From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ee0e39a63b78849f8abbef268b13e4838569f646 ]
Move is_vsyscall_vaddr() into asm/vsyscall.h to make it available for
copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() in arch/x86/mm/maccess.c.
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
index b986b2ca688a0..8154b25cb975a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/seqlock.h>
#include <uapi/asm/vsyscall.h>
+#include <asm/page_types.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
extern void map_vsyscall(void);
@@ -22,4 +23,13 @@ static inline bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
}
#endif
+/*
+ * The (legacy) vsyscall page is the long page in the kernel portion
+ * of the address space that has user-accessible permissions.
+ */
+static inline bool is_vsyscall_vaddr(unsigned long vaddr)
+{
+ return unlikely((vaddr & PAGE_MASK) == VSYSCALL_ADDR);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_VSYSCALL_H */
--
2.43.0
From: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b4ea9b6a18ebf7f9f3a7a60f82e925186978cfcf ]
iucv_path_table is a dynamically allocated array of pointers to
struct iucv_path items. Yet, its size is calculated as if it was
an array of struct iucv_path items.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/iucv/iucv.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/iucv/iucv.c b/net/iucv/iucv.c
index aacaa5119b456..da4cee91fc63d 100644
--- a/net/iucv/iucv.c
+++ b/net/iucv/iucv.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static char iucv_error_pathid[16] = "INVALID PATHID";
static LIST_HEAD(iucv_handler_list);
/*
- * iucv_path_table: an array of iucv_path structures.
+ * iucv_path_table: array of pointers to iucv_path structures.
*/
static struct iucv_path **iucv_path_table;
static unsigned long iucv_max_pathid;
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static int iucv_enable(void)
get_online_cpus();
rc = -ENOMEM;
- alloc_size = iucv_max_pathid * sizeof(struct iucv_path);
+ alloc_size = iucv_max_pathid * sizeof(*iucv_path_table);
iucv_path_table = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iucv_path_table)
goto out;
--
2.43.0
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 787f1b2800464aa277236a66eb3c279535edd460 ]
"struct bvec_iter" is defined with the __packed attribute, so it is
aligned on a single byte. On X86 (and on other architectures that support
unaligned addresses in hardware), "struct bvec_iter" is accessed using the
8-byte and 4-byte memory instructions, however these instructions are less
efficient if they operate on unaligned addresses.
(on RISC machines that don't have unaligned access in hardware, GCC
generates byte-by-byte accesses that are very inefficient - see [1])
This commit reorders the entries in "struct dm_verity_io" and "struct
convert_context", so that "struct bvec_iter" is aligned on 8 bytes.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZcLuWUNRZadJr0tQ@fedora/T/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 4 ++--
drivers/md/dm-verity.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 908bf07688275..d094dd274c461 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -46,11 +46,11 @@
struct convert_context {
struct completion restart;
struct bio *bio_in;
- struct bio *bio_out;
struct bvec_iter iter_in;
+ struct bio *bio_out;
struct bvec_iter iter_out;
- u64 cc_sector;
atomic_t cc_pending;
+ u64 cc_sector;
union {
struct skcipher_request *req;
struct aead_request *req_aead;
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
index 6e65ec0e627a6..04ef89e318564 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ struct dm_verity_io {
/* original value of bio->bi_end_io */
bio_end_io_t *orig_bi_end_io;
+ struct bvec_iter iter;
+
sector_t block;
unsigned n_blocks;
- struct bvec_iter iter;
-
struct work_struct work;
/*
--
2.43.0
From: Greg Joyce <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5429c8de56f6b2bd8f537df3a1e04e67b9c04282 ]
The SED Opal response parsing function response_parse() does not
handle the case of an empty atom in the response. This causes
the entry count to be too high and the response fails to be
parsed. Recognizing, but ignoring, empty atoms allows response
handling to succeed.
Signed-off-by: Greg Joyce <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
block/opal_proto.h | 1 +
block/sed-opal.c | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/block/opal_proto.h b/block/opal_proto.h
index e20be82588542..2456b8adc4574 100644
--- a/block/opal_proto.h
+++ b/block/opal_proto.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ enum opal_response_token {
#define SHORT_ATOM_BYTE 0xBF
#define MEDIUM_ATOM_BYTE 0xDF
#define LONG_ATOM_BYTE 0xE3
+#define EMPTY_ATOM_BYTE 0xFF
#define OPAL_INVAL_PARAM 12
#define OPAL_MANUFACTURED_INACTIVE 0x08
diff --git a/block/sed-opal.c b/block/sed-opal.c
index 9651c40e093a5..7c7cd27411541 100644
--- a/block/sed-opal.c
+++ b/block/sed-opal.c
@@ -844,16 +844,20 @@ static int response_parse(const u8 *buf, size_t length,
token_length = response_parse_medium(iter, pos);
else if (pos[0] <= LONG_ATOM_BYTE) /* long atom */
token_length = response_parse_long(iter, pos);
+ else if (pos[0] == EMPTY_ATOM_BYTE) /* empty atom */
+ token_length = 1;
else /* TOKEN */
token_length = response_parse_token(iter, pos);
if (token_length < 0)
return token_length;
+ if (pos[0] != EMPTY_ATOM_BYTE)
+ num_entries++;
+
pos += token_length;
total -= token_length;
iter++;
- num_entries++;
}
if (num_entries == 0) {
--
2.43.0
Hi!
> Move is_vsyscall_vaddr() into asm/vsyscall.h to make it available for
> copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() in arch/x86/mm/maccess.c.
This seems to be just part of a patch -- it does not move anything --
and we should not really need it for 4.19, as we don't have those
copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed changes.
Best regards,
Pavel
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/seqlock.h>
> #include <uapi/asm/vsyscall.h>
> +#include <asm/page_types.h>
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
> extern void map_vsyscall(void);
> @@ -22,4 +23,13 @@ static inline bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
> }
> #endif
>
> +/*
> + * The (legacy) vsyscall page is the long page in the kernel portion
> + * of the address space that has user-accessible permissions.
> + */
> +static inline bool is_vsyscall_vaddr(unsigned long vaddr)
> +{
> + return unlikely((vaddr & PAGE_MASK) == VSYSCALL_ADDR);
> +}
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_VSYSCALL_H */
--
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.
On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 10:12:02PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
>Hi!
>
>> Move is_vsyscall_vaddr() into asm/vsyscall.h to make it available for
>> copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() in arch/x86/mm/maccess.c.
>
>This seems to be just part of a patch -- it does not move anything --
>and we should not really need it for 4.19, as we don't have those
>copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed changes.
Yup, looks like it's not needed on <5.10.
--
Thanks,
Sasha