2022-07-18 00:13:36

by Jane Chu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware

With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
badrange according to 1ULL << MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(mce->misc), it's been
discovered that the mce->misc LSB field is 0x1000 bytes, hence injecting
2 back-to-back poisons and the driver ends up logging 8 badblocks,
because 0x1000 bytes is 8 512-byte.

Dan Williams noticed that apei_mce_report_mem_error() hardcode
the LSB field to PAGE_SHIFT instead of consulting the input
struct cper_sec_mem_err record. So change to rely on hardware whenever
support is available.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
index 717192915f28..a8274fd57add 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void apei_mce_report_mem_error(int severity, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err)
m.bank = -1;
/* Fake a memory read error with unknown channel */
m.status = MCI_STATUS_VAL | MCI_STATUS_EN | MCI_STATUS_ADDRV | MCI_STATUS_MISCV | 0x9f;
- m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | PAGE_SHIFT;
+ m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask);

if (severity >= GHES_SEV_RECOVERABLE)
m.status |= MCI_STATUS_UC;
--
2.18.4


2022-07-18 16:23:53

by Luck, Tony

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware

+ m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask);

Do we want to unconditionally trust the sanity of the BIOS provided physical_address_mask?

There's a warning comment on the kernel __ffs64() function:

* The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word
* is non-zero before calling this.

Otherwise, this looks like a good idea.

-Tony

2022-07-18 19:21:32

by Dan Williams

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware

Luck, Tony wrote:
> +m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask);
>
> Do we want to unconditionally trust the sanity of the BIOS provided physical_address_mask?
>
> There's a warning comment on the kernel __ffs64() function:
>
> * The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word
> * is non-zero before calling this.
>
> Otherwise, this looks like a good idea.

It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero
in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a
broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change,
so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that
->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.

2022-07-18 19:51:00

by Luck, Tony

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware

> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero
> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a
> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change,
> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that
> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.

Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it.

-Tony

2022-07-18 21:29:56

by Jane Chu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware

On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote:
>> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero
>> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a
>> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change,
>> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that
>> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.
>
> Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it.
>

Is it possible that with
if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK)
the ->physical_addr_mask is still untrustworthy?

include/ras/ras_event.h has this
if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK)
__entry->pa_mask_lsb =
(u8)__ffs64(mem->physical_addr_mask);
else
__entry->pa_mask_lsb = ~0;
which hints otherwise.

apei_mce_report_mem_error() already checks mem->validation_bits
up front.

thanks!
-jane


> -Tony

2022-07-18 22:15:47

by Luck, Tony

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/mce: retrieve poison range from hardware

On Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 09:11:33PM +0000, Jane Chu wrote:
> On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote:
> >> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero
> >> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a
> >> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change,
> >> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that
> >> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.
> >
> > Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it.
> >
>
> Is it possible that with
> if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK)
> the ->physical_addr_mask is still untrustworthy?

The validation_bits just show which fields the BIOS *says* it filled in.
If a validation bit isn't set, then Linux should certainly ignore that
field. But if it is set, then Linux needs to decide whether to use the
value, or do a sanity check first.

-Tony