From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
E0 is not allowed with Level 4:
BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:
'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
not shortened'
SC enabled:
> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Page: 1/2
Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
LE Supported (Host)
Secure Connections (Host Support)
> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)
SC disabled:
> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Page: 1/2
Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
LE Supported (Host)
> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
Handle: 256
Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
---
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 20 ++++++++------------
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index cdd4f1db8670..c69309ffd40a 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -1402,11 +1402,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
else
encrypt = 0x01;
- if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
- conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
+ if (!status) {
+ if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
+ conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
- if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
- conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+ if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+ conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+ }
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index 307800fd18e6..b99b5c6de55a 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -1323,6 +1323,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
return 0;
}
+ /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
+ *
+ * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
+ * page 1319:
+ *
+ * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
+ * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
+ * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
+ * not shortened)
+ */
+ if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+ !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
+ bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
+ "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
return 0;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index cfeaee347db3..d6a1e2450696 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -3065,27 +3065,23 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
+ /* Check link security requirements are met */
+ if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
+ ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+
if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
+ /* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
+ * disconnecting.
+ */
+ hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
hci_conn_drop(conn);
goto unlock;
}
- /* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
- * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
- * combination key.
- */
- if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
- (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
- conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
- hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
- hci_conn_drop(conn);
- goto unlock;
- }
-
/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;
--
2.25.3
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27
"Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be
working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any limitation
imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to
re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
---
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 -
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 8 +++-----
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 11 ++---------
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index c69309ffd40a..13b90b5fdd3b 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -732,7 +732,6 @@ void hci_inquiry_cache_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev);
/* ----- HCI Connections ----- */
enum {
HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND,
- HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND,
HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND,
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index b99b5c6de55a..f595acf0032b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -1372,12 +1372,10 @@ static int hci_conn_auth(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type)
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_AUTH_REQUESTED,
sizeof(cp), &cp);
- /* If we're already encrypted set the REAUTH_PEND flag,
- * otherwise set the ENCRYPT_PEND.
+ /* Set the ENCRYPT_PEND to trigger encryption after
+ * authentication.
*/
- if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
- set_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
- else
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index d6a1e2450696..cfc7edcce3cd 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -2884,14 +2884,8 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!ev->status) {
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
-
- if (!hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
- test_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
- bt_dev_info(hdev, "re-auth of legacy device is not possible.");
- } else {
- set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags);
- conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
- }
+ set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags);
+ conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
} else {
if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
@@ -2900,7 +2894,6 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
- clear_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
if (!ev->status && hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn)) {
--
2.25.3
Hi Marcel,
On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Luiz Augusto von Dentz
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
>
> E0 is not allowed with Level 4:
>
> BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:
>
> '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
> required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
> SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
> not shortened'
>
> SC enabled:
>
> > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Page: 1/2
> Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
> LE Supported (Host)
> Secure Connections (Host Support)
> > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)
>
> SC disabled:
>
> > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Page: 1/2
> Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
> LE Supported (Host)
> > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
> [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
> < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
> Handle: 256
> Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
>
> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
> net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 20 ++++++++------------
> 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
> index cdd4f1db8670..c69309ffd40a 100644
> --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
> +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
> @@ -1402,11 +1402,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
> else
> encrypt = 0x01;
>
> - if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
> - conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
> + if (!status) {
> + if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
> + conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
>
> - if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
> - conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
> + if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
> + conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
> + }
>
> mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
> list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
> index 307800fd18e6..b99b5c6de55a 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
> @@ -1323,6 +1323,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
> return 0;
> }
>
> + /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
> + *
> + * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
> + * page 1319:
> + *
> + * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
> + * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
> + * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
> + * not shortened)
> + */
> + if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
> + !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
> + bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
> + "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
> !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
> return 0;
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> index cfeaee347db3..d6a1e2450696 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> @@ -3065,27 +3065,23 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
>
> + /* Check link security requirements are met */
> + if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
> + ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
> +
> if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
> if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
> set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
>
> + /* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
> + * disconnecting.
> + */
> + hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
> hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
> hci_conn_drop(conn);
> goto unlock;
> }
>
> - /* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
> - * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
> - * combination key.
> - */
> - if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
> - (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
> - conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
> - hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
> - hci_conn_drop(conn);
> - goto unlock;
> - }
> -
> /* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
> if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
> struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;
> --
> 2.25.3
Looks like we had left this behind.
--
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Luiz,
> E0 is not allowed with Level 4:
>
> BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:
>
> '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
> required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
> SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
> not shortened'
>
> SC enabled:
>
>> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Page: 1/2
> Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
> LE Supported (Host)
> Secure Connections (Host Support)
>> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)
>
> SC disabled:
>
>> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Page: 1/2
> Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
> LE Supported (Host)
>> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
> Status: Success (0x00)
> Handle: 256
> Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
> [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
> < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
> Handle: 256
> Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
>
> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
> net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 20 ++++++++------------
> 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
patch has been applied to bluetooth-next tree.
Regards
Marcel
On Wed, 2020-05-20 at 14:20 -0700, Luiz Augusto von Dentz wrote:
> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
>
> This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27
> "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be
> working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any
> limitation
> imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to
> re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Looks like this fell through the cracks, do you want me to rebase and
re-send it?
Hi Bastien,
On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 7:02 AM Bastien Nocera <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2020-05-20 at 14:20 -0700, Luiz Augusto von Dentz wrote:
> > From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
> >
> > This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27
> > "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be
> > working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any
> > limitation
> > imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to
> > re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
>
> Looks like this fell through the cracks, do you want me to rebase and
> re-send it?
Yeah, please resend so we get the CI to test it doesn't break anything.
--
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
On Thu, 2023-11-30 at 08:43 -0500, Luiz Augusto von Dentz wrote:
> Hi Bastien,
>
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 7:02 AM Bastien Nocera <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 2020-05-20 at 14:20 -0700, Luiz Augusto von Dentz wrote:
> > > From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27
> > > "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems
> > > to be
> > > working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any
> > > limitation
> > > imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible
> > > to
> > > re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
> >
> > Looks like this fell through the cracks, do you want me to rebase
> > and
> > re-send it?
>
> Yeah, please resend so we get the CI to test it doesn't break
> anything.
Done.
Cheers