux environments.
> >
> > The Linux security features to be provided in hp-bioscfg driver enables
> > managing the BIOS settings and security solutions via sysfs, a virtual
> > filesystem that can be used by user-mode applications. The new
> > documentation cover HP-specific firmware sysfs attributes such Secure
> > Platform Management and Sure Start. Each section provides security
> > feature description and identifies sysfs directories and files exposed
> > by the driver.
> >
> > Many HP Commercial notebooks include a feature called Secure Platform
> > Management (SPM), which replaces older password-based BIOS settings
> > management with public key cryptography. PC secure product
> management
> > begins when a target system is provisioned with cryptographic keys
> > that are used to ensure the integrity of communications between system
> > management utilities and the BIOS.
> >
> > HP Commercial notebooks have several BIOS settings that control its
> > behaviour and capabilities, many of which are related to security.
> > To prevent unauthorized changes to these settings, the system can
> > be configured to use a cryptographic signature-based authorization
> > string that the BIOS will use to verify authorization to modify the
> > setting.
> >
> > Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
> > The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
> > Other published security components are under Windows.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>
> >
> > ---
> > Based on the latest platform-drivers-x86.git/for-next
> > ---
> > drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c | 961
> +++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 961 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
> b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..4b0d4f56e65f
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/bioscfg.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,961 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +/*
> > + * Common methods for use with hp-bioscfg driver
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (c) 2022 HP Development Company, L.P.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
> > +
> > +#include <linux/fs.h>
> > +#include <linux/module.h>
> > +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> > +#include <linux/wmi.h>
> > +#include "bioscfg.h"
> > +#include "../../firmware_attributes_class.h"
> > +#include <linux/nls.h>
> > +#include <linux/errno.h>
> > +
> > +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>");
> > +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HP BIOS Configuration Driver");
> > +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> > +
> > +struct bioscfg_priv bioscfg_drv = {
> > + .mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(bioscfg_drv.mutex),
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct class *fw_attr_class;
> > +
> > +int get_integer_from_buffer(int **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, int *integer)
> > +{
> > + int *ptr = PTR_ALIGN(*buffer, 4);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure there is enough space remaining to read the integer */
> > + if (*buffer_size < sizeof(int))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + *integer = *(ptr++);
> > + *buffer = ptr;
> > + *buffer_size -= sizeof(int);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +int get_string_from_buffer(u8 **buffer, u32 *buffer_size, char *dst, u32
> dst_size)
> > +{
> > + u16 *src = (u16 *)*buffer;
> > + u16 src_size;
> > +
> > + u16 size;
> > + int i;
> > + int escape = 0;
> > + int conv_dst_size;
> > +
> > + if (*buffer_size < sizeof(u16))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + src_size = *(src++);
> > + /* size value in u16 chars */
> > + size = src_size / sizeof(u16);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure there is enough space remaining to read and convert
> > + * the string
> > + */
> > + if (*buffer_size < src_size)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
> > + if (src[i] == '\\' ||
> > + src[i] == '\r' ||
> > + src[i] == '\n' ||
> > + src[i] == '\t')
> > + escape++;
> > +
> > + size += escape;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Conversion is limited to destination string max number of
> > + * bytes.
> > + */
> > + conv_dst_size = size;
> > + if (size > dst_size)
> > + conv_dst_size = dst_size - 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * convert from UTF-16 unicode to ASCII
> > + */
> > + utf16s_to_utf8s(src, src_size, UTF16_HOST_ENDIAN, dst,
> conv_dst_size);
> > + dst[conv_dst_size] = 0;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < size && i < conv_dst_size; i++) {
> > + if (*src == '\\' ||
> > + *src == '\r' ||
> > + *src == '\n' ||
> > + *src == '\t')
> > + dst[i++] = '\\';
> > +
> > + if (*src == '\r')
> > + dst[i] = 'r';
> > + else if (*src == '\n')
> > + dst[i] = 'n';
> > + else if (*src == '\t')
> > + dst[i] = 't';
> > + else if (*src == '"')
> > + dst[i] = '\'';
> > + else
> > + dst[i] = *src;
> > + src++;
> > + }
> > +
> > + *buffer = (u8 *)src;
> > + *buffer_size -= size * sizeof(u16);
> > +
> > + return size;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * calculate_string_buffer() - determines size of string buffer for use with
> BIOS communication
> > + * @str: the string to calculate based upon
> > + */
> > +size_t bioscfg_calculate_string_buffer(const char *str)
> > +{
> > + int length = strlen(str);
> > + int size;
> > +
> > + /* BIOS expects 4 bytes when an empty string is found */
> > + if (!length)
> > + length = 1;
> > +
> > + /* u16 length field + one UTF16 char for each input char */
> > + size = sizeof(u16) + length * sizeof(u16);
> > +
> > + return size;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int bioscfg_wmi_error_and_message(int error_code)
> > +{
> > + char *error_msg = NULL;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + switch (error_code) {
> > + case SUCCESS:
> > + error_msg = "Success";
> > + ret = 0;
> > + break;
> > + case CMD_FAILED:
> > + error_msg = "Command failed";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case INVALID_SIGN:
> > + error_msg = "Invalid signature";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case INVALID_CMD_VALUE:
> > + error_msg = "Invalid command value/Feature not
> supported";
> > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > + break;
> > + case INVALID_CMD_TYPE:
> > + error_msg = "Invalid command type";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case INVALID_DATA_SIZE:
> > + error_msg = "Invalid data size";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case INVALID_CMD_PARAM:
> > + error_msg = "Invalid command parameter";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case ENCRYP_CMD_REQUIRED:
> > + error_msg = "Secure/encrypted command required";
> > + ret = -EACCES;
> > + break;
> > + case NO_SECURE_SESSION:
> > + error_msg = "No secure session established";
> > + ret = -EACCES;
> > + break;
> > + case SECURE_SESSION_FOUND:
> > + error_msg = "Secure session already established";
> > + ret = -EACCES;
> > + break;
> > + case SECURE_SESSION_FAILED:
> > + error_msg = "Secure session failed";
> > + ret = -EIO;
> > + break;
> > + case AUTH_FAILED:
> > + error_msg = "Other permission/Authentication failed";
> > + ret = -EACCES;
> > + break;
> > + case INVALID_BIOS_AUTH:
> > + error_msg = "Invalid BIOS administrator password";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case NONCE_DID_NOT_MATCH:
> > + error_msg = "Nonce did not match";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case GENERIC_ERROR:
> > + error_msg = "Generic/Other error";
> > + ret = -EIO;
> > + break;
> > + case BIOS_ADMIN_POLICY_NOT_MET:
> > + error_msg = "BIOS Admin password does not meet password
> policy requirements";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case BIOS_ADMIN_NOT_SET:
> > + error_msg = "BIOS Setup password is not set.";
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + case P21_NO_PROVISIONED:
> > + error_msg = "P21 is not provisioned";
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + case P21_PROVISION_IN_PROGRESS:
> > + error_msg = "P21 is already provisioned or provisioning is in
> progress and a signing key has already been sent.";
> > + ret = -EINPROGRESS;
> > + break;
> > + case P21_IN_USE:
> > + error_msg = "P21 in use (cannot deprovision)";
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + case HEP_NOT_ACTIVE:
> > + error_msg = "HEP not activated";
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + case HEP_ALREADY_SET:
> > + error_msg = "HEP Transport already set";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + case HEP_CHECK_STATE:
> > + error_msg = "Check the current HEP state";
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + error_msg = "Generic/Other error";
> > + ret = -EIO;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (error_code)
> > + pr_warn_ratelimited("Returned error 0x%x, \"%s\"\n",
> error_code, error_msg);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * pending_reboot_show() - sysfs implementaton for read
> pending_reboot
> > + * @kobj: Kernel object for this attribute
> > + * @attr: Kernel object attribute
> > + * @buf: The buffer to display to userspace
> > + *
> > + * Stores default value as 0
> > + * When current_value is changed this attribute is set to 1 to notify reboot
> may be required
> > + */
> > +static ssize_t pending_reboot_show(struct kobject *kobj,
> > + struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> > + char *buf)
> > +{
> > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bioscfg_drv.pending_reboot);
> > +}
> > +static struct kobj_attribute pending_reboot =
> __ATTR_RO(pending_reboot);
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * create_attributes_level_sysfs_files() - Creates pending_reboot
> attributes
> > + */
> > +static int create_attributes_level_sysfs_files(void)
> > +{
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + ret = sysfs_create_file(&bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset->kobj,
> &pending_reboot.attr);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +static void attr_name_release(struct kobject *kobj)
> > +{
> > + kfree(kobj);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct kobj_type attr_name_ktype = {
> > + .release = attr_name_release,
> > + .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops,
> > +};
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * get_wmiobj_pointer() - Get Content of WMI block for particular
> instance
> > + *
> > + * @instance_id: WMI instance ID
> > + * @guid_string: WMI GUID (in str form)
> > + *
> > + * Fetches the content for WMI block (instance_id) under GUID
> (guid_string)
> > + * Caller must kfree the return
> > + */
> > +union acpi_object *get_wmiobj_pointer(int instance_id, const char
> *guid_string)
> > +{
> > + struct acpi_buffer out = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
> > + acpi_status status;
> > +
> > + status = wmi_query_block(guid_string, instance_id, &out);
> > + return ACPI_SUCCESS(status) ? (union acpi_object *)out.pointer :
> NULL;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * get_instance_count() - Compute total number of instances under
> guid_string
> > + *
> > + * @guid_string: WMI GUID (in string form)
> > + */
> > +int get_instance_count(const char *guid_string)
> > +{
> > + union acpi_object *wmi_obj = NULL;
> > + int i = 0;
> > +
> > + do {
> > + kfree(wmi_obj);
> > + wmi_obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(i, guid_string);
> > + i++;
> > + } while (wmi_obj);
> > +
>
> Hi,
>
> the instance count of a WMI object is already known to the WMI driver core,
> see drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c (struct guid_block). Unfortunately, there is
> currently
> no way for WMI drivers to access this information.
> Maybe you can implement such a function instead?
>

Such an improvement can probably also mean that the equivalent function
in the Dell driver can go too.

> > + return i-1;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * alloc_attributes_data() - Allocate attributes data for a particular type
> > + *
> > + * @attr_type: Attribute type to allocate
> > + */
> > +static int alloc_attributes_data(int attr_type)
> > +{
> > + int retval = 0;
> > +
> > + switch (attr_type) {
> > + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> > + retval = alloc_string_data();
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> > + retval = alloc_integer_data();
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> > + retval = alloc_enumeration_data();
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> > + retval = alloc_ordered_list_data();
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> > + retval = alloc_password_data();
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return retval;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int convert_hexstr_to_str(const char *input, u32 input_len, char **str, int
> *len)
> > +{
> > + int ret = 0;
> > + int new_len = 0;
> > + char tmp[] = "0x00";
> > + char *new_str = NULL;
> > + long ch;
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + if (input_len <= 0 || input == NULL || str == NULL || len == NULL)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + *len = 0;
> > + *str = NULL;
> > +
> > + new_str = kmalloc(input_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!new_str)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < input_len; i += 5) {
> > + strncpy(tmp, input + i, strlen(tmp));
> > + if (kstrtol(tmp, 16, &ch) == 0) {
> > + // escape char
> > + if (ch == '\\' || ch == '\r' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\t') {
> > + if (ch == '\r')
> > + ch = 'r';
> > + else if (ch == '\n')
> > + ch = 'n';
> > + else if (ch == '\t')
> > + ch = 't';
> > + new_str[new_len++] = '\\';
> > + }
> > + new_str[new_len++] = ch;
> > + if (ch == '\0')
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (new_len) {
> > + new_str[new_len] = '\0';
> > + *str = krealloc(new_str, (new_len + 1) * sizeof(char),
> GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (*str)
> > + *len = new_len;
> > + else
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + } else {
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (ret)
> > + kfree(new_str);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* map output size to the corresponding WMI method id */
> > +int encode_outsize_for_pvsz(int outsize)
> > +{
> > + if (outsize > 4096)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + if (outsize > 1024)
> > + return 5;
> > + if (outsize > 128)
> > + return 4;
> > + if (outsize > 4)
> > + return 3;
> > + if (outsize > 0)
> > + return 2;
> > + return 1;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Update friendly display name for several attributes associated to
> > + * 'Schedule Power-On'
> > + */
> > +void friendly_user_name_update(char *path, const char *attr_name,
> > + char *attr_display, int attr_size)
> > +{
> > + char *found = NULL;
> > +
> > + found = strstr(path, SCHEDULE_POWER_ON);
> > + if (found)
> > + snprintf(attr_display,
> > + attr_size,
> > + "%s - %s",
> > + SCHEDULE_POWER_ON,
> > + attr_name);
> > + else
> > + strscpy(attr_display, attr_name, attr_size);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * update_attribute_permissions() - Update attributes permissions when
> > + * isReadOnly value is 1
> > + *
> > + * @isReadOnly: ReadOnly value
> > + * @current_val: kobj_attribute corresponding to attribute.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +void update_attribute_permissions(u32 isReadOnly, struct kobj_attribute
> *current_val)
> > +{
> > + if (isReadOnly)
> > + current_val->attr.mode = (umode_t)0444;
> > + else
> > + current_val->attr.mode = (umode_t)0644;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * destroy_attribute_objs() - Free a kset of kobjects
> > + * @kset: The kset to destroy
> > + *
> > + * Fress kobjects created for each attribute_name under attribute type
> kset
> > + */
> > +static void destroy_attribute_objs(struct kset *kset)
> > +{
> > + struct kobject *pos, *next;
> > +
> > + list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &kset->list, entry)
> > + kobject_put(pos);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * release_attributes_data() - Clean-up all sysfs directories and files
> created
> > + */
> > +static void release_attributes_data(void)
> > +{
> > + mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > +
> > + exit_string_attributes();
> > + exit_integer_attributes();
> > + exit_enumeration_attributes();
> > + exit_ordered_list_attributes();
> > + exit_password_attributes();
> > + exit_sure_start_attributes();
> > + exit_secure_platform_attributes();
> > +
> > + if (bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
> > +
> destroy_attribute_objs(bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset);
> > + kset_unregister(bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset);
> > + bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset = NULL;
> > + }
> > + if (bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
> > + sysfs_remove_file(&bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset->kobj,
> &pending_reboot.attr);
> > + destroy_attribute_objs(bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset);
> > + kset_unregister(bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset);
> > + bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = NULL;
> > + }
> > + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * hp_add_other_attributes - Initialize HP custom attributes not reported
> by
> > + * BIOS and required to support Secure Platform, Sure Start, and Sure
> > + * Admin.
> > + * @attr_type: Custom HP attribute not reported by BIOS
> > + *
> > + * Initialiaze all 3 types of attributes: Platform, Sure Start, and Sure
> > + * Admin object. Populates each attrbute types respective properties
> > + * under sysfs files.
> > + *
> > + * Returns zero(0) if successful. Otherwise, a negative value.
> > + */
> > +static int hp_add_other_attributes(int attr_type)
> > +{
> > + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
> > + union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
> > + int retval = 0;
> > + u8 *attr_name;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > +
> > + attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!attr_name_kobj) {
> > + retval = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto err_other_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Check if attribute type is supported */
> > + switch (attr_type) {
> > + case HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE:
> > + attr_name_kobj->kset =
> bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
> > + attr_name = SPM_STR;
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE:
> > + attr_name_kobj->kset = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
> > + attr_name = SURE_START_STR;
> > + break;
> > +
> > + default:
> > + pr_err("Error: Unknown attr_type: %d\n", attr_type);
> > + retval = -EINVAL;
> > + goto err_other_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj, &attr_name_ktype,
> > + NULL, "%s", attr_name);
> > + if (retval) {
> > + pr_err("Error encountered [%d]\n", retval);
> > + kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
> > + goto err_other_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Populate attribute data */
> > + switch (attr_type) {
> > + case HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE:
> > + retval = populate_secure_platform_data(attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + case HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE:
> > + retval = populate_sure_start_data(attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > +
> > + default:
> > + goto err_other_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +err_other_attr_init:
> > + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > + kfree(obj);
> > + return retval;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * hp_init_bios_attributes - Initialize all attributes for a type
> > + * @attr_type: The attribute type to initialize
> > + * @guid: The WMI GUID associated with this type to initialize
> > + *
> > + * Initialiaze all 5 types of attributes: enumeration, integer,
> > + * string, password, ordered list object. Populates each attrbute types
> > + * respective properties under sysfs files
> > + */
> > +static int hp_init_bios_attributes(int attr_type, const char *guid)
> > +{
> > + struct kobject *attr_name_kobj;
> > + union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
> > + union acpi_object *elements;
> > + struct kset *tmp_set;
> > + int min_elements;
> > + char str[MAX_BUFF];
> > +
> > + char *temp_str = NULL;
> > + char *str_value = NULL;
> > + int str_len;
> > + int ret = 0;
> > +
> > + u8 *buffer_ptr = NULL;
> > + int buffer_size;
> > +
> > +
> > + /* instance_id needs to be reset for each type GUID
> > + * also, instance IDs are unique within GUID but not across
> > + */
> > + int instance_id = 0;
> > + int retval = 0;
> > +
> > + retval = alloc_attributes_data(attr_type);
> > + if (retval)
> > + return retval;
> > +
> > + switch (attr_type) {
> > + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> > + min_elements = 12;
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> > + min_elements = 13;
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> > + min_elements = 13;
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> > + min_elements = 12;
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> > + min_elements = 15;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + pr_err("Error: Unknown attr_type: %d\n", attr_type);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* need to use specific instance_id and guid combination to get right
> data */
> > + obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(instance_id, guid);
> > + if (!obj)
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > + while (obj) {
> > + if (obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE && obj->type !=
> ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
> > + pr_err("Error: Expected ACPI-package or buffer type,
> got: %d\n", obj->type);
> > + retval = -EIO;
> > + goto err_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Take action appropriate to each ACPI TYPE */
> > + if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE) {
> > + if (obj->package.count < min_elements) {
> > + pr_err("ACPI-package does not have enough
> elements: %d < %d\n",
> > + obj->package.count, min_elements);
> > + goto nextobj;
> > + }
> > +
> > + elements = obj->package.elements;
> > +
> > + /* sanity checking */
> > + if (elements[NAME].type != ACPI_TYPE_STRING) {
> > + pr_debug("incorrect element type\n");
> > + goto nextobj;
> > + }
> > + if (strlen(elements[NAME].string.pointer) == 0) {
> > + pr_debug("empty attribute found\n");
> > + goto nextobj;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (attr_type == HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE)
> > + tmp_set =
> bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
> > + else
> > + tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
> > +
> > + /* convert attribute name to string */
> > + retval =
> convert_hexstr_to_str(elements[NAME].string.pointer,
> > +
> elements[NAME].string.length,
> > + &str_value, &str_len);
> > +
> > + if (retval) {
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate integer
> package data. Error [0%0x]\n", ret);
> > + kfree(str_value);
> > + return ret;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (kset_find_obj(tmp_set, str_value)) {
> > + pr_debug("Duplicate attribute name found -
> %s\n",
> > + str_value);
> > + goto nextobj;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* build attribute */
> > + attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj),
> GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!attr_name_kobj) {
> > + retval = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto err_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + attr_name_kobj->kset = tmp_set;
> > +
> > + retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj,
> &attr_name_ktype,
> > + NULL, "%s", str_value);
> > +
> > + if (retval) {
> > + kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
> > + goto err_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* enumerate all of these attributes */
> > + switch (attr_type) {
> > + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_string_package_data(elements,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_integer_package_data(elements,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_enumeration_package_data(elements,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_ordered_list_package_data(elements,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_password_package_data(elements,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + kfree(str_value);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
> > +
> > + buffer_size = obj->buffer.length;
> > + buffer_ptr = obj->buffer.pointer;
> > +
> > + retval = get_string_from_buffer(&buffer_ptr,
> &buffer_size, str, MAX_BUFF);
> > + if (retval < 0)
> > + goto err_attr_init;
> > +
> > + if (attr_type == HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE ||
> attr_type == HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE)
> > + tmp_set =
> bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset;
> > + else
> > + tmp_set = bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset;
> > +
> > + if (kset_find_obj(tmp_set, str)) {
> > + pr_warn("Duplicate attribute name found -
> %s\n", str);
> > + goto nextobj;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* build attribute */
> > + attr_name_kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr_name_kobj),
> GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!attr_name_kobj) {
> > + retval = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto err_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + attr_name_kobj->kset = tmp_set;
> > +
> > + temp_str = str;
> > + if (attr_type == HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE)
> > + temp_str = "SPM";
> > +
> > + retval = kobject_init_and_add(attr_name_kobj,
> > + &attr_name_ktype, NULL,
> "%s",
> > + temp_str);
> > + if (retval) {
> > + kobject_put(attr_name_kobj);
> > + goto err_attr_init;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* enumerate all of these attributes */
> > + switch (attr_type) {
> > + case HPWMI_STRING_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_string_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> > +
> &buffer_size,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_integer_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> > +
> &buffer_size,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_enumeration_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> > +
> &buffer_size,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_ordered_list_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> > +
> &buffer_size,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + case HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE:
> > + retval =
> populate_password_buffer_data(buffer_ptr,
> > +
> &buffer_size,
> > +
> instance_id,
> > +
> attr_name_kobj);
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +nextobj:
> > + kfree(str_value);
> > + kfree(obj);
> > + instance_id++;
> > + obj = get_wmiobj_pointer(instance_id, guid);
> > + }
> > + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +err_attr_init:
> > + mutex_unlock(&bioscfg_drv.mutex);
> > + kfree(obj);
> > + return retval;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
> > +{
> > + int ret = 0;
> > + int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
> > +
> > + if (!bios_capable) {
> > + pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > + }
> > +
>
> Currently, this driver will no get automatically loaded on supported
> hardware,
> something which would be quite beneficial for users to have.
> Since the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is already handled by the hp-wmi driver,
> maybe this
> driver (which also already implements a function similar to
> hp_wmi_perform_query())
> could register a platform device which is then used by this driver? This
> together
> with MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() would allow for automatically loading the
> module on supported hardware.
>
> Armin Wolf
>
> > + ret = init_bios_attr_set_interface();
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + ret = init_bios_attr_pass_interface();
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface;
> > +
> > + if (!bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev ||
> !bioscfg_drv.password_attr_wdev) {
> > + pr_debug("Failed to find set or pass interface\n");
> > + ret = -ENODEV;
> > + goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = fw_attributes_class_get(&fw_attr_class);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
> > +
> > + bioscfg_drv.class_dev = device_create(fw_attr_class, NULL,
> MKDEV(0, 0),
> > + NULL, "%s", DRIVER_NAME);
> > + if (IS_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev);
> > + goto err_unregister_class;
> > + }
> > +
> > + bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("attributes",
> NULL,
> > +
> &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
> > + if (!bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + pr_debug("Failed to create and add attributes\n");
> > + goto err_destroy_classdev;
> > + }
> > +
> > + bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset =
> kset_create_and_add("authentication", NULL,
> > +
> &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
> > + if (!bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + pr_debug("Failed to create and add authentication\n");
> > + goto err_release_attributes_data;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * sysfs level attributes.
> > + * - pending_reboot
> > + */
> > + ret = create_attributes_level_sysfs_files();
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to create sysfs level attributes\n");
> > +
> > + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_STRING_TYPE,
> HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate string type attributes\n");
> > +
> > + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE,
> HP_WMI_BIOS_INTEGER_GUID);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate integer type attributes\n");
> > +
> > + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE,
> HP_WMI_BIOS_ENUMERATION_GUID);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate enumeration type
> attributes\n");
> > +
> > + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE,
> HP_WMI_BIOS_ORDERED_LIST_GUID);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate ordered list object type
> attributes\n");
> > +
> > + ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE,
> HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate password object type
> attributes\n");
> > +
> > + bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = NULL;
> > + ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate secure platform object type
> attribute\n");
> > +
> > + bioscfg_drv.sure_start_attr_kobj = NULL;
> > + ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE);
> > + if (ret)
> > + pr_debug("Failed to populate sure start object type
> attribute\n");
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +err_release_attributes_data:
> > + release_attributes_data();
> > +
> > +err_destroy_classdev:
> > + device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
> > +
> > +err_unregister_class:
> > + fw_attributes_class_put();
> > +
> > +err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface:
> > + exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
> > +
> > +err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface:
> > + exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __exit bioscfg_exit(void)
> > +{
> > + release_attributes_data();
> > + device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
> > +
> > + fw_attributes_class_put();
> > + exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
> > + exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
> > +}
> > +
> > +module_init(bioscfg_init);
> > +module_exit(bioscfg_exit);

2023-04-20 01:48:48

by kernel test robot

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile

Hi Jorge,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v6.3-rc7 next-20230419]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419151321.6167-14-jorge.lopez2%40hp.com
patch subject: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile
config: i386-randconfig-a015-20230417 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230420/[email protected]/config)
compiler: clang version 14.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project f28c006a5895fc0e329fe15fead81e37457cb1d1)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
git checkout cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 olddefconfig
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:141:2: warning: variable 'id' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (!buf_cp) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
#define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:169:18: note: uninitialized use occurs here
clear_passwords(id);
^~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:141:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
if (!buf_cp) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:138:8: note: initialize the variable 'id' to silence this warning
int id, ret = -EIO;
^
= 0
1 warning generated.
--
>> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:76:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (!start)
^~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
#define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:87:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
return ret;
^~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:76:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
if (!start)
^~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:72:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (!start)
^~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
#define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:87:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
return ret;
^~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:72:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
if (!start)
^~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:43:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (instance < 0)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
#define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:87:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
return ret;
^~~
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:43:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
if (instance < 0)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
#define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
^
drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:30:9: note: initialize the variable 'ret' to silence this warning
int ret;
^
= 0
3 warnings generated.


vim +141 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c

1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 132
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 133 static ssize_t new_password_store(struct kobject *kobj,
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 134 struct kobj_attribute *attr,
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 135 const char *buf, size_t count)
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 136 {
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 137 char *p, *buf_cp = NULL;
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 138 int id, ret = -EIO;
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 139
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 140 buf_cp = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 @141 if (!buf_cp) {
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 142 ret = -ENOMEM;
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 143 goto exit_password;
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 144 }
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 145
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 146 p = memchr(buf_cp, '\n', count);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 147
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 148 if (p != NULL)
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 149 *p = '\0';
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 150
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 151 id = get_password_instance_id(kobj);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 152
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 153 if (id >= 0)
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 154 ret = validate_password_input(id, buf_cp);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 155
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 156 if (!ret)
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 157 strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password,
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 158 buf_cp,
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 159 sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password));
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 160
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 161 if (!ret)
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 162 ret = hp_set_attribute(kobj->name, buf_cp);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 163
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 164 exit_password:
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 165 /*
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 166 * Regardless of the results both new and current passwords
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 167 * will be set to zero and avoid security issues
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 168 */
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 169 clear_passwords(id);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 170
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 171 kfree(buf_cp);
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 172 return ret ? ret : count;
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 173 }
1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 174

--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests

2023-04-20 04:03:22

by kernel test robot

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile

Hi Jorge,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v6.3-rc7 next-20230419]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419151321.6167-14-jorge.lopez2%40hp.com
patch subject: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile
config: i386-randconfig-s002-20230417 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230420/[email protected]/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-8) 11.3.0
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.4-39-gce1a6720-dirty
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
git checkout cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=i386 olddefconfig
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/

sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c:80:23: sparse: sparse: symbol 'sure_start_audit_log_entries' was not declared. Should it be static?
--
>> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c:191:23: sparse: sparse: symbol 'password_spm_status' was not declared. Should it be static?

--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests

2023-04-20 13:29:46

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile

Thank you for the heads up. I will look them over.

Regards,

Jorge

On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 10:57 PM kernel test robot <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi Jorge,
>
> kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
>
> [auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
> [also build test WARNING on v6.3-rc7 next-20230419]
> [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
> And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
> https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
>
> url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
> patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419151321.6167-14-jorge.lopez2%40hp.com
> patch subject: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile
> config: i386-randconfig-s002-20230417 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230420/[email protected]/config)
> compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-8) 11.3.0
> reproduce:
> # apt-get install sparse
> # sparse version: v0.6.4-39-gce1a6720-dirty
> # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
> git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
> git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
> git checkout cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
> # save the config file
> mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
> make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=i386 olddefconfig
> make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/
>
> If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
> | Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> | Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
>
> sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
> >> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/surestart-attributes.c:80:23: sparse: sparse: symbol 'sure_start_audit_log_entries' was not declared. Should it be static?
> --
> >> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/spmobj-attributes.c:191:23: sparse: sparse: symbol 'password_spm_status' was not declared. Should it be static?
>
> --
> 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
> https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests

2023-04-20 13:38:32

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile

Thank you. I will address those issues.

Regards,

Jorge

On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 8:45 PM kernel test robot <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi Jorge,
>
> kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
>
> [auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
> [also build test WARNING on v6.3-rc7 next-20230419]
> [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
> And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
> https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
>
> url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
> patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419151321.6167-14-jorge.lopez2%40hp.com
> patch subject: [PATCH v10 13/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Makefile
> config: i386-randconfig-a015-20230417 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230420/[email protected]/config)
> compiler: clang version 14.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project f28c006a5895fc0e329fe15fead81e37457cb1d1)
> reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
> wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
> chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
> # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
> git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
> git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jorge-Lopez/HP-BIOSCFG-driver-Documentation/20230419-231828
> git checkout cfbebfbd4ed15793fab894715bfd74387adcf4f1
> # save the config file
> mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
> COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 olddefconfig
> COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/
>
> If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
> | Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> | Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
>
> All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>
> >> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:141:2: warning: variable 'id' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
> if (!buf_cp) {
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
> #define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:169:18: note: uninitialized use occurs here
> clear_passwords(id);
> ^~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:141:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
> if (!buf_cp) {
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c:138:8: note: initialize the variable 'id' to silence this warning
> int id, ret = -EIO;
> ^
> = 0
> 1 warning generated.
> --
> >> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:76:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
> if (!start)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
> #define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:87:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
> return ret;
> ^~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:76:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
> if (!start)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:72:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
> if (!start)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
> #define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:87:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
> return ret;
> ^~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:72:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
> if (!start)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:43:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
> if (instance < 0)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:28: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:58:30: note: expanded from macro '__trace_if_var'
> #define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:87:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
> return ret;
> ^~~
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:43:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
> if (instance < 0)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: expanded from macro 'if'
> #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
> ^
> drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/biosattr-interface.c:30:9: note: initialize the variable 'ret' to silence this warning
> int ret;
> ^
> = 0
> 3 warnings generated.
>
>
> vim +141 drivers/platform/x86/hp/hp-bioscfg/passwdobj-attributes.c
>
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 132
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 133 static ssize_t new_password_store(struct kobject *kobj,
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 134 struct kobj_attribute *attr,
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 135 const char *buf, size_t count)
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 136 {
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 137 char *p, *buf_cp = NULL;
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 138 int id, ret = -EIO;
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 139
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 140 buf_cp = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 @141 if (!buf_cp) {
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 142 ret = -ENOMEM;
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 143 goto exit_password;
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 144 }
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 145
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 146 p = memchr(buf_cp, '\n', count);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 147
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 148 if (p != NULL)
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 149 *p = '\0';
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 150
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 151 id = get_password_instance_id(kobj);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 152
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 153 if (id >= 0)
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 154 ret = validate_password_input(id, buf_cp);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 155
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 156 if (!ret)
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 157 strscpy(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password,
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 158 buf_cp,
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 159 sizeof(bioscfg_drv.password_data[id].new_password));
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 160
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 161 if (!ret)
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 162 ret = hp_set_attribute(kobj->name, buf_cp);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 163
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 164 exit_password:
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 165 /*
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 166 * Regardless of the results both new and current passwords
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 167 * will be set to zero and avoid security issues
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 168 */
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 169 clear_passwords(id);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 170
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 171 kfree(buf_cp);
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 172 return ret ? ret : count;
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 173 }
> 1780f5eca27fb8 Jorge Lopez 2023-04-19 174
>
> --
> 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
> https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests

2023-04-21 11:39:28

by Pavel Machek

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 01/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - Documentation

Hi!

> HP BIOS Configuration driver purpose is to provide a driver supporting
> the latest sysfs class firmware attributes framework allowing the user
> to change BIOS settings and security solutions on HP Inc.’s commercial
> notebooks.

> +What: /sys/class/firmware-attributes/*/authentication/SPM/status
> +Date: March 29
> +KernelVersion: 5.18
> +Contact: "Jorge Lopez" <[email protected]>
> +Description: 'status' is a read-only file that returns ASCII text in JSON format reporting
> + the status information.
> +
> + "State": "not provisioned | provisioned | provisioning in progress ",
> + "Version": " Major. Minor ",
> + "Nonce": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>,
> + "FeaturesInUse": <16-bit unsigned number display in base 10>,
> + "EndorsementKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>",
> + "SigningKeyMod": "<256 bytes in base64>"

I don't think JSON is exactly "one value per file". This needs
different interface.

BR,
Pavel

--
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.


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2023-04-21 11:39:30

by Pavel Machek

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 02/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - biosattr-interface

Hi!

> Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
> The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
> Other published security components are under Windows.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>

> +/*
> + * ascii_to_utf16_unicode - Convert ascii string to UTF-16 unicode
> + *
> + * BIOS supports UTF-16 characters that are 2 bytes long. No variable
> + * multi-byte language supported.
> + *
> + * @p: Unicode buffer address
> + * @str: string to convert to unicode
> + *
> + * Returns a void pointer to the buffer containing unicode string
> + */
> +void *ascii_to_utf16_unicode(u16 *p, const u8 *str)
> +{

Does this need to go to library somewhere?

BR,
Pavel
--
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.


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2023-04-25 10:45:42

by Hans de Goede

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 02/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - biosattr-interface

Hi,

On 4/21/23 13:37, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
>> Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
>> The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
>> Other published security components are under Windows.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>
>
>> +/*
>> + * ascii_to_utf16_unicode - Convert ascii string to UTF-16 unicode
>> + *
>> + * BIOS supports UTF-16 characters that are 2 bytes long. No variable
>> + * multi-byte language supported.
>> + *
>> + * @p: Unicode buffer address
>> + * @str: string to convert to unicode
>> + *
>> + * Returns a void pointer to the buffer containing unicode string
>> + */
>> +void *ascii_to_utf16_unicode(u16 *p, const u8 *str)
>> +{
>
> Does this need to go to library somewhere?

This has already been discussed in earlier submissions
of the driver, the utf16 format is HP specific (prefixed
with a 16 bit le lenght, and the 0 length string needs
special encoding) so despite the name this is not generic.

It should probably be prefixed with hp_ because of this
though, to avoid potential symbol conflicts when builtin.

(and the same applies to other generic functions).

Regards,

Hans


2023-04-25 10:48:30

by Hans de Goede

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

Hi All,

On 4/19/23 20:04, Armin Wolf wrote:
> Am 19.04.23 um 17:13 schrieb Jorge Lopez:

<snip>

>> +static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
>> +{
>> +    int ret = 0;
>> +    int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
>> +
>> +    if (!bios_capable) {
>> +        pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
>> +        return -ENODEV;
>> +    }
>> +
>
> Currently, this driver will no get automatically loaded on supported hardware,
> something which would be quite beneficial for users to have.
> Since the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is already handled by the hp-wmi driver, maybe this
> driver (which also already implements a function similar to hp_wmi_perform_query())
> could register a platform device which is then used by this driver? This together
> with MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() would allow for automatically loading the module on supported hardware.

Both drivers can already co-exist since the old hp-wmi driver uses the old
wmi kernel functions and is not a "wmi_driver" so there is no need for
a platform_device for this driver to bind to since the wmi_device is
still free for it to bind to.

This does indeed need a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() statement for
the bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] id-table. Note only for that
table, because the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is present on models which do
not support this and we don't want the module to auto-load there.

Regards,

Hans




>
> Armin Wolf
>
>> +    ret = init_bios_attr_set_interface();
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        return ret;
>> +
>> +    ret = init_bios_attr_pass_interface();
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        goto err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface;
>> +
>> +    if (!bioscfg_drv.bios_attr_wdev || !bioscfg_drv.password_attr_wdev) {
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to find set or pass interface\n");
>> +        ret = -ENODEV;
>> +        goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    ret = fw_attributes_class_get(&fw_attr_class);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        goto err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface;
>> +
>> +    bioscfg_drv.class_dev = device_create(fw_attr_class, NULL, MKDEV(0, 0),
>> +                          NULL, "%s", DRIVER_NAME);
>> +    if (IS_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev)) {
>> +        ret = PTR_ERR(bioscfg_drv.class_dev);
>> +        goto err_unregister_class;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("attributes", NULL,
>> +                            &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
>> +    if (!bioscfg_drv.main_dir_kset) {
>> +        ret = -ENOMEM;
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to create and add attributes\n");
>> +        goto err_destroy_classdev;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset = kset_create_and_add("authentication", NULL,
>> +                                  &bioscfg_drv.class_dev->kobj);
>> +    if (!bioscfg_drv.authentication_dir_kset) {
>> +        ret = -ENOMEM;
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to create and add authentication\n");
>> +        goto err_release_attributes_data;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * sysfs level attributes.
>> +     * - pending_reboot
>> +     */
>> +    ret = create_attributes_level_sysfs_files();
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to create sysfs level attributes\n");
>> +
>> +    ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_STRING_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_STRING_GUID);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate string type attributes\n");
>> +
>> +    ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_INTEGER_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_INTEGER_GUID);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate integer type attributes\n");
>> +
>> +    ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ENUMERATION_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_ENUMERATION_GUID);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate enumeration type attributes\n");
>> +
>> +    ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_ORDERED_LIST_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_ORDERED_LIST_GUID);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate ordered list object type attributes\n");
>> +
>> +    ret = hp_init_bios_attributes(HPWMI_PASSWORD_TYPE, HP_WMI_BIOS_PASSWORD_GUID);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate password object type attributes\n");
>> +
>> +    bioscfg_drv.spm_data.attr_name_kobj = NULL;
>> +    ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SECURE_PLATFORM_TYPE);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate secure platform object type attribute\n");
>> +
>> +    bioscfg_drv.sure_start_attr_kobj = NULL;
>> +    ret = hp_add_other_attributes(HPWMI_SURE_START_TYPE);
>> +    if (ret)
>> +        pr_debug("Failed to populate sure start object type attribute\n");
>> +
>> +    return 0;
>> +
>> +err_release_attributes_data:
>> +    release_attributes_data();
>> +
>> +err_destroy_classdev:
>> +    device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
>> +
>> +err_unregister_class:
>> +    fw_attributes_class_put();
>> +
>> +err_exit_bios_attr_pass_interface:
>> +    exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
>> +
>> +err_exit_bios_attr_set_interface:
>> +    exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
>> +
>> +    return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __exit bioscfg_exit(void)
>> +{
>> +    release_attributes_data();
>> +    device_destroy(fw_attr_class, MKDEV(0, 0));
>> +
>> +    fw_attributes_class_put();
>> +    exit_bios_attr_set_interface();
>> +    exit_bios_attr_pass_interface();
>> +}
>> +
>> +module_init(bioscfg_init);
>> +module_exit(bioscfg_exit);
>

2023-04-25 13:48:46

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 02/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - biosattr-interface

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 5:31 AM Hans de Goede <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On 4/21/23 13:37, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > Hi!
> >
> >> Linux Security components are under development and not published yet.
> >> The only linux component is the driver (hp bioscfg) at this time.
> >> Other published security components are under Windows.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Jorge Lopez <[email protected]>
> >
> >> +/*
> >> + * ascii_to_utf16_unicode - Convert ascii string to UTF-16 unicode
> >> + *
> >> + * BIOS supports UTF-16 characters that are 2 bytes long. No variable
> >> + * multi-byte language supported.
> >> + *
> >> + * @p: Unicode buffer address
> >> + * @str: string to convert to unicode
> >> + *
> >> + * Returns a void pointer to the buffer containing unicode string
> >> + */
> >> +void *ascii_to_utf16_unicode(u16 *p, const u8 *str)
> >> +{
> >
> > Does this need to go to library somewhere?
>
> This has already been discussed in earlier submissions
> of the driver, the utf16 format is HP specific (prefixed
> with a 16 bit le lenght, and the 0 length string needs
> special encoding) so despite the name this is not generic.
>
> It should probably be prefixed with hp_ because of this
> though, to avoid potential symbol conflicts when builtin.
>
> (and the same applies to other generic functions).

I will add the prefix 'hp_' to those generic functions such
ascii_to_utf16_unicode.

>
> Regards,
>
> Hans
>
>

2023-04-25 14:33:39

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 5:34 AM Hans de Goede <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi All,
>
> On 4/19/23 20:04, Armin Wolf wrote:
> > Am 19.04.23 um 17:13 schrieb Jorge Lopez:
>
> <snip>
>
> >> +static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
> >> +{
> >> + int ret = 0;
> >> + int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
> >> +
> >> + if (!bios_capable) {
> >> + pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
> >> + return -ENODEV;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >
> > Currently, this driver will no get automatically loaded on supported hardware,
> > something which would be quite beneficial for users to have.
> > Since the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is already handled by the hp-wmi driver, maybe this
> > driver (which also already implements a function similar to hp_wmi_perform_query())
> > could register a platform device which is then used by this driver? This together
> > with MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() would allow for automatically loading the module on supported hardware.
>
> Both drivers can already co-exist since the old hp-wmi driver uses the old
> wmi kernel functions and is not a "wmi_driver" so there is no need for
> a platform_device for this driver to bind to since the wmi_device is
> still free for it to bind to.
>
> This does indeed need a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() statement for
> the bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] id-table. Note only for that
> table, because the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is present on models which do
> not support this and we don't want the module to auto-load there.
>

I am considering adding a check for the HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID
and HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID during the initialization process.
The driver will report a message If HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID is
found or not.
If HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID does not exist, the driver cannot
change the BIOS settings.

> Regards,
>
> Hans
>
>
>
>

2023-04-25 15:07:04

by Hans de Goede

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

Hi,

On 4/25/23 16:32, Jorge Lopez wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 5:34 AM Hans de Goede <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi All,
>>
>> On 4/19/23 20:04, Armin Wolf wrote:
>>> Am 19.04.23 um 17:13 schrieb Jorge Lopez:
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>>>> +static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int ret = 0;
>>>> + int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!bios_capable) {
>>>> + pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
>>>> + return -ENODEV;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>
>>> Currently, this driver will no get automatically loaded on supported hardware,
>>> something which would be quite beneficial for users to have.
>>> Since the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is already handled by the hp-wmi driver, maybe this
>>> driver (which also already implements a function similar to hp_wmi_perform_query())
>>> could register a platform device which is then used by this driver? This together
>>> with MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() would allow for automatically loading the module on supported hardware.
>>
>> Both drivers can already co-exist since the old hp-wmi driver uses the old
>> wmi kernel functions and is not a "wmi_driver" so there is no need for
>> a platform_device for this driver to bind to since the wmi_device is
>> still free for it to bind to.
>>
>> This does indeed need a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() statement for
>> the bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] id-table. Note only for that
>> table, because the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is present on models which do
>> not support this and we don't want the module to auto-load there.
>>
>
> I am considering adding a check for the HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID
> and HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID during the initialization process.
> The driver will report a message If HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID is
> found or not.
> If HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID does not exist, the driver cannot
> change the BIOS settings.

Right, adding a check for HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID to bioscfg_init()
sounds like a good idea.

That + add a a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() statement to
the bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] id-table.

Regards,

Hans


2023-04-25 18:49:36

by Jorge Lopez

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/14] HP BIOSCFG driver - bioscfg

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 9:59 AM Hans de Goede <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On 4/25/23 16:32, Jorge Lopez wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 5:34 AM Hans de Goede <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi All,
> >>
> >> On 4/19/23 20:04, Armin Wolf wrote:
> >>> Am 19.04.23 um 17:13 schrieb Jorge Lopez:
> >>
> >> <snip>
> >>
> >>>> +static int __init bioscfg_init(void)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + int ret = 0;
> >>>> + int bios_capable = wmi_has_guid(HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID);
> >>>> +
> >>>> + if (!bios_capable) {
> >>>> + pr_err("Unable to run on non-HP system\n");
> >>>> + return -ENODEV;
> >>>> + }
> >>>> +
> >>>
> >>> Currently, this driver will no get automatically loaded on supported hardware,
> >>> something which would be quite beneficial for users to have.
> >>> Since the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is already handled by the hp-wmi driver, maybe this
> >>> driver (which also already implements a function similar to hp_wmi_perform_query())
> >>> could register a platform device which is then used by this driver? This together
> >>> with MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() would allow for automatically loading the module on supported hardware.
> >>
> >> Both drivers can already co-exist since the old hp-wmi driver uses the old
> >> wmi kernel functions and is not a "wmi_driver" so there is no need for
> >> a platform_device for this driver to bind to since the wmi_device is
> >> still free for it to bind to.
> >>
> >> This does indeed need a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() statement for
> >> the bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] id-table. Note only for that
> >> table, because the HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID is present on models which do
> >> not support this and we don't want the module to auto-load there.
> >>
> >
> > I am considering adding a check for the HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID
> > and HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID during the initialization process.
> > The driver will report a message If HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID is
> > found or not.
> > If HP_WMI_SET_BIOS_SETTING_GUID does not exist, the driver cannot
> > change the BIOS settings.
>
> Right, adding a check for HP_WMI_BIOS_GUID to bioscfg_init()
> sounds like a good idea.
>
> That + add a a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() statement to
> the bios_attr_pass_interface_id_table[] id-table.
>

Will do. Thanks

> Regards,
>
> Hans
>
>